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This thesis entitled A Study of the Late Madhyamaka Doxography concerns the 
classification of the Indian Madhyamaka. Our studies of the Indian Madhyamaka 
classification have largely depended on Tibetan doxographical texts, such as Grub 
mtha'. While these Tibetan accounts systematically. exhibit its bifurcation, neither do 
they always agree to each other, nor always reflect the realities in India. 
In the first chapter, therefore, I show three types of classifications of the Indian 
Madhyamaka according to Tibetan doxographers and problems related to them. 
Chapter 2 is allotted to the classification of the externalist Madhyamaka and the 
internalist Madhyamaka, which are generally called `Sauträntika-Madhyamaka' and 
'Yogicära-Madhyamaka' respectively. Of these, Tibetan doxographers are discrepant 
especially in terms of to what extent the Sautrintika-Madhyamaka conventionally follows 
the Sauträntika's view. 
In chapter 3,1 examine the treatment of Bhäviveka and Candrakirti in India, who 
are representative of the Svätantrika and the Präsangika respectively. In Indian sources 
of the late period, we hardly find these terms, any opposition or any view which strictly 
follows either Bhäviveka's or Candrakirti's position although we so often classify the 
Madhyamaka into the Svätantrika and the Pr isangika. This causes a doubt whether this 
classification existed in India. I propose a possible explanation why it cannot be found. 
In chapter 4, I examine the classification of the Mäyopamadvayavädin and the 
Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin. Although this classification is traceable to Indian sources, 
their explanation is very ambiguous. Tibetan accounts seem to be confused, too, since 
their explanation of this classification differs significantly. 
By examining these classifications on the basis of Indian sources, I attempt to 
have a comprehensive look on the late Indian Madhyamaka doxography, which has 
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Note on Translation and Transliteration 
A few clarifications would be necessary concerning conventions. At the top of 
each translation, I assigned a number in square brackets [] for the sake of convenience. 
An asterisk * in translation indicates a conjectured but unattested Sanskrit reading 
based on Tibetan or Chinese. However, I did not use it for the names of philosophical 
schools, such as Prisangika, or for proper names of persons and texts, with a few 
exceptions. (I used it for *Karatalaratna, which only survives in Chinese and for 
*Laksanatikd, which does not have a title and was provisionally entitled by Rähula 
Sänkrtyäyana. ) I did not always use it in the main text which is not a translation of a 
primary source. 
In translation, square brackets [] indicate words which are not in the original 
Sanskrit or Tibetan and supplied by the present author. Round brackets () are used to 
indicate Sanskrit or Tibetan equivalents or explanation. 
The original texts of translation are given in footnotes, with the exception of the 
lTa ba'i khyad par and the Pancatathagatamudravivarana, which are given as appendices. 
I quoted Sanskrit and Tibetan texts from editions of these texts when available. Regarding 
Tibetan, when no edition is available, I followed the Derge edition and the Peking 
edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka. 
I use following abbreviations when I indicate different readings: 
Ed.: Edition. 
Em. : Emendation (by myself). 
D. : Derge edition. 
Ms. : Manuscript. 
P. : Peking edition. 
The table of transliteration of Sanskrit and Tibetan is shown below. Concerning 
Sanskrit, I changed nasals (ii, n, etc. ) in certain editions into anusvüra (m) for the sake 
of consistency. Regarding punctuation, I add and omit a danda (I) for Sanskrit and shad 
vii 
(/) for Tibetan as, I consider, appropriate. I re-transliterate in the following way when 
an edition which I refer to for my translation employs a different system. 
Sanskrit 
tt'a 31fä I'i ti 3u 3ii r tr w1 to ai 1'o tau 
T ka W kha IT ga q gha U. na 
'OJ ca cha f ja f jha ýr na 
to a tha da Zi dha Vf na 
ci to q tha da £i' dha 9' na 
If pa Lh pha zr ba W bha If ma 
? Tya Tra T1a Zr va 
7 sa Tsa Wsa ha 
Tibetan: 
ý ka N kha ga R nga 
a ca ffi cha E ja 9j nya 
tj to 9 tha 5 da na 
pa '4 pha P ba aI ma 
tsa tsha dza 
j wa cý zha za R 'a 
W ya ' ra M 1a -9 sha 
ýI sa 5 ha U1 a 
a'a k'a R 
to r da na 
vii' 
Introduction 
0.1 Doxography of the Indian Madhyamaka 
As the title shows, the purpose of this thesis is to clarify difference of ideas in the 
Indian Madhyamaka and to systematically classify these ideas as well as teachers who 
maintain them. Buddhism had developed a diversity of philosophical thoughts during its 
existence in India over 1500 years. It came to be roughly classified into four, the Vaibhäsika, 
the Sautrzntika, the Yog, cara and the Madhyamaka, towards the extinction of Buddhism 
in India at the beginning of the 13th C. Even in each of these philosophical schools, there 
was disagreement in its view and further divisions were made by Indian teachers. My 
interest is especially drawn to those of the Madhyamaka, which is, later in Tibet, considered 
the superior philosophical system in Buddhism. 
When we undertake studies of Buddhism in India and try to draw a picture of its 
development, we face many difficulties in finding clues in Indian sources. In general, 
Indians do not seem to have as much chronological concept as Chinese and Tibetans, 
who often leave some clues in their works. Chinese, in most cases, record the year in 
which they translated Indian Buddhist scriptures into Chinese. Tibetans often write the 
year of birth, death and so forth of Tibetan translators or of Indian teachers who entered 
Tibet in the text of history, for example. In fact, Chinese and Tibetan records, such as 
when certain texts were translated, when pilgrims visited India and when Indian teachers 
were invited, are used to speculate on the chronology of Buddhism in India. As very 
often pointed out, on the other hand, there are few texts written by Indian teachers 
themselves that concern the dates of events. Clues for dating them in Indian texts themselves 
are scarce and often limited to quotations and borrowing of ideas from one another. 
There are, in addition, many forgeries ascribed to famous teachers. This sometimes 
causes inconsistency in the works of a given teacher and sometimes confuses our 
understanding of chronological sequence. These forgeries and lack of chronological 
clues make it very difficult both to determine dates of teachers and to understand their 
ideas. When we examine the development of philosophical thoughts and attempt to 
classify them, they become huge obstacles. 
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Although Indian sources do not give us much information, there are countless 
texts composed in Tibet that refer to the doxography of the Madhyamaka. So far our 
understanding of the history and doxography of the Madhyamaka has largely depended 
on interpretations given by Tibetan texts called Grub mtha', which systematically classify 
Buddhist (and often non-Buddhist) philosophical schools and scholars according to 
differences in their views. Even though there are doxographical texts composed by 
Indian teachers, the designations of sub-schools are different from text to text and their 
explanations are often too brief to decide what sub-school it is and who belongs to it. 
Grub mtha' texts, on the other hand, explain divergences of the Madhyamaka in sequence, 
differences in views among sub-schools, and who belongs to these sub-schools. For this 
reason, Grub mtha' texts have helped us understand the development of the Madhyamaka 
thought and greatly contributed to the studies of the Madhyamaka by compensating, to a 
certain extent, for the lack of Indian sources. 
However, there are some problems in depending heavily on Tibetan sources. 
There exist many Grub mtha' or similar texts in Tibet, but not all agree on the way of 
classification, names of schools or attribution of teachers to the schools. Mimaki has 
already shown that these texts as well as various ways of classification in them were 
developed to a large extent in Tibet. ' Therefore we must be very cautious in dealing with 
these texts. If they were modified gradually over a long period of time in Tibet after the 
extinction of Buddhism in India so that they should provide clearer and more systematic 
explanations, they might not reflect what actually happened in India. Even though it is 
necessary to compare doxography described in Grub mtha' texts with Indian sources in 
order to verify their descriptions, this is often a very difficult task. The fact that the terms 
used to designate the Madhyamaka sub-schools, `Svitantrika' and `Prisaiigika', have not 
been found in any Indian sources in a strict sense serves as a good example. In addition, 
even though some Tibetan terms which could be restored as `Sauträntika-Mädhyamika' 
and `Yogäcära-M idhyamika' are found in the Tibetan translation of an Indian text, these 
Mimaki [1982a], [1982b] and [1983]. 
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terms have not been attested in original Sanskrit. ' This suggests that the classification of 
the Madhyamaka common in Tibet may not necessarily have been common in India. 
Thus, Tibetan doxography of the Indian Madhyamaka can be interpreted as the process 
of establishing coherent explanations of the Indian Madhyamaka, which had various and, 
in some cases, contradictory elements. As a consequence, Grub mtha' texts sometimes 
contradict each other and contain many problems. In this present work, therefore, I 
would like to show these problems concerning the Indian Madhyamaka doxography, 
which mainly originated from dependence on Grub intha' and other Tibetan sources. 
The problems are indeed too many to enumerate. To give a few brief examples, 
however, the doxography of the Indian Madhyamaka has been studied mainly based on 
Tibetan sources whose concern is the Svatantrika-Prisarigika dichotomy. Therefore, 
classification of the Indian Madhyamaka has often been explained on the basis of this 
dichotomy. On the contrary, we know almost nothing about how the philosophical view 
of Candrakirti (ca. 600-650), a Präsangika, was treated before the 8th C and there is 
hardly any surviving text written by the late Mädhyamikas (after Säntaraksita, i. e. the 8th 
C) which strictly follows either Bhäviveka's3 philosophical position or Candrakirti's. 
This causes a doubt whether the Sv5tantrika and the Pr isangika existed in opposition in 
India. 
Second, according to some Tibetan accounts, the Yog, c, ra-Mädhyamika is 
classified into the Säkira school (rnam bden pa) and the Niraira school (rnam brdzun 
pa). This SzkIra-Nirikzra distinction is originally applied to the epistemology of the 
Yogäcara school. Kajiyama explains their difference that if the image (dkdra) is real, one 
will have an image in cognition even when one reaches enlightenment, and if it is false, 
one will not have any image. If both cognition and images are real and identical, as the 
2 For example, it is reported that Jayänanda mentions the Rang rgyud pa in the MadhyamaWvatara; i a 
(Derge ed. No. 3870 ra 281b6, Peking ed. No. 5271 ra 337a8) and Laksmi mentions the mDo sde'i 
dBu ma pa and the rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dBu ma pa in the PancakramatXa KramdrthaprakVik-a 
(Derge ed. 1842 chi 240a6-bl, Peking ed. No. 2705 ngi 464a3-6) Cf. Ogawa [1984] and Ilakamaya 
[1976] pp. 199-200. 
3I call the author of the Prajnapradfpa `Bhäviveka' but not `Bhävaviveka'. See chapter 1, footnote 
82 (p. 43). 
'Kajiyama [1975] (pp. 29-30): 
Therefore, to the Yogicärin, the image of cognition is the appearance of our mind; and 
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S, kära-Yogäcra maintains, either mind will become manifold as objects are, or objects 
will become one as cognition is. This logical fault can be avoided by the proponents of 
nirikdra because they, denying the reality of images, hold that cognition, which is real, 
and images, which are not, are not identical. They are, however, criticised because one 
cannot have any cognition when one is enlightened. 
For the Yogcära, if an image is real, it exists ultimately and if it is false it does 
not exist ultimately. For the Midhyamika, the relation between the reality of images and 
their existence is not so straightforward. If the Yogncära-M, dhyamika is a Mädhyamika 
who accepts the tenet of the Yogäcira conventionally, there will not be much point in 
distinguishing the S kära-Mädhyamika and the Niräkära-M idhyamika. Regardless of 
whether or not an image is real at the conventional level, it appears conventionally for 
both sides and is empty at the ultimate level. In this case, the only distinction among the 
Sakära-Mädhyamika and the Niräkära-Mädhyamika is whether they hold the conventional 
reality of images, which is not so important for the Midhyamikas. On the other hand 
some modern scholars seem to consider that this is applied to images at the ultimate 
level. In this case, because nothing is real ultimately for the MIdhyamikas, only whether 
or not there are images, which are anyway empty, comes into question. As a result, it is 
very difficult to classify the Yogzcira-Mädhyamika teachers into these two sub-schools 
because it is not clear on what criteria they should be classified. I have seen few studies 
done by Western scholars on this matter, and some attempts at classification by Japanese 
scholars do not seem to be successful so far. ' 
this necessarily implies that a cognition is always endowed with an image which is represented 
by our mind. Thus, all the Yogäcärins must be sdkäravädins as far as the cognition of common 
people is concerned. A problem, however, appears in regard to the emancipated person, who 
is supposed to have acquired nirvikalpajnüna or non-conceptual, super-mundane knowledge. 
Some Yogäcärin thought that knowledge of emancipated person is freed from the fetter of 
cognitum and cognizer and accordingly is clear like a pure crystal without specks. And they 
held that this clear, imageless knowledge is essence of cognition, regarding images as false, 
unreal stains born due to our vasann. This is the essential of the nirdk-arajndnatinda. But others 
frone the same school criticized this theory, saying that what is not real can be never manifested, 
since otherwise it would entail the unfavourable doctrine of asatkhyati. Every cognition, 
inasmuch as it is knowledge, must have an image and yet their is no harn in that an emancipated 
person's knowledge is with an image, if he is freed from conceptual thinking, the fundamental 
of which is the bifurcation of cognitium and cognizer. 'T'his is the essential point of the 
snkdrajn"ünatiada of the Yogdcärins. 
51 will discuss this issue in chapter 4 (p. 211 ff. ). 
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It is extremely difficult to solve these problems. I do not think that I could give a 
definitive conclusion on these matters. There are many other problems surrounding the 
study of late Madhyamaka doxography. Compared with studies of the early and middle 
period of the Madhyamikas such as those of Nägärjuna, Bhlviveka and Candrakirti 6 
those of the late Mädhyamikas have not advanced so much, except for those of the 
so-called `Yogzcira-Mzdhyamika' of Säntaraksita and Kamalasila. Especially, while 
some Tibetan accounts classify the late Mzdhyanükas into branches and sub-branches, 
our studies have not reached the point to judge its legitimacy on the basis of Indian 
sources. Although Tibetan sources have largely contributed to our understanding of late 
Madhyamaka, it is necessary to examine what evidence Tibetan sources depend on, 
whether the evidence is traced back to Indian sources and how Tibetan doxography of 
the Indian Madhyamaka itself has developed. Once we find the basis of the doxography 
given by Tibetans in an Indian source, it will make it possible for us to judge its 
legitimacy. Once we find a dichotomy, it leads to further understanding of the late 
Madhyamaka philosophy because existence of an opposition among the Mädhyamikas 
suggests that that certain point of the argument was of large interest to teachers in that 
period. Therefore, it is now necessary to review this phase of the Madhyamaka on the 
basis of Indian sources. 
The other problem concerning the doxography of the Madhyamaka is how we 
should define 'school. ' So far we have used the term `school' in an extremely vague 
way. When we say `Przsarigika school, ' it is not clear what kind of school it was, 
whether there was a group consisting of teachers holding the same philosophical view or 
a lineage of the same philosophical thought based on the teacher-disciple relation. 
Furthermore, we are not sure if `Prdsatigika', for example, should actually be understood 
to designate a school. It can be used to classify a person or a view itself or a text which 
61 call the period of Nägärjuna and Aryadeva, during which there was no division in the Madhyamaka 
`early period', the period of Bhäviveka and Candrakirti when the distinction of the Svätantrika and. 
the Präsangika is thought to have arisen `middle period' and the period after S: mtaraksita `late 




contains a particular view. ' Because no example of the term `Pr5satigika' has been found 
in Indian sources so far, it may be pointless to discuss it in detail. I also doubt whether 
the term `Mzdhyamika' contains the sense of `school' at all. I am not going to discuss 
this matter systematically in this thesis, but will mention when a description of some 
proponent comes up. The purpose of this present thesis is, therefore, to make clear what 
classifications of the Madhyamaka existed in India as well as what was classified by 
them. 
0.2 Structure of the Present Work 
In chapter 1 of this present work, I will first show differences in the classification 
of the Madhyamaka in Tibetan Grub mtha' texts and other sources that mention the 
Madhyamaka sub-divisions in order to examine the ways Tibetan teachers classify the 
Madhyamaka and the development of the classification of the Madhyamaka in Tibet. We 
will mainly examine doxography of the dGe lugs pa because it is the basis of our 
understanding of the Madhyamaka classification. Regarding development of the 
Madhyamaka doxography in Tibet, I heavily depend on previous studies such as Mimaki's 
and can hardly say anything new. I think, however, it is necessary to examine these texts 
first in order to show how much the doxography of the Madhyamaka changed in Tibet 
and to what extent the fact is reflected, in these texts by comparing them with Indian 
sources in the later chapters. 
Although we classify the Madhyamaka in one way or another, we do not know 
much about how it was actually classified in India. My interest in this topic started when 
I read Atiga'sx works. Even though he is said to have been a Prisaiigika according to 
some Tibetan accounts, 9 I could not find, in Atiga's works, much evidence that his view 
In this thesis, if there is no proviso, the terns `school' is not used with regard to institutional 
-divisions but to difference of philosophical views. 
8 With regard to the name of the author of the Satyadvayävatdra and the Bodhipathapradipa, I 
adopt `Atisa' following Eimer [ 1977] although I am not entirely sure which name, Atisa or Ati§a, is 
right. 
9Such as the Wang skya grub mtha' of ICang skya II Rol pa'i rdo rje. See Mimaki [1982a] p. 30 
and note 59. 
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is indeed similar to Candrakirti's. I felt the need of comparison between Indian texts and 
Tibetan accounts. Some modern scholars have expressed the feeling that it is not easy to 
classify late Madhyamaka teachers in the simple dichotomy of the Svätantrika and the 
Präsangika, 1° which is accepted by Tibetan teachers as well as most modern scholars. 
In this present work, therefore, we first examine how Tibetan accounts classify 
the Madhyamaka. Then an attempt will be made to show what distinction actually 
existed in the late Indian Madhyamaka. 
In chapter 2, we will examine the distinction of the Madhyamaka based on 
conventional existence: the view which accepts the existence of external objects 
conventionally and that which accepts mind-only conventionally, which are commonly 
designated as `Sauträntika-Madhyamaka' and `Yogäcdra-Madhyamaka' respectively. In 
order to clarify this way of classification, I will pick up passages that mention the 
classification of the Madhyamaka from selected texts which are placed within the middle 
and the late periods of the Madhyaniaka: Bhäviveka's Praji0praclipa, S intaraksita's 
Madhyarnakalarnkara and his own commentary (vrtti), Bodhibhadra's JiiünasJra- 
samnccayanibandhana, the anonymous Bodhisattvacarycavataravyäkhyanapanjika, 
Laksml's Pancakrainatikä Kramarthaprakdsikä, Prajnikaramati's Bodhicaryävatüra- 
panjikä, Ratn-akarasänti's Madhymnakadamkäropadesa and Prajndpdramitopadesa, and 
so on. This part of the present work heavily depends on previous works of eminent 
scholars, namely, Kajiyama for Bhäviveka, Ichigö for Sintaraksita, Yamaguchi for 
Bodhibhadra, Saito for the anonymous commentary on the Bodhisattvacaryavaldra, Ruegg, 
Umino and Matsumoto for Ratn5kara nti, and so on. 
In this thesis, I refrain from using the terms `Sautrzntika-Madhyamaka' and 
`Yogzcära-Midhyamika' to denote these views which disagree on conventional existence 
when I mean that they are not necessarily the Svätantrika because these terms are 
commonly used to denote two sub-schools in the Sv5tantrika-Madhyamaka. In those 
Indian texts mentioned above, the dichotomy of the Svätantrika and Prisangika is not 
present. It is not clear at this point if the Prisangika is included in the view which 
10 For example, Ejima 11982] p. 172. 
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accepts external objects, or even whether or not the dichotomy of the Sv, tantrika and the 
Prisangika existed in India. Therefore, I will provisionally use the terms `externalist' 
Madhyamaka/Mzdhyamika and `internalist' Madhyamaka/ Mzdhyamika to denote these 
two opposing sides. Even though in Indian sources the evidence for this dichotomy is 
clearer than any other ways of classification, we know little about their tenets, especially 
that of the externalist Madhyamaka. 
Then in chapter 3, we will examine the classification of the Svztantrika and the 
Präsangika. Firstly, I compare the view of Bhzviveka and Candrakirti in India, who are 
respectively the representative figures of the Svätantrika-Mzdhyatnikas and the Pr isangika- 
Mädhyamikas, as well as how later Indian and Tibetan teachers treated their thoughts. 
The former, the comparison of their views, is done by examining their works. Because 
there are many previous studies that deal with this subject, I only show differences in 
their views that make it possible for us to understand the criteria of the classification. 
The latter, transmission of their views, can be done in two different ways: by checking 
historical records, for example, when their works are translated into Tibetan, and by 
reading texts written by later teachers who quote their works or support or criticise either 
view. With regard to later Indian teachers, we look especially at Atisa, who is very often 
regarded as a Präsangika. We will examine his view on the two truths and on inference 
which Bhäviveka ascribes to the ultimate truth (paramarthasatya) and Candrakirti to the 
conventional truth (samvrtisatya) in order to find out if their views are followed by later 
M5dhyamikas and why we cannot find clear evidence of this classification in later 
Madhyamaka texts. 
In chapter 4, we will examine a division into the Mäyopamädvayavädin and the 
Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin. Although this division is also traceable to Indian sources, 
Tibetan accounts seem to be confused, and their views on this way of classification differ 
considerably, probably due to the ambiguity of Indian accounts concerning these two 
sides. This seems to have resulted in confusion among modern scholars, too. We will 
look into the view of these two proponents on the basis mainly of works written by 
Advayavajra and his disciples. In addition to this, we also discuss the differences between 
the Sdkdravidin and the Nir5kirav idin since it seems that the classification of the 
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M5yopam5dvayavädin and the Sarvadharmzpratislhanavadin is something to do with the 
Buddha's cognition. 
Thanks to our predecessors' works, I was able to spot passages that show 
classification of the Madhyamaka and differences of their doctrines. In Indian sources, 
however, it is not easy to identify whose view these passages are describing. Texts do 
not always mention names of proponents but only say "some say" for example. Even if 
they do, the terms used to designate them are not at all consistent. Some passages are too 
brief or ambiguous to identify. Moreover, the Mädhyamikas often argue at the level of 
the ultimate truth. Basically, there is no difference of views among the Midhyamikas 
concerning the ultimate truth. Therefore, it is difficult to classify them on the basis of the 
view on the ultimate truth. Due to these problems, modern scholars do not always agree 
on how to classify the Madhyamaka. My thesis is also somewhat inconclusive in many 
respects and it is virtually impossible to understand all the historical events that happened 
after Candrakirti or Säntaraksita until the extinction of Buddhism in India. However, 
there is still a need for a comprehensive look at these texts and the late Madhyamaka 
doxography even though it is a patchwork of fragmentary pieces of evidence. I hope that 
this present work can contribute to a certain extent to the understanding of the late Indian 
Madhyamaka by showing a clearer picture. 
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As stated above in the introduction, our studies of the history and classification of 
Indian Madhyamaka heavily depend on doxographical texts called Grub intha', which 
deal with Buddhist (and often non-Buddhist) philosophical systems. Texts in this genre 
show the classification of different philosophical views between Buddhist schools as 
well as between their sub-schools, and who belongs to these schools. These texts sometimes 
quote passages from Indian sources to prove their legitimacy. This helps us judge whether 
or not the description of a certain Grub iniha' is justified. 
In the Lain rim then mo, whose classification seems to have become the model of 
later Grub mntha' texts, Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), the founder of the dGe lugs pa in 
Tibet, mentions three different ways of classifying the Mädhyamikas: (1) the Svätantrika 
(rang rgyud pa) and the Prllsangika (that 'gyur ba), (2) the Yogäcära-Mädhyamika (rnal 
'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma pa) and the Sauträntika-Mädhyamika (mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu 
ma pa), and (3) the Mäyopamädvayavädin (sgyu ma rigs grub pa) and the 
Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin (rab tu mi gnas par smra ba). " Of these, concerning 
classification (1), we know that Candrakirti criticised Bhzviveka over the use of syllogistic 
inference. 12 However we have not found the terms `Svitantrika' and `Prisahgika' in any 
works of the Indian Madhyamaka teachers before Jay5nanda (12th C) and do not know if 
Candrakirti's criticism against Bhzviveka created opposing sub-schools in India. 
Classification (2) is traced back to Indian sources and studied to a certain extent. With 
regard to the classification (3), we do not know what differentiates these two proponents 
even though we find these designations in Indian sources. Moreover, Grub mtha' texts 
do not agree on what is the criterion to distinguish the Mzyoparn dvayavädin and the 
Sarvadharmäpratisthünaviidin. 
In this chapter, therefore, I will show some examples of the Tibetan doxography 
of Indian Madhyamaka, and their problems, as a background to our examination of the 
These names do not necessarily correspond to the Tibetan terms given in brackets. Concerning 
these terms, see 1.2 (p. 23 ff. ) of this thesis. 
12 We will discuss disagreement between Bhäviveka and Candral irti in chapter 3 (p. 116 ff. ). 
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classification of Indian Madhyamaka. 
1.1 dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po 
The Grub mtha' rnain bzhag rin then phreng ba of dKon inchog 'jigs med dbang 
po (1728-1791) is one of the most studied Tibetan Grub mtha' texts. 13 Grub intha' texts 
in this period show an established form of doxography and are the basis of our understanding 
of the Madhyamaka doxography. It is not clear to what extent Grub mtha' texts in this 
period reflect the actual classification of the Madhyamaka in India because they tend to 
follow earlier Tibetan doxographical works and are not necessarily based on Indian 
sources. Many of them are also written from the point of the view of the dGe lugs order, 
whose interest is in Candrakirti's Präsangika. Although they may not properly reflect the 
doxography of the Indian Madhyamaka, our understanding of its doxography is influenced 
by them in one way or another. In order to evaluate their reliability, it is first necessary to 
see how dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po classifies the Madhyamaka in the Grub mtha' 
rnam bzhag rin then phreng ba. 
In the Madhyamaka chapter, he gives four topics to be explained: the definition 
[of the Mzdhyamika], the term [Midhyamika], the distinction [in the Mädhyamika] and 
the meaning of each division. In the third section (distinction) he explains as follows: 
[1-1] 
Third (distinction): If a division should be made in the [M idhyamika], 
there are two: the Svätantrika-Mdhyamika and the Präsangika- 
[Mädhyamika]. la 
According to dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, thus, M idhyýunika is first classified 
into the Sv itantrika (rang rgyud pa) and the Präsangika (thal 'gyur ba). Then he again 
gives four topics to be explained with regard to the Svitantrika: the definition [of the 
" The Grub mtha' ream bziaag rin chen phreng ba was edited by Mimaki [ 1977] and translated into 
English by Guenther [1971], by Sopa and Hopkins [1976] and partially by Iida [1980]. 
14 Grub mtha' rnam bzhag rin then phreng ba (lida [1980] p. 29,12-13): 
gsum pa ni/ dc la dbye na/ dbu ma rang rgyud pa dang/ that 'gyur ba gnyis yod/ 
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Svztantrika], the term [Svätantrika], the distinction [in the Svätantrika] and the way 
tenets are asserted. He explains the sub-schools of the Svztantrika as follows: 
[1-2] 
Third (distinction): If a division should be made in the [Svdtantrika], 
there are two: the Yoglcra-Sv, tantrika-Mzdhyamika and the 
Sautrantikacara-Svätantrika-Madhyamika. The Mädhyamika that does not 
accept external objects but accepts self-awareness is the definition of the 
former. The foundation of the definition is the dcdrya Szntaraksita and 
the like. The Mzdhyamika that does not accept self-awareness but accepts 
external objects established by its particular characteristic (rang gi intshan 
nyid) is the definition of the latter. The foundation of the definition is the 
äcärya Bhäviveka and the like. 
There is also an explanation of terms. Concerning the respective 
establishment of the basis, by reason of maintaining [mind-only] in 
agreement with the Vijnänav idin, it is called Yogäcära-Mzdhyamika. By 
reason of maintaining the external objects as an aggregate of atoms, in the 
manner of the Sautrhntika, it is called Sauträntikicära-Mädhyamika. 's 
Thus Svitantrika is divided into the Yog5c, ra-M5dhyamika (real 'byor spyod 
pa'i dbu ma pa) and the SautrZntik, ýcira-Midhyamika (mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa). 
This distinction is based on whether or not they accept external objects and self-awareness. 
The Sautr, ntikzcära-Mädhyamika postulates external objects but does not accept self- 
awareness. Conversely, the Yog, cara-Mzdhyamika asserts self-awareness and denies 
15 Grub rntha' main bz/zag rin cben phreng ba (lida [1980] p. 30,7-16): 
gsum pa ni/ de la dbye na! mal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu nia rang rgyud pa dang/ mdo sde spyod 
pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa gnyis/ phyi don khas mi len zhing/ rang rig khas len pa'i dbu ma pa 
dc dang po'i mtslian nyid/ mLshan gzlii ni slob dpon zhi ba 'tsho lta but 
rang rig khas mi len zhing/ phyi don rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa khas len pa'i dbu 
ma pa de gnyis pa'i mtslian nyid/ mtshan gzlii ni slob dpon legs ldan 'byed lta but 
sgra bshad lyang yod de/ gzhi'i mam hzhag sems tsam pa dang mthun par khan len pas 
na mal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma pa dang/ mdo sde pa Itar rdul phra rab bsags pa'i phyi rol gyi 
don l has len pas na mdo sdc spyod pa'i dbu ma pa zhes brjod do// 
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external objects. Their designations are considered to be derived from the names of two 
Buddhist philosophical schools, the Sautrhntika and the Yogäc5ra, whose views these 
two Mädhyamikas follow conventionally. " 
He further classifies the Yogicira-Midhyamika into two: 
[1-3] 
Also in regard to the Yogicira-Svitantrika-Midhyamika, there are two: 
the Madhyamika that is conformable to the Sakara school [which maintains 
the reality of images] and the M5dhyamika that is conformable to the 
NirlUra school [which maintains the falsity of images]. The former is 
S intaraksita, Kamalasila, Aryavimuktisena and the like. The latter is the 
ncarya Haribhadra, Jiffiri, Kambala and the like. It is said that Jithri is 
conformable to the Samala-Nirakara school, but Kambala conformable to 
" the Nirmala-Niräkära school. 
The Yogic, -Svztantrika-M5dhyamika is further divided into the Madhyamika 
that is conformable to the Sak-ara school (rnarn bden pa dang mthun pa'i dbu ma pa) and 
the M dhyarnika that is conformable to the Nirikira school (rnain brdzun pa dang 
mthun pa'i dbu ma pa). The latter is further divided into one that is conformable to the 
Samala-Nirakara school (ream brdzun dri bcas pa dang mthun pa) and one that is 
conformable to the Nirmala-Niräkara school (rnam brdzun dri med pa dang inthun pa). 
Säntaraksita, Kamalasila and Aryavimuktisena are classified as the Mädhyamikas that 
16 Concerning the designation `Sauträntil: acära-Mädhyamika' (mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa) I 
suspect that `ücdra' (spyod pa) is redundant. If the Mädhyamika who follows the Yogäcära 
conventionally is called Yogäcära-Mädhyamika, the M idhyamika who follows the Sauträntika 
should be the Sauträntika-Mädhyamika. If the Mädhyamika who follows the Sauträntika 
conventionally is called the Sauträntikäcära-Mädhyamika in the sense that those who undertake 
practice in the way of the Sauträntika, the Mädhyamika who follows the Yogäcära conventionally 
would be the Yogäcär5cära-Mädliyamika. Therefore I henceforth use `Sauträntika-M5dliyamika' in 
this thesis even when the original Tibetan is mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa. 
17Grub mtha' rnam bzhag rin chen phreng ba (lida [1980] p. 30,17-23): 
mal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa la yang mam bden pa dang mthun pa'i dbu ma pa 
dang/ ream brdzun pa dan mthun pa' i dbu ma pa gnyis yod/ dang po ni/ zhi ba 'tsho dang/ ka 
ma la shi la dang/ 'phags pa grol sde lta bu'o/ gnyis pa ni slob dpon seng ge bzang po dang/ 
dze ta'a ri dang/ Iva ba pa Ita bu ste dze ta'a ri mam brdzun dri boas pa dang mthun la/ Iva ba 
pa ni mam brdzun dri med pa dang mthun par bshad do// 
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are conformable to the Sdkära school, while Haribhadra, Jit, ri and Kambala are classified 
as the M, dhyamikas that are conformable to the Nirzkrra school. This can be shown as 
follows: 
Svätantrika 
Sautrzntika-Mädhyamika ..................................... Bhäviveka 
Yogäc ara-Mädhyainika 
Säkara-Madhyamika ............................... Säntaraksita, Kamalasila 
Nirakara-Mädhyamika ............................ 
Haribhadra, Jitäri, Kambala 
L Sainala-Nir k, ra-M5dhyamika........ Jita ri 
Nirmala- Nirakdra-Mädhyatnika ...... Kambala 
Przsangika 
Although dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po classifies the Svztantrika-Mädhyamika 
in this way, he does not explain the differences of these sub-schools in detail, especially 
that of the M, dhyamika conformable to the Samala-Nir, 5k5ra school and the Mzdhyamika 
conformable to the Nirmala-Nirlkära school. It is, therefore, almost impossible to ascertain 
the validity of these classifications on the basis of Indian sources. 
On the other hand, dKon inchog 'jigs med dbang po gives the definition and the 
representatives of the Prhsangika as follows: 
[1-4] 
Second (Präsangika): When explaining the view of the Präsangika, there 
are three topics: definition, [meaning of] the term and the way [their tenet 
is] asserted. 
First (definition): A proponent of no intrinsic nature, who does not 
hold the establishment through particular characteristics (rang gi mtshan 
nyid) even as common usage, is the definition of the Prisaingika. The 
foundation of the definition is Buddhapzlita, Candrakirti, Säntideva and 
14 
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the like. '8 
This classification held in the dGe lugs order of Tibet, which classifies the 
Midhyamika into the Pr5isaiigika and the Svätantrika, the latter of which is further 
classified into the Yogic5ra-Midhyamika and the Sautrintika-Midhyamika, is, to a certain 
extent, adopted by the majority of modern scholars to explain the history and doxography 
of Indian Madhyamaka19 
It is thought that the Madhyamaka had no division during the period of Nzgärjuna 
and Aryadeva, but was divided into the Svitantrika and the Präsaügika in the 6-7th C 
when Bhäviveka (ca. 500-570) criticised Buddhapdlita (ca. 470-540) and later Candrakirti 
(ca. 600-650) raised an objection to Bhäviveka in support of Buddhap-5lita. Here according 
to dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, the difference between the Svätantrika and the 
Präsangika is whether or not they accept establishment through particular characteristics 
(rang gi mntshan nyid, svalaksana) conventionally. Later, at the end of the 8th C, when 
Säntaraksita (ca. 725-788) adopted the mind-only theory to explain conventionality, the 
Sv5tantrika-M5dhyamika was divided into the Yogicära-Svätantrika-Mftdhyamika and 
the Sauträntika-Svitantrika-Mädhyatnika. This classification is based on their view of 
conventional existence. The Yogicira-Mzdhyamika holds mind-only conventionally and 
the Sautrintika-Mädhyamika accepts external objects conventionally. The Yogäc5ra- 
MZdhyamika was further divided into the S5k5ra-Yogäcära-M5dhyainika and the Nir3k5ra- 
Yog3c5ra-M5dhyamika in the same way as in the Yogäcira. The latter is further divided 
into the Samala-Nir, -k;, ra-Yogäczra-Mädhyamika and the Nirmala-Nirýkära-Yogäcära- 
Mädhyamika although dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po does not mention the criteria of 
this last distinction. He here quite systematically classifies Madhyamaka sub-schools and 
distributes teachers. However, there are some problems in these classifications. 
19 Grub mtha' ream bzhag rin then phreng ba (lila [ 1980] p. 40,14-15,19-21): 
gnyis pa that 'gyur ba'i lugs bshad pa la/ mtshan nyid/ sgra bshad/ 'dod tshut dang gsum/ dang 
po ni/ rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa tha snyad tsam du yang mi bzhcd pa'i ngo bo nyid 
med par smra ba de dial 'gyur ba'i mtslian nyid/ mtshan gzhi ni/ Sangs rgyas bskyangs/ zla 
grags / zhi ba Ilia Ita bu'o// 
19 For example, Skilton [1994] (p. 116). Also see Williams 11989b] p. 57 If. 
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Firstly, as often pointed out, no one has yet found the Sanskrit terms `Präsaiigika' 
and `Svitantrika' in an opposing sense in Indian sources, and existence of these traditions 
is questioned. As we will discuss later in this chapter, this problem is implicitly expressed 
already by Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), the founder of the dGe lugs order of Tibet, in the 
Lain rim then Mo. 20 Moreover, we hardly find any texts or teachers that strictly follow 
the view of Candrakirti in India. Although silence is not definitive, there is a possibility 
that the Mädhyamikas did not form the two opposing traditions after Candrakirti. At 
least, this absence of his followers makes it almost impossible to trace the actual transmission 
of his thought in India? ' 
Secondly, the classification of the Präsaiigika and the Svätantrika and the 
classification of the Yogäcära-Mädhyamika and the Sauträntika-Mädhyamika are two 
completely different ways of classifications. The former classification is based on whether 
they accept establishment through particular characteristics conventionally and the latter 
on whether they accept self-awareness and external objects, according to dKon mchog 
'jigs med dbang po. Mimaki's study shows, however, that these two distinct divisions 
were combined in Tibet in the process of development of doxography and understanding 
the history of Indian Buddhism, and they were dealt separately in early Grub mtha' 
texts. 2 
Thirdly, the Sauträntika-Mädhyamika is said to postulate external objects but does 
not accept self-awareness even though the Sautrintika is understood to accept both 
external objects and self-awareness. To cite an instance, in verse 23 of the 
Jnänasärasamuccaya, the Sauträntika's tenet is explained as follows: 
[1-5] 
The objects of perception produce cognition with images, [but] are not 
accessible for sense faculties. Space is like a son of a barren woman and 
the two cessations (nirodha) are like space. (v. 23) 
20 See [1-17] (p. 26). 
21 We will discuss this issue in chapter 3 (p. 116 ff. ). 
22 See Mimaki [1982a] and [1982b]. 
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Conditioned entities are not insentient, and there is no one who grasps the 
three times. [However] it is not the case that a material form of an 
aggregate [of atoms] does not exist. The Sautrhntikas consider in this 
way. (v. 24'3 
Here, an Aryadeva24 explains that the Sautr5antikas assert that in fact our cognition 
is not perception of external objects through sense faculties, which have contact with 
external objects, but cognition has images in itself. This suggests that the Sauträntika is 
understood to maintain self-awareness by the Mädhyamikas. Unlike the Yog5cära, however, 
the Sauträntikas do not deny the existence of external objects as shown in verse 24. 
In theTriyanav)yavasthana, Ratnäkarasänti (B)) explains the tenet of the Sauträntika 
in a similar way: 
[1-6] 
The Sauträntikas consider that apprehension (blo, *dhi) arises together 
with images. And they hold that the images of apprehension themselves 
73 Jn"dnasarasamuccaya, vv. 23-24 (Mimaki [20(X)] p. 238,17-18,28-29): 
s ik5rajnänajanakä drsyä ncndriyagocaräh I 
vandhyäsutasamam vyoma nirodhau vyomasannibhau 11 23 II 
samskärä na jadäh santi tmikälyänugamo na ca I 
asan na samcitam riipam(') iti sauträntikä viduh 11 24 II 
(1) Ed: nrpam 
Concerning asan na samcitam ri pam, Miniaki [2000] (p. 239 note 22) gives the following observation: 
asap na samcitam rüpam is a reconstruction from the Tibetan version, but it is confirmed 
by the commentary of Bodhibliadra: ream par sizes pa las gud na rdul phra rab bsags pa'i 
gong bu'i gzugs med pa ni min no zhes 'dod pa ste (JSSN 196.15-17 =P 49a7-8). On the other 
hand, the reading of the manuscript asad apratigha-rupam (non-resistant matter [= avijilapti] 
is nonexistent) corresponds with the Sugatamataviblumgakarika of Jitäri (thugs bcas gzugs 
min yod ma yin) and his auto-commentary confirms this reading: thogs pa med pa'i gzugs yod 
min zhes gsungs so//thogs pa ste rang gi yul du gzhan 'byung ba'i gegs byed pa mam par rig 
byed ma yin pa zhes bya ba'i gsugs gang la med pa de yang yod pa ma yin tel (SMVBh 
94.25-96.1 =P 322b4-5). The verse cited in the Vimalaprabha has almost the same form as 
Jitdri's. I do not know for the moment how to analyse correctly what happened with the 
manuscript of the Jiiänasdrasamuccaya. 
24 The PUnasarasamuccaya is ascribed to Aryadeva. However, lie is not identical with the author of 
the Catulüataka. Even though previous studies show that the Jndnasarasamuccaya is not a genuine 
work of Aryadeva, it was probably considered to be his authoritative work by later Indian 
Mädhyamikas, such as Bodhibhadra, who composed a commentary on the Jiwnasnrasamuccaya. 
25 With regard to Ratnäkaragänti (B), sec chapter 4, footnote 2 (p. 212). 
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arise from images of others, [i. e. external objects, ] similar to them, but 
these [images] have the established nature conformable to the colour of 
atoms. Moreover, they do not accept these three times and postulate that 
even the unconditioned entities are like a son of barren woman. 26 
In this text, the epistemology of the Sauträntika is explained briefly but to the 
point. With regard to epistemology, the Sauträntika insists that our cognition has images 
but they are not images of external objects themselves. Images of our cognition, however, 
arise as being similar to images of external objects, i. e. aggregates of atoms. This explanation 
is in line with that of the Jn nasdrasa, nuccaya. This view that images belong to our 
cognition is called the sükdra view. On the other hand, proponents of the nirakära view 
maintain that images belong to external objects and are projected on our cognition which 
is like a crystal. This is the distinction of the sükdra and nirüküra among externalists 27 
Thus in the works of the Indian Mädhyamikas, the Sauträntikas are understood to 
accept self-awareness. If Bhäviveka is called a Sautrhntika-M, dhyamika only because he 
maintains the existence of external objects in the same way as the atom theory of the 
Sautrintika, his ontology corresponds to that of the Sauträntika, but his epistemology 
does not. Ontology and epistemology of Säntaraksita, a Yogäcära-M, dhyamika, on the 
other hand, correspond to those of the Yog5c5ra that denies external objects and accepts 
self-awareness. Because maintaining the existence of external objects is nothing but 
accepting the atomic theory, there is not much point in calling a Mzdhyamika who holds 
the existence of atoms but does not accept self-awareness a Sautr5ntika-Mädhyamika. 
26 Triyanavyavast ana (Ilayashi [ 1996] p. 51,8-12, Derge ed. No. 3712 tsu 100b4-5, Peking ed. No. 
4535 nu 111 bI -3): 
mdo sde pa mains ni blo main pa dang bcas pa nyid du skye bar rtog cing blo'i main pa rnams 
kyang dc dang 'dra ba gzhan gyi main pa las stye la/ dc yang rdul phra rab klia dog dang rjes 
su mthun par gnas pa'i bdag nyid du 'dod do// yang di dag ni dus gsuni dag 'di khas nti len 
cing 'dus ma byas rnams kyang mo gsham gyi bu dang 'dra bar 'dod pa ste/... 
21 The classification of sdkära and nirakära is applied to both internalist and externalist views. 'I'lie 
Sauträntika and the Sidra-Yogizcara maintain the former view, and the Vaibhäsika and the Nir: ikära- 
Yogiicära hold the latter. The proponents of the snkdra view maintain that cognition is an image 
itself that belongs to cognition. The proponents of the nirjkdra view maintain that cognition is not 
an image itself. Concerning this classification among the Yog5c5ras, see Kajiyama's explanation in 
note 3 above. 
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On the contrary, it could be more appropriate to call him a Vaibhäsika-Mädhyamika 
because the Vaibhzsika accepts the atomic theory and denies self-awareness 28 Therefore, 
this explanation given by dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po in the Gnib mtha' rnain 
bzhag rin then phreng ba is not very convincing. It seems that the first appearance of 
these terms is in the lTa ba'i khyad par written by Ye shes sde. I will mention this 
problem later in this chapter, 29 when we examine the ZTa ba'i khyad par. 
Lastly, it is not clear if it is possible to apply the classification of the Säkzra and 
the Niräkira, which are originally used to distinguish the Yogäcdra depending on whether 
or not cognition has images ultimately, to the classification of the Yogäcära-Mädhyamika 
which accepts the mind-only view only conventionally. In terms of the distinction of the 
S-ikära- and the Nir kära-Yog5cara-M, ýdhyamika, however, there is an Indian account 
which mentions this distinction. While dKon inchog 'jigs med dbang po does not give 
any evidence for this distinction of the Mddhyamika, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (1648-1722), 
who classifies the Mädhyamika basically in the same way as dKon mchog 'jigs med 
dbang po in the Grub mtha' then mno, quotes a passage from Sahajavajra's 
Tattvada, akatikd 30 Sahajavajra, commenting on verse 2b of the Tattvadasaka, states as 
follows: 
[1-7] 
28 According to the JiUnasarasamuccaya, the Vaibhüsika holds that images we perceive belong to 
external objects that are aggregates of atoms, as seen in verse 22 (Mimaki [2000] p. 238,4-5): 
According to the wise, apprehension arisen from eyes has no image, but one experiences 
accumulation of atoms directly. This is considered to be the tenet of the Kashmir Vaibhäsii: as. 
aksaja dhir anakärd s. ksäd veddnusancayam I 
dliunatäm iti käsmiravaibhisikamatam matam 1122 II 
Nevertheless, dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po understands that the Sautrantika who follows 
scriptural authority does not accept self-awareness while the Sauträntika who follows reasoning 
accepts it. (Sec Sopa and Hopkins [1976] p. 92) 'flierefore, if this division of the Sauträntika 
existed in India, the extemalist Mädhyamilca who does not accept self-awareness is rightly called 
Sauträntika-Mädhyamika. At least in the Jiuanasarasamuccaya, however, we do not find this division 
of the Sauträntil: a. 
29See 1.2.1 (p. 31 ff. ). 
30 This is discussed in Matsumoto [1980b] pp. 162-165. It seems that 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa 
follows Tsong kha pa's explanation in the Legs bshad snying po. See 1.2, especially [1-20] (p. 30). 
Concerning the classification of the Sskdua-Mädhyamika and the Niri7l ira-MIdhyamika, see 4.2 
(p. 211 ff. ) of this thesis. 
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Alternatively, "Neither Säkära nor Nirdkäras3' means that the Sik ira- 
Madhyamaka (niam pa dang bcas pa'i dbut ma) and the Niräkära- 
Madhyamaka (rnam pa med pa'i dbu ma) are these two main [tenets] to 
be highlighted. 32 
After this passage Sahajavajra names Säntaraksita and Kambala as proponents of 
the Säk5ra-Madhyamaka and the Nirdkzra-Madhyamaka respectively. Therefore this 
distinction given by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po is 
justified in terms of being based on an Indian source. It is also known from this that 
Säntaraksita was regarded as the Säkära-Mädhyamika and Kambala as the Niräkära- 
Mädhyamika already in India by the 11th C. 33 Nevertheless classification of Haribhadra 
and Jitäri into the Nirdkira-Mzdhyamika is problematic. dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang 
po does not give us any reason for their classification. As Matsumoto points out, " 
however, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa quotes from Haribhadra's Abhisarnaydlamkara 
Sphuft rtha to justify his classification of Haribhadra as a Niräkära-M idhyamika. The 
original passage of Haribhadra is translated as follows: 
[1-8] 
[Then he], observing that when there is no perceived object, there is no 
perceiving subject, [should] shake off even this state of representation-only 
(vijnaptimi7tratii), whose nature is the image of the perceiving subject. 
31 Tattvadasaka, v. tab (Shastri 11 [1927] p. 59,4, Mikkyö [1991] p. 92,4): 
I7lere is neither Serra nor Nir ra for those who desire to know the reality. 
na säl: äranirakare tathatäm jnätum icchatali I (v. 2ab) 
I here follow the reading of Shastri. 
327attvadasakattka (Derge ed. No. 2254 wi 164b5, Peking ed. No. 3099 mi 180a5-6): 
yang na/ 
mam boas ma yin mam med min // 
zlies bya ba ni mam pa dang bcas pa'i dbu ma dang/ mam pa med pa'i dbu ma gsaP bar bya 
ba'i gtso bo 'di dag go(2)// 
(1) I): gsal, P: bsal. (2) D: gtso bo'i di dag go, P: gtso bo 'di dag go. 
33 Sahajavajra is considered a disciple of Advayavajra and Advayavajra is contemporary with Atisa 
(982-1054). See IIadano [1987] (pp. 168-169 and pp. 172-173). 
34 Matsumoto [1980b] p. 174 and p. 180 note 25. 
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[Then he should] ascertain that nothing but the non-dual (advaya) cognition 
is existent in reality. 35 
According to Matsumoto, this is the stage of denying the view of the Sikdra- 
Cittamitra from the viewpoint of the Nirikira-Cittam tra in gradual stages of cultivation 
(bhnvanükrama) from the externalist view through the view of the Säkära-Cittam, tra and 
the Niräk5ra-Cittam5tra to that of the Madhyamaka. This way of progressing stages from 
a lower view to a higher one is also seen in Szntaraksita's and Kainalasila's works. 36 
Kajiyama examines this matter further. According to him, this passage corresponds to 
[1-11] of the following passage in the Abhisamnayälamkdrillokä of Haribhadra, which we 
have in Sanskrit: 
[1-9] 
To explain, [a Yogin should] abandon attachment to the Self, considering 
that there is no Self because of emptiness of arising or cessation. 
[1-10] 
[Then he should] recognise as having a nature free from the [Self] the 
[five] constituents, and so on, which arise in dependence and whose 
characteristic is arising and cessation. [Then he], whose attachment to the 
mind in its aspect of the perceiving subject is unremoved, [should] remove 
attachment to external objects, thinking that because blue and its cognition 
are always perceived together, this is indeed mind-only and not external 
objects. 
[1-11] 
35 Sphutart a, (Amano [1975] p. 227,23-26, Derge ed No. 3793 ja, Peking cd. No. 5191 ja 
144a6-7): 
gzung ba med na Win pa med do snyam du nges par Sems pas 'dzin pa'i rnam pa'i mtshan 
nyid ream par rig pa tsam de yang bsal te/ gnyis su mcd pa'i ye shes 'ba' zhig 'di yang dag par 
yod pa'i ngo bo yin no snyam du nges par byas nas/... 
36 Matsumoto [1980b] p. 174.1 will compare the stages of cultivation given by Kamalas'i1a and 
I laribhadra in 4.2 (p. 240 ff. ) of this thesis. 
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[Then he], observing that when there is no perceived object, there is no 
perceiving subject, [should] shake off even this state of representation-only 
(vijiiaptimütratd), whose character is the image of the perceiving subject. 
[1-12] 
[Then he should] ascertain that nothing but the non-dual (advaya) cognition 
is existent in reality. 
[1-13] 
[Then he should] meditate that in reality that [non-dual cognition 
(advayaji2 na)] also lacks its intrinsic nature like an illusion because it 
arises in dependence, and free from the nature of one sided reflection of 
existence, non-existence and so on. When the power of the meditation is 
completed, and like some people's knowledge of jewel, silver, and so on, 
there arises apprehension illuminating by itself like an illusion, with all 
causes of faults eliminated, free from conceptualisation and which is 
somehow individually known, the Yogin should completely abandon the 
obscuration of what can be known (jüeyävarana). 37 
Kajiyama points out38 that this is nothing but stages of cultivation from (1) 
abandonment of the view of outsiders who have attachment to the Self [1-9], through (2) 
abandonment of the view of the Sautrintika and the SarvAstivzda who have attachment 
to external objects [1-10], (3) abandonment of the view which seems to be the Säkäraväda 
37 Abhisamayalamkaraloka (WVogiwara [1932] p. 884,18-p. 885,1): 
tath3 by udayavyayasünyatvän nasty iitmeti vibhävayann ätmäbhinivesam parityajya 
tadviviktasvabhävam skandliädikam pratityasamutpannam udayavyayadliarmakam 
samupalabhya nllataddhiyoh saliopalambhaniyamäc cittamatram evcdam na bäl yo 'rtho 'stiti 
manasikurvan aparityaktagrähakäkäracittäbhinivego bähyärthäbhinivesam tiraskrtya I 
grähyäbhävc grshakäbhäva iti nidhyäyams tam api gr hakäkäralal-sanäm vijnaptimätratäm 
avadhüyädvayajnänam eva kevalam bhävato bhävarüpam iti niscitya I tad api 
pratityasamutpannatvän mayävan nihsvabhävam tattvato'pagataikäntab1 väbhävädiparämarsa- 
rtipam iti bhävayan I bhävanäbalanispattau kesiimcin maninipyädijnänavad utsäritasakala- 
bhräntinimittäyii mäyopamätmapratibhäsadhiyo nirvikalpäyäh kathamcit pratyätma-vedyäyäh 
samutpäde jneyävaranam samyag yogi prajahyät II 
38 Kajiyama [1982] pp. 67-71. 
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of the Cittamätra [1-11] and (4) abandonment of the view of the Niräkära-Cittamätra 
[1-12], up to (5) the highest truth of the Madhyamaka in which even non-dual knowledge, 
i. e. self-awareness, which is maintained to be free from the subject-object dichotomy by 
the Nirzkära-Cittamitra is empty because of dependent origination [1-13]. As a result, he 
confirms Matsumoto's claim that this is not a sufficient evidence to classify Haribhadra 
into the Nirikzra-M5dhyamika. 39 On the other hand, it is not clear on what basis 'Jam 
dbyangs bzhad pa and dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po classify Jitäri into the Samala- 
ao Nirzkära-Mädhyamika. 
In this way, Grub intha' texts in the later period contain some problematic 
classification and we cannot accept their explanation without careful examination. Because 
it seems that the Lain rim chen mo composed by Tsong kha pa is the basis of these 
doxographical texts of the dGe lugs order, we shall examine it next in order to compare 
the early accounts and the later ones. 
1.2 Tsong kha pa 
The Lain rim chen mno, composed by Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), the founder of 
the dGe lugs order of Tibetan Buddhism, is of special interest to us in terms of its 
classification of the Indian Madhyamaka. In that text, lie gives three ways of classification 
of the Midhyamikas: (1) the Svätantrika (rang rgyud pa) and the Präsangika (thal 'gyur 
ba), (2) the Sauträntika-M dhyamika (m(lo sde spyod pa'i dint ma ba, *sauträntikäcnra- 
mädhyamika) and the YogZc ra-MZdhyamika (rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dint ma ba) and (3) 
the M3yopamädvayavidin (sgyu ma rigs grub pa) and the Sarvadharm5pratisth5navädin 
(rab tit mi gnas par smra ba) 41 Not only does he mention the names of these sub-schools 
and their views but also gives the ground for their validation. Considering his influence 
39 Matsumoto [1980b] p. 174. 
40 Shirasaki [1986] classifies Jit -i into the Samala-Niräl: ära-Mädhyamika. I am, however, not fully 
convinced with his argument because I doubt that there was the distinction of the Samala-Nirsl: ära- 
Moclliyamika and the Nirmala-Nirak ira-Mädhyamika in India. I discuss this matter in the fourth 
chapter. 
41 Concerning the designations of the third classification in Sanskrit and in Tibetan, see Ruegg 
11981 a] (pp. 58-9) and Napper 119891 (p. 403 and p. 813, note 502). 
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on later Tibetan Buddhism, we can assume that his classification may have become a 
model of the classification of Indian Madhyamaka in Tibet. In some parts, however, his 
expression is somewhat ambiguous and it has caused controversy among his disciples. 
To examine his account, I first translate the part of the Lam rim chen mo which is related 
to the classification of Mädhyamikas: 
[1-14] 
Concerning the [classification of Mzdhyamikas] certain spiritual advisers 
(dge ba'i bshes gnyen) of the previous generation said: 
Mädhyamikas, who are designated according to the way of positing 
common usage (tha snyad, *vyavahara), are of two types: the 
Sauträntika-Mädhyamikas, who assert that external objects exist 
at the level of common usage, and the Yoglcära-Mzdhyamikas, 
who assert that external objects do not exist at the level of common 
usage. [Mädhyamikas] who are designated according to the way 
of postulating the ultimate are also of two types: the 
Mayopamädvayavidins (sgyu ma rigs grub pa), who assert that 
collection of the two, appearance and emptiness, is an ultimate 
truth, and the Sarvadharmipratisthänavidins (rab tu mi gnas par 
smra pa), who assert that the mere elimination of discriminative 
thought (*prapanca) with respect to appearances is an ultimate 
truth. 
They asserted that the former of these two are the masters Szntaraksita, 
Kainalasi1a, and others. The common usage inayoparnd and apratisthdna 
are asserted also by some Indian teachers. 2 
42 Lam rim then mo (p. 571,20-p. 572,7): 
de la snga rabs pa'i dge ba'i bshes gnyen klia cig na re/ 
tha snyad 'jog tshul gyi sgo nas ming btags pa'i dbu ma ba ni gnyis te/ tha 
snyad du phyi rol yocl par 'dod pa mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma ha dang/ tha 
snyad du phyi rol med par 'dod pa mal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma ba'o// don dam 
pa 'dod tshul gyi sgo nas ming btags pa'ang gnyis te/ snang stong gnyis tshogs 
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[1-15] 
Indeed, in general, some Indian and Tibetan äcdryas who claimed to be 
the Mzdhyamikas did make such assertions, but what is to be settled here 
is just the views of the great Madhyamikas who are followers of the 
jcdrya N igärjuna. Who can explain the subtleties? Moreover, the statement 
by the great translator, bLo Idan shes rab, that classifying [the 
Mädhyamikas] into two by way of their mode of asserting the ultimate is 
a presentation generating delight in the obscured is very good. 
For, their assertion appears to be an assertion that the mere object 
which is comprehended by inferential reasoning is an ultimate truth, whereas 
it is said in both Säntaraksita's Madhyamakdlamkdra and Kamalasila's 
Madhyamaküloka that an object comprehended by reasoning is designated 
ultimate due to being conformable to the ultimate truth. Also since the 
other great Midhyamikas do not assert that the mere object which is 
elimination of discriminative thought through reasoning is the ultimate 
truth, [this] is not good. 3 
[1-16] 
Concerning this, the ücärya Ye shes sde explains that in the Madhyamaka 
treatises composed by the dcürya noble father (Nägärjuna) and his son 
don dam bden par 'dod pa sgyu ma rigs grub pa dang/ snang ba la spros pa rnam 
par bead pa tsam don dam bden par 'dod pa rab tu mi gnas par smra ba'o// 
dc gnyis kyi snga ma ni slob dpon zhi ba 'tsho dang ka ma la sh'i la la sogs pa yin par 'dod la/ 
sgyu ma Ita bu dang rab tu mi gnas pa'i tha snyad ni rgya gar ba'i slob dpon kha cig kyang 
'dod do// 
43 Lant rint chen nto (p. 572,8-17): 
spyir dbu ma bar khas 'che ba'i rgya bod kyi slob dpon 'ga' re dc liar du 'dod pa yod mod 
kyang/ slob dpon klu sgrub kyi rjes su 'brang ba'i dbu ma ba chen po reams kyi lugs ji Itar yin 
gtan la dbab par bya yi/ phra mo reams su zhig gis bshad par nus/ gzhan yang/ don dam 'dod 
tshul gyi spo nas gnyis su bzhag pa ni rmongs pa ngo mtshar skyed pa'i mam gzhag go zhes lo 
tsha'a ba" chen po blo Idan slies rab gsung ba ni shin tu legs te/ de dag gi 'dod pa ni rigs sties 
rjes dpag gis gzhal ba'i don tsam don dam bden par 'dod par snang la/ rigs sties lyi gzhal bya 
ni don dam bdcn pa dang mthun pas don dam zhes btags par dbu ma rgyan dang snang ba 
gnyis ka nas gsungs pa'i phyir ro// dbu eia ba chen po gzhan mains kyang rigs pas spros pa 
bead pa'i (ion de tram ni don dam bden par mi bzhed pas legs pa ma yin no// 
(1) Ed. lo tstsha ba 
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(Aryadeva), the way external objects do and do not exist was not made 
clear, and that after them the dcdrya Bh-5viveka, having refuted the view 
of the representation-only, posited a view in which external objects exist 
at the level of common usage. Then because the dcdrya Sintaraksita 
made a different way of Madhyamaka which teaches, depending on 
Yogicära texts, that external objects do not exist at the level of common 
usage and also teaches that mind lacks intrinsic nature ultimately, the 
Mädhyamika became of two types. The former is designated Sauträntika- 
Midhyamika and the latter Yogäcära-Mädhyamika. [Concerning his 
explanation, ] the sequence of history is evident in this way. 4 
[1-17] 
However, although the äcarya Candrakirti asserts that external objects 
exist at the level of common usage, because he does not agree with 
proponents of other doctrines it is not appropriate to call him a 
Sauträntika-[Mädhyamika]. Likewise, it is very irrational again to assert 
that he accords with the Vaibhzsika. 45 
Scholars of the later dissemination to the range of the snowy mountains 
(Tibet) use the twofold common usage, Priisatigika and Svätantrika for 
Mädhyamikas, and because this accords with Candrakirti's Prasannapadn, 
you should not think that it is their own fabrication" 
ai Lam rim chen nzo (p. 572,17-p. 573,5): 
'di la slob dpon ye shes sde na re/ slob dpon 'phags pa yab sras kyis dbu ma'i bstan bcos 
mdzad pa las phy'i don yod med kyi tshul gsal bar ma mdzad la/ de'i 'og tu slob dpon legs 
Idan 'byed kyis main par rig pa tram gyi lugs sun phyung ste/ tha snyad du phyi'i don yod pa'i 
lugs mam par bzliag go// de nas slob dpon zhi ba 'tshos mal 'byor spyod pa'i gzhung la brien 
nas tha snyad du phyi rol med pa dang don dam par sems rang bzhin med par ston pa'i dbu 
ma'i tshul mi 'dra ba zhig mdzad pas dbu ma ba main pa gnyis su byung zhing/ snga ma la 
mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma ba zhes pa dang phyi nia la mal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma ba zhes 
btags so zhes 'chad pa ni byung ba'i rim pa de Itar du mngon no// 
45, I1 is view is based on Candrakirti's statement in the Madhyamakävatdrablzasya. See chapter 2.11. 
Cf. Legs shad snying po (p. 132,17-p. 133,5). 
46 Lam rim then mo (p. 573,5-10): 
'on kyang slob dpon zla ba grags pa ni tha snyad du phyi rol yod par bzhed kyang grub mtha' 
smra ba gzhan dang sgo mi bstun pas mdo sde spyod pa zhes byar mi rung la/ de bzliin du bye 
brag tu smra ba dang mthun par 'dod pa'ang shin tu mi rigs so// 
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[1-18] 
Therefore, [Midhyamikas] are certainly of two types: those who do and 
do not assert external objects at the level of common usage. Also if 
names are designated according to the way the view ascertaining emptiness, 
the ultimate, arises in the continuum, they are of two types, the Prlsaügika 
and the Svätantrika 47 
These passages tell us many important points in terms of the divisions of 
M, dhyamikas. Since I raised four questions in the previous chapter, let us see how 
Tsong kha pa's account deals with these problems. 
Firstly, concerning the question whether the Sautrzntika-Madhyainaka and the 
Yogicdra-Madhyamaka are sub-schools of the Svatantrika, it seems that Tsong kha pa 
does not combine the classification based on conventional existence and that of the 
Präsangika and the Svätantrika although he does not include Candrakirti in the Sautrzntika- 
Mädhyamika. This is in line with the theory that the combination of these two classifications 
was developed in Tibet 48 
Secondly, passage [1-17] suggests that there was controversy over the validity of 
the classification of the Präsangika and the Svztantrika. The oldest textual evidence of 
the term `Svätantrika' is Jayznanda's commentary on the MadhyamakJvatdra, which 
gangs ri'i khrod lyi phyi dar gyi mkhas pa mams dbu ma ba la thal 'gyur ba dang rang 
rgyud pa gnyis kyi tha snyad bycd pa ni tshig gsal dang mthun pas rang bzor mi bsam mo// 
"Lam rim then mo (p. 573,10-12): 
des na tha snyad du phyi rol 'dod mi 'dod gnyis su nges la don dani pa stong pa nyid nges pa'i 
Ita ba rgyud la slycd tshul gyi sgo nas ming 'dogs na'ang thal rang gnyis su nges pa yin no// 
48 Mimaki [1982a] and [1983] (pp. 161-165) shows that according to dBus pa blo gsal (14th C) 
these two are not regarded as subdivisions of the Svätantrika. When dßus pa bio gsal distinguishes 
the Svätantrika and the Prasangika, he classifies Ridnagarbha as a Sviitantril: a. However, when lie 
distinguishes how Mädhyamikas understand the conventional world, lie classifies Jnänagarbha as a 
'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dBu ma pa (Lokaprasiddha-Mädhyamika? ) together with Candrakzrti. 
Ile classifies Jnänagarbha neither as a Yog5cära-Mädhyamika nor as a Sauträntika-Mädhyamika 
which are often regarded as a subdivision of the Svätantrika-Mädhyamika. This possibly implies 
that these two types of Mddhyamika sub-divisions, i. e. Svdtantrika: l'räsangika and 
Yogäcdra: Sauträntika had not been combined at the time of dBus pa blo gsal. Mimaki also shows 
that Tsong kha pa, who is roughly contemporary with dBus pa blo gsal, does not clearly combine 
these two types of classification in the Lam rim then mo. 
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was written outside India in the 12th C 4" Tsong kha pa seems to have known the fact 
that these terms are not found in Indian sources but gives support to this classification on 
the basis of the Prasannapadd. At the same time, this shows the fact that some Tibetan 
teachers before Tsong kha pa had already raised a question with regard to the validity of 
this classification. 
Thirdly, concerning the derivation of the term `Sauträntika-MAdhyamika' and 
disagreement of epistemology between the Sauträntika and the Sauträntika-Madhyamaka, 
Ye shes sde's account on the division based on conventional existence is regarded as 
authoritative since Tsong kha pa follows it. He does not explain here if Bhäviveka is 
called a Sauträntika-M idhyamika in the sense of one who follows the view of the 
Sauträntika conventionally. However, when Tsong kha pa excludes Candrakirti from the 
Sautrzntika-Midhyamika, he explains that Candrakirti's view on conventionality accords 
neither with the Sauträntika nor with the Vaibhasika, and that Säntaraksita follows Yog, cära 
texts. Therefore we can assume that Tsong kha pa uses the term `Sautr5ntika-Mädhyamika' 
in the sense of the M idhyamika who follows the view of the Sautrintika conventionally. 
He, however, does not clearly mention that Bhzviveka's epistemology corresponds to 
that of the Sautrantika school. Therefore, it is not clear if Tsong kha pa holds that 
Bhiviveka denies self-awareness conventionally from this part of the Lain rin then mo. 
Nevertheless, Tsong kha pa mentions the epistemology of Bhäviveka's system in 
the Legs bshad snying po, which is translated as follows: 
[1-19] 
With regard to this, [i. e. how conventional objects and cognition are 
maintained, ] the noble father (Nägärjuna) and son (Aryadeva) do not 
teach clearly by distinguishing whether external [objects] exist or not, at 
the level of common usage. However, this ücarya (Bhäviveka) maintains 
that at the level of common usage, external [objects] exist, cognition from 
sense faculties does not perceive them without having images but perceives 
by possessing images, and these two [external objects and cognition] are 
49 Sec p. 43 footnote 81. 
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earlier causes and later effects so 
Here Tsong kha pa understands that Bh iviveka maintains cognition with images 
(sdkdrajflana) conventionally. Bhlviveka's view on conventionality is thus explained in 
accordance with the view of the Sautrhntika in terms of ontology as well as of epistemology. 
If we postulate the säkdra view, we have to accept self-awareness because what we 
actually perceive is an image in cognition, and an external object is not directly perceived 
by cognition. This does not agree with the view of dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po in 
the Grub intha' rncnn bzhag rin then phreng ba, which explains that the Sauträntika- 
Mädhyamikas deny self-awareness conventionally. " It is surprising that later dGe lugs 
teachers did not follow Tsong kha pa's view because it makes more sense if the Sauträntika- 
Mädhyamika follows the Sautr intika conventionally in terms both of epistemology and 
ontology. 
Finally, concerning the S5kara-Yogicdra-M5dhyamika and the Nirdkära-Yogacira- 
Mädhyamika, Tsong kha pa does not provide any information in the Lam riet chen rno. 
Instead, he presents the division of the Mäyopamädvayavädin and the 
Sarvadharm pratisthänavidin, which is not mentioned in the Grub mtha' main bzhag rin 
then phreng ba of dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po. It is not clear by what criterion the 
Miyopam5dvayav din and the Sarvadharmzpratisthznavidin are classified, except for 
Tsong kha pa's predecessors' opinion that it is the classification based on the ultimate 
truth. On this point, Napper has done an excellent study 52 According to her, later 
commentarial tradition is divided into two groups. One group of teachers hold that the 
Mzyopam idvayavidin and the Sarvadharm5pratisth5navädin are alternative names for 
the Svitantrika and the Präsangika. The other group of teachers maintain that Tsong kha 
pa denied legitimacy of this classification. This seems to have been caused by the 
50 Legs bshad snying po (p. 109,17-p. 110,3): 
'di la 'phags pa yab sras kyis ni tha snyad du phyi rol yod mal phye nas gsal bor bshad pa 
mcd la slob dpon 'dis tha snyad du phyi rol yod pa dang dbang bo'i sties pas don mam mcd du 
mi 'dzin gl/ rnam Idan gyi sgo nas 'dzin pa dang de gnyis rgyu 'bras snga phyi bar bzhed do// 
51See [1-2] (p. 12). 
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ambiguity of the passage [1-15] above. It seems he does not support this classification 
given by earlier teachers because S, --intaraksita and Kamalasila, whom they regard as the 
M iyopamidvayavädins, do not postulate that the mere object which is comprehended by 
inferential reasoning is the ultimate truth. It is, however, not clear whether he points out 
only a misunderstanding of the earlier teachers or denies this way of classification 
entirely. 53 As a result, some later dGe lugs teachers understand that this classification is 
illegitimate and others consider that the Mäyopamädvayavdin and the 
Sarvadharmäpratisthänav, idin are another designation of the Sv itantrika and the 
Prisangika. 
Although Tsong kha pa does not mention the classification of the Säkära- 
Mädhyamika and Nirakira-M idhyamika in the Lam rim then mo, he does briefly mention 
it in the Legs bshad snying po: 
[1-20] 
This view [of Säntaraksita] maintains that appearance of blue, yellow and 
others are real. Because it is explained in this way in Dharmakirti's view, 
too, this is the M, dhyamika that conventionally maintains [mind-only] in 
accordance with the Säk, ra school. It establishes self-awareness 
conventionally, but does not clearly explain whether or not it establishes 
the dlayavijnäna. It is, however, seen to be on the side of not maintaining 
it. The pandita Sahajavajra explains that the Mädhyamika that maintains, 
at the level of common usage, that appearance of blue, yellow and others 
are unreal, in accordance with the Nirikära school, seems to be explicated 
by the acürya Kambala. 54 
53 In passage [1-15], '1'song kha pa says, "[this] is not good. " It is not clear whether this classification 
is not good, i. e. lie denies this classification, or this explanation is not good, i. e. lie accepts the 
classification itself. 
$i Legs bshad snying po (p. 119,1-7): 
lugs 'dis sngo ser la sogs pa'i ream pa dngos por 'dod de/ chos kyi grags pa'i bzhed pa yang 
de Isar 'grel pas tha snyad du ream bden pa liar 'dod pa'i dhu ma pa'o// rang rig tha snyad du 
'jog la kun gzhi 'jog mi 'jog gi tshul gsal bar ma bsliad kyang mi bzhed pa'i phyogs su mngon 
no// tha snyad du sngo scr la sogs pa'i main pa reams dngos por med pa main rdzun pa liar 
'dod pa'i dbu ma pa ni/ slob dpon Iva ba pas bkral ba ltar yin no zhes pa ndi to than cig skyes 
pa'i rdo rjes bshad do// 
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Szntaraksita and Kambala are understood as the S1ktra-M5dhyamika and the 
Nirakara-Mzdhyamika respectively on the grounds of Sahajavajra's statement. 55 This is 
probably the basis of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's explanation in the Grub mtha' then mo. 
Here Säntaraksita is considered a Szkira-Mädhyamika. It should be noted that his name 
is also given by some earlier teachers as a Mäyopamidvayav din in the Lain rim then 
mo, and that the explanation in [1-14] seems to have something to do with existence of 
appearance at the ultimate level. Therefore this distinction may be related to the distinction 
of the Mäyopamädvayavidin and the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavidin. In any rate, it is 
necessary to examine both Indian sources and other Tibetan sources mentioning these 
distinctions. 
In this way, Tsong kha pa gives three different types of distinction in the Lain rim 
then mo, 56 i. e. the Sauträntika-Midhyamika and the Yogäcära-Mzdhyamika, the 
Svätantrika and the Präsangika, and the M5yopam, dvayav5din and the 
Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin. In addition to them, he mentions the Skara-Madhyamika 
and the Niräkära-Mzdhyamika in the Legs bshad snying po. It seems that Tsong kha pa's 
view became the model for later Tibetan doxography of Indian Madhyamaka since most 
of the classifications known from later accounts were already mentioned by him. 
Nevertheless, later doxographers' views do not always agree with his, and all of these 
classifications contain problems in one way or another. In the following sections, therefore, 
we will examine how other Tibetan teachers explain these classifications. 
1.2.1 Sauträntika-Mädhyamika and Yogäcära-Mädhyamika 
Of the four different types of classification which Tsong kha pa presents in the 
Lain rim then nio and the Legs bshad snying po, the classification of the Sauträntika- 
Mädhyamika and the Yogäcdra-Mftdhyainika is based on the ITa ba'i khyad par composed 
55 See 1.1, quotation [1-7] (pp. 19-20). 
56 To be precise, he gives four, including distinction between the Mädhyamika of fundamental texts 
(gzhung phyi mo'i dbu ma pa) and the partisan Mädhyamika (phyogs 'dzin pa'i dbu ma pa). 1, 
however, do not examine this classification because they are not rival factions existing at the same 
time. 
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by Ye shes sde (ca. 8-9th C), 57 as described in the Lain rim chen mo. 58 Ye shes sde was a 
chief translator (zhu cheng gyi lo t sä ba) at the time of the earlier dissemination of 
Buddhism into Tibet. As he translated many texts, it is probable that his account is 
relatively reliable. It seems that this text is, among Tibetan texts, the source of the terms 
`Sautrintika-Madhyamaka / Wdhyamika' and `Yogac5ra-Madhyamaka / Mädhyamika' 
which are used to name the externalist and the internalist Madhyamakas / M5dhyamikas. 
Concerning this way of classification, the question is how the terms were derived. Tsong 
kha pa seems to understand that the externalist Mädhyamikas represented by Bhzviveka 
is called `Sauträntika'-Mädhyamikas because he asserts that external objects and cognition 
with images exist conventionally in agreement with the Sauträntika view. This means 
that the Sauträntika-Midhyamika maintains both self-awareness of cognition and existence 
of external objects. dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po in the Grub mtha' rncnn bzhag rin 
chen phreng ba, however, explains that Bhäviveka denies self-awareness conventionally. 
It is now necessary to examine how Ye shes sde understands this classification in the 17'a 
ba'i khyad par, which is the oldest account of this classification known to us. As 
Ueyama reports, the contents of the 17'a ba'i khyad par kept in the Tibetan Tripitaka are 
considerably disarranged, compared with the ITa ba'i khyad par found in Dun-huang 59 
The following translation of the Ma ba'i khyad par (the part of exposition of Madhyamaka 
views) is therefore based on Pelliot Tibetan No. 814, which is edited by Ueyama 60 
Translation of the 1Ta ba'i khyad Par 
[1-21] 
If one asks what are the characteristics of the two types of Madhyamaka 
57 According to Ueyama's study, Fa eben (Chos grub), in the Da cheng dao yu jing sui ling shu, a 
commentary on the Shcislambasatra, quotes passages from Ye shes sde's ITa ba'i khyad par 
(Ueyama [1968] pp. 147-155 and pp. 193-207). A manuscript of the commentary is written in 838 
(Ueyama [1967] pp. 152-153). On the other hand, Ye she sde mentions Kamalasila (ca. 740-797) in 
his ITa ba'i khyad par. Therefore, Ye shes sde is considered to have lived around the second half of 
the 8th C and the first half of the 9th C. 
59 See [1-16]. 
59 See Ueyama [1977] pp. 27-29 and Ruegg [1981b] pp. 212-213. 
60 The text is edited in Ueyama [1977] pp. 32-33. See Appendix 1 (p. 276 ff. ). 
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(dbtt'na main gnyis), [they are as follows]: 
[1-22] 
Fonnerly, the Madhyamaka teacher, ncnrya Näg, rjuna and Aryadeva only 
made Madhyamaha treatises, and there was no division into the two 
types. 
[1-231 
After it, the noble Asanga and Vasubandhu made the treatises which 
maintain mind-only. Having established that although external objects do 
not exist, consciousness appears as objects, they explained that pure non- 
dual consciousness exists ultimately as well. Later, however, there lived a 
Madhyamaka teacher called Bhavya (Bhäviveka), who acquired perfection 
which has instruction of Nägärjuna's view. Having refuted the opinion of 
representation-only, he composed [a text] called Prajn`npradtpa (shes rab 
sgron ma), a commentary on the Madhyamakakdrikü (dbu mna'i ka ri ka) 
composed bythe äcarya Nägdrjuna, and [a text] called Madhyainakahrdaya 
(dbu ma'i snying po). 
[1-24] 
The intermediate teacher called Säntaraksita, having depended on the 
treatise of representation-only, the Yogdcara[bhicmi], composed by the 
äcürya Asanga, composed a Madhyamaka treatise called 
Madhyamakälamkdra, which establishes representation-only 
conventionally, following its (the Yogacarabhümi's) view but explains 
that even consciousness lacks intrinsic nature ultimately. Because two 
[types of] Madhyamaka treatises which do not agree slightly came into 
existence, [the texts] composed by Bhäviveka are named mDo sde (spyod) 
pa'i dBu ma (Sauträntika-Madhyamaka? ) 61 and [the texts] composed by 
61 According to Matsumoto (1981a] (p. 115, note 16), the original Tibetan word is mdo sde pa'i dbu 
ma in Peking edition (No. 5847 cho 252b1) but Pelliot No. 814 (5a6) has mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu 
33 
Chapter I Tibetan Accounts 
thedcdrya Sintaraksita are named rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dßu ma (Yogficära- 
Madhyamaka? ). 
[1-25] 
In [the texts] composed by the äcdrya N glrjuna and Aryadeva, it is 
explained, as it appears in the Arya-Prajfläparamitä(sirtra) and others: 
Because on the whole, things arise in dependence, there is arising 
only in a similar way to illusion conventionally. But it is impossible 
to arise ultimately either from itself, from others, from both or 
from non-cause, and there is no intrinsic nature. 
Therefore, both [types of] Madhyamakas depend on those [texts of 
Nägärjuna and Aryadeva]. 
[1-26] 
Of these, the view of the rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dBu ina is explained [as 
follows]: Conventionally, in conformity to the proponents of representation- 
only, even if consciousness perceives objects, it is possible to perceive 
[the objects] because objects themselves are the intrinsic nature of 
consciousness, due to connection [between cognition and objects] by means 
of self-awareness. However, if it is postulated that objects are different 
[from consciousness], because there is no connection to cognition, it is 
impossible to cognise [them]. Even if it appears that [perception] arises in 
dependence on external causes, to explain, it is the same way that what is 
seen in a dream is seeing mind itself without objects, as it is also taught 
in the Lahkävatära: 
A material form (rilpa) does not exist externally. hiternal mind 
appears as external. 62 
ma. Ile concludes that it is not possible to decide which is right. 
62 Lankdvatdrasutra, v. 10: 489ab (Nanjo [1923] pp. 326,8). With regard to the identification of the 
quotations in the ITa ba'i khyad par, I followed Matsumoto [1981a]. 
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Ultimately, even that mind is not established as existent by means of the 
reasoning `lack of one intrinsic nature and many'. If [one asks] how, [I 
answer that] if objects themselves are the intrinsic nature of consciousness, 
either mind also becomes many because objects are various and many, or 
objects also do not become diverse, like the mind. Therefore, relying on 
mind-only, it should be understood that external objects do not exist. 
Relying on this way of Madhyamaka, it should be understood that even 
that mind lacks Self, as it is found also in the Arya-Lokottaraparivarta: 
Oh, Jinaputras, the triple world is mind-only, and also the three 
times are understood as mind-only. Then even that mind is 
understood to be without extreme and middle 63 
Also it is said in the Lar kävatara: 
Having relied on mind-only, one should not consider external 
objects. 
Having abided in the reality, one should go beyond even mind-only. 
Having gone beyond the mind-only, one should go beyond non- 
appearance [of subject and object]. 
The Yogin who abides in non-appearance sees the Great Way. " 
Therefore this way of Madhyamaka does not contradict the silt ras. 
[1-27] 
The view of the mDo sde dBu ma explains that all external and internal 
things arise in dependence, in accordance with the view of [the texts] 
composed by the ücärya Nägärjuna. Because they arise from causes and 
conditions conventionally, they exist just like an illusion. But by means 
of the four-part reasoning that it is impossible [for something] to arise 
6' Lokottaraparivarta (Peking cd. No. 761 shi 179b8-180a1) 
64 Lanlnvatdrasütra, vv. 10: 256-257 (Nanjo [1923] p. 298,5-p. 299,1) 
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ultimately either from itself, from others, from both or from non-cause, 
there is no arising of things.. 65 
... 
[The passage] found in the Arya-Dasabhirmika: 
The triple world is mind-only. 
is a denial of the agent and the recipient66 because it is said in that very 
sit-Ira: 
When, in this way, having examined arising in dependence in ten 
ways, one examined that they are without Self (ütman), without 
life (jiva), without person (pudgala), empty of substantiality and 
without the agent and the recipient in nature, the entrance to 
liberation of emptiness arises 67 
It is explained that although it is found in the Arya-Lariküvatära, and so 
forth that there are no external objects, mind appears as those [external 
objects]. This is taught in this way in order to make use for cultivation by 
denying that things exist ultimately and by postulating mind-only, 
considering [the fact] that objects, which arise in dependence without 
being established as existence by nature, are superimposed as existent by 
conceptual construct. 
[1-281 
It is said in the Madhyamaka treatise called Madhyamaküloka composed 
by Kamalasila: 
Although conventionally the two types of Madhyamakas do not 
65 The following part that explains the impossibility of the four ways of arising is omitted for it is 
less relevant. 
'6 The explanation that the sutra's passage "ne triple world is mind-only" is a denial of the agent 
and recipient is very similar to the explanation of the externalist Mädhyamika in the 
MadhyamakdlamkOravrlli of Säntaraksita. See 2.7 (p. 85) of this thesis. 
67Dasabhümika (Kondo 119361 p. 102) 
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agree slightly, there is no contradiction because they are the same 
in maintaining that ultimately all internal and external entities lack 
intrinsic nature. 68 
Concerning this description made by Ye shes sde, Matsumoto6' made the following 
four observations and I do not have much to add to them at this stage. Therefore I will 
show Matsumoto's view on the 171a ba'i khyad par. 
First, the designations `mDo sde dBu ma' and `rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dBu ma' are 
given respectively to the texts made by Bhäviveka and Säntaraksita. In the Lam rim chen 
mo, `mDo sde spyod pa'i dBu ma pa' and `rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dBu ma pa' are clearly 
used as names of sub-schools while `mDo sde dBu ma' and `rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dBu 
ma' in the 11 a ba'i khyad par are not. 
Second, in the 171a ba'i khyad par `mdo sde' of `mDo sde dBu ma' means siitras 
such as the I'rajnäpäramit siitra but not the Sautrantika as a Buddhist philosophical 
school. In the same way, `rNal 'byor spyod pa' indicates texts such as the Yogacnrabhilmi. 
In other words, `mDo sde dBu ma' means the Madhyamaka [text] depending on sistras 
such as the Prajnäpüramiti7sirtra and `rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dBu ma' the Madhyamaka 
[text] depending on the Yogacarablhami. '° 
Third, it seems that in the Ma ba'i khyad par the view of the mDo sde dBu ma is 
considered superior to that of the rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dBu ma because Ye shes sde 
places the description of the mDo sde dBu ma after that of the rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dBu 
ma. " 
68 According to Matsumoto [1981a] (p. 111), this is not a word-for-word quotation frone the 
Madhyamaküloka, but there is a passage similar to this quotation in the Madhyamakäloka. (Derge. 
No. 3887 sa 159a7-bl, Peking ed. No. 5287 sa 173b3-4) 
69 Matsumoto [1981a] (p. 113) 
70 Matsumoto's argument on this point is extremely elaborate and I am not confident if I can show 
his theory briefly and precisely here. However I think it is necessary to summarise it because his 
article is written in Japanese. 
71 This conclusion does not agree with ICang skya's view that Ye sties sde was a disciple of 
S. 3ntaraksita and followed his master's Yogiicära-Svätantrika-Madhyamaka. See Lopez [1987] p. 
259. Matsumoto's conclusion is, however, not entirely convincing because the only reason lie gives 
is that Grub mtha' texts tend to place more important doctrines later. 
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Fourth in the l'I'a ba'i khyad par, S ntaraksita and Kamalasila are not considered 
to have the same view. 72 
Of these, the second is of the most interest to us. I show Matsumoto's theory 
below: 
The construction of the text is: In [1-211 the question "what are characteristics of 
two types of Madhyamakas" is raised. Then in [1-22], [1-23] and [1-24] brief history of 
Mah-iyäna Buddhism is shown. In [1-25] the view of Nzglrjuna and Aryadeva is explained. 
And in [1-26] and [1-27] the answer for "what are the characteristics of two types of 
Madhyamakas" is given. 
The brief history of Mahzyina Buddhism is divided into four periods: (1) the 
period Nägärjuna and Aryadeva composed the Madhyamaka treatises and there was no 
distinction of the two Madhyamakas [1-22], (2) the period Asanga and Vasubandhu 
composed the treatises of representation-only (vijnapt n tra), (3) the period in which 
Bhnviveka, a follower of N igzrjuna, composed the Praji pradipa and the 
Madhyamakahrdaya and refuted the proponents of representation-only [1-23], and (4) 
the period in which "Säntaraksita, having depended on the treatise of the representation- 
only, the Yogacjra(bhi ni), composed by the acärya Asatiga, composed the Madhyamaka 
treatise called the Madhyantakdlamküra, which establishes representation-only 
conventionally, following its (the Yogäcirabhiani's) view but explains that even 
consciousness lacks intrinsic nature ultimately" [1-24]. As a result of this, the two 
Madhyamakas came into existence. Here it is very clear that the text composed by 
Sintaraksita is called a Yogiicära-Madhyamaka because it follows the Yogl7ci7rabhiiimi. 
On the other hand, the reason why the text composed by Bhäviveka is called a 
mDo sde dBu ma is shown in [1-25]. There the view of Nägärjuna and Aryadeva is 
shown as "Because, on the whole, things arise in dependence, there is arising only in a 
similar way to an illusion conventionally. But it is impossible [for something] to arise 
ultimately either from itself, from others, from both or from non-cause, and there is no 
intrinsic nature. " This is given as a quotation from the Prajfiapdramitdsii! ra. This is 
?2 Matsumoto [1981 a] pp. 112-113. 
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identical with the view of the mDo sde dBu ma in [1-27], "Because they arise from 
causes and conditions conventionally, they exist just like an illusion. But by means of the 
four-part reasoning that it is impossible [for something] to arise ultimately either from 
itself, from others, from both or from non-cause, there is no arising of things. " In this 
way, the view in the works of Näg5arjuna and Aryadeva accords with the sirtras such as 
the Prajndpärainitäsütra, and the view in Bhiviveka's works is identical with the view 
in the works of Nigärjuna and Aryadeva. Therefore, the view in Bhäviveka's works 
accords with the sutras such as the Praji0püramitcisiitra. 
Furthermore, the statement at the end of [1-26] "Therefore this way of Madhyamaka 
does not contradict sutras" reinforces this argument because this passage implies that 
there is an idea that the mDo sde dBu ma accords with szitras and rNal 'byor spyod pa'i 
dBu ma follows treatises such as the Yogücarabhii ni but the latter also does not deviate 
from sutras. 
In this way, Matsumoto maintains that `indo sde' of the mDo sde dBu ma in the 
lTa ba'i khyad par is very likely to have derived from sutra but not from the Sauträntika 
as a philosophical school. He also points out that in this part of the lTa ba'i khyad par, 
the Sautrintika is not mentioned even once. 
In addition to this, the Pancakramatikü, the only Indian account we know which 
mentions the classification of the mDo sde'i dBu ma pa and the rNal 'byor spyod pa'i 
dBu ma pa, does not answer our question clearly. In this text, the mDo sde'i dBu ma pa 
is considered to maintain external objects and consciousness without images. 73 It is 
rather strange if the term mdo sde'i dbu ma pa is derived from the Sauträntika (mDo sde 
pa) that maintains consciousness with images, in the sense that the mDo sde'i dBu ma pa 
conventionally postulates what the Sautrzntika postulates ultimately. However, if 
Matsumoto's theory is right and the lTa ba'i khyad par reflects what actually happened 
to the Indian Madhyamaka, it is not contradictory that what we call `Sauträntika- 
Madhyamaka' denies self-awareness, as is described in Tibetan doxographical texts because 
mdo sde of mDo sde'i dBu ma pa is nothing to do with the Sauträntika. 
73 See 2.2 concerning the passage of the Pancakramatiki. 
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To conclude, the classification of the Madhyamaka into the Sautrintika- 
Madhyamaka and the Yogzc3ra-Madhyamaka has a problem in terms of how the designation 
`Sautrintika' is derived. In the Grub intha' rnain bzhag rin then phren ba of dKon 
mchog 'jigs med dbang po, Bhäviveka is said to accept existence of external objects. As 
far as this is concerned, he can be called a Sautr intika-Midhyamika. Nevertheless, dKon 
mchog 'jigs med dbang po considers that Bhäviveka does not accept self-awareness, 
although the Sautrhntika school apparently holds self-awareness which is associated with 
images (äkära). In this sense, the explanation of dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po is not 
fully convincing. Although we can trace a similar description back to Tsong kha pa and 
further to Ye shes sde, the question is not clearly answered. Tsong kha pa considers that 
`Sauträntika' of the Sautrintika-Midhyamika is derived from `Sautrzntika' as a 
philosophical school and that the Sauträntika-Mädhyamika takes the sakdra view. However, 
when we examine the explanation of Ye shes sde in the lTa ba'i khyad par, which Tsong 
kha pa indicates as the source of the classification, 'indo sde' of the mDo sde pa'i dbu 
ma may mean sutras such as the Prajnüpürmnitdsiitra and Ye shes sde does not mention 
the matter of self-awareness or of cognition with or without images (akara). In this way, 
the view that the Sautrzntika-Madhyamaka denies self-awareness and therefore holds the 
nirakdra view, which is found in the Grub mtha' ream bzhag rin then phreng ba cannot 
be traced back to the lTa ba'i khyad par or to the Legs bshad snying po although it can 
be to the Indian source, the Pancakramatikü of Laksmi. There are at least two hypotheses: 
The designation Sauträntika-Madhyamaka is originally derived from the Sautrintika and 
for some reason they are considered to deny self-awareness. Otherwise, the designation 
`mdo sde' of the mDo sde pa'i dbu ma was not derived from the Sautrlntika (mDo sde 
pa), but later misunderstood to be related to the Sautriintika and possibly wrongly 
Sanskritised as the Sauträntika-Madhyamaka because of verbal similarity of their 
designations. In this latter case, there is no problem in their postulating the nirdkdra 
view. In addition to this, it is not clear how Candrakirti's view on conventional existence 
was understood at the time of Ye shes sde since he does not mention Candrakirti. 
It is thus impossible to solve the problem only by examining Tibetan accounts due 
to their inconsistency and it is necessary to look into Indian sources to clarify the 
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doxography of the Indian Madhyamaka. We will deal with this problem of the classification 
of the externalist and the internalist Madhyamakas in the second chapter. 
1.2.2 Sviitantrika and Präsaiigika 
Concerning the classification of the Madhyamaka into the Svätantrika and the 
Przsaiigika, Tsong kha pa briefly explains what differentiates these two. According to 
him, this classification is based on how the view ascertaining emptiness arises in one's 
mental continuum. 74 According to dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, on the other hand, 
the definition of the Präsangika is `a proponent of no intrinsic nature, who does not 
assert the establishment through particular characteristics even as common usage?. 75 As 
is implied in their designations, this classification is based on the difference of the 
methods to ascertain emptiness, namely svatantra anumüna and prasangäpatti. 
Even though this classification is very common in Tibet, it is not clear if it existed 
in India. According to Tsong kha pa, "Scholars of the later dissemination to the range of 
the snowy mountains (Tibet) use the twofold common usage, Prdsafigika and SvAtantrika, 
for the Midhyamika, and because this accords with Candrakirti's Prasannapadd, you 
should not think that it is their own fabrication. "76 As is pointed out in many previous 
studies, this indicates that there was a view that this classification was made up by 
Tibetan translators of the later dissemination. Indeed we do not find this classification in 
the lTa ba'i khyad par of Ye shes sde, who was the chief translator of the earlier 
dissemination. " Tsong kha pa, in addition, admits that there are no Svätantrikas who 
criticise the Pr5saiigika or who mention the dichotomy of the two sub-schools. 78 This 
also shows that as far as he knows, there were no Indian Mzdhyamikas who mention this 
classification after Candrakirti. 
The earliest usage of the classification of the Svätantrika and the Präsangika is, as 
74 See [1-18] (p. 27). 
's See [1-4] (p. 14). 
76 See [1-17] (p. 26) 
77 See my translation of the Madhyamaka section of his Ma ba'i khyad par in 1.2.1 (p. 31 ff. ). 
79 Hopkins [1989]. 
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far as we know, by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (1055-? ). " The work of Nyi ma grags that 
mentions the classification of the Svitantrika and the Prdsacigika does not survive. As 
Matsumoto points out, however, the passage is quoted by 'Jain dbyangs bzhad pa in the 
Garb nitha' chen mo: 
[1-29] 
According to the statement of Pa tshab rin po che, the two, Präsaügika 
and Svatantrika, are explained: 
Bhiviveka holds the view of the svatantra and Buddhapälita and 
Candrakirti the view of the prasafiga. 
If [one asks] what is the difference of the Svätantrika and the Präsangika 
of Madhyamaka, Pa tshab says that the Mädhyamika who accepts the 
valid means of knowledge (tshad Ana, *pramüna) induced from objectivity 
is the Svätantrika, and [the Mädhyamika] who does not accept it is the 
Präsafigika. S° 
Here the explanation of Nyi ma grags mentioned by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa is so 
brief that we only understand that Bhäviveka is classified into the Svütantrika and 
Buddhapilita and Candrakirti into the Pr tsatigika, and that the difference between them 
is whether or not they accepted the objective validity of pratnana. However, it is very 
clear that Nyi ma grags knew this classification and used the term rang rgyttd and thal 
'gyur. He was a translator who worked with the Kashmirian teacher Jayänanda (ca. 12th 
Q. As I briefly mentioned above, Ogawa reports Jaydnanda's use of the word rang 
rgyudpa, which may have been translated from svJtantrika, in the Madhyamakavataratika, 
79. According to Matsumoto [1981b] p. 146. See Mimal: i [1982a] p. 45, note 110. 
80 Grub mtha'chen mo (ca 74b5-7, as quoted in Miniaki [1982a] p. 45, note 110): 
pa [shah rin po che'i gsung las ... 
legs ldan rang rgyud phyogs dang/ sangs rgyas bskyangs 
dang Aa ba'i zhabs that 'gyur gyi phyogs 'dzin pas that rang gnyis po gsung/ dbu ma that rang 
gi khyad gang yin zlie na/ pa tshab dngos po stobs zhugs kyi tshad ma khas len pa dbu ma rang 
rgyud dang de mi len pa that 'gyur ba zer skad del... 
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which was written outside India. " Yonezawa also reports that a term 
svatantrasddhanavädin is used to designate Bhäviveka by a Tibetan Dharmakirti (ca. 
12th C), who probably studied Candrakirti's works under Abhayäkaragupta82 and wrote 
notes on the Prasannapada and the Madhyamakavatara, in Sanskrit but with dBu med 
scripts. 
At any rate, we cannot trace these terms back to India in a strict sense, or prior to 
the 12th C. Nevertheless the terms, svdtantrika and prdsarigika have, to a certain extent, 
a connection to India, and it does not seem that they are invented by Tibetan translators 
alone. What we do not know is how this difference of ideas between Bhäviveka and 
Candrakirti was understood by later Indian teachers in the middle and late period of the 
Madhyamaka after Candrakirti, i. e. after the 7th C until the 12th C. In chapter 3, therefore, 
we will examine differences of ideas between Bhäviveka and Candrakirti, how they are 
inherited by later Mädhyamikas and why we cannot find a clear distinction between the 
Svätantrika and the Präsangika in Indian sources. 
1.2.3 Mäyopamädvayavädin and Sarvadharmäpratisthänaviidin 
The last of the three classifications mentioned by Tsong kha pa in the Lam rim 
chen mo is that of the M5yopam-5dvayavädin and the Sarvadharm, pratisthnav, ýdin. 
According to him, these terms, mdyopain and apratisthäna are used by some Indian 
teachers, 83 but he does not name who they are. It is also not clear on what basis they are 
$' Ogawa [1984] reports that the term `Rang rgyud pa' which may be translated from `Svätantrika' 
is found in Jayänanda'sMadhyamakdtiatdrat7a3 (Dcrgc cd. No. 3870, Peking cd. No. 5271): 
de'i zlies bya ba ni dbu ma rang rgyud pa'o// (Derge ed. ra 281b6, Peking cd. ra 337a8) 
'dis rhos bya ba ni rang rgyud pas so// (Derge ed. ra 282a3, Peking ed. ra 337b6) 
82 Yonezawa [1999]. According to the colophons of three works of Abhayäl aragupta, the 
Abhayapaddhati, the Munimatülcankära and the Amnnyamanjari, he wrote them respectively in the 
25th, 30th and 37th year of the reign of the king Rämapäla of the Päla Dynasty. These are 1108, 
1113 and 1120 AD. respectively. Therefore, Abhayäkaragupta was considered active between the 
last quarter of the 11th C and the first quarter of the 12th C. See Bühnemann [1991] and Erb [1997] 
pp. 27-29. 
Yonezawa's article is also important since it points out that this Tibetan Dharmakirti gives the 
name Bhäviveka, not Bhävaviveka, for the author of the Prajiiapradipa. Ejima [1990] proposed 
`Bhäviveka' on the basis of Chinese and Tibetan translation as well as of an examination of 12 
manuscripts of the Prasannapadd, each mentioning his name four times. 
83 See [1-14] (p. 24). 
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distinguished. Although Tsong kha pa shows the view of earlier teachers that this 
classification is based on how they postulate the ultimate truth, he does not agree with 
these teachers. 84 According to these earlier teachers, the Mäyopamädvayavidins assert 
that collection of the two, appearance and emptiness, is an ultimate truth, and the 
Sarvadharmäpratisthinavidins assert that the mere elimination of discriminative thought 
(prapanca) with respect to appearances is an ultimate truth. This distinction should have 
something to do with appearance at the level of the ultimate truth, if the view of these 
earlier teachers is correct. On the other hand, some dGe lugs teachers maintain that the 
Mäyopamädvayavidin and the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin are alternative names of the 
Svätantrika and the Präsangika, and others deny the validity of this classification entirely gs 
Concerning the identification of the Indian teachers, Ruegg indicates Advayavajra, who 
mentions the Mäyopamädvayavzdin and the Sarvadharmäpratisthznavädin in the 
Tallvaratnüvali. 86 Thus we know that this classification was used by Indian teachers. 
However, it is still not entirely clear what is the difference between the two. 
While some dGe lugs teachers thus relate this classification to that of the Svätantrika 
and the Prasangika, Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507-1554), on the other hand, gives a different 
account concerning the system of Advayavajra, who mentions this classification. Mi 
bskyod rdo rje is a teacher in the bKa' brgyud order who wrote a commentary on 
Candrakirti's Madhyamakavatara and its Bhdsya entitled dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam 
bshad, dPal Man dus gsum mkhyen pa'i zhal lung dtivags brgyud grub pa'i shing rta. In 
the introduction to this commentary, he explains three lines of lineage through which the 
teachings of the bKa' brgyud order are handed down. These three lines are respectively 
from Nzro pa, Maitri pa (Advayavajra)R' and Pa tshab Lo tsä ba. Of these, his explanation 
of the lineage from Advayavajra is of the most interest to us because Advayavajra seems 
to be a Sarvadharmipratisthanavädin $$ 
&s See [1-15] (p. 25). 
85 Napper [1989] p. 403 ff. 
86 Ruegg [1981a] p. 58. Cf. Napper [1989] p. 817, note 577. Also sec chapter 4. 
87 About identification of Maitd pa with Advayavajra, sec lladano [1987]. 
93 Concerning Advayavajra's position, sec; chapter 4. 
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Mi bskyod rdo rje explains his lineage frone Advayavajra as followsP 
[1-30] 
The second [lineage] is as follows. It is the master jina Maitri pa who 
after keeping in mind that the meaning of the Madhyamaka which Saraha 
the Elder and the Younger, the acärya Nägärjuna and Candrakirti 
maintained is identical, taught it to others. And with regard to the division 
of teaching of the Madhyamaka of this system it is called the division of 
the teaching of amanasikara (yid la mi byed pa). Also concerning the 
name jina Maitri pa, he is called jina (victor) because having understood 
the view of the Niräkära-Cittamätra [postulated] by the i7cirya Sinti pa 
(Ratnäkarasanti) and having debated, lie was victorious 90 
[1-31] 
Then because the great äc«rya Maitri pa in the Tativadasaka explains 
that: 
For one who wishes to know the true state (tathatä), it is neither 
Säkira (with images) nor Nirak51ra (without images). A middle not 
89 This part of the text is already translated by Ruegg [1988]. However I give my translation below 
because in some parts there are problematic points which I want to discuss. 
90 dßu ma !a 'jug pa'i ream bshad (5a4-6): 
gnyis pa Itar na/ sa ra ha the chung dang/ slob dpon kin sgrub dang zla grags bzhed pa'i dbu 
ma'i don geig par thugs su chud nas gzlian la ston par mdzad pa mnga' bdag rgyal ba mai tri 
pa std lugs 'di'i dbu ma'i rhos skor la yid la mi byed pa'i chos skor zhes grags ]a/ (1-rgyal ba 
mai tri pa zhes pa'ang slob dpon slia'a nti pas sems tsam rnam rdzun gyi phyogs bzung nas 
brtsad pa las rgyal bas rgyal ba zhes grags s6')// 
(1) 'I7iis part of Mi bskyod rdo rje's description is not entirely clear. Ruegg [1988] (p. 1255) 
translates it as follows: 
Concerning his being known as Victor (Jina) Maitripäda, he debated with Ratnäkarasiinti - 
who adhered to the thesis of the AlWk-dra-Cittamätra - and victorious over him. 
From Tibetan it is not clear who holds the thesis of the Niräkära (Alikähara)-Cittamitm. Although 
Ruegg understands that Ratn: ikarasänti adhered to it, Advayavajra (Maitre da) also maintains the 
view of the Niräkära-Cittamztra-Madhyamaka as Mi bslyod rdo rje later explains in [1-32]. If we 
consider that Mi bskyod rdo rje is explaining Advayavajra's lineage here, it is possible to interpret 
that Advayavajra understood the view of the Nirakara-Cittamätra which was possibly taught by 
Ratnäkarasänti. 
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adorned with the guru's teaching is [just] mediocre. " 
The Jcärya Sahajavajra says: 
"In this way, this is one who wishes to know the reality which has 
the characteristic of dependent origination taught by the 
M,; idhyamikas: the noble Nigzrjuna, Aryadeva, Candrakirti and 
others. 
Thinking of this meaning, the Bhagavat says: 
That which arises from conditions does not arise. 
Then there is no arising by nature. 
What is dependent on conditions is said to be empty. 
He who knows emptiness is heedful. 
What arises in dependence has no intrinsic nature. 
What has no intrinsic nature does not arise in any way. 
Any phenomenon which arises is never found. 
With regard to phenomena which do not arise, 
fools hold that they arise. 
and so on. Because of that [it is said by Maitre pa], 
a middle which is not adorned with 
the guru's teaching is [just] mediocre. 
[The verse means] thus. Because the remainder of negating the 
division [of the SA-ira and the Nirzkära] is the object which is 
postulated [in this system], this is said to be a middle, i. e. the 
doctrine of the intrinsic nature of the true state (tathatä) of 
yuganaddha adorned with the ornament of the teaching by the 
supreme guru Bhagavati which steals the minds of the learned. 
91 Tattvadasaka, v. 2 (Shastri [1927] p. 59, Mikkyo [ 1991 ] p. 92): 
na sak-hraniräkärc tathatam jnätum icchatah I 
madhyamä madhyamä caiva guruväganalaml rtä II 
I here follow the reading of Shastri [1927]. 
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However in respect that the establishment of the truth of cognition, i. e. 
the remainder of negating the division [of the Sdkära and the Nirlk'Ara], 
that is to say, negating the Cittamltra, is postulated, asserting [it as] 
Madhyamaka, is a middle, i. e. mediocre, and not the pure Madhyamaka 
system. Therefore, it is indicated that he, having adorned [his teaching] 
with the teaching of the venerable N5g, irjuna and others, explains the 
meaning of the middle. ' 
92 d13u ma la jug pa'i ream bshad (5a6-5b6): 
des na slob dpon chen po mai tri pas de I: lio na nyid bcu par/ 
de bzhin nyid ni zlies 'dod pas// ream bcas ma yin ream med min// 
bla ma'i ngag gis ma brgyan pa'i// On ma'ang 'bring po tsam nyid do// 
zlies pa'i 'grel par slob dpon than cig styes pa'i rdo rjes/ dc liar na 'di ni dbu ma pa 'phags pa 
Mu sgnib dang 'phags pa Ilia dang/ zla ba grags pa la sops pas bsngags ba rtcn cing 'brel bar 
'byung ba'i mtshan nyid can gyi de bzliin nyid sties par 'dod pa yin no// 
bcom ldan 'das kyis don 'di nyid la dgongs nas gang gsungs pa/ 
gang zhig rk-yen las skycs pa de ma skyes// de la ngo bo nyid kyis skye ba med// 
rk-yen la rag las gang de stong par bshad// gang zhig stung nyid sties de bag yod yin// 
gang zhig rten cing 'brei bar 'byung// de ]a ngo bo cung zad med// 
gang ]a ngo bo nyid med ba// de dag gang du'ang 'byung ba med// 
gang zhig skye bar 'gyur ba yi// chos ni cung zad myed mi 'gyur// 
'byung ba med pa'i chos reams la// byis pa roams ni 'byung bar 'dod// 
ces bya ba la sogs pa'o// 
de'i phyir bla ma'i ngag gis ma brgyan pa'i// dbu ma'ang 'bring po tsam nyid do// 
Abes ('bye brag bkag nas Ibag ma khas blangs pa'i yul nyid yin pa'i phyir 'di ni dbu ma bcom 
ldan 'das ma bla ma dam pa'i man ngag gi rgyan gyis brgyan pa'i zud du 'jug pa'i de bzhin 
nyid lyi no bo nye bar bstan pa ni mkhas pa rnams kyi yid 'phrog par byed pa yin no zhes 
'byung la/-') (2bye brag mam par bkag nas zhes sems tsam pa main par bkag nas Ilhag ma slies 
pa bden grub khas Ien, pa la dbu mar brjod pa ni dbu ma 'bring po ste dbu ma'i lugs main par 
dag pa de ma yin past 'dir ni bla ma klu sgrub zhabs sogs kyi lung gyis brgyan nas dbu ma'i 
don 'chad do zhcs bstan pa yin Ial 
Ruegg [1988] (p. 1255-1256) translates this part, as follows: 
Now in his Tattvadasaka (verse 2) Maitripäda has written: `For one wishing to know 
tathatd there is neither the Säkära nor the Nirdk-dra: a middle not endued with a Guru's 
instructions is only middling'. Therefore Sahajavajra has stated in his comment on this passage' 
that the Mädhyamil a thus wishes to knowtathatü having the mark of origination in dependence 
proclaimed by Arya-Nägärjuna, Aryadeva, Candralilrti and the others. As was stated by the 
Bhagavat with this meaning in mind: What is born from conditions (pralyaya) is [really] 
unborn, there being no birth by self-nature; what is dependent on conditions is stated to be 
empty (si7nya), and lie who knows Emptiness is attentive; what arises has no self-nature 
whatever, and whatever has no self-nature arises nowhere; no factor (dharma) is found which 
is something born, [but] foolish holddharmas that do not arise to arise. Therefore, if Maitripäda 
has stated that `A middle not endued with a Guru's instruction is only middling', the remainder 
(ilia ma) after rejection of the specific [i. e. the Sak-ara and the Nirdkära doctrines of the 
`Cittamätra'] is a cognitive object (visaya) that is postulated; so this teaching of the essence of 
the tathatü of yuganaddha endued with the excellent Guru's instructions - the Mädhyamika- 
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[1-32] 
Concerning the Amanasikzra-Madhyamaka of the great acdrya Maicri pa, 
here in Tibet three different kinds of conclusions of his intention arose. 
And of the three: (1) realisation after practising the profound and luminous 
Mantra-Madhyamaka, (2) realisation after practising the profound Sütra- 
Madhyamaka and (3) realisation after practising the Nirzkzra-Cittamätra- 
Madhyamaka, the latter, those who explain that the goal of doha is 
knowledge empty of a perceiving subject and a perceived object, which is 
self-awareness, self-illumination and the ultimate accomplishment are very 
many in India and Tibet such as Vajrapäni of India, Asti of Nepal and 
Kor Niru pa 93 
[1-33] 
Since those who maintained that it was right to explain that this system is 
Rhagavati - captivates the minds of the learned. After having rejected the specific - that is, 
after having rejected the Cittamätra - to assert that the postulation of a remainder, namely 
cognition established in reality (ses pa bden grub), is the Madhyamaka is then itself a middling 
middle, and not the very pure Madhyamaka system. It is accordingly indicated that here [in 
Maitripada's teaching] lies the explication of the meaning of the Middle endued with the 
teaching of Nägärjuna and other superiors (guru). 
n Sahajavajra, Tattvadasakatikd, fol. 182a of the Peking edition, vol. mi. (The text of Mi 
bskyod rdo rje's quotation differs slightly from the text found in the Peking edition. ) 
In Ruegg's translation, it is not clear where the quotation from Sahajavajra ends although Ruegg, 
in note 31, points out it is from the Tattvadasakatika. This is in fact up to the end of (1), ... zhes 'byung la, in Tibetan, "... which steals the minds of the learned" in my translation and "... captivates 
the minds of the learned" in Ruegg's translation (TattvadasakatXa, Derge ed. no. 2254 wi 166b3-7, 
Peking ed. no. 3099 mi 182a), but Mi bskyod rdo rje does not clearly indicate the end of quotation. 
I wonder if `remainder' described in the part following this quotation, i. e. (2) in the Tibetan 
text is explanation of `remainder' in the quotation from the Tattvadasakatikd. In tlie quotation 
`remainder' of negation of Cittamätra is explained as an object (visaya). In Mi bskyod rdo rje's 
explanation, on the other hand, `remainder' of negation of Cittamätra is explained as the establishment 
of the truth of cognition , and asserting 
it is not the pure Madhyamaka system. 
If this is the case, we should understand that in Advayavajra's system it is postulated that the 
`remainder' is an object, and that in the other system, it is postulated that the `remainder' is 
cognition. This may be the distinction between Advayavajra's and the opponent's views. 
93 dBu ma la jug pa'i rnam bshad (5b6-6a2): 
slob dpon chen po mai tri pa'i yid la mi byed pa'i dbu ma 'di la bod 'dir dgongs pa skong. 
tshul mi 'dra ba gsum byung stet zab gsal sngags lyi dbu ma rtsal du bton nas nyams su len pa 
dang/ zab ma mdo'i dbu ma rtsal du bton nas nyams su len pa dang/ Sems tsam mam rdzun gyi 
dbu ma rtsal du bton nas nyams su len pa gsum las/ phyi ma 'di ni gzung 'dzin gyis stong pa'i 
shes pa rang rig rang gsal don dam du grub pa do ha'i don du '(shad pa rgya gar phyag na 
dang/ bal po a su dang/ kor ni ru pa cogs rgya bod du ches mang ngo// 
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the Madhyamaka did not please many scholars such as Gro lung pa, 
[they], saying that some sort of systems such as that of amansikära do 
not agree with the systems of the Madhyamaka, deny it, Having depended 
only on this statement, Sa skya pan Chen and some bKa' gdams pas have 
caused hostility and disrespect (, dang zhen) to a whole division of the 
pure teaching of amanasikfira of the reverend Maicri pa. Following this, 
even noble ones who abuse the meaning of Doha. sargfli, amanasikära of 
the great brahmin, and the lord Maitri pa, the reverend Saraha the elder 
and the younger have appeared. 9' 
[1-34] 
Traditions of the former two are both entirely contained in the master 
Mar pa and Mi la ras pa 95 
From these passages, it is known that there are three different interpretations of 
Advayavajra's system: the Mantra-Madhyamaka, the Sütra-Madhyamaka and theNirzk5ra- 
Cittamitra-Madhyamaka. Of these, according to Mi bskyod rdo rje, the first two are 
already found in the system of Mar pa and Mi la ras pa, which derived from Nro-pa. It 
is, therefore, considered that the teaching most peculiar to Advayavajra's system is that 
of the Niräkära-Cittamätra-Madhyamaka. 
This description differs from those of some teachers in the dGe lugs order that are 
discussed above. With regard to the distinction of the Mayoparn dvayavädin and the 
9' d1u ma la ju pa'i ream bshad (6a2-4): 
lugs 'di dbu mar 'chad pa la rigs par smra pa gro lung pa cogs dpyod Idan mang pos ma rangs 
nas a ma na si pa sogs ci rigs kyi lugs dbu ma pa'i lugs dang mi mthun zhes 'gog par mdzad la/ 
tshig 'di tsam ]a brten nas sa skya pan chen dang/ bka' gdams pa ci rigs pa zhig gyis rje btsun 
mai tri pa'i chos ream par dag pa a ma na sa'i skor thams cad la sdang zhen byed dang/ de'i 
zliar la bram ze chen po'i yid la mi byed pa do ha mdzod lyi glu'i don dang/ mnga' bdag mai 
tri pa dang rje btsun sa ra ha the chung la skur pa 'debs pa'i skal ba can yang byung snang 
ngo// 
vsrlia ma !n 'jug pa'i mom hslurd (6a5): 
dang po gnyis kyi bka' srol ni/ rje mar pa dang mi la Ita bu la gnyis La tsliang bar bzhugs skiing 
nyams len du mdzad la/... 
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Sarvadharmipratisth: inavädin made by some earlier teachers given in Tsong kha pa's 
Lain rim then nm, the criteria they give for this distinction is something to do with. 
appearance at the ultimate level. In this case, it is possible that the earlier teachers whom 
Tsong kha pa refutes consider that this distinction is based on the dichotomy of the 
S, ýk, ýra-Yog: ic, ra-Midhyamika and the Nir, k. ra-Yog: ic: ra-M dhyamika. If this 
assumption is right, the interpretation by some dGe lugs teachers that Tsong kha pa 
identifies this distinction with that of the Svltantrika and the Präsargika should be 
wrong. 
If we regard the description by Mi hskyod rdo rje as more reliable, considering 
that lie regards himself as a successor of Advayavajra, the distinction of the 
Mäyopamädvayavädin and the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin can be understood as that 
of the Säkära- and Niräkfira-Yog5c5ra-M5dhyamikas. This also agrees with the 
classification of S3ntearaksita in Tsong kha pa's works. In the Lant rim then no, he is 
said by some earlier teachers to he a Mayopamädvayavadin, and in the Legs hshad 
. snying po, he is said, on the basis of Sahajavajra's statement, to be a Säkära-Mädhyamika. 
Here we can ssume, as a hyp: thesis, that 
üzntaraksita is aS v3ra-M dhyamiUa as well 
as a Mäyopamidvayavädin, and Advayavajra is a Niräkzra-Mädhyamika as well as a 
Sarvadharmapratisthanavadin. 
However, Mi hskyod rdo rje, does not mention this dichotomy of the 
Mayopamzdvayavzdin and the Sarvadharmäpratisthiinavädin and there is no information 
about the M5yopam5dvayav5din or of the S5k5ra-Yog5c5ra-Mdhyamika. On the other 
hand, he explains that Advayavajra's system is concordant with the teaching of Ng rjuna 
and Candrak? rt1. it iss therefore, possible to regard Advayavajra aS a Präcanaaika ý6 A_t this 
point, it is too early to draw a conclusion about this type of classification. The matter 
will be discussed in chapter 4 on the basis of Indian sources. 
96 Since being a Priisafioika and being a Nir5i: ära-M dhyamika are. not contradictory, it is not 
technically impossible that the Säktira-Madhyamaka is the Yogäcära-Svätantrika-Madhyamaka and 
the Nirä}: ära-Madhyamaka is the Yogäcära-Priisangika-Madhyamaka. Even if this is the case, 
however, it does not agree with the later dGe lugs doxography of the Indian Madhyamaka, such as 
dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po's, which divides the Yogiicära-Sviitantrilca-Mädhyamika into the 
Säkära- and the Niräkära-Mädhyamika. 
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1.3 Summary 
As we have observed, while Grub mtha' texts and other Tibetan sources provide 
us with precious information, they sometimes contradict each other. When we attempt to 
establish the history of Buddhism in India, therefore, it is necessary to look into Indian 
sources and find out what they actually record. 
In the following chapters we will examine three different types of classification 
following the Lain rim chen no of Tsong kha pa: classification (1) of the externalist and 
the internalist in chapter 2, classification (2) of the Svitantrika and the Pr isailgika in 
chapter 3 and classification (3) of the Mäyopamädvayavädin and the Sarva- 
dharm3pratisthanavidin in chapter 4. 
With regard to the first classification, the following questions are raised. Firstly, 
Bhiviveka is regarded as a Sautr5ntika-M5dhyamika because he asserts the existence of 
external objects in the way the Sauträntika does, according to the Grub mtha' main 
bzhag rin then phreng ba of dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po (passage [1-31). However, 
it is not entirely clear if Bhzviveka actually maintains the Sautr5ntika view conventionally 
in terms both of ontology and epistemology. While dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po 
maintains that Bhzviveka does not accept the idea of self-awareness (svasamvedana) 
conventionally, the Sautrintika asserts self-awareness and infers the existence of external 
objects. On the other hand, Tsong kha pa holds that the Sv5tantrika postulate the säkdra 
view. This amounts to saying that the Svitantrika accepts self-awareness. As suggested 
by Matsumoto, moreover, it is very likely that the term indo sde dbu ma was used in the 
sense of a Madhyamaka text that follows sutras in the lTa ba'i khyad par, which is the 
earliest account we know mentioning this term. 
Secondly, if the Sauträntika-Madhyamaka and the Yogäcära-Madhyamaka are not 
necessarily two branches of the Svitantrika-Madhyamaka, as Mimaki maintains, there is 
a. possibility that the Prdsangika is included in the former as it asserts the existence of 
external objects conventionally. Tsong kha pa, however, denies this, as seen in [1-17]. 
On the other hand, the lTa ba'i khyad par of Ye shes sde does not mention Candrakirti. 
Thirdly, we will also examine if there is any division in the internalist Madhyamaka 
such as that of the S75k5ra-Madhyamaka and the Niräkära-Madhyamaka although this 
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division will mainly be discussed in chapter 4 when we examine the classification of the 
Miyopamadvayavzdin and the Sarvadhannapratisthinavadin. Even if there is no apparent 
distinction between the Sakara-Madhyamaka and the Nirakara-Madhyamaka, it may be 
possible to judge whether the view of a certain internalist Mädhyamika is concordant 
with the Sdk-ra or the Nirakara. These three points in question, concerning the classification 
of the internalist Madhyamaka and the externalist Madhyamaka, will be examined in 
chapter 2. 
Concerning the classification (2), of the Svitantrika and the Pr isaiigika, there is a 
suggestion that it may not have existed in India. This is implicitly stated by Tsong kha pa 
in passage [1-17]. He supports this classification assuming that this is not a fabrication 
by the translators in the later dissemination because the evidence is found in Candrakirti's 
work. On the contrary, this indicates that there was a view that it did not exist in India 
and was made up by the translators during the later dissemination. This classification is 
not mentioned in the ITa ba'i khyad par, one of the earliest Tibetan accounts of Indian 
Madhyamaka doxography. It is, however, problematic to adopt silence as proof. There is 
a possibility that Ye shes sde did not mention this classification, even if it existed, 
because it seems that his account is based on the explanation of S3ntaraksita and Kamalaslla, 
which does not mention the distinction of the Svztantrika and Prisangika. To clarify this 
matter, it is necessary to examine the views of Bhäviveka and Candrakirti and then to 
compare them with the views of later Mzdhyamikas who are thought to be in either 
Bhäviveka's or Candrakirti's lineage in order to find out whether their ideas are handed 
down to the later Madhyamaka teachers. By doing so, we attempt to probe into why we 
find little evidence of this classification in Indian sources and how their ideas were 
transmitted to the later Indian Madhyamaka teachers. 
We find confusion among Tibetan teachers with regard to the classification (3), of 
the Miyopam, dvayavädin and the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin. There are, at least, three 
different interpretations of this classification. Firstly, some dGe lugs teachers identify the 
Svätantrika with the Mzyopam5dvayav idin and the Pridsatigika with the 
Sarvadharmäpratisthänavidin respectively. On the other hand, others deny the validity of 
the classification of the Miyopamädvayavidin and the Sarvadhann5pratisthinavIdin. In 
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addition to these two different interpretations, Mi bskyod rdo rje holds that Advayavajra, 
presumably a Sarvadharmipratisthinav idin, maintains the view of the Nir5kara-Yogacara- 
Madhyamaka. This raises another possibility that this classification is based on the 
reality of images in the mind: sakära and nirüküra. The earlier teachers mentioned by 
Tsong kha pa may have understood it in this way since their distinction of these two 
proponents is somewhat related to the existence of appearance at the level of the ultimate 
truth. Even though some dGe lugs teachers hold that Tsong kha pa identifies the Svätantrika 
with the Mäyopamzdvayav din and the Przsai gika with the Sarvadharmäpratisthänav5din, 
lie himself may have had a different view. In the fourth chapter, we will examine 
Advayavajra's works to determine what is the difference between the 
M, yopam, dvayavidin and the Sarvadharmäpratisth-nav, ýdin. The discussion will proceed 
on the hypothesis that the Mäyopamädvayavädin and the Sarvadharm5pratisth5nav'5din 
may possibly be the Szkira-Mzdhyamika and the Nirzkira-Mddhyamika respectively, 
because both sets of classification indicate the same teachers as representatives. 
In the following chapters, we will examine Indian sources which relate to these 
problems. This will hopefully lead us to a better understanding of the Indian Madhyamaka 
classification, which has so far depended heavily on Tibetan sources. However, just as 
Tibetan doxography of the Indian Madhyamaka is, in some respects, not reliable, Indian 
writers are not necessarily right, either, when they classify Madhyamaka teachers. It 
must be understood that the main purpose of this thesis is to clarify the late Madhyamaka 
doxography, i. e. how later Indian teachers understood their predecessors' views, and 
classified them accordingly. This does not necessarily mean that they understood their 
predecessors' views correctly and classified them properly. 
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As seen in chapter 1, according to the Lain rim then mo of Tsong kha pa, there 
are three different types of classification of Mädhyamikas. Of these, the classification 
based on conventional existence, i. e. whether or not they assert the existence of external 
objects conventionally, is often found in Indian sources after Säntaraksita (ca. 725-788). 
However, it seems that the understanding widely shared by modern scholars that these 
two proponents are included in the Svätantrika-Mädhyamika as the Sautr5ntika- 
Svätantrika-Mddhyamika and the Yogäcära-Svätantrika-Mädhyamika is based on Tibetan 
doxography of the Indian Madhyaunaka. In relation to this, it is not yet clear if Candrakirti 
was excluded from the former, who asserts existence of external objects conventionally. 
Therefore, I use provisionally the terms externalist (Madhyamaka/Mzdhyamika) and 
internalist (Madhyamaka/Mädhyamika) when I mean that these two views or proponents 
do not necessarily belong to the Svätantrika. 
In this chapter, we will examine the difference in epistemology and ontology 
between the two proponents. The epistemology and ontology of the internalist Madhyamaka 
have been discussed in many previous studies. On the other hand, those of the externalist 
Madhyamaka are controversial, including the validity of the designation `Sauträntika, ' 
i. e. whether the epistemology and ontology of Bhiviveka or other externalist M, dhyamikas 
are identical with that of the Sauträntika. Later dGe lugs doxographers, such as dKon 
mchog 'jigs med dbang po, consider that the Sautrzntika-Midhyamikas do not accept 
self-awareness. On the other hand, the Sautr5ntikas hold that any image we perceive 
cannot be that of an external object itself but an image in cognition because the object, 
being momentary, does not exist a moment later when we perceive it. Therefore, they 
maintain self-awareness that possesses images which are not those of external objects 
themselves. 
According to Kajiyama's study, it is understood that the epistemology and ontology 
of Bhäviveka are similar to those of the Sauträntika 1 He consequently regards this 
Kajiyama [1982] pp. 35-51. Because this article is written in Japanese, I will show his argument 
and conclusion later in 2.1 (p. 56 ff. ). 
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designation as appropriate. Most Tibetan doxographical accounts indeed agree that 
Bhäviveka maintains the existence of external objects that are aggregates of atoms. 
On the other hand, Matsumoto maintains that in the lTa ba'i khyad par, `mdo sde' 
in the mDo sde'i dBu ma is derived from the sutras, such as the Prajnüpdramitasirtra, 
and `rnal 'byor spyod pa' in the rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dBu ma means the Yog, cära 
treatises such as the Yogdcürabhllnzi. It should be noted, moreover, that he concludes 
that these terms which are generally understood to indicate `school' or `proponent' is 
used to designate texts. From Matsumoto's study alone, however, it is not clear how 
they were understood in India. It is possible that the Sautrzntika-Madhyamaka meant the 
Madhyamaka texts that follow siltras, such as the Prajiiäpüramitdsi=rtra, and the Yogäc5ra- 
Madhyamaka likewise meant the Madhyamaka texts that follow the Yogacarabhirmi and 
similar treatises in India as well. If this is the case, it is not a problem that the Sautr3ntika- 
M5dhyamika does not accept self-awareness conventionally, but the Sanskrit reconstruction 
`Sauträntika-Madhyamaka' may not be accurate. Indian sources which mention the 
doxography of the Madhyamaka are often too brief to give a definitive answer to this 
problem. Nevertheless, it is possible to show whether they are supportive to either theory 
or silent, even though there is no guarantee that these later Indian accounts are right. 
In addition to this, we discuss if Candrakirti and his successors should be categorised 
in externalists together with Bhäviveka. Even though both Bhäviveka and Candrakirti 
accept external objects conventionally, Tibetan doxographers do not consider that 
Candrakirti holds the same view on conventionality as Bhäviveka. According to Tsong 
kha pa, for example, Candrakirti's view is special and it is not appropriate to assume that 
his view accords either with the Vaibhsika or with the Sauträntika. If this is the case in 
India, it may be possible to find a distinction in the externalist Madhyamaka in Indian 
sources. 
On the other hand, Tibetan doxographers classify the Yogäc ira-Midhyamikas 
into the S5kra-M,, dhyamika and the Nir5l: 5ra-M5dhyamika. As we have seen in the first 
chapter, Sahajavajra mentions this classification. We examine if there is any other account 
Z Matsumoto [1981a]. Sec 1.2.1 (p. 31 ff. ). 
55 
Chapter 2 Internalist and Externalist 
that mentions this classification in the internalist Madhyamaka when the classification of 
the internalist Madhyamaka and the externalist Madhyamaka is mentioned. 
Additionally, if we can find any other characteristic that arises from a difference 
in epistemology and ontology, it will be discussed to a certain extent to show points of 
controversy other than the matter of the existence of external objects. 
2.1 Bhäviveka 
Bh5viveka (ca. 500-570) is regarded as a Sautrzntika-Mädhyamika in dKon mchog 
'jigs med dbang po's Grub mtha' ream bzhag rin then phreng ba, Tsong kha pa's Lain 
rim then mo and Legs bshad snying po and Ye shes sde's 11'a ba'i khyad par. dKon 
mchog 'jigs med dbang po understands that Bhiviveka does not accept self-awareness 
but accepts external objects? Tsong kha pa considers that Bhäviveka conventionally 
maintains existence of external objects and cognition with images. ' Ye shes sde explains 
that, according to the view of the mDo sde dBu ma, all external and internal things arise 
in dependence and because they arise from causes and conditions conventionally, they 
exist just like an illusion. ' With regard to ontology, they all consider Bhaviveka postulates 
existence of external objects. Concerning epistemology, however, dKon mchog 'jigs 
med dbang po and Tsong kha pa do not agree on whether or not Bhäviveka accepts 
self-awareness, and Ye shes sde is silent. Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain if Bhäviveka 
himself accepts epistemology of the Sautrintika conventionally. 
The bases of the Sautrzntika view are causality and momentariness. The Sauträntika 
regards the process of perception as causality. If an object is the cause of perception and 
cognition is the result, they cannot exist at the same time but in sequence. First, an object 
has contact with the faculty of sight and in the next moment cognition of the object 
arises. Then, at the moment the cognition of the object arises, the object no longer exists 
because of momentariness. It is therefore impossible for cognition to perceive any external 
object directly, and cognition and its object cannot exist simultaneously. What cognition 
3 See [ 1-21(p. 12) 
4 Sec [1-191 (p. 28) 
5 Sec 11-271 (pp. 35-36) 
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perceives must be an image of the object thrown into the cognition and external objects 
are postulated only through inference as the cause of images in cognition. 
According to Kajiyama's study, Bh-Aviveka follows the Sautrzntika in that he 
accepts external objects which are only inferred and cognition with images. He examines 
various aspects of Bhiviveka's ideas in detail. Of these, the following passage in the 
Prajiäpradipa is of the most interest: 
[2-1] 
In order to establish the way of the truth of common usage, it is said [in 
Abhidharma] that [the multitude of the 6 sensory perceptions (viji-Ona)] 
is associated with objects. Because when [the multitude of perceptions] 
arise due to some object, then its appearance arises, it is said [the multitude 
of perceptions] is associated with objects. However, it is not because they 
are connected simultaneously like a wealthy man [that is the simultaneous 
connection of a man and his wealth] 6 
Kajiyama explains that because the simultaneous existence of cognition and its 
object is compared to a wealthy man, the negation of this metaphor implies that the 
relation between cognition and its object occurs sequentially, i. e. as causality. Because 
an object that is the cause gives rise to cognition with appearance of the object, this is 
regarded as the saküra view. Bhaviveka here accepts it as the truth of common usage. 
In addition to this, Nönin points out another passage that relates this issue. 7 In 
chapter 3 of the same work, Bhäviveka analyses epistemology of the Sautr5ntika, as 
follows: 
[2-2] 
G Praji pradipa (Walleser [1914] p. 43,14-17, Derge cd. No. 3853 tsha 59b1-2, Peking ed. No. 
5253 tsha 71a8-bl): 
dmigs pa dang bcas pa zhes bya ba ni [ha snyad kyi bden pa'i lugs ream par gzhag pa'i phyir 
Eel dmigs pa gang gis skye ba na// der snang ba skye ba'i phyir dmigs pa dang bcas pa zbes 
bya'i/ nor can bzhin du dus gcig kho nar 'brei pa'i phyir ni nia yin no// 
NOnin [1986]. 
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The Sauträntika says [as follows]: 
Because conditioned things do not have any effect, eyes do not 
see them, or it is not the others [that see them]. Then if [one asks] 
why, [I answer] that because it is said in a sutra that the eye 
perception arises depending on an eye and material things, you 
[the Midhyamika] establish only what has already been established, 
saying that eyes do not see [anything]. 
Because arising is indeed denied, the eye perception is not accepted. 
Therefore, it is not establishing what has already been established. There 
arises no damage to our view because the meaning of the sutra, which is 
concordant with the truth of the common usage, is accepted and because 
the meaning of the sistra has no logic ultimately! 
This passage suggests that Bhaviveka conventionally accepts the Sauträntika's 
epistemological idea that the eye perception arises depending on eyes and material 
things. As Nönin explains, this means that there is only a causal relationship between the 
eye perception and a combination of eyes and material things. It is not the case that 
material things, which are objects, have simultaneous effects on the eye perception. It 
becomes clearer from the fact that this argument is presented after Bh iviveka's criticism 
over the Kashmirian Vaibhisika, who maintains that eyes do the seeing because they are 
the subject of seeing. ' Therefore, as Nönin concludes, Bhäviveka is considered to accept 
8 Prajilapradipa (Derge cd. No. 3853 tsha 77a3-5, Peking cd. No. 5253 tsha 92b7-93a2): 
mdo sde pa dag na re/ 
'du bycd mams la bya ba med pa'i phyir mig kyang Itaý') bar mi bycd la/ gzhan 
yang ma yin te/ 'o na ci zhe na/ mdo sde las mig dang gzugs roams la brten nas 
mig gi roam par shes pa skye'o zhes gsungs pas lhyed mig ita bar mi byed do 
zhes zer ba ni grub pa klio na Ia sgrub pa yin no 
zhe'o// skye ba bkag pa kho nas mig gi main par sties pa mi 'thad pa'i phyir grub pa la sgrub 
pa ma yin no/ : has blangs pa la gnod par mi 'gyur te/ tha snyad kyi bden pa dang rjes su 
mthun pa'i mdo sde'i don khas blangs pa'i phyir dang/ don dam par mdo sde'i don la rigs pa 
med pa'i phyir ro// 
(1) D: Ita, P: blta. (2) D: ma yin no, P: yin no. 
9 Prajnapradipa (Derge cd. No. 3853 tsha 77a2, Peking cd. No. 5253 tsha 92b5): 
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the Sautrintika's epistemological view conventionally rather than Vaibh, sika's. 
From these passages, thus, we find the evidence that indicates that Bh, viveka 
conventionally accepts Sauträntika's sakära view. It is, therefore, appropriate to call him 
a Sauträntika-Mädhyamika in the sense that he accepts the Sauträntika view conventionally. 
However, this is not to say that it is without foundation that dKon mchog 'jigs med 
dbang po considers that Bhäviveka does not accept self-awareness. 
2.2 Laksmi 
To the best of my knowledge, the only Indian source mentioning the terms which 
may be restored as yogacüra müdhyamika and sauträntika mädhyamika in a pair is 
Laksmi's Pan"cakramatikd Kram«rthaprakdsikä. We came to know that there were 
examples of these terms in the Indian source, after Hakamaya1° pointed out that 'Jam 
dbyangs bzhad pa in the Grub mtha' chen mo cites the work of Laksmi. Laksm mentions 
the terms `mdo sde dbu ma pa' (Sauträntika-MZdhyamika) and `real 'byor spyod pa'i 
dbtu ma pa' (Yog, c, ra-Mzdhyamika), as follows: 
[2-3] 
External objects, which arise from causes and conditions, are established 
on the one hand, consciousness without images is established on the other 
hand. Even these two lack intrinsic nature. Thus the reality (de kho na 
nyid, *tattva) is grasped by the Sautrhntika-Mzdhyamikas. 
External entities are nothing but images of cognition, but even they 
lack intrinsic nature. Thus the reality is grasped by the Yogacära- 
Mzdhyainikas. 
One, having eliminated defilement through the ways of seeing and 
practice, obtains the dhannakäya. Thus the doctrine is postulated by the 
Mädhyamikas of the Mother of Victors (royal ba'i yum gyi dbu ma pa, 
kha the ba dag na re/ trüg ni Ita bar byed pa nyid de/ Ita ba'i bycd pa po yin pa'i plhyir ro 
zbe'o// 
Cf. AbI1idhannakosabJz sya (Pradhan [1967] p. 31) 
10 1 lakamaya [ 1976] 
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*jinajanani-, nddhyamika)" 
[2-4] 
For the Sautrintika-Midhyamikas, it is maintained that twelve sense fields 
(skye inched, *dyatana) which arise from causes and conditions exist in 
the form of perceiving subjects and perceived objects, but lack intrinsic 
nature. 12 
According to Mimaki, 13 Laksmi is a Kashmirian who lived in the l1th C. Although 
this text is much later than Ye shes sde's lTa ba'i khyad par, which was composed in the 
early 9th C, this proves existence of the terms, Sauträntika-M, dhyamika and Yogäcära- 
Mädhyamika or similar, in India. 14 According to Laksmi, however, the Sautr5ntika- 
Midhyamikas are understood as proponents of the nirdkdra view. They hold that objects, 
which arise in dependence, exist as well as consciousness without images. On the other 
hand, the Yog, cira-Mädhyamikas maintain that what we perceive as external objects is 
in fact images of cognition. This is basically the same way of explanation as Ye shes sde 
because he explains in the l7'a ba'i khyad par that, according to the Sautrzntika- 
Madhyamaka, external objects arise in dependence and lack intrinsic nature, and, according 
to the Yogicära-Madhyamaka, they are images of cognition. " Also it is very likely that 
the Yogäc, ra-Mdhyamikas maintain the sakära view because in that view, images are 
"PancakramatXä (Derge cd. No. 1842 chi 240a6-bl, Peking cd. No. 2705 ngi 464a3-6): 
rgyu dang rk1cn las 'byung ba'i phyi'i') don logs su 'grub dang/ ream pa mcd pa'i main par 
sties pa logs(2 su 'grub pa ste/ de gnyi ga yang rang bzhin med pa'o zlies mdo sde'i dbu ma pa 
mains kyis dc kho na n yid gzung ba yin no// 
phyi'i dngos po ni) ye sues kyi ream pa kho na yin te/ de yang rang bzhin rued pa'o zhes 
mal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma pa mains kyis dc kho na nyid gzung ba yin °) no// 
mthong ba dang bsgom pa'i lam maws kyis nyon mongs pa spangs te/ chos kyi sku thob 
pa'o zhcs rgyal ba'i yum gyi dbu ma pa mains grub pa'i mtha' 'dod do// 
(1) D: phyir, P: phi'i. (2) D: logs, P: log. (3) D: ni, P: na. (3) D: min, P: yin. 
12 Pan"cakr(Jn J :d (Derge ed. No. 1842 chi 268b7, Peking ed. No. 2705 ngi 508a3-4): 
mdo sdc dbu ma rnams kyi') rgyu dang rk-yen las byung ba'i skye ruched bcu gnyis bzung ba 
dang 'dzin pa'i gzugs su so sor yod pa std 'on kyang rang bzhin mcd pa yin no zhes 'dod do// 
(1) D: kyi P: gyi. 
13 Miniaki [1982a] (p. 43). Cf. Naudou [1968] (pp. 154-155 and 161). 
14 It is the biggest concern here what the original Sanskrit ofmdo sde is. 
15 See 1.2.1 (p. 31 ff. ). 
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considered to be identical with cognition. Laksmi does not give any individual names of 
these proponents, and it is not clear if ýantaraksita and Bh iviveka are intended to be the 
representatives of these proponents as in the 17'a ba'i khyad par. 
Although we have found an example of this classification and use of the terms, it 
is still problematic that the only Indian account which mentions the terms which can be 
restored to Sautr5ntika-Mädhyamika and Yogzcara-Midhyamika explains that the 
Sautrzntika-Mzdhyamikas hold the niriiküra view. In this case, it is doubtful that 
Sautr intika-Mädhyamika is meant to be the Mädhyamika who holds the view of the 
Sauträntika conventionally because the Sauträntika holds the sakära view even though 
they both accept existence of external objects. Therefore it is not clear from these 
passages how indo sde of mDo sde'i dbu ma pa is derived. Concerning the origin of the 
terms, Mimaki places priority on Ye shes sde16 because the latter is about two centuries 
earlier. It is also possible, as Matsumoto maintains, that in the lTa ba'i khyad par 
Sautrdntika-Madhyamaka was not meant to be the Madhyamaka that holds the view of 
the Sauträntika conventionally, but later Tibetan doxographers misunderstood that they 
are related because of similarity of these terms. 
While this does not explain how the term `Sautrintika-Madhyamaka' is derived, 
this could explain why the Sautrintika-Mädhyamika is considered by later Tibetan 
doxographers to deny self-awareness even though they are supposed to follow 
conventionally the Sautrntika view which accepts self-awareness with images. Because 
this text of Laksmi is quoted by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, it is certain that Tibetan 
accounts given by dGe lugs doxographers depended on this text and as a result, the 
Sauträntika-Mädhyamika is said by them to have held the nirüküra view and denied 
self-awareness. It is then not appropriate to attribute this inconsistency of epistemology 
of the Sautrzntika-Mndhyamika and the Sautr intika to the misunderstanding by Tibetan 
doxographers since this is based on the Indian source. Concerning the validity of the 
term `Sautrintika, ' however, it is not clear from these passages by Laksmll how the term 
is derived. 
16 Miniaki [1982a] (p. 43) and [1983] (p. 163). Also see Williams [1989a] (p. 2) that suggests a 
possibility that this division which originated in Tibet was subsequently introduced to India. 
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In addition to these two Mädhyamikas, Laksmi mentions the MZdhyamikas of the 
Mother of Victors (rgyal ba'i yum gyi dbu ma pa, *jinajanani-mirdh), ainika). Her 
explanation of their view is not based on ontology that is the criterion of the classification 
for the former two Mädhyamikas. Therefore, it is not clear who these third Mzdhyamikas 
are from the brief explanation of Laksmi. " 
Concerning the Yogcära-MIdhyamika, Laksnü shows her view on self- 
awareness: 18 
[2-5] 
Because of the reasoning that it is neither from itself nor from another 
and so on, if one examines the triple world, it is only empty. However, in 
the position of the YogAcära-Madhyamaka, cognition that is self-awareness- 
only appears as external and internal forms. 
And if one asks what difference there is from the view of consciousness 
with images, [he, Nigirjuna, ] answers, 'It has no characteristic like space. " 
(v. 2: 28b)'9 This means that that cognition which is free from characteristics, 
i. e. arising and so on, i. e. which is free from arising and destruction and so 
on, is the doctrine of the M, dhyamika. 
Therefore, it seems as if [cognition] is not self-awareness, and it is in 
an inexpressible state because the form of self-awareness is not established. 20 
17 Yoshimizu [1988] (p. 459 and p. 468, note 12) briefly mentions these three classifications and 
points out that Ilakamaya [1976] having quoted passages from the work of Laksmi as the source of 
the classification of the Madhyamaka, only mentions the Sautrrntika-Mädhyamika and the Yogäclira- 
Mldhyamika, but not the third classification (rgyal ba'i yum gyi dbu ma pa, which she translate as 
the Prajnä-MAdhyamil: a) She also points out that it is not mentioned in Matsumoto [1980b], 
[1981a] and Kajiyama [1982], which examine the Laksmi's classification following Ilakarnaya's 
study, either. 
18 The most part of the following passages, [2-5] and [2-6] are translated into Japanese in Yoshimizu 
119881. 
19 Pancakrama, v. 2: 30ab (=v. 3: 30ab according to the numbering of La Vallee Poussin [1896] p. 
28,32): 
samvittimätrakam jnänam äk avail alaksanam 
20Pancakramatikä (Derge ed. No. 1842 chi 230b3-6, Peking ed. No. 2705 ngi 449a2-6): 
rang las ma 'in gzhan las min/ zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i rigs pas khams glum main par dpyad 
na stong pa") kho na yin to/ 'on kyang mal 'byol spyod pa'i dbu ma'i phyogs su rang rig tsam 
gyi ye sties phyi nang gyi gzugs su snang ba yin no// 
'o na ream pa dang boas pa'i ream par sties pa smra ba las khyad par gang yod ce na smras 
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In this passage the view of the Yog, ýcara-M dhyamika is explained that cognition 
that is self-awareness-only appears as external and internal forms. She seems to rephrase 
it as the view of consciousness with images (nenn pa clang bcas pa'i rnam par shes pa 
smra ba, *sakdravijill nav da). Her explanation that cognition appears as internal and 
external forms is regarded as the sdkara view because cognition is considered not different 
from images in that view. While it is not clear whether her view is also included in the 
position of the Yog iclra-Mädhyamika, it is clear that her explanation is based on the 
Mädhyamika view in that the triple world is considered empty on the basis of the 
reasoning that neither from itself nor another and so on? ' If this position is different from 
that of the Yogäcdra-M,, dhyainika, it may possibly be identified with the Mzdhyamikas 
of the Mother of Victors (rgyal ba'i yum gyi dbu ma pa, *jinajanani-mddhyamika). 
Likewise she later explains cognition, as follows: 
[2-6] 
It is said "supreme just like the surface of space" and so on, [i. e. 
Then splendour that is supreme just like the surface of space should 
be observed. (v. 2: 60cd)]22 
Splendour ('od gsal, prabhasvara), i. e. the reality without images, which 
is similar to clear lamplight and similar to an ocean without waves, should 
be perceived. 
Splendour is of two types: splendour of mind (sem kyi 'od gsal, *citta- 
pa/ nam mkha' lta bur mtshan nyid med/ Ces (2) bya ba ni ye sties de yang mtshan nyid de(') skye 
ba la cogs pa std/ dc dang bral ba ni Skye ba dang 'jig pa la sogs pa dang4) bral ba ste dbu ma 
pa'i grub pa'i mtba'o// 
'dis ni rang rig pa ma yin pa lta bu ste rang rig pa'i gzugs ma grub pas brjod du med pa'i 
gnas skabs yin no// 
(1) D: pa, P: ba. (2) D: ces, P: zhes. (3) D: de, P: ni. (4) D: omit P: dang. 
21 Mülamadhyamakal nrilä, v. 1: 1 (La Vallee Poussin [1903-13] p. 12,13-14): 
na svato n5pi parato na dväblhyäm näpy ahetutal) I 
utpanni jätu vidyantc bhäväh kvacana kecana 111: 111 
22 Pancakrama, v. 2: 60cd (=v. 3: 60ed according to the numbering of La Vallee Poussin [1896] p. 
30,21. This verse is my insertion. ): 
prabhäsvaram tu älambyam : il: ssatalavat param I 
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prabadsvara) and splendour by nature (rang bzhin gyis 'od gsal, prakrti- 
prabhosvara). Of these, splendour of mind is consciousness without images, 
and splendour by nature is empty of all and obtained at the fourth stage. 
At this [second stage] the Venerable [Mgdrjuna] accepts only splendour 
of mind. Otherwise, the fourth stage would incur an undesired consequence 
of meaninglessness because of repetition. 
Then if one asks how it is, [Nigärjuna answers, ] "Just like the surface 
of space" (v. 2: 60d). Just as, even though space is filled with clouds, 
darkness, snow, and so on, it does not have impurity, just so the reality 
free from false images, which is different from that [reality], should be 
perceived, like the surface of space. Therefore, supreme means that it is 
more excellent than the view of consciousness-only associated with images 
because intrinsic nature of images is not established 23 
Again in this passage, Laksmi elucidates her view on cognition. She gives two 
types of Splendour (prabhdsvara): splendour of mind, which is consciousness without 
images and splendour by nature, which is empty of all. This is nothing but the view of 
the Nirzkära-Madhyamaka because it proceeds from the stage of the Nir5kira-Cittam5tra 
where consciousness without images is postulated to that of the Madhyamaka where that 
73 Pan'cakramatika (Derge ed. No. 1842 chi 236b5-237a1, Peking ed. No. 2705 ngi 458b2-8): 
nam mkha'i ngos Itar mchog gyur pal/ zhics bya ba la Sogs pa la 'od gsal bar"" ni marn pa med 
pa dang/ dang ba'i mar me'i 'od zer dang 'dra ba dang dpa' rlabs med pa'i 'dra ba'i2 de kho 
na nyid dmigs par bya'o// 
'od gsal ba ni mam pa gnyis te/ senis kyi 'od gsal ba dang rang bzhin gyis 'od gsal ba'o// de 
la sems kyi 'od gsal ba ni mam pa mcd pa'i mam rig dang/ rang bzhin gyis") 'od gsal ba(4) ni 
thams cad stong pa std/ rim pa bzhi pas thob par bya'o// 
'dir e btsun gyi zhal snga nas kyis / sews kyi 'od gsal ba klio na bzhed pa yin te/ gzhan du 
na zlosý pa'i phyir rim pa bzhi pa6 don med pa(') that bar 'gyur ro 11 
dc yang ji Ita bu yin zhc na/ narr mkha i 8) egos Itar zees pa(9) ji Itar sprin dang mun pa dang 
kha ba la sogs pas nam ml; ha' khyab na yang/ ngo bo nyid du dri ma mcd pa std/ dc bzhin du 
de las ilia dad pa'i brdzun"0) gyi main pa manes dang brat pa'i"') dc nyid nam nikha'i ngos Isar 
dmigs par bya'ol/ 
de nyid phyir/ mchog tu gyur pa ni mam pa dang boas pa'i mam rig tram smra ba las khyad 
par dang ldan pa std main pa mains kyi rang bzlim ma grub pa'i phyir roll 
(1) D: pa'i, I': ba'i, Em: bar. (2) D: 'dra ba'i, P: rgya mtsho dang 'dra ba'i. (3) D: gyi, P: 
gyis. (4) D: 'od gsal, P: 'od gsal ba. (5) D: zlos, P: bzlos. (6) D: rim pa bzhi pa, P: rim bzhi pa. 
(7) D: pa, P: par. (8) D: nam mkha'i, P: nam mkha'. (9) D: pa, P: ba. (10) D: brdzun, P: 
rdzun (11) D: pa'i, P: ba'i. 
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consciousness is also empty. It is also clear that she understands that images are different 
from the reality, i. e. consciousness. This shows that there was a further classification in 
the internalist Madhyainaka: the sdkdra and the niraküra. It is also very likely that the 
Niräkära-Madhyamaka has something to do with the Arya school to which Nägärjuna, 
the author of the Pancakrama is considered to belong. 
Thus Laksmi classifies the Mädhyamikas into the Sautrintika-Mldhyamika and 
the Yogäcära-Mädhyamika. The Sauträntika-Mädhyamika is considered to maintain the 
externalist niräkära view while Bhzviveka maintains the säkära view. She distinguishes 
the Sikira-Mädhyamika and the Nirakära-Mädhyamika although it is not clear if both 
are included in the Yogäcära-Mädhyamika. She does not give any names related to these 
classifications, except for Nägärjuna who is regarded as the internalist Nirzkära- 
Mddhyamika. 
2.3 Bodhibhadra 
Bodhibhadra24 is known to have written the Jnänasdrasamuccayanibandhana, the 
commentary on the Jnünasürasamuccaya written by a certain Aryadeva. He is considered 
to have lived around 10-11th C since Atisa (982-1055) mentions him as his direct 
teacher, '' whose teaching he adhered to. He is therefore regarded as a contemporary of 
Laksnü. 
The Jnanasürasamuccaya is a doxographical text which explains and analyses the 
teaching of outsiders and the four major Buddhist philosophical views. In verses 27 and 
28, Aryadeva shows the teaching of the Madhyamaka. Of these, it is verse 28 concerning 
which Bodhibhadra mentions two types of Mädhyamikas who have opposing views. 
Verse 28 of the Jndnasdrasamuccaya and part of a commentary given by Bodhibhadra 
are translated as follows: 
[2-7] 
Neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both existent and non- 
24 Newnan [1992] (p. 229, note 5) proposes Bhadrabodhi. 
25 See Lindtner [1981] pp. 210-1 and 3.4.2 (p. 188 ff. ) of this thesis. 
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existent, nor even [anything] with the nature of neither [existent 
nor non-existent]. The Midhyamikas know that the reality is free 
from the four alternatives (catuskotr). (v. 28)26 
[2-s] 
Here, also these Midhyarnikas have two conventionally differentiated 
positions. Those who do not consider appearance are Bhavya (Bhäviveka) 
and others, and those who assert that things which appear are not as they 
are [thought to be external], but only internal cognition appears in various 
ways are Säntaraksita and others. 7 
Aryadeva denies that the four alternatives (catu koti) based on existence and 
non-existence28 are the teaching of the Madhyamaka. In the commentary on this verse, 
Bodhibhadra explains that Bhavya and Szntaraksita are two Mzdhyamikas who do not 
agree on appearance. It is understood here that Säntaraksita and others hold the view of 
the internalist Madhyamaka, that is to say, the view that what we consider the outside 
world is actually the manifestation of internal cognition. This is the s«kara view because 
cognition itself appears as objects. The view that cognition which is single appears as 
objects which are plural corresponds to that of the Säkära-Yogäcära 29 On the other hand, 
what Bhäviveka and others hold is not entirely clear since the explanation is too brief. 
26 Jiidnasarasamuccaya, v. 28 (Mimal i [2000] p. 241,1-2): 
na san näsan na sadasan na cäpy anubliayätmakam 
catuskotivinirmuktam tattvam mädhyamikä viduh 1128 II 
27 JiNnasürasamuccayanibhandhana, ad v. 28 (Miniaki [1976] p. 206,27-30, Derge cd, No. 3852 
tsha 44a7-bl, Peking cd. No. 5252 tsha 51b7-8): 
'dir dbu ma pa de dag kyang lain rdzob ream par gzhag pa gnyis te/ snang ba la mi 'jal ba ni 
slob dpon blia bya la sogs pa dang/ snang ba'i dngos po ji Ita ba ma yin gyi nang gi shes pa 
lho na sna tshogs su snang bar smra ba slob dpon zhi ba 'tsho la sogs pa'o// 
It is very important to examine how the Madhyamaka teachers understand the four alternatives 
(catuskoti). As we will see in chapters 3 and 4, they can be classified depending on interpretation 
of the four alternatives and on use of different kinds of four alternatives. The Svätantrika can be 
distinguished from the Prdsangika according to their interpretation of the verse. 7I71e 
Mäyopamädvayav; idin and the Sarvadhannapratisthsnavadin respectively use the four alternatives 
based on existence and on permanence. 
2' Matsumoto [1984a] (p. 147) assumes that this corresponds to the citrddvaita view of the Shc: ära- 
Yogiicära. 
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Kajiyama3° interprets `appearance' in the commentary as `appearance of images (dkära) 
in knowledge'. He accordingly concludes that Bhzviveka is here understood as a 
Niräklravidin. This means that Bodhibhadra's understanding of Bh iviveka's view is 
almost the same as the view of the Sauträntika-Mädhyamika described by Laksin in the 
Pancakramatikä Kraarärthaprakäsikii. It is again unlikely that the externalist M idhyamika 
was considered to have any relation to the tenet of the Sauträntika. 
Bodhibhadra names Bhiviveka and ýftntaraksita as the representatives of these 
two views. Nevertheless he does not mention any other subdivision or the name of a 
teacher. He does not give any information about Candrakirti. 
2.4 Prajnäkaramati 
Prajnäkaramati (10-11th C), 3' in the commentary on verse 9: 20cd of the 
Bodhicaryävatära, discusses self-awareness. 32 After denying the existence of self- 
awareness by showing that lamplight is an inappropriate inferential example of self- 
awareness, he examines the theory of self-awareness given by Säntaraksita, who holds 
mind-only conventionally. Therefore, the topic here is not self-awareness as ultimate 
existence, but that at the conventional level. It is also known that he regards S, ntideva, 
the author of the Bodhicarydvatära, as an externalist Mädhyamika. Here he first introduces 
the Yogäciira's objection that some Madhyamikas (for example, Säntaraksita) also admit 
self-awareness, and then quotes two verses from the Madhyamakalamkdra of S, ntaraksita: 
[2-9] 
30 Kajiyama [1982] (P. 50. ) Because, according to Kajiyama's study, Bhäviveka was a Säkhravädin 
who maintains the existence of external objects, which justifies the name `Sauträntika-Mädhyamika' 
(see 2.1), he holds that this passage is based on Bodhibliadra's misunderstanding. 
31 Tibetan accounts of the history of Indian Buddhism report that Prajnäkaramati was a gatekeeper 
at Vikrama§iia together with Ratnäkarasänti, who was a teacher of Ati§a (982-1055). See Rocrich 
[1976] (pp. 205-206) for the account of the Deb ther sngon po. Atiga entered Tibet in 1042. 
Yamaguchi [1941] (p. 303) and Kajiyama [1982] (p. 17) propose ca. 950-1030 for Prajn ikaramati's 
date. Therefore, Laksmi, Bodhibliadra and Prajnäkaramati are regarded as contemporaries. 
'Z Williams [1998] and Shaku [2000] deal with Prajnäkaramati's commentary on verses 9: 20 and 
25. However I do not agree with Williams's interpretation of these parts of commentary and Shaku 
does not discuss much about Säntaraksita's view expressed in verses 16 and 17 of the 
Madhyamakülamküra that are quoted by Prajnakaramati. 
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[The Yogcära says: ] This [self-awareness], which is pleasant, is agreeably 
established [even by the Midhyainika], because self-illumination [which 
illuminates] cognition independent of other illumination, and which arises 
from its own causes and conditions as being opposite to insentient intrinsic 
nature, is called self-awareness. Even by you, [the Midhyamikas, ] who 
attack intrinsic nature of blue, this is indeed approved. To this extent, 
lamplight is also given as an example. Moreover, we do not regard self- 
illumination as a distinction of [the object of] action (karman), an agent 
(kartr) and activity (kriyä), because it is not appropriate for a single 
existent to have three kinds of intrinsic nature such as activity. Then even 
if there is an objection through the distinction of activity and the others, 
we[, the Yogäcäras, ] do not have any damage, because self-illumination 
originated from a cause in itself cannot be damaged. In this way, there is 
no faulty consequence shown [by the Mädhyamika] with regard to self- 
awareness. 
It is said [in the Madhyamakülamkdra, 16-17]; 33 
Consciousness arises as what is opposite to those with insentient 
intrinsic nature. This sentient nature is self-awareness of that 
[consciousness]. (v. 16) 
But, its self-awareness is not based on distinction between activity 
and an agent, because it is not reasonable that a single thing without 
parts has three forms. (v. 17)3' 
33 Bodicaryüvatärapaiijikä (La Vallee Poussin [1914] p. 396,4-13): 
nanu priyam idam anusthitam priyena I yasmäj jadasvabhävavyävrttätmatayä svahetupratyayät 
utpattir eva jnänasya prakäsäntaranirapeksasyätmaprakäsatä svasamvedanam ucyate I etad eva 
tvayäpi nilasvarüpaparämarsena samarthitam I etävanmätrena pradipo 'pi drst. ntilglah 
na punar asmäbhih karmal artrkiiyäbhedena jnänasyätmaprakäsanam isyate I ekasya satah 
karmädisvabhävatrayasyäyogät I tan na kriyädibhedena düsane 'pi kimcid düsitam asmäl: am 
syit I svahetujanitasyätmaprakäsasy inupaghätät I iti nätmasamvedane pratipäditadosaprasan- 
gah I taduktam 
14 Bodhicaryävatärapaiijikd (La Vallee Poussin [1914] p. 396,14-7 = Madhyama(iilamkrra, vv. 
16-17 =7 ättvasamgraha, vv. 1999-2000): 
vijnänam jadarüpebhyo vyävrttam upajiyate 1 
iyam evätmasamvittir asya yä '_jadartipatä II 
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It is first necessary to examine what Szntaraksita is trying to show with these 
verses in the Madhyamakdlamkdra. In verse 16, sentient nature is said to be self-awareness 
of consciousness. It is not unreasonable even for those who deny self-awareness, unless 
they are materialists, that consciousness which is mental has a sentient nature and external 
objects which are material have an insentient nature. It can also be understood, in 
reverse, that material things, which do not have sense, thought and so on, are defined as 
insentient, and consciousness, which has sense, thought and so on, is understood as 
sentient. We usually think that this sentient consciousness perceives insentient material 
things. This dichotomy of sentient and insentient can differentiate consciousness which 
is the subject of perception from material things which are the objects of perception. It 
does not necessarily follow, however, that consciousness that has a sentient nature has 
self-awareness. Therefore a sentient nature alone is not a sufficient reason for self- 
awareness. Then why is it that Säntaraksita defines here that sentient nature is self-awareness 
of consciousness? In the Madhyamakdlmnkäravrtti on verse 16, he explains as follows: 
[2-10] 
Of these, first, with regard to dualism, the view of consciousness without 
images, it is not possible that consciousness which does not take appearance 
of an object has the nature to perceive an object different from itself, 
because ['perception of object'] is only figuratively used for mere perception 
of nothing but itself. " 
Säntaraksita seems to be saying that cognition, which is sentient, cannot perceive 
external objects, which are insentient, because they are of opposite quality and cannot 
have a connection. Because consciousness cannot perceive insentient objects that are 
kriyäklrakabhedena na svasamvittir asya tu I 
ekasyänam§arüpasya trairtipyänupapattitali II 
35 Mnclhymnakcrcanküravrtti (Ichigo [1985b] p. 70,5-8): 
de Ia re zhig gnyis kyi tshul mam pa med pa'i mam par shes pa'i phyogs ni / mann par shes pa 
yul gyi snang ba dang ma phrad pa/ bdag tsam rig pa tsam la gzhol ba kho nar zad pas/ bdag 
dang tha dad pa'i don myong ba'i bdag nyid du mi rung ngo// 
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different in quality, Säntaraksita insists, it is necessary for consciousness to have the 
appearance of an object in itself. Here he, from the point of the view of sükdra, criticises 
the (externalist) Nirikärav-adin, who postulates that when it perceives an object, 
consciousness does not take in appearance, and that images belong to external objects. 
Thus although the sentient nature of consciousness itself does not directly indicate the 
self-awareness of consciousness, incompatibility between sentient consciousness and 
insentient objects suggests the former's inability to perceive the latter. 
Thus having postulated self-awareness in verse 16 of the Madhyamakdlamkdra 
Säntaraksita goes on to deny its having three aspects in verse 17. With regard to this, he 
comments on the verse, as follows: 
[2-11] 
It is not possible to establish self-awareness in the way it is postulated, in 
the view of consciousness with images (*säkäravijndna), that with regard 
to the object which can throw its image [into consciousness], this state of 
being the cause is the state of being the percept, and with regard to 
consciousness which places the form of the object [in itself], this state of 
being caused to arise is the state of being the perceiver. " 
Thus Szntaraksita denies the view of the externalists who hold that consciousness 
has images, such as the Sautr5intika. As we examined previously, 37 the Sautrzntika postulates 
self-awareness which takes images thrown in by external objects. In this case, consciousness 
does not perceive external objects themselves but images thrown into it by the objects 
and therefore the difference of their quality does not obstruct perception. The bases of 
this theory are the ideas of momentariness and causality. If an object is the cause of 
perception and cognition is the result, they cannot exist at the same time but in sequence. 
36 Madhyamakd1wpkäravrtti (Ichigö [1985b] p. 72,1-4): 
ji skad du yul rang gi mam pa 'jog nus pa ni rgyu nyid de rig par bya ba nyid yin pa dang/ 
mane par shes pa yul gyi ngo bor bzhag pa ni bskyed par bya ba nyid de rig pa po nyid do zhes 
rnam pa dang bcas pa'i sties pa'i tshul las brjod pa Ita bur rang rig pa la ni dc liar ream par 
bzhag par mi 'thad dc/ 
37 Sec; [1-5] and [1-6] (pp. 16-18). 
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First, an object has contact with the faculty of sight and in the next moment cognition of 
the object arises. Then, at the moment the cognition of the object arises, the object no 
longer exists because of momentariness. It is therefore impossible for cognition to perceive 
any external object and what cognition perceives must be an image of the object thrown 
into the cognition. 
Säntaraksita, however, slightly changes the point of the argument when he explain 
why this way of perception is impossible. He, immediately after the previous passage, 
gives the following reason: 
[2-12] 
It is because it is not reasonable that consciousness without parts has the 
[three] aspects, which are the result of arising, the cause of arising and 
the activity of arising, or the three aspects by the distinction of the perceived 
object, the perceiving subject and perception. To explain, there is no 
capability [of self-awareness] before arising [of cognition] because of 
non-existence. When there is capability, just like the form maintained as 
the cause of arising, the form maintained as the result of arising that is 
not different from the [cause] has also been accomplished. The activity 
on itself is contradictory 38 
In this passage, the subject and the object are said to be the result of arising and 
the cause of arising: literally `what is caused to arise' (bskyed par bya ba) and `what 
causes to arise' (skyed pa po). The proponent of consciousness with images who maintains 
existence of external objects postulates that an object can throw its image into consciousness, 
consciousness places the image of the object in itself and cognition arises in dependence 
38 Madhyamakdlamhdravrtti (Ichigö [1985b] p. 72,4-10): 
mam par sties pa cha med pa'i bdag nyid lay) bslyed par bya ba dang/ skyed pa po dang/ 
bskyed pa'i bya ba'i tshul du 'am/ rig par bya ba dang/ rig pa po dang/ rig pa'i bye brag gis 
glum gyi tshul du mi rigs pa'i phyir te/ 'di Itar skye ba'i snga logs na ni med pas nus pa med 
la/ nus pa'i dus na ni skyed pa por 'dod pa'i ngo bo bzliin du de dang tha mi dad pa bskyed par 
bya bar 'dod pa'i ngo bo yang yongs su gnib ste/ bdag nyid la bycd pa ni 'gal lo// 
(1) Ed. las. 
71 
Chapter 2 lnternalist and External ist 
on the image. This implies that the image of the object is the cause and the cognition is 
the result. According to Snntaraksita, however, this is not tenable. Before cognition 
arises, there is no capability of self-awareness. When self-awareness has capability, 
cognition which is identical with the object is existent. In other words, at the moment the 
object is existent and cognition is not, self-awareness is not in effect. Then the object 
cannot be a part of self-awareness. On the other hand, at the moment self-awareness is in 
effect, the cognition and the object which are identical are both existent. If they exist 
simultaneously, they cannot be a cause and its result. According to Säntaraksita, therefore, 
in self-awareness there are not the three parts, i. e. the subject which is a result, the object 
which is a cause and the causality between them which is understood as activity or a 
function. In this way Säntaraksita denies only the causality between an object and cognition 
and at the same time introduces his idea of self-awareness that is the identity of an object 
and cognition 39 
In this way Säntaraksita refutes the externalist who holds the niraknra view in 
verse 16 and the externalist who holds the sakära view in verse 17. It naturally follows 
that what cognition perceives must be cognition itself. This conclusion is shown in verse 
18 of the Madhyamakälamkära (=verse 2001 of the Tattvasa, ngraha) which is not quoted 
by Prajnäkaramati: 
[2-13] 
Then because this [consciousness] has the nature of cognition (bodha), to 
this extent self-awareness is possible. But how is awareness of any other[s] 
in the form of an object [possible] by that [consciousness]? '° 
39 Thus Sdntaraksita, in verses 16 and 17 of the Madhyamakülamknra, does not introduce two kinds 
of self-awareness which Williams [1989b] (pp. 19-35) proposes (self-awareness (i) which takes an 
object which is consciousness itself, and self-awareness (ii) which has reflexivity not relevant to an 
object. ) Säntaraksita, in verse 17, denies self-awareness that arises in dependence on external 
objects and asserts self-awareness which is based on the identity of cognition and an object, which 
does not relate to external objects (see v. 18 below), and which rather corresponds to Williams's 
self-awareness (i). 
40 Madhyamakalamkara, v. 18 =Tattvasamgraha, v. 2001 (Ichigo [1985b] p. 74, note 1): 
tad asya bodharüpatv5d yuktam tävat svavedanam I 
parasya tv artharüpasya Lena samvedanam katharn II 
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In this way, by denying the externalist views of niräkära and sakara, Säntaraksita 
shows his view on self-awareness and concludes that consciousness perceives itself 
because it is impossible to perceive any other external objects. Even if one admits the 
existence of self-awareness, this does not imply the non-existence of external objects as 
the Sautrzntika holds. Therefore he argues that it is not appropriate for one entity to have 
three parts and refutes this view of the Sautr5ntika. Thus he postulates self-awareness 
without different aspects which is regarded as self-illuminating like lamplight. The 
opponent of Prajnäkaramati shows, by quoting verses 16 and 17 of theMadhyamakdla»pkara 
(=verses 1999 and 2000 of the Tattvasamgraha), that even the Mädhyamika 
(conventionally) accepts self-awareness and denies external objects. 
In response to this objection of the Yogzcära with quotations from the 
Madhymnakülarnkdra, Prajnäkaramati states as follows: 
[2-14] 
[This] is said on this point: Having conceded the meaning of words well 
known as common usage (vyavahara) by distinguishing activity and an 
agent, the objection is stated [by you, the Yogzcira], because the word 
`self-awareness' expresses that meaning. However if you avoid the meaning 
of the words well known in the world for fear of a fault, then you will be 
invalidated by the world a' 
Prajnäkaramati, in this part, points out that it is contradictory if S5ntaraksita uses 
the word self-awareness and denies its three aspects as [the object of] action (karman), 
an agent (kart) and activity (kriyü) at the same time. Prajii karamati and Säntaraksita 
agree that the Sauträntika-type of self-awareness, which has different aspects, is 
unacceptable. This implies that Prajnäkaramati does not follow the epistemological view 
of the Sauträntika, that postulates self-awareness with three aspects even conventionally. 
41 Bodhicaryivatarapaiijikä (La Vallee Poussin [1914] p. 397,1-4): 
atrocyate I kriyäkarakabhedena vyavaharaprasiddham §abdärtham adhigamya düsanarn uktam 
svasamvedanasabdasya tadarthäbhidhiiyakatvät 1 yadi punar dosabhayäl lokaprasiddho'pi 
sabdhärthah parityajyate tadä lokata eva badhä bhavato bhavisyati I 
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The point of disagreement is self-awareness postulated by the Yog, cara and Sintaraksita, 
which is without different aspects and is self-illuminating. To establish that consciousness 
perceives consciousness, it is necessary to have another consciousness which perceives 
that consciousness perceives consciousness. To prove that this is the case, another 
consciousness is required. Therefore this view that the subjective aspect of consciousness 
perceives its objective aspect falls into infinite regress. On the other hand, if one denies 
this distinction of consciousness into different aspects like Säntaraksita and the Yogäcära, 
and postulates self-awareness which is reflexive, like lamplight that illuminates itself 
without another source of light, it is possible to avoid infinite regress. However it 
becomes very difficult to explain how we perceive objects in ordinary terms because 
perception cannot arise without the subject and the object. Thus the self-awareness 
maintained by Säntaraksita and the Yogacira leaves room for logical contradiction. 
Prajnäkaramati's objection exposes this contradiction briefly and to the point. 
At a glance, however, Prajiiäkaramati's objection here looks very weak because 
he just says "if you avoid the meaning of the words well known in the world for fear of a 
fault, then you will be invalidated by the world. " It also looks as if it is not Prajnzkaramati 
himself who makes an objection to this view. However, `well known in the world' 
(lokaprasiddha) is almost synonymous with the conventional truth (smnvrtisalya). 42 Here 
he clearly expresses, therefore, that self-awareness is not accepted conventionally. 
This attitude towards self-awareness is also reflected in the commentary on 9: 25äb. 
After the opponent's claim that if self-awareness is negated, there cannot be any experience 
of objects because it is impossible for cognition to perceive `external' objects, 
Prajnäkaramati states as follows: 
[2-15] 
When it is said that `there cannot be common usage such as what is seen, ' 
is it on the level of the ultimate or the conventional? Of these if it is said 
`there cannot be [common usage] on the level of the ultimate, ' then it is 
preferable to us, because what is conventional cannot reach the ultimate 
42 Cf. Mad/zyainakavatära, v. 6: 9, Satyadva)thataravr? ti, 9a2-4. 
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thought. But [if it is said] `as what is commonly known in the world, ' 
then he says: 
What is seen, heard or known as it is cannot be denied here. (v. 
9: 25ab) 
What is seen as it is means what is ascertained directly by cognition of 
eyes and other [senses]. What is heard means [what is known] from 
another person and scriptural authority. What is known means what is 
affirmed from inference arising from the three-fold inferential mark. On 
the basis of common usage, here [at the level of the conventional truth] 
all of them cannot be denied, i. e. cannot be rejected. In the way something 
is experienced on the mundane level, in that way it, whose nature has not 
yet been examined, is accepted as what is well known in the world, but 
not on the ultimate level. Therefore, one who maintains the theory of the 
ultimate does not make such mistakes that as a result of no [self-]awareness 
of cognition, there is no experience of objects a3 
Here Prajnäkaramati denies the objection that if there is no self-awareness 
conventionally, it is not possible to perceive objects. He interprets the verse that `what is 
seen' and so forth are the valid means of knowledge (pramndna), i. e. direct perception, 
scriptural authority and inference, and that these valid means of knowledge are not 
denied conventionally even though there is no self-awareness. This means that he 
conventionally denies self-awareness but considers that perception is possible without it. 
43 Bodhicaryäiatarapan`jika (La Vallee Poussin [1914] p. 404,11-p. 405,7): 
yad ucyate drstädivyavahäro na syäd iti I sa kim paramärtho na syät samvrtyä vä I tatra yadi 
paramärthato na syäd ity ucyate tadä priyam idam asmäkam I na lii s: inrvrtasya 
paramärthacintäyäm avatäro 'sti 1 atha lokaprasiddhitas tadä 
yathä drstam srutam jnätam naiveha pratisidhyate 1 (v. 9: 25 ab) 
iti I yathä dram iti caksurädivijnänena pratyaksena pratipannam I grutam iti parapudgalad 
ägamäc ca I jnätam iti trirüpaliiigajäd anumiinän niscitam I tad etad iha sarvam vyavahäram 
ä§ritya naiva pratisidhyate na väryate I yad yathä lokatah pratiyate tat tathaivävicäritasvarüpam 
abhyupagamyate lokaprasiddhitah I na tu punah paramärthatali II tena jnänasamvedanäbhäviid 
arthänadhigamädayo 'pi dosäli paramärihapaksavädina iha nävataranti 
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It is worth noting that these `what is seen, ' etc. are in fact considered a kind of 
definition of the conventional truth here in Prajnikaramati's commentary. As mentioned 
above, `well known in the world' (lokaprasiddha) is used as a synonym of the conventional 
truth (samvrtisatya). In this passage, too, Prajnäkaramati explains that what is experienced 
on the mundane level is accepted as what is well known in the world (lokaprasiddha). 
This shows that for Prajnäkaramati, the conventional truth is what is established through 
direct perception or scriptural authority or syllogistic inference, and is considered well 
known in the world. Concerning self-awareness, direct perception cannot perceive it and 
scriptural authority also denies it 4' Then it is necessary to prove it by means of inference. 
Therefore when he criticises Säntaraksita's view of self-awareness, Prajnzkaramati says, 
indicating it cannot be established through inference, "However if you avoid the meaning 
of the words well known in the world for fear of a fault, then you will be invalidated by 
the world, " because a contradictory statement cannot be a proposition of syllogistic 
inference 45 This amounts to saying that Prajnäkaramati commented on the 
'4 Bodhicaryeivatüra, 9: 17cd (La Vallee Poussin [1914] p. 391,12): 
And the protector of the world said that mind does not see the mind. 
ul. -tam ca Iokanäthcna cittam cittam na pasyati II 
as For example, Dignäga gives four faulty propositions: 
1. Something denied by direct perception, e. g. "Sound is not heard. " 
2. Something denied by inference, e. g. "A pot is eternal. " 
3. Something denied by authority or doctrine of one's own, e. g. ` Fhe object of perception is 
not the object of valid means of knowledge. " 
4. Something denied by common sense or common usage, e. g. "Sarin is not the moon. " 
(Pramänasamuccaya, 3: 2. See Kitagawa [1965] p. 471-3 and p. 130, note 169. ) 
In this case, Prajnäkaramati's criticism is classified into the fourth case. Thus it is here implied that 
svasamvedana which contains semantic contradiction cannot be a proposition and therefore cannot 
be established. The view of Williams [1998] (p. 43) that ` Prajnäl: aramati simply fails to state that 
for Säntideva, svasanrvedana is not the case even conventionally" is not sustainable. Ile, examining 
Prajfdkaramati's criticism against Säntaralsita [2-14], states as follows: 
°1'he world' (i. e., the realm of concern of those who are not considering the ultimate way of 
things) has a number of layers. Since whatever are the latest scientific discoveries of psychologists 
psychiatrists and neurosurgeons for example concerning the mind are not matters of ultimate 
truth, for the M3dhyamika they have to come within the conventional. But they do not correspond 
with the way things are understood by our person-in-the-street. 'lhhere are specialists within the 
conventional realm, and indeed Prajnäkaramati's comments rely on the considerably refined 
specialization of Sanskrit grammarians like Pänini and Patanjali. It is actually debatable whether 
the ordinary person-in-the-street always considers that verbs require agent, action and so 
on....... S: untaraksita can perfectly consistently claim that Sanskrit grammar does not necessarily 
reflect empirical reality, and the conventional truth anyway means non-ultimate truth, not 
simply whatever is considered to be true by our poor benighted cowherder..... I do not see that 
Prajnäl: aramati would find this unwelcome conclusion. Ile rather implies in his phrasing that 
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Bodhicarydvatara from the point of the niriikäira view that does not require self-awareness 
since, according to the nirakdra view, images belong to external objects and not to 
cognition. 
This means that Prajnakaramati considers that ýäntideva is an externalist 
Mzdhyamika who holds the nirdkdra view. Considering that Prajnäkaramati often quotes 
from the Madhyamakdvatära of Candrakirti as support to his commentary, we can 
tentatively assume that he regarded Candrakirti as an externalist Mädhyamika who holds 
the nirdkdra view as well. Prajn karamati, however, does not explain S5ntaraksita's 
system in detail. 
2.5 Ratnäkarasänti 
Ratnäkarasznti was an eminent Yogäcära teacher who lived around the 11th C in 
Vikramasila. He is mentioned by Atisa as one of his teachers in the Bodhirnärga- 
pradipapanjika. '6 Therefore he is regarded as almost contemporary with Laksmi, 
Bodhibhadra and Prajnäkaramati. When he criticises the Mädhyamikas from the point of 
the view of the Niräkira-Yogäcära, he classifies different Madhyamaka views and points 
out their respective faults. Therefore we find detailed accounts of the Madhyamaka 
classification in his works. Nevertheless, he does not criticise the views of certain 
Midhyamikas individually, but together with some Yogicira. This makes identification 
of a certain Madhyamaka view very difficult. 
His criticism of the Madhyamaka is found in the Madhyainakdlamkäropadesa and 
Prajnapnrainitopadesa among others. We will look into these works, which have many 
common or similar passages. In the Madhyamakalamkdropadefa, he states as follows: 
his concern is to warn (his opponent or) Säntaralsita that as it stands his disagreement is not 
with himself, Prajnälaramati, but rather with the world, and it is against the world that 
ntaraksita will have to defend himself. (pp. 41-43) 
Williams obviously takes the word `world' quite literally. However, Prajnakaramati defines the 
conventional world as the world of pramäna. Theoretically, an object ascertained through direct 
perception or inference arises equally to everyone. This is what is meant by `well known to the 
world' and 'known to everyone down to a cowherder. ' Here Prajnäl aramati does not necessarily 
mean that a cowherder or a grammarian says that the word svasarp edana is contradictory, but 
rather intends that it cannot be proved by means of inference and therefore not established in the 
conventional world, which is the world of pramäna. 
"6 See 3.4.. 2 (p. 188 ff. ). 
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[2-16] 
Others who are Buddhists teach as follows: 
The Vaibhäsikas are those who maintain that objects such as blue 
are perceived by cognition without images. It is the Sautrzntikas 
who maintain that cognising images of reflections supplied by 
objects is perception of objects. Furthermore, the third position 
that appears like the Madhyamaka, " and fourth position of the 
Yogäczra, should be refuted by the wise according to the valid 
means of knowledge, scriptural authority and treatises 48 
Thus he shows the four philosophical positions of Buddhism: the Vaibhzsika, the 
Sauträntika, the Madhyamaka and the Yogäcära. Here his classification is typical of this 
period. Of these the views of the third and fourth, i. e. the Madhyamaka and the Yogäcära, 
are partially shown together: 
[2-17] 
If some Yogäcäras and Mädhyamikas who assert cognition with images 
argue: 
If blue and illumination were false and not false [respectively], it 
is not possible to be identical because of the difference in their 
characteristics. However, if they are not identical, blue and others 
are not illuminated. If [it is argued] that blue and others are 
illuminated, they answer that blue and others are not superimposed 
or arisen as real because it is not different from illumination which 
47 According to Matsumoto [1980], Ratnaarasänti's position, i. e. the Nirra-Madhyamaka is the 
real `Middle way' for Ratnskarasänti and the Mddhyamikas following NSgärjuna are called `Pseudo' 
(liar snang ba). 
'' Madhyamakü1amküropadesa (Derge cd. No. 4085 hi 226b4-6, Peking ed. No. 5586 ku 261a1-3): 
gzhan dag sangs rgyas pa reams 'di skad du(» smra std gang zhig main pa med pa'i sues pas 
sngon po la sogs pa'i don rig par 'dod pa ni bye brag tu smra ba'o// gang zhig don gyis plian 
btags pa'i gzugs brnyan gyi rnam pa nyams su myong ba don rig par 'dod pa nyid ni mdo sde 
pa'o// gzhan dbu ma liar snang ba'i phyogs gsum dang/ mal 'byor spyod pa'i Phyogs bzhi/ 
tshad ma dang lung dang bstan bcos la mkhas pa maws kyis(2) sun dbyung bar bya ste/... 
(1) D: du, P: omit (2) D: kyis, P: kyi. 
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is not superimposed or arisen as real. 49 
Here the view of the M5dhyamikas and the Yog, c5ras who assert cognition with 
images (shes rab main par bcas pa, *sdkdrajrräna, ) is shown. Ratn5kara9-5nti explains 
the view of süküra briefly. It is asserted that cognition (=illumination) and objects, such 
as blue, are identical and both real. The condition for objects to be perceived is to be 
identical with illumination. This seems to be in line with Säntaraksita's view on 
conventionality that external objects that are insentient cannot be perceived and objects 
must be cognition itself which is sentient 5° 
In addition to this Ratnäkara. nti shows other proponents afterwards in the same 
work: 
[2-18] 
The Yogäciras and the Mädhyamikas who assert [cognition] without 
images maintain that the accumulation of conceptual construct (rnam par 
rtog pa'i his, *vikalpaküya) does not exist in substance (rdzas sit, 
*dravyatas). Even in their view, the valid means of knowledge that is 
direct perception is free from conceptual construct of the first moment, it 
is impossible to deny this image [of illumination] at all because there is 
no inferences' 
49 Madhyarnakilamkdropadesa (Derge ed. No. 4085 hi 228a3-5, Peking ed. No. 5586 lai 262b6-8): 
mal 'byor spyod pa pa dang/ dbu ma pa shes pa ream pa dang bcas par smra ba kha cig na re/ 
sngon po gsal ba dag brdzun pa dang brdzun pa ma yin par 'gyur na chos 'gal ba nyid kyis na 
de'i bdag nyid du 'thad par mi 'gyur la/ de'i bdag nyid ma yin na/ sngon po la sogs pa gsal bar 
mi 'gyur na / sngon po la sogs pa ni gsal ba yin no the na/ sgro ma btags pa'am dngos por 
'gyur ba'i gsal ba las gzhan ma yin pa'i phyir/ sngon po la sogs pa ni sgro ma btags pa'am/ 
dngos por 'gyur ba yin no zer te/.. 
SO-See 2.4, especially passage [2-9] (pp. 67-68). 
51 Madhyamakdlamkdropadesa (Derge ed. No. 4085 hi 228b2-3, Peking ed. No. 5586 lai 263a7-8): 
mal 'byor spyod pa pa dang/ dbu ma pa mam pa med par smra ba mams mam par rtog pa'i lus 
rdzas su(1) med par smra ste/ de dag gi Itar na yang mngon sum gyi tshad ma ni skid cig ma 
dang po'i rtog pa dang bral ba yin la/ rjes su dpag pa ni med pa'i phyir rnam pa 'di ni thams 
cad du dgag par nus yin no// 
(1) Em: rdzas su, D, P: rjes su. following the reading suggested by Matsumoto [1980b] (p. 
173). 
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It is not entirely clear what this passage means 52 The accumulation of conceptual 
construct (main par flog pa'i his), however, seems to mean the conceptualisation of the 
unreal (abhirtaparikalpa) that causes to arise images of the subject and the object. This 
implies that conceptual construct (vikalpa) is existent as conventional designations 
(vijnaptisat) and consciousness is substantially existent ((Iravyasat). When consciousness 
does not have any conceptual construct, there is no direct perception of an object because 
there is neither the subject nor the object, which arise from conceptual construct. It is 
also not possible to cognise an object through inference because inference is conceptual 
activity. This does not, nevertheless, mean that there is no cognition at all. Ratnäkarasznti 
considers that consciousness perceives itself as illumination. This self-awareness is direct 
perception without conceptual construct and it cannot be denied through inference because 
there is no inference that can deny it. Although passage is brief, it is clear that Ratnäkarasänti 
distinguishes the Sdkära-M idhyamikas and the Nirikdra-Mädhyamikas. 
The other position of the Madhyamaka is explained as follows: 
[2-19] 
Some Mädhyamikas say: 
What is well known in the world is the conventional. Because external 
objects also are well known in the world, they also exist conventionally 
like mind and mental concomitance. Mind and mental concomitance 
are delusion because self-awareness is contradictory, just as the edge 
of a sword does not cut itself. We both maintain that awareness of 
other things also is just confusion. Therefore because the ultimate is 
realised with delusion exhausted, with regard to Buddhas, mind and 
mental concomitance are exhausted. When these happen, then the 
ultimate, which is the non-arising of all phenomena, is established as 
experience by obtaining what is concordant. With regard to non-abiding 
52 According to the previous studies, such as Matsumoto [1980b] (p. 173) and Umino [1983a] (p. 
15) this passage is understood as a 'criticism' over the Niräkäravädins. However, it seems to me 
that this is not a criticism but an explanation of the niräkara view, which Ratnäkarasänti himself 
maintains. 
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nirväina, having transformed into the riipa[küya] in order to bring 
about the benefit for sentient beings and established it, he realises 
perfect enlightenment 53 
Thus he explains the third position of the Madhyamaka after the Säkära- 
Madhyamaka and the Nirýkdra-Madhyamaka. It is evident that this is the view of the 
externalist Mädhyamikas because external objects are accepted conventionally together 
with mind and mental concomitance. Likewise, Ratnzkarasinti explains the view of the 
externalist Mädhyamikas in the Prajn0püramitopadesa, as follows: 
[2-20] 
Some Mzdhyamikas say: 
Just as mind and mental concomitance exist conventionally, external 
objects also exist. But because ultimately mind and mental 
concomitance also are delusion by nature, there is not the nature of 
self-awareness. In order to bring about the benefit for all sentient 
beings in all ways without effort, having transformed into the riipaküya 
and established it like a wish-fulfilling gem, Bodhisattvas realise perfect 
enlightenment. On this point, because just as all phenomena do not 
exist at all, just so all mind and mental concomitance also do not exist 
at all ultimately, rejection of mind and mental concomitance is right 
53 MadhyanurkiVamküropadesa (Derge ed. No. 4085 lei 228b3-6, Peking ed. No. 5586 ku 263a8-b4): 
gang yang dbu ma pa kha cig na re 'jig rten la(') grags pa ni kun rdzob yin te/ phyi rol gyi don 
yang 'jig rten la grags pas (2)j Sems dang sems las byung ba bzhin du de yang kun rdzob tu yod 
pa yin no// Sems dang sews las byung ba ni 'khrul pa yin te/ rang gyi rig pa 'gal ba'i phyir ral 
gri'i sos rang mi gcod pa bzhin no// gzhan rig pa yang bslad pa tsam du 'u bu cag gnyi ga 'dod 
do// de bas na 'khrul pa zad pas don dam pa rtog pa'i phyir roll sangs rgyas pa mains ni scros 
dang sems las byung ba zad pa nyid do// gang gi tshe de rnams kyi skye ba de'i tshe chos 
thanes cad skye ba med pa'i don dam par rjes su byed pa thob pas myong bar bzhag° go// mi 
gnas pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa ni/ sems can sna tshogs pa'i don bya ba'i phyir gzugs byin gyis 
brlabs to bzhag 4 nas/ yang dag pa'i byang chub mngon du bycd do... 
(1) D: las, P: la (2) D: grags pa yin pas, P: Brags pas (3) D: gzhag, P: bzhag (4) D: gzhag, P: 
hzhag 
A parallel passage is found in the Prajnüpnramitopadeia (berge cd. No. 4079 hi 152b2-5, Peking 
cd. No. 5579 1 . -u 173a1-5). 
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perception through concordance because it is impossible in other ways 5" 
As Matsumoto observes, " the view of the externalist Mädhyamikas thus described 
by Ratnikarasänti is comprised of three points. First, the convention (smlrvrti) is defined 
as `well known in the world, ' and both mind and external objects exist conventionally 
because they are well known in the world. Second, self-awareness is not accepted because 
activity on itself is contradictory, just like the edge of a sword does not cut itself. It is not 
clear whether it is denied conventionally or ultimately in the Madhyamakalainkaropadesa. 
It is, however, rejected only ultimately in the PrajiJparamitopadesa. Therefore, we 
cannot know if Ratnäkarasänti considers that the externalist Mädhyamika denies self- 
awareness conventionally. Third, the ultimate is realised through exhaustion of mind and 
mental concomitance. Although there is no perception because there are no mind or 
mental concomitance, it is realised through concordance 56 To these three points given by 
Matsumoto, we can add the fourth point that a Buddha can bring about benefit for the 
sake of sentient beings, by transforming into the rirpakaya, even though he has no mind 
or mental concomitance. 
The first point is the evidence that this is the view of the extemalist Mädhyamika. 
The second and third explain their understanding of the ultimate. According toMatsumoto's 
study, 57 these three points are all found in Candrakirti's Madhyamakavatara and its 
54 Prajnapüramitopadesa (Derge ed. No. 4079 hi 143b1-4, Peking ed. No. 5580 k-u 162a7-b4): 
gang yang dbu ma pa kha cig na re lam rdzob sems dang sems las byung ba yod pa de bzliin 
du/ phyi rol don kyang yod pa yin la()/ don dam par sems dang sems las byung ba mams 
kyang rang bzhing gyis 'khrul pa'i phyir/ rang rig pa'i ngo bor yod pa ma yin te/ byang chub 
sems dpa' roams kyis/ sems can thams cad lyi don mams thams cad du limn gyis grub par bya 
ba'i phyir yid bzhin gyi nor bu Itar gzugs kyi sku byin gyis brlabs nas bzlhag ste/ yang dag par 
rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon suns du mdzad do// dc yang gang gyi phyir ji ltar rhos thams 
cad don dam par shin tu med pa de bzhin du/ sems dang sems las byumg ba thams cad kyang 
don dam par shin tu med pas/ scros dang sems las byung ba manis shin tu 'gags pa ni rjcs su 
mthun bas yang dag par rtogs par yin te/ gzhan la de ni mi rung ba'i phyir ro... 
(1) D: and P: yod pa ma yin la, Emend it to yod pa yin la following Matsumoto [1980x] (p. 
171 note 28). Also see the previous footnote. 
55 Matsumoto [1980a] p. 157. 
56 Concordance may require an explanation. Conventionally when the cognition obtains what is 
concordant to the image of an external object, it is understood as perception. Ultimately although 
nothing perceives anything, cognition becomes concordant to an object in terms of non-arising. 
This is said to be experience of the ultimate in the conventional terra. 
57 Matsumoto [1980a1 pp. 156-163. 
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Bhasya and he concludes that the opponent whom Ratnäkarasänti refutes in this part is 
Candrakirti. The fourth point is found in the Bodhisattvacaryüvatüra. 58 This view is also 
considered the criterion to distinguish the externalist Mzdhyainika and the internalist 
Mädhyamika. 
In this way Ratnäkarasänti classifies the Midhyamikas into the extemalist and the 
internalist. The views of the externalist Madhyamikas in his account seems close to those 
of Prdsaiigika because they are found in Candrakirti's and SZntideva's works. However, 
he does not mention if the externalist Madhyamikas maintain self-awareness 
conventionally. On the other hand, he distinguishes the Saära-Madhyamaka and the 
Niräkära-Madhyamaka. 
2.6 Summary 
When we look into these texts which are later than the 10th C, we can draw a 
vague picture of the externalist Mädhyamikas and the internalist Mädhyamikas. 
As for the internalist Mädhyamikas, Säntaraksita is considered representative in 
the Jnänasürasamuccayanibandhana of Bodhibhadra and the Bodhicaryavatarapanjika 
of Prajnäkaramati. Laksmi and Ratn-akaragznti do not mention who is the internalist 
Mädhyamika. On the other hand, Laksmi and Ratnäkarasänti distinguish the sakdra view 
and the niräkdra view in the internalist Madhyamaka. Neither of the four teachers 
mentions distinction in the externalist Mädhyamikas. 
Concerning the externalist Mädhyamika, Prajnzkaramati made the commentary 
on the Bodhicaryüvat ra of Säntideva from the point of the view of the externalist. In 
addition, lie quotes many verses from Candrakirt. i in his commentary. Therefore, we can 
assume that he regards Sdntideva and Candrakirti as the externalist Mädhyamikas. 
Ratn, dkarasinti also seems to intend Candrakirti or his followers when he criticises the 
externalist Mädhyamika. Bodhibhadra, on the other hand, names Bhavya as the 
representative of the externalist M idhyamika. He probably followed the 
Madhyainakalamkdravrtti, in which a passage from Bhdviveka's Madhyamakahrdaya is 
58 See 2.9 (p. 93 ff. ). 
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quoted as the opinion of the externalist Mädhyamika. Nevertheless, Bodhibhadra's 
understanding of verse 28 of the Ji nasärasamuccaya does not accord with the way the 
Svätantrika understands the four alternatives, which we will examine later. If he is an 
externalist but not a Svztantrika, it is a little strange that he mentions Bhavya when he 
distinguishes the internalist and the externalist. We will discuss these points in the third 
chapter 59 
Concerning self-awareness, none of the teachers whose works we have so far 
examined in this thesis explains that the external Mädhyamika positively accepts existence 
of self-awareness conventionally. Considering that some teachers regard Candrakirti as 
the representative of the externalist Madhyainika, it is not contradictory for the externalist 
Mzdhyaniikas to deny self-awareness. However, Laksmi maintains that the Sautrzntika- 
Madhyamika holds cognition without images. Bodhibhadra does not say that Bhavya, the 
externalist Mädhyamika, accepts the sakdra view or self-awareness. 
It should also be noted that among the texts later than the 10th C which we 
examined, there is no account that mentions difference of the views of Bhzviveka and 
Candrakirti or of the Svätantrika and the Pr,; isangika, and we cannot find the Madhyamaka 
view that accepts both external objects and self-awareness, either. It is, therefore, tentatively 
assumed that the externalist MAdhyamika postulated existence of external objects and 
denied self-awareness conventionally. 
The explanation of the Sauträntika-Svätantrika-Midhyamika in the Tibetan accounts 
we discussed in chapter 1 is concordant with this view of the externalist M5dhyamika 
shown in the later Indian Madhyamaka texts rather than that of the Sauträntika, in terms 
of their postulating external objects and rejecting self-awareness. Nevertheless, in some 
later Indian Madhyamaka texts, the externalist Miidhyamikas is considered to espouse 
Candrakirti or his view. Tibetan doxography of Indian Madhyamaka that classifies the 
externalist Madhyamaka into the Sauträntika-Svätantrika-Madhyamaka and the Präsatigika 
cannot be applied to the later externalist Madhy maka. However, this does not necessarily 
59 See the following section (2.7) with regard to the Madhyamaknlamknravrtti. The difference of 
interpretation of the four alternatives between the Svätantrika and the Präsaingika is examined in 
3.3.6 (p. 168 ff. ). Concerning who this Bhavya is, sec 3.5 (p. 199). 
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mean that there was no Madhyamaka which could be called Sautrintika-Madhyamaka in 
terms of postulating external objects and self-awareness in India. We will discuss this 
possibility in the following sections. 
2.7 Säntaraksita 
S5ntarlksita (ca. 725-788) 60 in the Madhymnakdlamkäravrtti, the auto-commentary 
on the Madhyarnakdlmnkdra mentions two groups of Mädhyamikas who have different 
views of conventional existence. This is one of the earliest accounts that mention 
classification of the Madhyamaka into the internalist and the externalist. Concerning the 
classification of the Sauträntika-Madhyamaka and the Yogäcära-Madhyamaka, the oldest 
account that mentions them by name is, as far as we know, Ye shes sde's ITa ba'i khyad 
par. In the text, Säntaraksita's works are named as Yogäcära-Madhyamaka. It seems that 
Ye shes sde's description of the classification of the Madhyamaka is partly based on this 
passage of S intaraksita. S intaraksita explains two different ideas of conventional existence 
in verse 91 and its commentary, as follows: 
[2-211 
Some assert that conventional entities are causal relationships and intend 
to refute all wicked disputes. It should be examined what are these 
[conventional entities]: How do they have the very nature of only mind 
and cognition, or how do they also have the nature of external objects? 
Of these, some are those who seem to assert, according to the latter view: 
It is in order to deny the agent and the recipient that it is said that 
"[this triple world] is mind-only" in a treatise 61 
60 Frauwallner [1961] (pp. 141-144). Kajiyama [1982] (p. 19) suggests ca. 725-784. 
61 Almost identical with verse 5: 28cd of the Madhyamakahrdayaärikd: 
It is in order to deny the agent and recipient that it is said "[this triple world] is mind-only" in 
the [DasabhümikalSütra. 
sästresu cittamätroktih kartrbhoktrnisedlritah II (Lindtner [2001] p. 61) 
Ye she sde also quotes this passage to explain the view of the Sauträntika-Madhyamaka. See, 1.2.1 
(p. 31 ff. ), especially [1-27] on pp. 35-36. 
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The view of the others is 
That which is cause and effect is only cognition. It is ascertained 
that what is self-established is cognition. (v. 91) 
There is no considering any other form of cognition, dismissing the form 
which is self-established. 62 This form which is self-established is also just 
like the form of a dream, an illusion and like 63 
Here the two views of Middhyamikas are distinguished depending on how they 
postulate conventional existence, which is understood as causality. Some maintain that 
causality involves external objects and others hold it is only mind. This is basically the 
same as the distinction of the Sautrintika-Mädhyamika who conventionally accepts external 
objects and the Yogicära-Mädhyamika who does not accept them even conventionally. 
Those who insist that conventional entities are external are represented by Bhäviveka 
since the verse quoted here ("It is in order to deny the agent and the recipient... ") is from 
his Madhyamakahrdayakürika (v. 5: 28bc). 64 He regards the teaching of mind-only as a 
62 The original Sanskrit of `the form which is self-established' (rang gis grub pa'i ngo bo) is 
identified to `svatahsiddharüpa' by Matsumoto [1984a] (p. 150). This is based on a passage 
"svatahsiddharüpam etiädvayam jn"üncun ekasvabiüivam" in the Abhisamaynlamkdrnlokn of 
Ilaribhadra (Wogihara [1932] p. 626,9-10). 
63 Madl: yamakalamkdravrtti, (Ichigö [1985b] p. 290,14-p. 292,8. Derge ed. No. 3885 sa 78b5-79a1, 
Peking ed. No. 5285 sa 78b1-5): 
gang dag gis rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos por dam bcas pas rgol ba ngan pa thams cad kyi Ian 
btab par 'dod pa'i kun rdzob kyi dngos po dc dag gang yin pa de dpyad par bya'o/ ci seins 
dang seins las byung ba tsam gyi bdag nyid kho na'am/ ci phyi'i bdag nyid kyang yin the na/ 
dc la klia cig ni phyogs phyi ma la brtcn to 
bstan bcos las Sems tsam mo zhes gsungs pa ni byed pa po dang za ba po dgag 
pa'i phyir ro 
zhes ji skad du shim ba Ita bu'o/ gzhan dag Sems pa ni 
rgyu dang 'bras bur gyur pa yang// slies pa 'ba' zhig klio na ste// 
rang gis grub pa gang yin pa// de ni shes par gnas pa yin// 91 // 
rang gis grub pa'i ngo bo bor nas sties pa'i ngo bo gzhan rtog pa med do// rang gis grub pa'i 
rang bzhin yang rmi lam dang sgyu ma la sogs pa'i gzugs bzhin no// 
b' Kajiyama [1982] (pp. 35-38) and Matsumoto [1984a] (pp. 147-151) examined this passage in the 
Madhyamakdlamküravrtti and identified the Mädhyamika who insists that conventional existents 
are external with Bhdviveka. My study depends heavily on theirs with regard to this passage of 
Ssntaraksita. 
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provisional meaning (neyärtha), saying, "to deny the agent and the recipient. " However, 
Santaraksita does not explain the view of Bhzviveka in detail here. As a result, we are 
not able to judge if Bhäviveka is thought by S5ntaraksita to have held the sdkära view as 
the Sauträntika school does. 
The others are, as shown in verse 91 of the Madhyamakdlamkdra, the Midhyamikas 
who assert that conventional entities are made of just mind and mental concomitance, 
according to Kamala§ila's commentary, Pan`jikii. 65 As we will examine later, " causality 
is considered conventional by the M idhyamikas, and it is said here that it is only 
cognition. This implies that external things do not have causal efficiency and therefore 
cannot cause any effect. As a result what we perceive is limited to our cognition itself 
because external objects do not have any ability to cause cognition. Therefore if verse 91 
is kntaraksita's own view, he indeed holds self-awareness and mind-only conventionally. 
Based on this evidence, we can be sure that by the time of Kamalasila, at the latest, this 
way of classification had already come into existence. 
It should be noted that Bhaviveka and Santaraksita are named as the extemalist 
and the internalist respectively in many later doxographical accounts in India and Tibet, 
such as Bodhibhadra's and Ye shes sde's. It is, therefore, plausible that this passage is 
the model of this classification. 
Additionally, as Matsumoto maintains, 67 if we regard verse 91 as S-ntaraksita's 
own view, he is considered a proponent of the sakdra view. 6ß After the passage previously 
65 Kamalasila comments that "It should be examined" (de dpyod par bya 'o, See [2-21]) means "By 
this, two types of ways of the Madhyamaka should be examined". 
de dpyad par bya'o zhes bya ba ni 'dir dbu nza'i lam rnam pa gnyis dpyod par byed pa yin no/A 
(Madhyamakälamkärapan"jikd, Ichigo [1985b] p. 291,6, Derge ed. No. 3886 sa 128a1, Peking 
cd. No. 5286 sa 136b4) 
Ile understands that two different Madhyamaka views on conventional existence are shown here. 
However, Matsumoto [1984a] (especially pp. 148-9) insists that v. 91 is not Säntaraksita's own 
view but the view of the pure Vijnaptimätra by showing Ilaribhadra's account on the view of 
mind-only which is similar to the commentary of the Madhyamakdlamkdra (the passage immediately 
following my translation [2-21]). Therefore, Sdntaraksita may not have intended to show two 
`Madhyamaka views' here. Nevertheless, at least Kamalalla understands that this is the classification 
of the two Mädhyamikas. 
66 Sec 3.3 (p. 149 ff. ). 
67 Matsumoto [1984a] 
68 Those who maintains no difference between cognition and images are regarded as proponents of 
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quoted, he comments on it as follows: 
[2-22] 
Therefore perception of those [material things and others] is perception 
of images (dkdra) such as blue which is not different [from perception]. 69 
In this way, he considers that cognition has images and it is not different from 
cognition. This is obviously the sükara view. He clearly postulates existence of self- 
awareness (svasamvedana) without which cognition cannot perceive images which are 
not different from cognition itself. This is in clear contrast to Laksmi's understanding 
that the reality (splendour of niind) is free from false images, which are different from 
it. 70 Concerning the classification of the internalist and the externalist, Kamalasila, who 
is regarded as a direct disciple of ýäntaraksita, has made a more detailed explanation in 
the Madhyamakdloka. 
2.8 Kamalasi1a 
Kamalas 1a (ca. 740-797) is known as a disciple of Säntaraksita. He, as his teacher 
did, entered Tibet and had a great influence on the formation of Tibetan Buddhism. In 
fact, Ye shes sde, in the lTa ba'i khyad par, refers to the Madhyamakäloka of Kamala ila 
as the conclusion after he explains the views of the Sauträntika-Mzdhyamika and the 
Yogäcära-Mädhyamika. 'I Therefore, examination of Kamalaszla's view on the 
classification of the Madhyamaka is indispensable. In the Madhyamakdloka, he explains 
the view of the externalist Mädhyantikas in detail, as follows: 
thesäiara view. 'Ilis is discussed in chapter 4. 
69 Madhyaniakälamkäravrui (Ichigö [1985b] p. 292,11-13, Derge ed. No. 3885 sa 79a2, Peking ed. 
No. 5285 sa 78b6-7): 
de Ita bas na dc dag myong ba ni tha dad pa ma yin pa'i sngon po la(') cogs pa'i main pa 
myong ba stel 
(1) D, Ed. sngon po la sngon po la, P: sngon po la. 
70See [2-6] (PP. 63-64). 
71 See 11 -28] (pp. 36-37). 
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[2-23] 
Others say: External objects also exist conventionally like consciousness. 72 
[2-24] 
Because external objects are also well known [in the conventional world] 
like consciousness, there is no damage by [the conventional view] well 
known. Because if they are examined by reasoning, neither of two, [i. e. 
external objects and consciousness, ] can bear the burden of examination, 
they cannot obtain the state of existence. But at the level of the truth of 
common usage (tha snyad kyi bden pa, *vyavaharasatya) both entities 
are also well known [among people] up to the wife of a cowherd. 73 
According to Kamalasila's explanation, `others' hold that both mind and external 
objects exist conventionally and neither of the two can be ultimately existent. This is 
nothing but the view of the externalist Mzdhyamika. Here the conventional truth (=the 
truth of common usage) is defined as well known (grags pa, prasiddha) in the world. 74 
This passage itself does not involve any proof to establish existence of external objects 
but what is `well known in the world' is accepted as conventional among the Madhyamikas. 
In Szntaraksita's Madhyamakdlamkdra the view of the externalist Midhyamika is not 
shown in detail. On the other hand, Kamalasila introduces it, as follows: 
[2-25] 
The purpose of the teaching of mind-only is in order to deny the agent 
and the recipient imagined by outsiders, because, even as conunon usage, 
'L Mad/zyamakäloka (Derge cd. No. 3887 sa 158b4, Peking ed. No. 5287 sa 172b6): 
gzhan dag na re lmun rdzob tu main par shes pa dang 'dra bar phyi'i don yang gnas pa yin no// 
73 Madhyannakaloka (Derge ed. No. 3887 sa 158b7-159a1, Peking ed. No. 5287 sa 173a1-3): 
ream par shes pa bzhin du phyi'i don yang grags pa'i phyir grags pas gnod pa mag» yin te/ rigs 
pas mam par dpyad na ni gnyi ga yang brtag pa'i khur mi bzod pa nyid lyis dngos po'i gnas 
mi thob(2) la/ tha snyad kyi bden par ni dngos po gnyi ga yang gnag rdzi'i chung ma yan chad 
la grags pa nyid do// 
(1) D: ma, P: yang (2) D: Mob , 
P: thud 
" Compare this passage with [2-15] (pp. 74-75) of the Bodhicarynvatdrapanjika of Prajnäkaramati, 
and [2-19] (pp. 80-81) of the Madhyamakälamkdropadesa of Ratniikarasänti. 
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other agent[s] and so forth except for mind are not established, or it is 
because the mind is established as fundamental with regard to all phenomena 
for mind precedes all phenomena. 75 
Here Kamalasila presents two different interpretations of mind-only. As Matsumoto 
points out, 76 the first is Bhiviveka's since he has the view that the sutra says that [the 
triple world] is mind-only, "in order to deny the agent and the recipient" as is shown in 
the Madhyamakälarnküravrtti on verse 91. " The second passage beginning with `Or' can 
possibly be Candrakirti's view because the view that mind is fundamental is found in the 
Madhyamakdvatdra. 78 
It is thus very likely that both Bhäviveka and Candrakirti are classified into the 
externalist without much distinction according to Kainalasila. The next argument of the 
externalist Mädhyamika given by Kamalasila immediately after [2-25] is of the most 
interest to us: 
[2-26] 
Moreover, it is said: 
"There is no object. It is mind-only. "79 
as well as: 
75 Madhyamakdloka (berge ed. No. 3887 sa 159a1-2, Peking ed. No. 5287 sa 173a3-4): 
sems tsam du gsungs pa'i 'bras bu ni. than gyis kun brtags pa bycd pa po dang za ba po dgag 
pa yin te/ tha snyad du yang seins las) ma gtogs pa'i bycd pa po la sogs pa gzhan rab tu ma 
grub pa'i phyir ro// yang na sems ni chos thams cad kyi sngon du 'gro ba yin pa'i phyir chos 
thams cad la Itos2 nas Sems gtso bor bsgrub pa'i phyir roll 
(1) D: seins las, P: sews. (2) D: ltos, P: bltos. 
76 See Matsumoto [1984a] p. 155. 
71 See the quotation [2-21] above (pp. 85-86). Candrakirti, too, in the Madhyamaknratara, v. 6: 84, 
maintains that the teaching `the triple world is mind-only' is to deny the agent. 
79 Madhyamakavatara, v. 6: 87 (La Vallee Poussin [ 1907-12] p. 185,10-13): 
Just as the Buddha speaks of reality extensively, just so mind-only is taught in the [Larikdºatdra-]sutra 
because only mind is fundamental in the world. 'I7ms the meaning of the sutra is not "material 
things (rüpa) are denied by this. " 
de nyid rgyas la sangs rgyas bsnyad ji bzliin// de bzhin sems tsam gtsor gyur 'jig rten la// 
mdo las sews tsam zhcs gsungs gzugs ni 'dir// 'gog pa dc Itar mdo yi don ma yin// 6: 87 ll 
79 Lankavatärasütra, v. 10: 146c (Nanjo [1923] p. 284,1): 
nasty arthas cittamätreyam 
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"Mind disturbed by latent impressions (vasanü) comes to appear 
as objects. " S° 
and so on. Even so, it is necessary to accept that it (mind) is certainly 
accompanied with images (sükdra) because it is never possible for the 
mind without images (niraikära) to perceive objects. Therefore, because 
images of objects do not appear except for images of mind, it is limited 
only to explain, by means of denial of that [mind without images], that 
mind is accompanied with images. But it is not understood that there are 
no external objects from the [statements]. 81 
Because this passage inunediately follows the previous one, it is understood as the 
view of the externalist Madhyamika. According to Kamalasila's explanation, the externalist 
Mädhyamika certainly postulates cognition with images in the same way as the Sautr intika. 
As we have seen in chapter 1, Ye shes sde is very likely to have followed Kamalasrla 
when he wrote the 17a ba'i khyad par. In that case, it is plausible that he had Kamalasila's 
explanation of the externalist Mädhyamika in his mind when he mentioned the Sauträntika- 
Mädhyamika although this is tentative. In some Tibetan accounts, such as dKon mchog 
'jigs med dbang po's, the Sauträntika-Midhyamika is explained as proponent of niriiküra 
or as being against self-awareness, although the Sautrantika holds süküra cognition and 
accepts the existence of self-awareness. These later Tibetan accounts explain that the 
Sauträntika-Mädhyamika postulates that external objects exist on the basis of the atomic 
theory held by the Sauträntika. In other words, the Sauträntika-Mädhyamika follows the 
view held by the Sauträntika in terms of its ontology, but not its epistemology. This is 
80 Larikävatdrasütra, v. 10: 155ab (Nanjo [1923] p. 285,5): 
väsanair luditam cittam arthäbhdsam pravartate I 
81 Madlryamaküloka (Dcrge ed. No. 3887 sa 159a2-4, Peking cd. No. 5287 sa 173a4-7): 
gang yang/ don yod ma yin sems nyid de// zhe bya ba dang/ de bzhing du/ bag chags kyis ni 
dkrugs pa'i sems// don du snang bar rab tu 'byung// zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa der yang 
mam pa med pa'i Sems kyis ji liar yang yul 'dzin par mi rung has de'i phyir gdon mi za bar de 
rnam pa dang bcas pa nyid du khas blang dgos so// 
de has na seins kyi mam pa las ma gtogs pa don gyi mam pa(') mi snang ba'i phyir de 
bkag pas(2) seins main pa dang bcas pa nyid du bstan pa 'ba' zhig tu zad kyi/ de las phyi rol gyi 
don mcd par rtogs par 'gyur ba ni ma yin no// 
(1) D: pa, P: par. (2) D: pas, P: par. 
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the origin of our question whether or not `Sauträntika' in Sauträntika-Midhyamika is 
derived from the Sautrintika as a philosophical school. The 17'a ba'i khyad par does not 
mention anything concerning how the term is derived. Therefore we do not know in what 
sense Ye shes sde used this term. We now know, on the other hand, an example of an 
Indian account in which the externalist Mädhyamika is understood to be a proponent of 
cognition with images (srkdrajii nna). This indicates that there were the M5dhyamikas 
who could be rightly called the Sauträntika-Mzdhyamika in terms both of ontology and 
epistemology. 82 Nevertheless, this does not prove that the externalist Mädhyamika 
establishes the conventional truth according to the view of the Sauträntika because 
neither Kamalasila nor Ye shes sde mentions the extemalist Midhyamika's relation to 
the Sauträntika. There still are possibilities that `mdo sde' of mDo sde'i dBu ma in Ye 
shes sde's ZTa ba'i khyad par means `sutras, ' as Matsumoto maintains, and that it is a 
mere coincidence that the externalist Midhyamika mentioned by Kamalasila postulates 
cognition with images (säkärajiläna) in the same way as the Sauträntika. Anyhow, 
Kamalasila's understanding of the epistemology of the externalist Madhyamaka is different 
from that of later teachers after the 10th C who either understand that the externalist 
Midhyamikas hold cognition without images (nirakärajnana) or are silent. It does, on 
the other hand, correspond to Bhiviveka's understanding of perception. 
The other point here is that Kamalasila seems to include both Bhäviveka and 
Candrakirti in the externalist Mädhyamikas who postulate cognition with images 
(säkdrajnana). According to Tsong kha pa, Candrakirti's view on conventional existence 
is different both from the Sautrantika and the Vaibhäsika, and therefore special. Kamalasila 
and Tsong kha pa may disagree on whether Candrakirti should be included in externalist 
M5dhyamika together with Bhäviveka. 
We now go on to examine more accounts which mention the classification of the 
externalist and the internalist Mädhyamikas and find out if the externalist Midhyarnika 
82 1 laving examined the same passages, Matsumoto [1984a] (pp. 153-157) concludes that the externalist 
M dhyamika described by Kamalasila holds the sakdra view. Ile however considers that this view 
is fiction made up by Kamala§zla and it is possible that the M idlryamil: a who postulated it did not 
exist in reality. It may be the case that this conclusion is influenced from his study of the ITa ba'i 
kiryad par, whose conclusion is that `mdo sde' of `mDo sde dBu ma' means sutras such as the 
Prajnäpdramitüsütra but not the Sauträntika as a philosophical school. See 1.2.1 (p. 31 ff. ). 
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is constantly considered to postulate cognition with images (säkäraj&ina) and if it 
establishes the conventional truth according to the view of the Sauträntika. 
2.9 Bodhisattvacaryävatäravynkhyänapanjikä 
The Bodhisativacar), dvatdravyukhjnapanjikü83 is a commentary on the 9 chapter 
version of the Bodhi(sattva)cary«vatüra. Neither the name of the author nor the exact 
date of the text is known to us. It is however clear that this commentary is written after 
Jf, nagarbha (ca. 8th C) because we find a quotation from his Satyadva)yavibhangavr11i. 84 
It is also likely that he knew of Säntaraksita's (ca. 725-788) `lacking one and many' 
reasoning described in verse 1 of the Madhyamakülamküra. 85 Therefore we can tentatively 
assume that this was composed not long before the beginning of the 9th C or afterwards. 
According to Saito's studies, the author classifies the Mzdhyamikas into the 
Mzdhyamikas who assert that external objects exist (phyi'i don yod par smra ba'i All 
ma) and the M idhyamikas who assert that they are denied ('di 'gog par sinra ba'i dbu 
ma). He mentions the view of the M idhyaniika who asserts external objects when he 
explains how a Buddha can appear in front of sentient beings even when he does not 
have cognition, in the commentary on verses 8: 27-28 (36-37 of the 10 chapter version): 
[2-27] 
Then, if [one says] that when [a Buddha] has no conceptual construct in 
this way, the Buddha's appearance in front of disciples as a riüpaküya is 
83 Derge cd. No. 3873, Peking ed. No. 5274. Saito has made extensive studies on this text and I am 
heavily indebted to Saito [1993], [1996], [1997] and [2000]. 
$' Bodhicarydvatarav)iqkhyänapanjikä (Saito [1993] p. 59,8-9): 
bden pa gnyis las kyang/ 
de nyid pliyir na de stong min// 
This is an antarasloka under v. 11 of the Satyadvayavibhafiga (Eckel [ 19871 p. 162,4): 
de nyid phyir na de stong min// mi sstong ma yin yod med min// 
mi skye ma yin stye min zhes// de la sogs pa bcom Idan gsungs// 
Sec Saito [2000] (p. 98 note 6) and [3-38] (p. 154) of the present thesis. 
85 BodhicarAratdravyäkhyanapaiijika (Saito [1993] p. 72,3): 
re zhig gcig dang du ma dang bral ba la sogs pas spyod pa'i dus gang gi tshe/... 
Pointed out in Saito [2000] (p. 99, note 14). See [3-44] (p. 159) for v. 1 of the Madhyamakalamküra. 
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not possible, he (Aksayamati), having considered that there is no 
contradiction in Buddha's appearance even without conceptual construct 
like the wish-fulfilling gem and the wish-granting tree because of the 
merit of disciples, says `the wish-fulfilling gem' and so on, [i. e. 
In the way the wish-fulfilling gem or the wish-granting tree fulfil 
a wish, in that way the body of the Jina appears by the power of 
the merit of sentient beings. (v. 8: 27)] 
But now, if [one says] that [Buddha's] benefiting sentient beings contradicts 
his being without conceptual construct, he (Aksayamati), having considered 
that it is not contradictory to benefit sentient beings even without conceptual 
construct when being a Buddha because of the transmitted force conceived 
at the earlier state of Bodhisattva, and that it is the same, for instance, as 
a pillar of a charmer against poison, says `having completed a pillar' and 
so on, [i. e. 
In the way, when a charmer against poison, having completed a 
pillar, dies, it neutralises poison and the like, even long time after 
his death. (v. 8: 28)] 
These [verses] teach that there is no conceptual construct at the Buddha 
stage, but do not teach that [a Buddha] has no body or wisdom because 
those [two] do not contradict as being consistent with seeing and because 
objects of dreams and like, too, are accepted as being consistent with 
seeing according to the doctrine of the Madhyamika who asserts that 
external objects exist. 
Therefore, it is just as the similes such as a wish-fulfilling gem, a 
wish-granting tree and a pillar, without conceptual construct, appear in 
various ways and cause effects in various ways, but it is not the case that 
they themselves also do not exist. 
Therefore, it is said that some say this is the Mzdhyamika who asserts 
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that they are denied, [but] I do not regard it in that way. 86 
The author of this text thus classifies the Mädhyamikas into two, namely the 
MZdhyaniika who asserts that external objects exist and the Mädhyamika who asserts 
that they are denied. The author of the commentary assumes Aksayamati (=Szntideva? ), 
the author of the original verses, is classified into the former. 
In addition to this, the commentator, in [2-27] above, mentions `appearance' 
(snang ba) and `causal efficiency' (don byed pa, *arthakriyd) as "it is as if the similes 
such as a wish-fulfilling gem, a wish-granting tree and a pillar, without conceptual 
construct, appear in various ways and cause effects in various ways (de dang de liar 
snang ba dang/ de dang de liar don byed pa yin). " They are given as characteristics of 
the conventional truth by Jnznagarbha. Therefore Saito assumes that the commentator 
understands that Aksayamati, the author of the 9-chapter version, is close to Jii nagarbha 
in terms of his view of conventional existence 87 
The other point here is that Aksayamati insists that a Buddha can appear in front 
86 Bodhicaryrhvatdravyiikh)4napanjikn (Commentary: Saito [1993] p. 72,16-p. 73,14. Verses: Saito 
[2000] p. 52,23-30. The verses are inserted by the present author. ): 
'on to dc Itar rtog pa mi mnga' na gdul bya roams la Sangs rgyas kyi gzugs lyi skur snang ba 
mi 'thad do The na/ rtog pa mi mnga' yang gdul bya'i bsod nams kyis yid bzhin gyi nor bu 
dang/ dpag bsam gyi shing bzhin du snang ba ]a 'gal ba med do snyam du bsams nas/ yid 
bzhin nor bu zhes bya ba la cogs ps gsung so// 
yid bzhin nor bu dpag bsams skiing// ci ltar re ba yongs bskong ba/ 
de bzliin sems can bsod narns kyi// dbang gis rgyal ba'i sli snang ngo// 27 // 
'o na de Isar rtog pa mi mnga' ba nyidyin na sems can gyi don mdzad pa 'gal lo zhe na/ sngar 
byang chub scros dpa'i gnas skabs kyi rtog pa'i 'phen slings lyis sangs rgyas nyid la rtog pa 
mi mnga' yang sems can gyi don mdzad pa mi 'gal te/ dper na nam mkha' lding gi mchcxl 
sdong dang 'dra'o snyam nas/ mchod sdong grub pas zhes bya ba smos te/ 
mlha' Iding grub pas ci lta bur// mchod sdong bsgrubs nas 'das gyurd na// 
dc 'das yun ring Ion yang de// dug la stsogs pa zlii bar byed// 28 // 
'di dag Sangs rgyas kyi sa la rtog pa med pa ston pa yin gyi sku dang/ ye shes nyid kyang mi 
conga' bar ston pa ma yin te/ phyi'i don yod par snug ba'i dbu ma'i lugs la de dag ji Itar snang 
ba bzhin du mi 'gal ba'i phyir dang/ rmi lam gyi don la sogs pa yang ji liar snang ba bzhin 
khan len pa'i phyir te/ de has na dpe yid bzhin gyi nor bu dang/ dpag bsam gyi shing dang/ 
mchod sdong la sogs pa yang rtog pa med bzhin du de dang de Itar snang ba dang / de dang dc 
Itar don hycd pa yin gyi/ de dag rang nyid kyang med pa ni ma yin pa bzhin no// de has na la 
la dag na re/ 'di 'gog par smra ba'i dbu ma yin zhes zer ro zhes grags te/ bdag gis ni de Isar ma 
mthong ngo// 
87 Saito [19961. Also the commentator quotes from Jf: inagarb1ia's Satyadvayavibhaügavrtti. 
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of sentient beings to help them by keeping his nrpaknya even when his cognition has no 
object. This can be regarded as another characteristic of the externalist Madhyamaka. 
This is closely linked with its ontology, i. e. the view that external objects exist as it is 
used to distinguish between the externalist and the internalist. As we have examined, 
Ratn-karasänti mentions similar view when he criticises the externalist Mzdhyamika 88 
Concerning the epistemology of the externalist M idhyamika, the anonymous author 
evidently considers that Aksayamati accepts self-awareness conventionally in the 
commentary on verse 21-22, as Saito points out 89 
[2-281 
Considering that even if it (self-awareness) is not established by direct 
perception, it is established by inference which is produced from the 
proof of result, [the Yogäcra] says "if self-awareness" and so on, [i. e. 
If there is no self-awareness, why is consciousness remembered? 
(v. 8: 21 ab)] 
It is considered that [even] if there is no self-awareness which feels 
happiness and others later, however, causal self-awareness which produces 
memory exists. 
But it is said `object of memory' and so on, [i. e. 
It is remembered, needless to examine, by means of production of 
objects of remembrance. (v. 8: 21cd)] 
It should be considered that by means of arising of remembered cognition, 
ultimate (don dam pa) cognition of self-awareness is not established, 
because in the way it is stated above the ultimate self-awareness is not 
established 90 
Sec 2.5 (p. 77 ff. ) for the view of the extemalist Madhyamika criticised by Ratnä: aras5nti. 
89 Saito [1997] pp. 163-165. 
9 Bodhicar)iivarüravyükhyanapanjikä (Commentary: Saito [1993] p. 70,12-21. Verse: Saito [2000] 
p. 51,28-31. ): 
gal to mngon sum gyis ma grub kyang 'bras bu'i rtags las skyes pa'i rjes su dpag pas 'grub bo 
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[2-29] 
Or rather, if [one says] that if existence of the ultimate self-awareness is 
not established, it is not appropriate that remembered cognition arises 
later, [it is answered that] it is remembered because of arising of remembered 
cognition by means of existence of self-awareness conventionally, although 
it is not ultimate. 
Or rather, if [one says] that it is not appropriate even that it exists 
conventionally because it is admitted that there is no intrinsic nature, it is 
said "as they are" and so on, [i. e. 
Everything [such as] what is seen and heard as they are cannot be 
denied here. (v. 8: 22ab)] 
Because conventional things such as what is seen and heard are not 
denied by this [view of the Madhyamaka] 9' 
As we have seen in the previous section, Kamalasila, who is allegedly a Yogäcära- 
snyam nas/ gal to rang rig ces bya ba la sogs pa smos te/ 
gal to rang rig yod myin na// mam sties ci liar dran bar 'gyur// 8: 21ab // 
gal to bde ba la sogs par nyams su myong ba'i rang rig pa med na phyis kyang dran pa Skye 
ba'i rgyu rang rig pa zhig yod par rjes su dpag pas 'grub bo snyam pa la/ don dran zhcs bya ba 
la sogs pa smos te/ 
don dran gyurd pa'i sgo nyid nas// dpyad myi dgos par de dran no// 8: 21cd // 
dran pa'i sties pa skye ba'i sgo nas rang rig pa'i sties pa don dam pa zhig sgrub mi dgos te/ 
gong du ji skad bshad pa'i tshul gyis rang rig pa don dam pa de ni grub pa'i phyir ro snyarn du 
bsam pa'o// 
91 Bodhisattvacar üvatäravyükhyänapan"jikd (Commentary: Saito [1993] p. 70,32 -p. 71,4. Verse: 
Saito [2000] p. 51,31-32. ): 1 
'on to rang rig pa don dam pa de yod pa nyid du ma grub na ni phyis dran pa'i sties pa Skye ba 
mi 'thad do the na/ don dam pa mcd lyang rang rig pa kun rdzob tu yod pa'i dbang gis dran 
pa'i shes pa skye ba'i phyir de dran no zhes gsungs so// 
'on to kun rdzob tu yod pa nyid du yang mi thad de/ rang bzhin med par khas fen pa 'i 
phyir ro the na/ 'di ltar zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos te/ 
de Itar mthong dang thos pa kun// 'di la dgag par bya myed kyi// 8: 22ab // 
mthong ba dang thos pa la sogs pa Lain rdzob pa ni 'dir mi 'gog pa'i phyir dang/... 
Saito [1996] holds that the author of the IlodhisaitiacarAtafaravydk-hyanapafijiAýa considers that 
Aksayamati postulatessükärajnnna, on the basis of this passage. Also See Williams [1998] p. 65. 
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Mädhyamika, regards the externalist Mädhyamika as proponents of cognition with images 
(sükürajndna). Now in this conunentary, too, the externalist M, dhyamika is considered 
to accept self-awareness conventionally. It is remarkable that the author of the 
BodhisattvacaryavataravyJkhyanapanjikii made the commentary from the point of view 
of the externalist Mädhyamika who accepts self-awareness. Although this view can 
appropriately be called `Sautr intika-Madhyamaka' in terms of accepting both external 
objects and self-awareness conventionally, its relation to the view of the Sauträntika is 
not clear. The difference of understanding between the anonymous author and 
Prajnäkaramati will become clear if we compare their commentary on the same verse. 
Prajnikaramati also comments on verse 9: 25 of 
`10-chapter version, which is the 
corresponding verse of 8: 22 of 9-chapter version. He, in contrast, interprets that what is 
seen, heard and known respectively mean direct perception, scriptural authority and 
inference so that it means that valid means of knowledge cannot be denied conventionally 
even when self-awareness is denied conventionally. 2 
Thus the anonymous author's commentary is based on the Madhyamaka view that 
accepts self-awareness and external objects conventionally, which deserves the designation 
`Sautrantika-Madhyamaka'. He, in the same text, shows his understanding of the 
Sautrzntika when he explains the two truths: 
[2-30] 
Now, to teach briefly that the nature of an entity should be examined by 
elimination of false conceptualisation concerning the nature of an entity, 
it is said that "Concerning that, " [i. e. 
Concerning that, two types of people are observed: a Yogin and 
an ordinary person. Of these, ordinary people are invalidated by 
Yogins. (8: 3) 
Even Yogins are invalidated by the superior that is successively 
higher. Because two kinds [of people] are observed, therefore the 
92 See 2.4 for Prajnäkaramati's commentary on the IBodhicaryJvatara, v. 9: 25. 
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objects should be examined. (8: 4)] 
Having just taught the nature of an entity, concerning that, two types of 
ep ople: a Yogin and an ordinary person, i. e. a Sautr5ntika and like, because 
of being conformable with an ordinary person, are, according to order, 
observed as the ways of non-duality and duality. Of these the assertion of 
ordinary people is invalidated by Yogins. But the assertion of a Yogin 
that is higher than an ordinary person is invalidated by the superior view 
of the Mädhyani ka that is even higher than that. Therefore, [their] 
characteristics should be examined. 93 % 
[2-311 
Now, having first generated the motivation to teach this in detail, then if 
[one asks] how what an ordinary person asserts is invalidated by a Yogin, 
[Aksayamati] says that people and so on, [i. e. 
By people entities are observed and conceptualised to be real, but 
not just as an illusion. Here there is disagreement between a Yogin 
and people. ] 
By ordinary people such as the Sautrintika. Entities are observed, i. e. 
material things [are observed]. To be real means to be existent as external 
93 BodhicarydvataravAkh)napanjikd (Commentary: Saito [1993] p. 60,9-20. Verses: Saito [2000] 
p. 49,12-20. '17he verses are inserted by the present author. ): 
da ni dngos po bdag nyid la log par rtog pa bsal ba'i sgo nas dngos po'i bdag nyid dpyad par 
bya ba mdor bstan pa'i phyir/ dc la zlics bya ba smos te/ 
dc la 'jig rten mam gnyis mthong// rnal. 'byor pa dang de bzhin phal// 
de la mal 'byor 'jig rten gyis//'jig rten phal pa sun yang 'byin// v. 8: 3 // 
gong ma gong ma'i khyad par gyis// mal 'byord pa yang sun 'byind to// 
de liar rnam gnyis mthong bas na// dc phyir don mams dpyad par bya// v. 8: 4 // 
dngos po'i bdag nyid bstan ma thag pa de la mal 'byor pa dang/ phal pa dang mthun pas phal 
pa ste/ mdo sde pa la sogs pa 'jig rten pa mam pa gnyis kyi go rims bzhin du/ gnyis med pa'i 
tshul dang/ gnyis kyi tshul du mthong std/ dc la mal 'byor spyod pas 'jig rten phal pa'i 'dod pa 
sun 'byin par byed cing 'jig rten phal pa las gong mar gyur pa mal 'byor pa'i 'dod pa de ni/ de 
las kyang gong mar gyur pa dbu ma pa'i Ita ba'i khyad par gyis sun 'byin par byed pas de'i 
phyir mtshan nyid Ia dpyad par bya'o zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go// 
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objects consistent with seeing (ji ltar snang ba). As an illusion means as 
appearing in that way. 9' 
These passages are also discussed in Saito's studies 95 He points out that the 
Sautrzntika is included in ordinary people in terms of their holding duality of the subject 
and the object as well as existence of external objects. Because the view that external 
objects are real is regarded as that of ordinary people represented by the Sautrintika, it is 
conceivable that the M idhyamika who conventionally maintains existence of external 
object is called a Sauträntika-M idhyamika. It is, however, not clear whether this Sauträntika 
is here considered to hold self-awareness or whether the anonymous author of the 
commentary understands that even ordinary people accept self-awareness. 
Thus a Madhyamaka view that can appropriately be called `Sauträntika- 
Madhyamaka' appears in this text although neither does the author explicitly indicate its 
connection to the view of the Sauträntika nor mention the term `Sauträntika-Madhyamaka'. 
2.10 Bhavya 
Concerning the classification of the Mzdhyamika into the externalist and the 
internalist, Bhavya's Madhyamakaratnapradipa contains interesting descriptions. I 
provisionally call the author of the Madhyamakaratnapradipa Bhavya in order to 
distinguish him from Bhiviveka, the author of the PrajndpradTpa and the 
Madhyamakahrdayakarika. The date of this text, which will be discussed later in detail 
in chapter 3, is between Säntaraksita and Atisa, which is between the 8th and the 10th 
9lBodhicarydvataravynkhyanapanjikn (Commentary: Saito [1993] p. 60,21-p. 61,5. Verse: Saito 
[2000] p. 49,21-24.11c verse is inserted by the present author. ): 
da ni re zhig de nyid rgyas par bshad pa'i dbang du byas nas/ 'on to 'jig rten phal pa'i 'dod pa 
ni gang/ de la mal 'byor spyod pas ni ji Itar sun 'byin par bycd ce na/ 'jig rten pa yis zhes bya 
ba la sogs pa smos te/ 
'jig rten pa yis dngos mthong la// yang dag nyid du 'ang rtog par byed// 
sgyu ma bzhin du myin bas 'dir// mal 'byord pa dang 'jig rtend rtsod// 
'jig rten phal pa mdo sde pa la sogs pas so// dngos mthong la zhes bya ba ni gzugs la sogs pa 
la'o// yang dag nyid du'ang zhcs bya ba ni ji Dar snang ba bzhin du phyi rol gyi don nyid du 
yang dag par ro// sgyu ma bzhin du zhes bya ba ni de Itar snang bar roll 
95Saito [1997]. 
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C. 96 Yamaguchi, one of the first modern scholars who studied the 
Madhyamakarainapradipa, excluded this text from the list of the genuine works of 
Bhaviveka, by examining its quotations. 7 
The 7th chapter, which is named bsGom pa'i rim pa (the stages of practice, 
*badvanäkrama), deals mainly with the way of meditation. Bhavya there mentions two 
types of the Madhyamikas when he explains the *slhidayoga and the *sirksmayoga. He 
distinguishes `externalist Madhyamaka' (phyi rol gyi dbu ma) and `internalist 
Madhyamaka' (pang gi dbu ma) according to the way of practice. He then explains these 
two types of Madhyamakas as follows: 
[2-32] 
After coarse yoga is explained in this way, now the subtle yoga should be 
explained. This is the subtle [yoga]: Just as all phenomena come into 
being as appearance of only an illusion of one's own mind, just so [what 
is] only an illusion of mind disappears from three times. Because [it has] 
neither colours nor shape, it is splendour by nature. Because of no 
appearance, all phenomena should be known to be an illusion of mind. 
There is a scriptural authority. It is said in the Arya-Lankävatdra[siitra] : 
Having relied on mind-only, one should not consider external 
objects. Having abided in the true state (de bzhin nyid, tathatd), 
one should go beyond even mind-only. Having gone beyond the 
mind-only, one should go beyond non-appearance [of subject and 
object]. The Yogin who abides in non-appearance sees the Great 
Way. 9s 
96 The reason is that Bhavya, in the Madhyamakaratnapradfpa, defines the conventional truth in a 
similar way to Säntaraksita (ca 725-788) and quotes from Padmavajra, whose date is also not clear 
but likely to be in the 9th C. His view is adopted by Atisa (982-1054). We can therefore tentatively 
place him between the late 9th and the first half of the 10th C. 
97 Yamaguchi [1943] reports that Bhavya refers to Candrakirti by name. This proves that the author 
of the Madhyamakaratnapradipa is not Bhiiviveka. Lindtner [1981] and [1982b] regards Bliavya 
and 13hiviveka as identical by showing similarity of their works. However, there are some differences 
in important points in their works although they are superficially similar. See 3.5. 
9Lanlärvatdrasütra, vv. 10: 256-257 (Nanjo [1923] p. 298,5-p. 299,1) See appendix 1 (p. 277). 
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The noble Nägärjuna, the acarya Aryadeva and the dcJrya reverend 
Candrakirti say as below and thus to maintain the conventional truth in 
the way of the Srlvaka is the coarse externalist Madhyamaka and to 
establish that that very [conventional truth] is mind-only is subtle [and] 
called the internalist Madhyamaka 99 
This passage clearly shows that in India there was the idea that the externalist 
Madhyamaka accords with the view of the Sr,! vaka concerning the conventional truth. 
The Srzvaka should be either the Vaibhäsika or the Sauträntika in terms of classification 
as a school according to the doxography given by late Indian Mahäyznists loo Therefore 
this externalist Madhyamaka can be rightly, called the Sauträntika-Madhyamaka if he 
postulates the view of the Sauträntika conventionally. He also states which Madhyamaka 
his text and others belong to: 
[2-33] 
Therefore most great texts written by them and me are said to be the 
externalist Madhyamaka. '°' 
99Madhyamkaratnapradipa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 2801-5, Peking cd. No. 5254 tsha 352b7-353a4): 
dc liar rags pa'i mal 'byor bstan nas/ da ni phra ba'i mal 'byor bstan par bya std/ 'di ni phra ha 
yin te/ ji liar chos thaws cad rang gi sems nyid sgyu ma tsam snang bar 'byung ste/ 'di liar 
sews sgyu ma tram ni dus gsum las 'das pa/ lila dog dag dang dbyibs med pa y rang bzlhin 
gyis 'od gsal ba/ snang ha med pas na chos thams cad ni scms nyid sgyu ma yin par sties par 
bya'o// 
lung yang yod de/ 'phags pa lang kar gshegs pa las/ 
sems tsam la ni brten nas su// phyi rol don la mi brtag go// 
dc bzhin nyid la brtcn nas ni// sems tram las kyang 'das pais') bya// (10: 256) 
seins tram las ni 'das gyur na// snang ba med la gnas par 'gyur// 
snang mcd gnas pa'i mal 'byor pa/ /dc yis(4) theg pa eben po mthong// (10: 257) 
zhes gsungs so// 
'pliags pa klu sgrub dang/ slob dpon 'phags pa'i Ilia dang/ slob dpon rje bLsun zla ba grags 
pa ni 'di skid du gsungs(s) pa yin te/ 'di ltar kun rdzob kyi bden pa nyan thos kyi tshul du 
smras pa ni phyi rol gyi dbu ma rags pa yin la/ de nyid rang gi scros tsam du gnas pa nang gyi 
dbu ma zhes bya ba plu-a ba yin no... 
(1) D: ji, P. 'di. (2) D: par, P: pa. (3) D: 'das par, P: bzla bar. (4) D: yis, P: yi. (5) D. gsungs, 
P: gsung. 
10° For example, Ratnäkarasänti and Atisa. Sec [2-16] (p. 78) and [3-74] (p. 191). 
1 °' Madhyamkaratnapradipa (Derge cd. No. 3854 tsha 281a2-3, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 354a5): 
de bas de dag dang bdag gis(l) gzhung chen po mang po dag bkod pa ni/ phyi rol gyi An ma 
yin no zhes par bya 'o// 
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As we have seen in chapter 1, Matsumoto maintains that the terms mDo sde dBu 
ma and rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dBu ma are used to designate texts in the l"I'a ba'i khyad 
par. This passage also shows that these terms can be applied to texts. "' As long as this 
point is concerned, the lTa ba'i khyad par agrees with the Madhyamakaratnapradipa. 
On the other hand, even if his assumption that mdo sde of mDo sde dBu ma stands for 
sirtras in the 1Ta ba'i khyad par is sustainable, it is highly questionable whether it 
reflects the classification of the Madhyamaka in India. Bhavya explicitly explains here in 
this text that the external Madhyamaka establishes the conventional truth according to 
the Srävaka, which is either the Sauträntika or the Vaibhäsika. 
Bhavya, however, does not mention whether the externalist Madhyamaka postulates 
sakürajnüna or nirdkdrajiiana. It is possible that he related the conventional view of the 
externalist Madhyamakä to the view of grävaka just because of their maintaining existence 
of external objects. Then his intention here is to say that the externalist Madhyamaka 
maintains existence of external objects conventionally without examining epistemological 
differences between the Sautr intika and Vaibhäsika. 
Concerning the matter of Srzvaka, the anonymous author of the Bodhisattva- 
caryavatüravyakhydpanjikn regards the Sauträntika as the representative of ordinary 
people who hold that external objects exist as they see them. He, on the other hand, 
considers that the Mädhyamika who asserts that external objects exist accepts conventional 
existence of self-awareness, that is to say, cognition with images. If we assume that the 
externalist Mädhyamika conventionally postulates existence of external objects in the 
way the Sauträntika does, and that the conventional truth is defined as `widely known to 
the world' (lokaprasiddha), we can see a consistency in his explanation. This consistency 
seems to be kept in the Madhyamakaratnapradipa. Bhavya does not mention whether 
the epistemology of the externalist Madhyamaka is based on the saküra view or the 
nirüküra view. He, however, does not explain that the conventional view of the externalist 
Madhyamaka agrees with the view of the Sautrintika. According to him, it agrees with 
(1) D: gi, P: gis. 
102 See 1.2.1 (p. 31 ff. ). 
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that of Sr ivaka, which includes both the Sautrintika, which holds the sJkära view, and 
the Vaibhosika, which holds the nirdkära view. 
If we gather the clues we examined above in this thesis, it is conceivable why 
Bhavya relates the view of the externalistMadhyamaka to Srzvaka but not to the Sautrintika. 
In the Krainärthaprakdsika of Laksmi and the Bodhicaryeivatýirapanjikäc of Prajnakaramati, 
which are both dated to the 11th C, the externalist Midhyamika is considered to maintain 
the nirikara view conventionally or to reject self-awareness conventionally. This does 
not agree with the view of the Sautrzntika in terms of epistemology. On the other hand, 
in the Madhyamaknloka of Kainalasila, which was written in the 8th C, it is explained to 
hold cognition with images. Bhavya'sMadhyamakaratnapradipa is roughly dated between 
the end of the 9th C and the first half of the 10th C. Then it is likely that this text was 
written while the conventional view of the externalist Mädhyamika was in transition 
from sükdra to niriakdra. This hypothesis would become more sustainable if we can 
place the Bodhisattvacaryavatdravyükhyünapaiijikü, whose date is not known, before the 
Madhyamakaratnapradipa. Although we are not absolutely sure about this because the 
number of texts we examined is not many enough and the date of the Bodhisattva- 
caryavat«ravywkhydnapanjiko is not certain, we certainly find two kinds of texts which 
respectively explain that the externalist Mädhyamika maintains the sdkätra view, and the 
nirdkdra view. It is probable that at Bhavya's time the both views are extant and the 
view of the externalist Mädhyamika is related to Srävaka. 
The other point which draw our attention is the way Bhavya understands the view 
of the internalist Madhyamaka. Here he explains that the mind that has neither colours 
nor shape is splendour by nature (rang bzhin 'od gsal ba, prakrtiprabhüsvara). This 
reminds us of Laksmi's explanation of prabhüsvara. In Laksmi's YaiicakramatTkü 
Kramnarthaprakasika, splendour of mind is regarded as nirakdra. Bliavya, nevertheless, 
do not distinguish splendour by nature and splendour of mind (seins kyi 'oil gsal, 
cittaprabhasvara) and his explanation of splendour by nature rather resembles to splendour 
of mind postulated by Laksmi. 
Bhavya mentions the classification of the internalist Madhyamaka and the externalist 
Madhyamaka in [2-32]. He also implies that Nägärjuna, Aryadeva and Candrakirti mention 
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the position of the internalist Madhyamaka. Then he indeed quotes verses and passages 
from their works immediately after [2-32]: 
[2-34] 
The meaning of this is [explained] extensively as follows. It is said by the 
venerable Acarya [Nägirjuna in verses 3: 17 and 22 of the Pancakrama]: 
Nothing whatsoever arises or nothing whatsoever has cessation. It 
should be known that phenomena are appearance of the nature of 
mind. 
Eyes, the other [sense faculties], and their objects are nothing but 
five wisdoms. Everything distinguished as internal and external is 
103 not different from mind 
[2-35] 
It is said by the venerable Aryadeva [in verse 51 of the Svddhisthäna- 
krainaprabheda]: 
External objects do not exist. [They are] observed as one's own 
mind. One should meditate that even this [mind] is an illusion. 
One should be mindful only of the real state (de bzhin nyid, tathata). 
10' MadhymnkaratnapradTpa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 280a5-6, Peking ed. No. 5254 tslia 353a4-6): 
... zhes gsungs pa'i 
don rgyas par ni ji skad du/ slob dpon gyi zhal snga nas/ 
'dir ni gang yang skye ba med// gang yang 'gag pa yod ma yin// 
seins kyi rang bzliin main gnas pa// chos mains nyid ni sties par bya// 
mig la sogs dang yul mains nyid// ye sues Inga po nyid dag stell 
phyi dang nang du main phye ball thams cad seins las gzlhan ma yin// 
zhcs bya ba la sogs pa mang du gsungs so// 
Almost identical with the Pancakrama, vv. 3: 17 and 22 (Mimaki and Tomabechi [1994] p. 33, 
29-30, p. 34,21-22): 
na cätrotpadyate kascin maranam näpi kasyacit I 
samsära eva jnätavya cittartipäkrtisthitah 11 3: 17 II 
al 4i visayg caiva jnänapancakam eva ca I 
adhyatmabahyato bhinnam sarvam mäyaiva nsnyathä 11 3: 22 II 
The edition of La Vallee Poussin [1896] (v. 4: 17 p. 37,16-17) has: 
na cätrotpadyate kascit saranam napi kasyacit I 
samssra eva jnstavyas cittailipdkitisthitah II 
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It is also said [in verse 58 and 59 of the same text]: 
The five [constituents] such as material things (gzugs, rilpa) as 
well as the twelve sense fields (skye inched, äyatana), the elements 
(khams, dhütu) conformable to them that are said to be eighteen, 
the five cognitions and the whole world; everything is nothing but 
one's own mind and not different [from the mind]. 
All those which are distinguished as the eight mountains, the eight 
oceans, islands and hells, and which are seen as immovable and 
movable are nothing but mind and not different [from the mind]. "' 
10SMadhyamkaratnapradipa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 280a6-bl, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 353a6-bl): 
slob dpon 'phags pa lha'i zhal snga nas/ 
phyi rol don ni yod ma yin// rang gi sems ni mthong bar'gyur// 
de yang sgyu mar bsgom bya zlhing// de bzhin nyid kyang rjes dran bya// 
Yang gsungs pa/ 
gzugs sogs Inga dang de bzhin Skye mched bcu gnyis dang// 
bco brgyad ces bshad kiiams ni de mam dang// 
sties pa Inga dang 'gro ba ma lus pa// 
tharns cad rang gi sems nyid yin gyi gz]han ma yin// 
gang yang ri brgyad dang ni rgya mtsho brgyad mams dang// 
gling la cogs dang dmyal ba la sogs dbyc// 
gang yang brtan dang g-yo ba nyid du mthong ba de// 
thams cad sems nyid yin gyi gzhan ma yin// 
Svadhis hänakramaprabheda, v. 51 (Pandey [1997] p. 176,11-12, Derge cd. No. 1805 ngi 114a1, 
Peking cd. No. 2670 gi 129b2-3) and vv. 58-59 (Pandey [1997] p. 177,9-14, Derge ed. No. 1805 
ngi 114a6-7, Peking cd. No. 2670 gi 129b8-130a2): 
madiyam dr§yate cittam bähyam artham na vidyate II 
evam vai bhävayen mäyä m tatliatäm apy anusmaret 115111 
pliyi rol don ni yod min pas// 'di dag rang gi sems su blta// 
dc bzliin sgyu mar bsgoms nas ni// de nyid kyang ni rjcs dran bya// 51 // 
r ipädipancakam ath: yatandni yäni astädascti codithh khalu dh itavas ca II 
jnänäni pafica visy59 ca jagatsamastam mäyämayah sa ilia vajradliaro 'pi n tnyat 1158 II 
gzugs sogs roam pa Inga dang gang yang skye mchcd rnams de nas// 
bco brgyad cW) byar gsungs dang khams ni mam pa Inga dang yang// 
ye sues Inga po dang ni yul de 'gro ba ma lus kun// 
sgyu ma las byung dc 'dir rdo rjc 'dzin de gzhan ma yin// 58 
(1) D: ces, P: zhes. 
yam parvatd astamahäsamudrä dvipäs ca sarve narakädibhcdäh II 
yat sthävaram jangamam eva drstam tattat svayam sarvavid eva nänyat 11 59 II 
ri mains dang ni rgya mtsho then po brgyad gang yin// 
gling mains dang ni dmyal ba la sogs dbyc ba mains// 
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Thus Bhavya's explanation of the internalist Madhyamaka is based on the works 
of N gärjuna and Aryadeva, namely, the Paiicakrama and the Svddhisthdnakrama- 
prabheda. Immediately after these quotations, passages from Candrakirti's and 
Bh5viveka's works are also quoted. It may be a little strange that Bhavya refers to 
Näg, rjuna and others but not to S5ntarlksita, who is regarded as the founder of the 
Yogäcära-Madhyamaka when he explains the internalist Madhyamaka. Because these 
quotations are mostly from later tantric works attributed to the great Madhyamaka teachers, 
this position of internalist Madhyamaka must have something to do with the tradition of 
Arya school in which they are considered to belong to. In this respect, the internalist 
Madhyamaka described in the Madhyamakarainapradipa is similar to the Nirzkira- 
Mädhyamika in the Kramürthaprakasika of Laksmi, which is a commentary on the 
Pancakrama. It must be noted, nevertheless, that in the Madhyamakarainapradipa it is 
explained with the quotations that all phenomena, whether they are perceived as external 
or internal, are not different from mind. In the Kramürthaprakäsikü of Laksrrn, on the 
other hand, the reality, which is the splendour of mind, is explained to be different from 
the images of objects. Thus both texts are closely related to the Pancakrama, but the 
Krameirthapraküsikei of Lak§m shows the clearer characteristics of the Nirakära- 
Madhyamaka than the Madhyamakaratnapradipa. Therefore, we can place the 
Madhyamakarainapradipa either in the process of the development of Arya school towards 
the clearer nirdkdra view, or in opposition to the Niräkira-Madhyamaka, which is shown 
in the Kramürthaprakdsika. It is not entirely clear whether there were two opposing 
positions in the tradition, or the position described by Bhavya preserves the doctrine at a 
primitive stage of the tradition before fully developing the niraküra view. 
Textual evidence also shows that the verses quoted by Bhavya do not necessarily 
express the nirakära view, and are different from those in the original Sanskrit texts that 
survive to date. As we examined, the passages seemingly quoted from the Paizcakrama 
of Nägärjuna and the Svadhisthanakramaprabheda of Aryadeva teach that all phenomena 
rgyu ba dang ni mi rgyu ba nyid gang yin pa// 
de de'i rang bzhin rdo rje 'dzin le gzlhan min blta// 59 // 
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are not different from mind. Nevertheless, if we look at the corresponding verses of the 
Paicakrama and the Svüdhisthünakramaprabheda which are now extant, we will realise 
that they all lack the parts of the verses that mention non-difference between mind and 
phenomena. The fourth quarter of the verse 3: 22 of the Pancakraina quoted in the 
Madhyamakaratnapradipa ([2-34]) reads, "Everything ...... is not different from mind" 
(shams cad seins las gzhan ma yin). The corresponding part in the Sanskrit text of the 
Pancakrama is sarvam mdyaiva ndnyathd. There is no word that can be translated into 
`seins' in verse 3: 22 of the Pancakrama. Instead it has `mayaiva' so that it means 
"Everything...... is not different indeed from an illusion". Likewise, the verses quoted in 
the Madhyamakaratnapradipa ([2-35]) have phrases that teach that all phenomena are 
not different from mind (thams cad rang gi seats nyid yin gyi gzhan Ana yin and Mains 
cad seins nyid yin gyi gzhan ma yin) while verses 58 and 59 of the S'vädhisthdna- 
kramaprabheda do not have terms which mean `mind'. The term `seins nyid' is here 
substituted to `rdo rje 'dzin' in both verses in Tibetan translation, and to vajradhara and 
sarvavid in Sanskrit. 
In the Madhyamakarainapradipa, the externalist Madhyamaka is explained to 
maintain the conventional truth in the way of Srävaka. It is not mentioned whether it 
particularly follows the Sautrntika or the Vaibhisika. This may be the result of ongoing 
transition of the externalist Madhyamaka from the externalist sakdra view which is 
regarded as the Sauträntika-Madhyamaka to the externalist nirdkdra view. It is evident 
that Bhavya understands that Madhyamaka is classified into the extemalist and the 
internalist according to the view of other schools that it conventionally follows. On the 
other hand, the internalist Madhyamaka is, in a way, explained to be the Niräkära- 
Madhyamaka as seen in [2-32], but not as systematised as the view of the Niräkära- 
Mädhyamika in the Kramdrthaprakicsika of Laksmi. It seems to me that this position is 
slightly different from the internalist Madhyamaka of Säntaraksita which is often referred 
to as Yogäcära-Madhyainaka in that Bhavya quotes verses from Nigirjuna, Aryadeva, 
Candrakirti and Bhlviveka when explaining the view of the internalist Madhyamaka. 
This may also be the result of ongoing transition of the Arya school's internalist view 
from that of the internalist sükira view to the internalist nirüküra view. Thus the 
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Madhyamakaratnapradipa contains many pieces of important information concerning 
the development of different Madhyamaka views in the late period. 
2.11 Candrakirti 
It is now certain that acceptance of self-awareness by the externalist M5dhyamikas 
is evident in the Madhyantakdloka of Kamalasila and the anonymous Bodhisattva- 
caryävatdravydkhyänapanjika. Bhavya, in addition, maintains that the externalist 
Madhyamaka follows the view of the Srdvaka conventionally. These accounts indicate 
that there were external Midhyainikas who maintained, at the conventional level, a view 
similar to that of the SautrAntika. In addition to them, there is a passage, in the 
Madhyanzakdvatdrabadsya of Candrakirti (ca. 600-650), which explains what view the 
Midhyamikas hold conventionally: 
[2-36] 
The wise drew a conclusion that, as this truth called emptiness is not 
explained without errors in the other texts because they do not belong to 
the texts of the Madhyamaka, so other texts do not contain the view 
produced from this view that I here presented with objections and replies, 
either, like the truth of emptiness. 
Therefore, it should be known that the opinion by some that the view 
that is ultimately held by the Sauträntikas is maintained by the Madhyamikas 
conventionally is stated just because the truth of meaning of the texts of 
the Madhyamaka is not clearly understood. '°5 
105 Madhyamakavatdrabhasya (La Vall6c I oussin [1907-12] p. 406,9-18): 
ji Itar dbu ma'i bstan bcos ma gtogs par bstan bcos gzlian las stong pa nyid ces bya ba'i chos 
'di phyin ci ma log par mi brjod pa dc bzhin du/ kho bo cag gis 'dir lugs gang zhig brgal Ian 
dang bras par bsnyad pa'i lugs 'di nas 'byung ba dc yang stong pa nyid lyi chos liar bstan 
bcos gzhan na med do zlies mkhas pa mains kyis nges par mdzad du gsol lo// 
de'i phyir kha cig gis mdo sde pa mains kyis lugs gang 71iig don dam par smras pa de nyid 
dbu ma pa maws kyis k-un rdzob tu 'dod do zhes smras pa gang yin pa dc ni dbu nia'i bstan 
bcos kyi don gyi de kilo na nyid mngon par mi sues pa kilo nas smras pa yin no Ales sues par 
bya'o// 
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Thus Candrakirti denies the position that the Mädhyamikas maintain the view of 
the SautrIntika conventionally. This passage of Candrakirti does not accord with Bhavya's 
explanation in the Madhyaniakarainapradipa in that the former denies this view but the 
latter does not. This, nevertheless, implies that some understood that the conventionality 
maintained by the Midhyamikas corresponds to the view of the Sautrintika. Therefore it 
is possible that the Sautrdntika-Mzdhyamika came into existence before the time of 
Candrakirti. 
Tsong kha pa, in the Legs bshad snying po, quotes this passage, as the evidence 
that Candrakirti conventionally follows neither the Sauträntika nor the Vaibhisika. 1°6 He 
also composed a commentary on the Madhyainakdvatarabhdsya and explained `some' as 
the Svätantrikas. 107 If he is right, it will be the case that the Svätantrika-Mädhyamika was 
considered to hold the view of the Sautr intika conventionally at the time of Candrakirti. 
This does not contradict to the fact that Bhäviveka accepts some views of the Sautrintika 
conventionally in the Prajilpradipa. 1118 It is, however, not certain if `some' are the 
M idhyamikas, or if distinction of `some' and those on Candrakirti's side corresponds to 
that of the Svätantrika and the Präsangika, or if this view of the Sauträntika includes both 
ontology and epistemology. 
2.12 Conclusion 
The main question of this chapter is whether or not it is legitimate to consider that 
the designation `Sautrantika-Madhyamaka' is derived from the Sautr5ntika as a 
philosophical school, in the sense that the Sautrzntika-Mädhyamikas conventionally 
understand the world in the way the Sauträntikas ultimately do. The characteristics of the 
Sauträntika view are acceptance of external objects and of self-awareness that is cognition 
with images (sakirajil na). According to some Tibetan doxographical texts of the dGe 
lugs order, as we examined in chapter 1, the Sauträntika-MZdhyaunikas are considered to 
accept the existence of external objects but to deny self-awareness conventionally. It is 
106 Legs bshad snying po (p. 132,17-p. 133,5). Cf. [ 1-17] (p. 26). 
107 dCongs pa rab gsat (Peking cd. No. 6143 ca 266b). 
109 See 2.1 (pp. 56-59) and Nönin [1986]. 
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very likely, according to his statement in the Legs bshad snying po, that Tsong kha pa 
considered that Bhiviveka postulated cognition with images (sUkarajnana). This is striking 
in terms of the later dGe lugs doxographers not following his view. It is also not entirely 
clear how the later Tibetan doxographers reconciled the view of the Sautrintika- 
Mädhyamikas that does not accept self-awareness conventionally with that of the 
Sautrintikas that accepts it. With regard to the foundation of this classification, it is the 
17'a ba'i khyad par of Ye shes sde that Tsong kha pa gives as an authority. 
When we look at the lTa ba'i khyad par, which is the earliest account we know of 
mentioning this classification, we find no statement that relates the Sautrlntika and the 
mDo sde'i dBu ma. Rather, as Matsumoto maintains, it seems that indo sde of mDo sde'i 
dBu ma is derived from sit-Ira but not from the Sauträntika in the lTa ba'i khyad par. 
Also there is no explanation of the epistemological view of the Sauträntika-Madhyamaka 
in the text. Therefore it is not clear, from these Tibetan accounts alone, what the Sauträntika- 
Madhyamaka held in terms of epistemology. 
Among the Indian sources we examined in this chapter, only Laksmi mentions 
both of these positions by the names which can be `Sauträntika-Mzdhyamika' and 
`Yogacara-Madhyamika' in original Sanskrit. In the text, the Sautrantika-Madhyamika is 
said to postulate cognition without images. This accords with the Tibetan accounts, or 
rather we should assume that Tibetan doxographers followed the view of Laksmi, 
considering some of them quote from her work as a support. The other Indian texts of the 
same period that mention the distinction of the internalist and the externalist, those of 
Bodhibhadra, Prajnäkaramati and Ratndkarasänti do not give the designations `Sauträntika- 
Madhyamaka' and `Yogäcära-Madhyamaka'. None of the externalist Madhyamaka 
mentioned in these later texts that are examined in this thesis positively supports 
conventional existence of self-awareness of cognition. The view of the later externalist 
Madhyamaka is in line with accounts of the later dGe lugs doxographers and the description 
of the Sauträntika-Midhyamikas given by Laksmi. Nevertheless, the externalist 
Mädhyamikas described in these texts later than the 10th C seem to have something to 
do with Candrakirti, with the only exception of Bodhibhadra who gives Bhavya as a 
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representative of the externalist Madhyamaka, which requires some more explanation. "' 
Prajnäkaramati, who gives an objection to the conventional existence of self-awareness, 
seems to follow Candrakirti's view. The externalist Midhyamika whom Ratn, -ikarag anti 
tries to refute seems to be Candrakirti or one who follows him. Therefore I cannot help 
hesitating to regard these externalist Wdhyamikas as Sauträntika-Sv, tantrika- 
Midhyamikas although their view accords with the description of the Sautrnntika- 
Svätantrika-Mädhyamika given by some Tibetan doxographers. 
On the other hand, Kamalas-ila and the anonymous commentator on the 9-chapter 
version of the Bodhisattvacaryävatära respectively hold that the externalist Mzdhyamikas 
accept cognition with images (sükürajüana) and self-awareness. In this case, the designation 
`Sautrzntika-Madhyamaka' is justified in terms not only of ontology but also of 
epistemology. In addition, Bhavya, in the Madhymnakaratnapradipa, explains that to 
maintain the convention (sam vrti) in the way the Srävakas do is the externalist Madhyamaka. 
Here the relationship between the view of conventionality held by the externalist 
Mzdhyamikas and the view of other schools is indicated. Candrakirti, moreover, mentions 
that there are those who consider that the Mädhyamikas conventionally maintain what 
the Sauträntikas ultimately maintain, although he does not agree with it. It is not clear 
who are these Mädhyamikas who conventionally maintain what the Sautrhntikas maintain 
ultimately. They may be Bhäviveka and the follower of his view, as Tsong kha pa 
suggests, because Bhiviveka seems to maintain that cognition and its objects do not exist 
simultaneously and to accept some epistemological view of the Sauträntika conventionally. 
These pieces of evidence indicates that in India there was a view that the Mddhyamikas 
hold the view of the Sauträntika conventionally. In turn, this suggests that even though it 
is very likely, as Matsumoto observes, that mDo sde'i dBu ma is nothing to do with the 
Sauträntika in the 171a ba'i khyad par, some considered that the externalist Madhyamaka 
had something to do with the Sauträntika around the times of Candrakirti and of Bhavya. 
This may also have been the case around the time of Säntaraksita and Kamalasila, which 
'0' This Bhavya is probably a Präsangika since the Bhavya whom Atisa respects quotes frequently 
from Candrakrrti and Bodhibhadra was Atisa's direct teacher. We will discuss his position in 
chapter 3. (3.5, p. 199 ff. ) 
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was between Candrakirti and Bhavya, and not long before Ye shes sde. 
Concerning who is considered an externalist Mädhyamika, Szntaraksita and 
Kamalasila show Bhiviveka's view as that of the externalist Madhyamaka. Kamalasila, 
who considers that the externalist Mzdhyamika holds the sakdra view, most probably 
includes both Bhäviveka and Candrakirti. The anonymous commentator on the 9-chapter 
version of the Bodhisattvacarydvatdra may regard Jnznagarbha as an externalist 
Mädhyamika who accepts self-awareness conventionally. Therefore those who consider 
that the externalist Mädhyamikas postulate self-awareness give teachers who are classified 
as Svätantrika-Midhyamikas by Tibetan doxographers. On the other hand, Ratnäkarasänti 
and PrajMkaramati seem to regard Candrakirti as the representative figure of the externalist 
Madhyamaka. Only Bodhibhadra among the Indian teachers later than the 10th C gives 
the name of Bhavya. However none of them distinguishes the views of Bhäviveka and 
Candrakirti except for Candrakirti himself, who denies the opinion that the Mzdhyamika 
conventionally maintains what the Sautrhntika maintains ultimately. 
In this way, the understanding of the view of the externalist Madhyamaka is not 
consistent among Indian accounts. It is as if there were two externalist Madhyamakas, 
i. e. the Pr isangika and the Sautr ntika-Sv5tantrika-Madhyamaka if we accept the terms 
which Tibetan doxographers employ. However, because none of the accounts we examined, 
except for Candrakirti's, mentions any difference between these two externalist 
Madhyamakas, it seems that this difference did not create two opposing factions. Rather 
it is likely that the externalist Mdhyamika changed its view as time passed. We can see 
two different kinds of changes. First, in terms of epistemology, while the externalist 
Mädhyamikas had been understood to maintain self-awareness that is cognition with 
images (sakdrajndna) in the early stage of the late Madhyamaka, they were later considered 
to deny self-awareness, and therefore to hold cognition without images (nirükdrajndna). 
Second, with regard to the representative figure, it had been Bhäviveka, who is regarded 
as a Svätantrika, and later changed into Candrakirti. The earlier externalist Madhyamaka 
is closer to what we should expect from the designation `Sauträntika-Svätantrika- 
Madhyamaka' and the later one corresponds to what later Tibetan doxographers often 
describe as the Satrtrantika-Madhyamaka. 
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Although this is speculation, I assume that this change is a result of the externalist- 
internalist dichotomy. Because the internalist M5dhyamikas maintain self-awareness, it 
may have been inevitable for the externalist Madhyamikas to change their view from 
sdküra to nirdkdra in order to make a clear distinction because to maintain the externalist 
sakära view opens a possibility for the internalist Madhyamaka. Moreover, if the internalist 
MAdhyamikas were the SvAtantrikas, as Tibetan doxographers maintain, it may also have 
been necessary for the externalist Mädhyamikas to follow Candrakirti's view rather than 
Bhäviveka's. This shows that at first the externalist Midhyamikas had the view that can 
be rightly called the Sauträntika-Madhyamaka in terms of their maintaining self-awareness 
and external objects and Bhäviveka was considered representative. This shifted, as time 
passed, so that they objected conventional self-awareness and Candrakirti obtained the 
dominant position. It is not clear why Laksmi consider the Sauträntika-Mädhyamika 
postulates cognition without images. It may be the case, however, that in spite of the 
shift in the views of the external Madhyamaka, the designation `Sautrintika-Madhyamaka' 
somehow survived. 
To prove this change in the externalist Madhyamaka, it is necessary to show how 
the Präsangika-Svätantrika dichotomy was understood in India because it seems that as 
the externalist MIdhyamikas changed their epistemological view from säkära to niräkara, 
they started to refer to Candrakirti more than Bh5viveka. As we have seen, it is not clear 
what happened to this dichotomy in India after Candrakirti. Therefore, this classification 
of the Svitantrika and the Präsailgika is dealt with in the following chapter. 
With regard to subdivisions in the internalist Madhyamaka, Ratnäkarasänti clearly 
mentions distinction of sakdra and nirükdra in the internalist Madhyamaka. It is also 
evident from the account of Sahajavajra in the '1 auvadasakatika that this classification 
existed in India around the 11th C. Laksmi comments on the Pancakranza from the point 
of the view of the intemalist Niräkära-Madhyamaka and compares the view with the 
sakara view. Thus we can find the classification between the S kdra-Madhyamaka and 
the Niräk. ra-Madhyamaka in the texts that are relatively late. S-ntaraksita is regarded as 
a representative of internalist Mädhyamikas in the Jnanasärasanuuccayanibandhana of 
Bodhibhadra and the Bodhicarydvat«rapauijikä of Prajnäkaramati. Sahajavajra regards 
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him as a Säkära-Mädhyamika. On the other hand, the Kramärthapraküsikd of Laksni is 
a commentary on the Pah-cakrama of Ng rjuna Bhavya, in the Madhyamakaratna- 
pradipa, also quotes the Paücakrrnna when he explains the internalist Madhyamaka. 
Therefore it seems that there were two different types of intemalist Madhyamakas related 
respectively to Sintaraksita and N igirjuna. They may have become the Sik, 5ra- 
Madhyamaka and the Nirakara-Madhyamaka. This classification is further discussed in 
detail in chapter 4. 
Finally concerning any other characteristics of the externalist Madhyamaka, the 
anonymous author of the Bodhisattvacaryavataravyakhyäniapanjika and Ratnäkara nti 
understand that the externalist Mädhyamikas consider that the riipakdya has various 
effects even though Buddhas must not have any conceptual construct. They both give an 
example of a wish-fulfilling gem (cintdmani), which does not have any conceptual 
construct but has various effects. This view seems to have been based on verse 9: 35-36 
of the Bodhicaryüvatara. 
It is thus clear that the distinction of the internalist Madhyamaka and the externalist 
Madhyamaka existed in India. However their views seems to have changed and diverged 
during the time of the late Madhyamaka. In the following chapters, therefore, we will 
examine these transition and bifurcation in the externalist Madhyamaka and the internalist 
Madhyamaka. 
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As presented in chapter 1, the classification of the Madhyamaka into the Svätantrika 
and the Prasangika developed mainly in Tibet and there are only the rudiments of this 
classification in Indian sources with regard to these terms although this classification is 
generally mentioned when the bifurcation of the Madhyamaka is explained. In chapter 2, 
it is shown that the distinction between the externalist and the internalist Madhyamakas 
is present in many Indian sources, but none of these passages shown in the previous 
chapter mentions this division of the Svätantrika and the Präsaiigika within the externalist 
Madhyamaka, except for Candrakirti. Some modern scholars, therefore, seem to have 
doubts on the existence of this classification in the middle period of Indian Madhyamaka. 
However, even though we cannot find the terms `Svätantrika' and `Prisangika' in Indian 
sources, it may be possible to trace actual opposition between the two positions. There is 
no doubt that Bhäviveka (ca. 500-570) positively employed so-called autonomous inference 
(svatantra anumiina)' to prove emptiness and Candrakirti (ca. 600-650) criticised it. 
Previous studies have, to a great extent, clarified the point of disagreement between 
them. What we do not know is whether or not this actually created two opposing positions 
of thoughts among the Mädhyamikas, especially among the externalist Mädhyamikas. It 
is also questioned if there was continuity of Prasangika thought from Candrakirti down 
to later Tibetans, especially Tsong kha pa, who considered the Prisaiigika as the foremost 
view. In order to clarify these points, we will first confirm what we know from past 
studies with regard to the disagreement between Bhäviveka and Candrakirti over the use 
of inference, the dates and order of translation of their works into Tibetan, and Indian 
commentaries on their works. In addition, we will also compare their interpretation of 
the two truths which differs according to their position. On the basis of these points, we 
will examine if their views are preserved as opposed in their successors' works and why 
we can hardly find any clear description concerning this classification in Indian texts 
after Candrakirti, if there was the classification of the Svätantrika and the Pr isaiigika. 
I only provisionally use translation `autonomous inference' in this thesis. This does not mean that 
a termsiatantrdnurräna is attested in any Sanskrit text. See footnote 58 of this chapter (p. 140). 
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3.1 Bhäviveka and Candrakirti 
While the Prisaingika-Mädhyamika was widely regarded in Tibet as the main 
stream of Mahäyzna Buddhism after Tsong kha pa, 2 we hardly find any evidence of 
Candrakirti's popularity until around 1000AD. 3 As we have seen in chapter 1, Ye shes 
sde's Ma ba'i khyad par, one of the earliest Tibetan doxographical accounts of Indian 
Buddhism, names Nägdrjuna, Aryadeva, Bhäviveka, Sintaraksita and Kamalasila, but 
not Candrakirti. Moreover, Ye shes sde does not mention the Svätantrika-Präsangika 
distinction although he classifies the Madhyamakas into the Sautrzntika-Madhyamaka 
and the Yogäcära-Madhyamaka. When we look at the history of translation of Candrakirti's 
works into Tibetan, it seems that in the earlier dissemination of Buddhism into Tibet, 
Candrakirti was not considered important. Only his Yuktisastiküvrtti, 4 a commentary on 
Nägirjuna's work, was translated by Ye shes sde in the 9th C. All the other works of 
Candrakirti were translated later than the 11th C. The Madhymnakdvatüra, one of his 
major works, was translated in the 11th C by Nag tsho and Krsna Pandita. 5 Nag tsho was 
a Tibetan translator whom Atisa (982-1055) worked with. The other main works such as 
the Madhyamaküvatärabadsya and the Prasannapada were translated by sPa tshab Nyi 
magrags. 6 Thus his main works were all translated by translators of the later dissemination. 
2 For example, Lopez [1987] (p. 22) states as follows: 
The primacy of the Prtsangika view was firmly established for the Tibetan tradition by 
Tsong-kha-pa, the founder of the Ge-luk (dGe-lugs) order, in works such as the Great Exposition 
of the Stages of the Path (Lam rim chen mo), the Essence of the Great Explanations (Legs 
bshad snyng po), and the Great Commentary on (Candrakirti's) "Supplement" ('Jug dik chen 
mo). In these works he presents both the central issues and most intricate points of the 
Präsangika school with a precision and style unmatched in Buddhist literature. Thus, it can be 
said that from the time of Tsong-kha-pa, if not before, the Prasangika school was the dominant 
philosophical system in Tibet. 
3 For example, see Dreyfus [1997] p. 19. 
4 This seems to be the only work of Candrakirti translated during the time of the earlier dissemination. 
It can be regarded as insignificant compared with the fact that 13häviveka's Praji0pradipa, a 
commentary on Nägdrjuna's Mülamadhyamakakürika was translated in this period together with 
Avalokitavrata's sub-commentary, the Prajilpradipatikn. 
5 TheMadhyamaküvatdra is later revised by Nyi ma grags. See Inaba [1966] p. 33. 
6 The years of Nyi ma grags's birth and death are not certain. lie translated some texts with a 
disciple of a joint translator of Bio ldan shes rab (1059-1109). It seems, therefore, that he lived in 
the late 11th C- early 12th C. See Inaba [1967]. 
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Furthermore, none of Candrakirti's works is found in the Chinese Tripitaka. 7 
As for Bh, viveka, in addition to the fact that he is mentioned by Ye shes sde, his 
PrajAdpradipa as well as the commentary, the PrajnüpradTpatika of Avalokitavrata,, was 
translated during the earlier dissemination. The Madhyarnakahrdayakdrikd and its 
commentary, the Tarkajväld, are mentioned in the Man dkar Ana catalogue as treatises in 
the process of translation 8 The *Karatalaratna (Zhang then lun) and the Prajnäpradipa 
were translated into Chinese. ' Tsong kha pa, when he supports the classification of the 
Svätantrika and the Przsatigika, says "you should not think that it is their own fabrication. "'o 
This statement implies that some teachers before Tsong kha pa maintained that this 
classification had been made up by Tibetan translators of the later dissemination. Thus 
there has been a doubt on the existence of this classification in India since the time of 
Tsong kha pa or even before, and it was probably caused by the lack of reference to 
Candrakirti in the records of the earlier dissemination, as well as by the absence of the 
terms svütantrika and prdsaügika in major Indian sources. This evidence shows that 
Bhäviveka was probably well known in Tibet already at the time of the earlier dissemination 
but Candrakirti was not. 
In addition, Indian sources suggest that Bhnviveka was the representative figure 
of the externalist Madhyamaka in the relatively early period. As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, Säntaraksita (ca. 725-788) in the Madhyamakdlarnküravrtti quotes a 
passage as the view of the externalist Mädhyamika from the Madhyamakahrdayakdrikä 
and Kamalagila (ca. 740-797) in the Madhya, nakiloka mentions the same view. " In 
addition to this quotation, commentarial tradition also shows that Bhäviveka was regarded 
as important. There are two commentaries on the Prajiiäpradipa, one of which was 
written by Avalokitavrata (7th C? ) and the other, which is now lost, was written by 
7 Sec Tsukamoto, Matsunaga and Isoda [ 1990] p. 232,14-p. 233,3. 
8 Lalou [1953] p. 337, No. 732, Yoshimura [1974] Nos. 728 and 729. Cf. Inaba [1966] p. 29. 
9 See Tsukamoto, Matsunaga and Isoda [1990] p 217,13-15. 
10 Sec; chapter 1.2 (p. 26 [1-17]). 
11 See chapter 2.7 (p. 85 [2-21 ]) as well as 2.8 (p. 89 [2-25]). 
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Gunadatta. '2 Thus Bh iviveka's works are frequently quoted and commented by Indian 
teachers before the 8th C. 
On the other hand, very little is known about the treatment of Candrakirti in India. 
There is no surviving Indian commentary on his main works except for the auto- 
commentary, the Madhyamakavatarabhjsya and the Madhyamaküvatäratikd of Jayznanda, 
which was written in the 12th C outside India. 13 To the best of my knowledge, among the 
Indian Mädhyamikas prior to Säntaraksita, i. e. before the 8th C, only Avalokitavrata in 
the Prajilapradrpatikä mentions him by name as one of the commentators on the 
Mislamadhyamakakürika of Nigärjuna. 14 Nevertheless, since he does not mention the 
view of Candrakirti, 's we do not know how he considered Candrakirti's criticism of 
Bhäviveka. As for other Indian teachers before the 8th C, it is pointed out that the works 
of Jn5nagarbha and Kamalagi1a may refer to the view of Candrakirti. 16 Unfortunately, 
however, they do not give his name and we are not absolutely certain to what extent they 
know of him. 
In the texts composed in the 10th C or later, however, many references of Candrakirti 
can be found. Prajfakaramati (10-11th C), in the Bodhlcaryavatarapalijika, quotes 6 
verses from the Madhyamakdvatära to explain the two truths. " Atisa, in the 
Satyadvayavatära and the Bodhimargapradipapanjikci mentions him by name and also 
'2 See Lindtner [ 1981 ] (p. 211 and p. 212 note 16). Although Atisa, in the Bodhimargapradipapanjila, 
reports that Avalokitavrata and Devasarman wrote commentaries on the Prajii apradipa, according 
to Lindtner, it is not Devasarman but Gunadatta who wrote its commentary. 
13 See Ogawa [1984] p. 170. 
14 Prajndpradipatika (Derge ed. No. 3859 wa 73a5, Peking ed. No. 5259 wa 85a8). See Kajiyama 
[1963]. In the Madhyamakaratnapradipa, a certain Bhavya mentions the name of Candrakirti. The 
time of its composition is assumed to be around the 9-10th C. See chapter 2, footnote 96 (p. 101). 
This may be the first surviving text which mentions Candrakirti by name after Avalokitavrata. 
15 It is not clear why he does not discuss it while he mentions the Prasannapadü by name. Kajiyama 
[1982] (p. 16) supposes that Avalokitavrata was contemporary with Candrakirti, based on the fact 
that lie does not discuss Candrakirti's view. There is, however, a possibility that he had not read the 
Prasannapadd although he knew the name, or that he did not regard Candraküti as a major 
opponent. 
16 For Jnänagarbha, see Ruegg [1981a] (pp. 70-71), Eckel [1987] (p. 141, note 120) and Matsumoto 
[1978]. We will discuss this matter later in this section (pp. 120-124). For Kamalasila, see 2.8. 
17 Bodhicarydvatarapanjika (La Vallee Poussin [1901-14]) p. 353,3-6 (Madhyamakavatara, v. 
6: 28), p. 353,13-16 (v. 6: 25), p. 361,4-7 (v. 6: 23), p. 365,2-5 (v. 6: 29), p. 369,15-p. 370,2 (v. 
6: 27) and p. 372,15-16 (v. 6: 80). 
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quotes from the same work of Candrakirti. 18 As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
Ratnikarasznti (10-11th C) seems to refer to Candrakirti, although not by name, when he 
refutes the view of the externalist Midhyamika. 19 
Therefore we may conclude that Bhäviveka was well known in India and Tibet. 
However, Candrakirti was rather neglected in India until the 10th C, i. e. before the time 
of Prajnäkaramati and others, and during the time of the earlier dissemination of Buddhism 
into Tibet. Concerning these situations surrounding them, it is tempting to suppose that 
there was no continuous opposition between the two groups in the earlier period of the 
late Madhyamaka (roughly from the second half of the 7th C until the 9th C) since 
Candrakirti's side was nearly forgotten. On the other hand, the name of Candrakirti and 
quotations from his works are very often found in many texts after about 1000 AD, such 
as those of Prajnäkaramati and Atisa. It is not yet clear what made this change of trend. 
While there is a possibility that the distinction of the Svztantrika and the Prisangika did 
not exist in India for some three hundred years after Candrakirti, it is unlikely, if not 
impossible, that his lineage had been extinct in the early stage of history after his death 
and it revived around 1000 AD since the works of Candrakirti survive. 
Now it is necessary to find out if we can find any texts that mention any difference 
or controversy between the Svätantrika and the Präsaiigika. Although Tibetan doxographers 
give names of major Indian teachers who lived between the second half of the 7th C and 
the 9th C, such as Säntideva, Säntaraksita and Kamalagila, we hardly find any dispute 
over the use of inference in their texts. Szntideva (ca. 650-700), who is often classified 
into the Prisangika by Tibetan doxographers, 20 adheres to the prasanga method, but does 
not criticise the use of inference at all. This cannot therefore be evidence of the opposition 
between the Svätantrika and the Präsangika. Prajiiikaramati's commentary on the 
'g For example, Satayadvayrivalara, v. 19 (Ejima [1983] pp. 365-366): 
slob dpon zla grags 'di skad du// 
thabs su gyur pa kun rdzob bdcn pa dang// thabs las byung ba dong dam bden pa dag// 
gnyis po'i dbye ba gang gis mi shes pa// de dag log par flogs pas ngan 'gror 'gro// 19 // 
(=Madhyamakävatara, v. 6: 80) 
19 See chapter 2.5 (pp. 80-83). 
20 Chos lyi rgyal mtshan, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and others. See Mimaki [1982a] (pp. 27-38). 
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Bodhicaryävatrra, the Bodhicaryävatdrapaiijika, which quotes many verses from 
Candrakirti probably had a large influence over the classification of Szntideva into the 
Pr, sangika. As we will examine later in this chapter, on the other hand, it may be the 
case that the 9-chapter version of the Bodhisattvacaryüvatara is interpreted from the 
point of the view of the Svztantrika in its commentary, the Bodhisattvacarydvatdra- 
vydkhyünapanjikü 2' According to Kajiyama's study, although Avalokitavrata puts 
Candrakirti's Prasannapadd on the list of commentaries on the Müülamadhyamakakdrikd, 
he does not comment on Candrakirti's view. If he was conscious of being the Svätantrika 
and knew of the argument made by Candrakirti in the first chapter of the Prasannapadd, 
he could not have helped mentioning it. This also makes us speculate that this difference 
of attitudes towards use of inference may not have been so important. 22 From these 
earlier accounts, therefore, it is hardly possible to find any evidence for the opposition 
between the Svätantrika and the Prisangika. 
As far as I know, modern scholars have not yet found any evident account that 
shows opposition of the Svätantrika and the Präsangika in Madhyamaka treatises after 
Candrakirti before the 9th C. Among teachers of this period who are classified into the 
Svätantrikas, however, Jnznagarbha (ca. 8th C) is the one who may have mentioned 
Candrakirti's view. According to Ruegg and Eckel, 23 he might criticise Candrakirti in 
21 See 3.3.2 (pp. 153-155). 
22 See Kajiyama [1963] and chapter 3, footnote 15 (p. 119). 
23 Ruegg [1981a] (pp. 70-71): 
In this treatise Jnänagarbha has mentioned (fol. 1 la sq. ) some `bad disputants' who held 
not only that entities such as rüpa are not produced in reality but also that they are not 
produced even in samvrti, so that they are comparable with the son of the barren woman 
(tiandhyaputra, etc., i. e. a mere flatus vocis).... The allusion might be to Candrakirti's theory of 
causal indeterminism even on the relative level, or it may be to some other opponent. 
Eckel [1987] (p. 141 note 120): 
Neither Jnänagarbha nor the subcommentator identifies the objector against whom this 
argument is directed. Ruegg points out (Literature, pp. 70-71), however, that the objection is 
similar to Candrakirti's conception of relative truth. If so, it is one of the few places in 
Svätantrika literature where the views of Candrakirti are addressed. The relevant passage in 
Candral irti is Madhyamaka atdra 6: 36-38... 
Both Ruegg and Eckel point out the possibility that this verse of Jnänagarbha is criticism of 
Candrakirti. Although Eckel gives vv. 6: 36-38 of the Madhyamakcivatara as the relevant passage, 
Rucgg seems to indicate v. 6: 111 because he considers that the expression `the son of the barren 
woman' is common to both Candrakirti's verse and Jnänagarbha's. 
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verse 25 of the Satyadvayavibhanga: 
[3-1] 
Some who are famous for their bad argument say, "An entity that does 
not arise in reality does not arise conventionally either, like the son of a 
barren woman. " (v. 25)24 
In this verse, arising both at the conventional and the ultimate levels is denied and 
compared to the son of a barren woman. To be precise, the opponent maintains that 
arising at the conventional level is impossible if there is no arising at the ultimate level. 
This verse is quite similar to the following statement made by Candrakirti in the 
Madhyamakävatara, verse 6: 111: 
[3-2] 
Neither does the son of a barren woman arise by his own nature in reality 
nor in the [ordinary] world. In that way, all these entities do not arise by 
nature in the [ordinary] world or in reality. (v. 6: 111)25 
Here Candrakirti maintains that nothing arises by nature either at the conventional 
or the ultimate level. This non-arising is compared to the son of a barren woman. With 
regard to these points, these two verses are similar. Jninagarbha and Candrakirti, being 
MAdhyamikas, would not disagree on non-arising at the ultimate level. Therefore the 
matter of disagreement is non-arising at the conventional level. If Jn-anagarbha, in the 
Satyadvayavibhariga, verse 25, indeed criticises the denial of intrinsic nature (svabha va) 
which is postulated in the Madhyanzakävatrra, verse 6: 111, this can be regarded as 
23 Satyadvayavibhanga, v. 25 (Eckel [ 1987] p. 178): 
rtsod ngan grags pa kha cig ni// yan dag par dngos ma skyes pa(s)// 
mo gsham bu la sogs bzhin du// kun rdzob tu yang mi skye zcr// 
Also see Eckel [1987] (pp. 141-2, note 120). 
'S Madhyomakatiatära, v. 6: 111 (La Vallcc Poussin [1907-12] p. 221,20-p. 222,3): 
mo gsham bu la rang gi bdag nyid kyis// stye ba de nyid du med 'jig rten du'ang// 
yod min de bAiin dngos 'di lain ngo bo// nyid kyis 'jig rien de nyid du ma skyes// 
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criticism of the Przsaiigika by the Svztantrika. According to Tsong kha pa, the Svztantrika 
conventionally accepts intrinsic nature but the Prisangika does not, and this difference of 
views on conventional existence is one of the most distinctive characters between them 26 
Matsumoto, who at first maintained the same view as Eckel, however, denies this 
assumption that Jnznagarbha, in the Satyadvayavibhafiga, verse 25, criticises Candrakirti. 
2' According to him, what Jnänagarbha actually criticises here is not the view of Candrakirti 
in the Madhyainakavatnra, verse 6: 111, but the view of the Vijnaptivädins which 
Candrakirti mentions in verse 6: 107 of the same text and its auto-commentary the Bhdsya: 
[3-3] 
Here [an objection] is stated [as follows]: If there is not even the slightest 
intrinsic nature of material things and others ultimately in this way, then 
there must be no intrinsic nature of them conventionally either because 
they do not exist ultimately like the son of a barren woman. But there 
also is intrinsic nature of material things and others conventionally. 
Therefore there is indeed existence of them ultimately. It is said [about 
this]: 
If entities do not exist in reality, they do not exist as common 
usage (tha snyad du, *vyavaharatas) like the son of a barren woman. 
Therefore, they indeed exist by nature. (v. 6: 1078 
As Matsumoto maintains, those whom Jnznagarbha criticised in verse 25 of the 
26 Williams [1989b] (p. 59,10-24). 
27 To be precise, this is first pointed out by Kazunobu Matsuda of Otani University. See Matsumoto 
[1985], Appendix 2 (pp. 121-124). 
28Madhyanuk-üvatdra, v. 6: 107 (La Vallee Poussin [1907-12] p. 217,16-p. 218,5): 
'dir smras pa/ gal tc dc Itar gzugs la cogs pa reams la don darn par rang bzhin 'ga' yang med 
na/ 'o na mo sham gyi bu bzhin du don darn par yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir / de dag gi rang 
bzhin kun rdzob tu yang yod par mi 'gyur ba zhig na/ gzugs la sogs pa mains kyi rang bzhin ni 
kun rdzob tu yod pa yang yin no// de'i phyir de dag gi yod pa nyid ni don dam par yang yod pa 
kho na'o/ zhes smras pa/ 
gal to dngos po rnams de nyid du med na// tha snyad du yang mo gsliam bu ji bzhin// 
dc dag mcd pa nyid 'gyur dc yi phyir// de dag rang bzhin gyis ni yod pa nyid// 6: 107 // 
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Satyadvayavibhanga seem to be these opponents mentioned by Candrakirti in verse 
6: 107 of the Madhyamakdvat ra. Here the opponent insists that if there is no intrinsic 
nature ultimately, there must be no intrinsic nature conventionally, but because there is 
intrinsic nature conventionally, it must exist ultimately. He clearly maintains that things 
exist by nature both at the conventional and the ultimate levels. The point of this dispute 
is ultimate existence rather than conventional. In other words, the opponent is trying to 
establish ultimate existence on the basis of conventional existence. 
To reinforce his argument, Matsumoto show Sdntaraksita's sub-commentary on 
"some who are famous for their bad argument say" that is the introductory part of verse 
25 of the Satyadvayavibhaüga: 
[3-4] 
And others who hate the way (ishiti) of the ultimate, seeking blame, say, 
"An entity that does not arise in reality does not arise conventionally, 
either, like the son of a barren woman. , 21 
Säntaraksita considers that the opponents mentioned in verse 25 of the 
Saiyadvayavibhariga `hate the way of the ultimate. ' If the opponents here were represented 
by Candrakirti, it would become absurd because Candrakirti would not disagree on 
non-arising at the ultimate level. Here it seems that the opponents are those who attempt 
to refute the ultimate truth maintained by the Mädhyamikas. Therefore, this also proves 
that what the opponents intend to do in this verse is not the establishment of non-arising 
both at the conventional and the ultimate levels, but refutation of non-arising at the 
ultimate level 30 
2"Satyadvayaviblzaregapaiijikü (Derge No. 3883 42b3, Peking No. 5283 sa 36a2-3): 
yang don darn pa'i tshul la sdang ba gzhan dag klan ka tshol bar bycd de/ yang dag par dngos 
ma skycs pa// mo gsham bu la sogs bzhin du// kun rdzob tu yang mi skye zer// 
Cf. Matsumoto [1984b] p. 10-11. 
3° It is not easy to prove that this opponent is indeed the Vijnaptivädin. Matsumoto [1984b] takes 
pains to do so by comparing relevant passages from Devendrabuddhi, Jnänagarbha, Säkyabuddhi 
and Säntaraksita who criticise each former teacher in order over this matter. Neither do I discuss 
this matter further nor show Matsunmoto's argument further because showing that the 
Satyadvayavibhanga verse 25 does not criticise Candrakirti should suffice our purpose at present. 
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Another point Matsumoto mentions concerning this matter is lack of the word `by 
nature' (svabadvatas) in verse 25 of the Satyadvayavibhariga. Candrakirti makes an 
objection to those who confound the non-existence of intrinsic nature of existence with 
the non-existence of existence. Whether or not it contains the word `by nature' (svabhdvatas) 
counts. As Matsumoto admits, the misunderstanding that the Satyadvayavibhariga verse 
25 indicates the Madhyamakdvatüra verse 6: 111 is caused by `superficial similarity of 
terms, "' and the word `by nature' (svabhdvatas) makes the opinion peculiar to Candrakirti. 32 
Based on these facts, Matsumoto concludes that Jnänagarbha does not criticise Candrakirti's 
view here in verse 25 of the Satyadvayavibhafiga. 
It is also worth mentioning that Matsumoto reports that S5ntaraksita distinguishes 
two types of proof in the Satyadvayavibhangapanjikä when explaining the same verse: 
[3-5] 
This can be either proof or proof by an undesired consequence (*prasariga) 
because there is no other kind [of proof] 33 
Thus even though we cannot find any controversy over the use of inference in the 
Satyadvayavibhariga of Jnänagarbha, S5ntaraksita, in the sub-commentary, distinguishes 
the inference and the prasanga method. Matsumoto also points out that Säntaraksita did 
not use the term `svatantra' to describe proof (bsgrub pa, *sädhana), 3' and it may be the 
case that the terms svatantra anumäna and prasarigrapatti/äpi7dana were not commonly 
used in this period. 
31 My translation. 
32 Matsumoto [1984b] (pp. 1-2). However this does not, of course, suggest that Jndnagarblia did not 
know Candrakirti but rather shows that lie knew the argument in the Mad/zyamakävatara. Matsumoto 
[1984a] (p. 145) also points out similarity of their definition of the conventional truth as `covering'. 
Anyway this cannot be the evidence of opposition between the Svätantrika and the Prasangika. 
33 Satyadvayavibhcingapanjikd (Derge No. 3883 sa 42b5, Peking No. 5283 sa 36a6): 
'di ni bsgrub pa'am thal bar bsgrub pa zhig tu 'gyur grang ste/ rnam pa gzhan ni med pa'i 
phyir ro// 
3' Matsumoto [1984b] (pp. 30-32 note 18) argues that it is doubtful that Säntaraksita knew of the 
terms autonomous inference and the prasariga method because lie uses a term südhana (bsgrub) 
but not svatantra. Ile supporses that use of these terms in contrast had not possibly been common 
until Kamalasila who, as far as we know, first used them after Candrakirti. 
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In addition to Szntaraksita, Kamalasila distinguishes the two types of proof and 
very briefly states that he employs syllogism but not the prasariga method in the 
Madhyamakäloka. 
[3-6] 
Also by adducing an undesired consequence (*prasangdpattil the desired 
object cannot be established because an undesired consequence like that 
is not proof. [This is] because only invalidation in the opponents' thesis 
takes place by means of the proof by an undesired consequence, but it is 
not establishment of one's own thesis and this requires another proposition 
to be established for both sides. 3s 
Matsumoto gives the following passage of the Madhyamakiloka as evidence of 
Kamalasi1a's use of the terms svatantra and prasariga in contrast. 
[3-71 
[Objection]: Also regarding those who say "all entities lack intrinsic 
nature because they lack one intrinsic nature and many", if it is the 
proof by an undesired consequence (thal bar sgrub), then because 
opponents do not admit such [proof], inferential reason is not established 
and do not in any case admit entities lacking one intrinsic nature and 
many. For this very reason, even if it is autonomously [employed] 
proof (rang dgar shrub), inferential reason is not established for the 
other side 36 
35 Madhyamakd1oka (berge ed. No. 3887 sa 136b5-6, Peking Cd. No. 5287 sa 147a5-6): 
that bar bsgrubs pas kyang mngon par 'dod pa'i don mi 'grub std dc Ita bu'i that ba nyid ma 
grub pa'i phyir roll thal bar sgrub pa'i sgo nas ni gzhan gyi phyogs la gnod pa tsam du 'gyur 
gyi/ rang gyi phyogs 'gnib pa ni ma yin te/ de ni gni ga la grub pa'i gtan tshigs gzhan la bltos 
pa'i phyir ro// 
36Madhynmakdloka (Dcrge ed. No. 3887 sa 138b6-7, Peking cd. No. 5287 sa 149b4-6): 
gang dag dngos po thams cad ni gcig dang du ma'i rang bzlhin dang bral ba'i phyir rang bzhin 
med pa'o zhes zer ba de la yang gal to thal bar sgrub na ni de'i tshe gzhan dag de Ita bu khas 
mi len pa'i phyir gtan tshigs ma grub pa yin te/ geig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral ba'i 
dngos po ni su yang khas mi fen to// de nyid kyi phyir rang dgar sgrub na yang gtan tsigs cig 
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These passages suggest that it will be appropriate to call Kamalagila a Svätantrika 
because he was aware of the difference between proof and the prasaºigdpatti, and rejects 
the latter. It is, however, not clear whether this is an objection to those who made use of 
the prasariga method or just a declaration of his view of reasoning. At least, Santaraksita 
and Kamalasila were conscious of the difference of two kinds of methods, and the latter 
did not regard the prasafiga method as an appropriate means of proof. Kamalasila also 
mentions proof by an undesired consequence and autonomouslly [employed] proof. 
To conclude, we have not found any convincing evidence that suggests existence 
of an opposition between the Svätantrika and the Präsangika before the 9th C. Candrakirti 
does not seem to have been highly regarded by Tibetans during the earlier dissemination 
of Buddhism into Tibet. His trace is hardly found in the record of translation of Buddhist 
texts or in doxographical texts in this period. The same applies in India, too. Compared 
with Bhdviveka one of whose text is quoted by Säntaraksita and another is commented 
on by Avalokitavrata and Gunadatta, Candrakirti drew much less attention from the 
Indian Mädhyamikas in this period. In addition, we have not found any statement which 
suggests an opposition of the Svitantrika and the Präsangika. The first teacher who 
clearly mention a difference between svatantra inference and prasariga method after 
Candrakirti seems to be Kamalasila. 
It is, therefore, impossible to confirm, on the ground of reliable evidence, that 
there was some kind of opposition between those who followed Bhaviveka and those 
who followed Candrakirti before this period. Especially, how Candrakirti's thought was 
treated by the Mädhyamikas between the 7th C and the 9th C is unknown. It is certain, 
however, that while before the 9th C Bhäviveka's side seems to have been far more 
dominant than Candrakirti's, Candrakirti received more attention after the 10th C. It 
seems that there was a shift of the trend of the Madhyamaka thought around the 9th C. In 
this case, there is a possibility that these two different positions did not exist in the same 
period as opposed among the externalist Mädhyamikas. In other words, the externalist 
shos la ma grub pa yin no// 
Cf. Matsumoto [1984b] p. 32. 
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Midhyamika first postulated the Svitantrika view and altered it to the Prilsangika view 
later. 
Below in this chapter, therefore, I will attempt to locate the Svztantrika and the 
Prisangika elements in late Madhyamaka works in order to trace change of trends to the 
earliest possible source. For this purpose, I will first examine what is the point of 
controversy between Bh5viveka and Candrakirti. Because I consider that the difference 
of attitude towards the use of logic appears in definitions of the two truths, as pointed out 
by Ejima and others, 37 we will then examine the definitions of the two truths by Bhäviveka 
and Candrakirti in relation to the use of inference, and then compare them with those of 
the later Indian Midhyamika teachers. 
3.2 Svätantrikas' Use of Inference 
The distinction of the Svätantrika and the Pr5sangika is understood to be based on 
their methodology that is their preference to use a particular style of reasoning, namely 
svatantra anumäna (autonomous inference) and prasaiigüpatti (adducing of undesired 
consequence or `prasaüga method'). They are used to establish non-arising (anutpatti), 
which is the teaching of Nigirjuna. It is this non-arising that the M5dhyamikas consider 
as the ultimate. The ultimate truth is, on the other hand, beyond expression. Here arises 
the problem how to establish this teaching of non-arising. The Svätantrika and the 
Przsangika resort to different approaches. 
It is accepted by the Midhyamikas that the ultimate truth is free from discriminative 
thought (prapanca) and from conceptual construct (vikalpa), as Nzgzrjuna expresses in 
the Madhyamakakürika, verse 18: 9: 
[3-8] 
Being not dependent on others, calm, not discriminated by discriminative 
thought (prapaiica), free from conceptual construct (vikalpa) and without 
37 Ejima [198th] (pp. 192-3). 
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objects differentiated: This is the characteristic of the reality. (v. 18: 9)38 
The highest reality is thus beyond any verbal or conceptual activity. Therefore it 
is indeed impossible to explain something from the point of view of the ultimate truth. It 
is, on the other hand, necessary for the Midyamikas to explain what the ultimate truth is, 
to a certain extent, in order both to prove it against opponents and to realise it for 
themselves. The difference of the Svätantrika and the Präsahgika can be understood as a 
difference of methods to establish the ultimate truth, that is to say, inference and the 
prasaiiga method. 
We will first look at the difference of attitude towards inference between Bhäviveka 
and Candrakirti, then see how Bh5viveka understands its role. Bhäviveka's attitude 
towards reasoning is clearly expressed at the beginning of the Prajnäpradipa, a commentary 
on the M%rlamadhyamakakärika: 
[3-9] 
The venerable «carya [N igirjuna] teaches, in verses only, inference 
(*aiiutnana) and refutation (*dasana) which are clear and true, and 
expounds the way of prajndpdramitn, which eliminates the net of wrong 
views. Among fellow practitioners, however, some do not understand it. 
Wishing to make them understand, therefore, I shall explain the 
Madhyamakasüstra (Miilamadhyamakakarikd) according to scriptural 
authority. " 
"'Mi7lamadhyamakakärikä, v. 18: 9 (La Vallee Poussin [1903-13] p. 372,12-13): 
aparapratyayam säntam prapancair aprapancitam I 
nirvikalpam anän. rtham etat tattvasya Iaksanam 11 18: 9 II 
39 Prajnapradipa (Walleser [1914] p. 1,13-p. 2,3, Derge ed. No. 3853 tsha 45b6-46a1, Peking ed. 
No. 5253 tsha 53b7-54a1): 
slob dpon gyi zlial snga nas kyis(') tshig le'ur byas pa dag kho nas rjes su dpag pa dang/ sun 
dbyung ba'i gsal ba dang/ dc kho na dag bstan pa dang/ ita ba ngan pa'i dra ba zhi bar byed pa 
dang Idan pa shcs rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i tshul bka' stsal mod kyi tshangs pa mtshungs 
par spyod pa reams las kha cig gis mi rtogs pas/ de'i phyir de dag gis rtogs par bya bar 'dod 
nas lung ji lta ba bzhin du dbu ma'i bstan bcos bshad par bya'o// 
(1) Em. kyis, D: kyi, Ed. P: omit. 
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In this statement, Bhäviveka understands that Nzgärjuna's Midamadhyamakakärikd 
is a work consisting of reasoning. According to Ejima's study on this passage of the 
Prajndpradipa, if inference here means syllogism with a three-fold inferential mark 
(trairirpyaliriga) and refutation means indication of a fault in an opponent's syllogism, it 
is impossible for NZgzrjuna to know the concept of these terms because it seems that a 
three-fold inferential mark as a condition of valid inference is introduced around the 5th 
C. 4° However, it can be understood, as Ejima maintains, that Bhäviveka intends to 
interpret the teaching of the Mt=damadhyamakakdrika in the form of syllogism. It is the 
teaching of non-arising that Nägzrjuna teaches in the Miila, nadhyamakakdrikýr, as shown 
in the very first verse: 
[3-10] 
No entities at all that have arisen from themselves, nor from another, nor 
from both, nor from a non-cause ever exist anywhere. (v. 1: 1)'1 
Bhäviveka therefore considers that the Nägdrjuna's teaching of non-arising should 
be established by means of syllogistic inference. This attitude of Bhäviveka is also found 
in the criticism of Buddhapälita, who does not employ syllogistic inference. Buddhapilita's 
comment on `non-arising from oneself in verse 1: 1 of the Mcrlamadhyainakakarikü is as 
follows: 
[3-11] 
Of these, firstly, entities do not arise from themselves, because their 
arising would become pointless and because their arising would become 
an infinite regress. 
To explain, entities existing in themselves also would have no purpose 
to arise again. Because if something arose although it exists, it would 
40 Pjima [ 1982] (pp. 154-155) 
41 MülamadhyamakaldriW, v. 1: 1 (la Vallee Poussin [1903-13] p. 12,13-14): 
na svato näpi parato na dväbhyäm näpy ahetutah I 
utpannä jätu vidyante bhäväh kvacana kecana 111: 1 II 
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never stop arising, that [arising from themselves] is again not accepted. 
42 Therefore, firstly, entities do not arise from themselves. 
Here Buddhapälita points out two logical faults in the theory of arising from 
themselves. First, there is no point for entities to arise again if they are already existent. 
Second, if they arose, this arising would be the nature of these entities and therefore they 
would keep arising. This negation of arising from themselves given by Buddhapälita is 
obviously in the prasafiga method, which points out faults in the opponents' reasoning 
without giving Buddhapälita's own proposition. It is, therefore, criticised as faulty by 
Bhäviveka in the Prajndpradlpa, as follows: 
[3-12] 
This is not appropriate because neither an inferential reason nor an example 
is mentioned and because the fault mentioned by the opponent is not 
avoided. And because there is manifestation of `what is to be proved' 
(südhya) and its property ((Iharma) which have an inverted meaning by 
inversion of the meaning in question due to a statement with possibility 
of [an objection], there would be a contradiction to [your] doctrine that 
entities arise from another, because arising is purposeful and because 
arising stops. 43 
42ßuddhapülitamülamad/zyamakavrtti (Walleser [1913] p. 11,5-11,1)erge ed. No. 3842 tsa 161b3-5, 
Peking ed. No. 5242 tsa 182a6-8): 
de la re zhig dngos po reams bdag gi bdag nyid las stye ba med de/ de dag gi skye ba don med 
pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir dang/ skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro// 'di liar dngos 
po bdag gi bdag nyid du yod pa reams la yang skye ba dgos pa med do// gal to yod kyang skye 
na nam yang mi skye bar mi 'gyur bas de yang mi 'dod de/ de'i phyir re zhig dngos po mams 
bdag las skye ba med do// 
43 Prajizdpradipa (Walleser [1914] p. 11,18-p. 12,4, Derge ed. No. 3853 tsha 49a6-bl, Peking ed. 
No. 5253 tsha 58b8-59a2): 
de ni rigs pa ma yin te/ gtan tshigs dang dpe ma brjod pa'i phyir dang/ gzhan gyis smras pa'i 
nycs pa ma bsal ba'i phyir roll glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa'i phyir te/ skabs kyi don ]as bzlog 
pas sgrnb par bya ba dang/ de'i chos bzlog pa'i don mngon pas dngos po rnams gzhan las Skye 
bar 'gyur ba dang/ Skye ba 'bras bu dang boas pa nyid du 'gyur ba dang/ skye ba thug pa yod 
par 'gyur ba'i phyir mdzad pa'i mtha' dang 'gal bar 'gyur ro// 
Quoted in thePrasannapadd (La Vallee Poussin [1903-13] p. 14,4-p. 15,2) 
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Here, Bhzviveka points out three faults in Buddhapälita's reasoning of non-arising 
from oneself: (1) there are neither an inferential reason nor an example, (2) he does not 
reply to the opponent's objection and (3) his negation establishes the opposite of non-arising 
from oneself, i. e. arising from another. I do not examine (2) here because it does not 
concern the way of reasoning. ' With regard to (1) Bhzviveka clearly expresses that it is 
necessary to show an inferential reason and an example to establish non-arising. This 
means that Bhäviveka regards syllogistic inference as the essential means to establish 
non-arising. In (3) he points out that the prasafiga method that adduces undesired 
consequences in opponent's inference leaves a possibility of an opposite conclusion, 
which is, in this case, arising from another and so on. This matter has much to do with 
two kinds of negation, paryuddsa and prasajyapratisedha. Before we look into them, we 
examine Candrakirti's objection to this view of Bhäviveka. 
Concerning this argument, Candrakirti in the Prasannapadl makes an objection 
to Bhäviveka's criticism against Buddhapälita. He argues that it is not necessary to show 
an inferential reason and an example, as follows: 
[3-13] 
Of these, first, it is not appropriate that it is said [by Bhäviveka], "because 
neither an inferential reason nor an example is mentioned. " Why? Because 
the opponent who accepts arising from oneself is asked about the purpose 
of arising again 45 
Candrakirti explains that Buddhapzlita uses the prasaiiga method, which adduces 
the opponent's fault and it is, therefore, not necessary to show an inferential reason and 
44 It may not be appropriate in a strict sense to consider that this second fault pointed out by 
Bhäviveka does not concern the way of reasoning. ßuddhapälita here uses the prasariga method 
whose function is negation of an opponent's proposition and not rebuttal of an objection to the 
M idhyamika. It is necessary only for those who have their own position to rebut criticism from 
opponents in order to protect that position. 'I7ierefore, the Präsangika does not necessarily have to 
reply to an opponent's objection. 
45 Prasannapadü (La Vallee Poussin [1903-131 p. 15,3-5): 
tatra yat tävat uk-tam hctudrstäntänabhidhän5d iti tad ayuktam I kim käranam I yasmät parate 
svata utpattim abhyupagacclian vidyamänasya punarutpäde prayojanam prcchyate I 
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an example in rejecting the opponent's view. This implies that Candrakirti considers that 
syllogistic inference is dispensable in showing non-arising. He further explains why he 
does not adopt syllogistic inference: 
[3-14] 
[Objection]: Why is it the case that the opponent does not yield [even] if 
[he is] criticised to this extent, wherefore there should be an advantage 
of employing an inferential reason and an example? 
[Answer]: However, the opponent does not yield even by criticism of 
contradiction in the view he accepts. In that case, he, likewise, will 
never yield even with an inferential reason and an example, because 
of his shamelessness. And we do not argue with an intoxicated person. 
In any way, the äcürya [Bhzviveka], resorting to inference although it is 
not a suitable occasion, exposes only his own attachment to inference. 6 
Bhzviveka may make an objection that an inferential reason and an example are 
necessary because the opponent will not yield even when the faults that Buddhapilita 
mentions above are pointed out. Candrakirti replies to this that if it is impossible to 
convince the opponent by means of the prasanga method, it is likewise impossible by 
means of syllogistic inference. This shows Candrakirti's belief that the prasanga method 
is not a less effective way to refute an opponent than inference. He further explains 
another fault of inference with quotations: 
[3-15] 
It is not appropriate for a Mädhyamika to use inference autonomously 
46 Prasannapadü (La Vallee Poussin [1903-13] p. 15,8-p. 16,2): 
('Kim iyati-') coditc paro näbhyupaiti yato hetudrs1iintopädänasip1ia1yam syät I atha 
sväbhyupagamavirodhacodanayäpi paro na nivartate I tadäpi nirlajjatayä hetudrstäntäbhyäm 
api naiva nivarteta II na conmattakena sahäsmäl am viväda iti II sarvathä2) priyänumänatäm 
evätmana äcdryah prakatayati I asthäne 'pi aumtnam pravesayan II 
(1) Ed: kirr [tanmütre. ua]. Em: kim iyati. (As emended by Yotsuya [1999] p. 57. ) (2) P. d. 
tasmilt, Mss: sarvat{üi. (Cf. La Vallee Poussin [ 1903-13] p. 16, note 1. ) 
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(svatantram) by himself (svatas), because there cannot be acceptance of 
other theses. And it is said by Aryadeva [in the Catuhsataka]: 
It is impossible, even after a long time, to refute one who has no 
position postulating that [things are] existent, non-existent or both. 
(Catuhsataka v. 16: 25)" 
Following this quotation, he quotes Nägarjuna's Vigrahavyävartani to explain 
why the Mädhyamikas should not rely on inference: 
[3-16] 
It is said in the Vigrahavydvartaiti: 
If I had some proposition (pratijna), 48 then necessarily (eva) I 
would have a fault. And I do not have any proposition. Therefore I 
never have a fault. (Vigrahavyivartant, v. 29)49 
It is thus clear that Candrakirti criticises the autonomous use of inference, on the 
ground that it has a proposition, which is always associated with a fault. This is to say 
that Candrakirti does not consider non-arising as his proposition but as mere denial of 
47I rasannapa&z (La Vallee Poussin [1903-13] P. 16,2-5): 
na ca miidhyamikasya svatah svatantram anuminam kartum yuktarn paksäntaräbhyupa- 
gamabhävät I tathä coktam(') äryadevena 
sad asat sadasac ceti yasya pakso na vidyate I 
upälambhas cirenäpi tasya vak--tum na sakyate II (Catulzsataka v. 16: 25) 
(1) Ed: tatiwktam, de Jong [1978] p. 29: tatlu3 coktam. 
43 With regard to what this `proposition' means, sec Ruegg [1983] and Matsumoto [1997] (pp. 
371-385). 
49 Prasannapadü (La Vallee Poussin [1903-13] p. 16,6-8): 
vigrahavyävartanydn colctam I 
yadi käcana pratijnä sy in me tata eva(l) me bhaved dosa}i I 
nästi ca mama pratijnä tasmän naivästi me dosah II (VigrahavAvarlani, v. 29) 
(1) La Vallee Poussin's edition has eva but de Jong [1978] (p. 29) and Yotsuya [1999] (p. 59) 
chose esa seemingly according to the Vigrahavylvartanr (Johnston and Kunst [1951] p. 127). 
While era seems to be more appropriate according to the Vigrahavyatiartani, it is also difficult 
for me to give up eva because it more clearly indicates the inevitable relationship between a 
proposition and a fault. 
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the opponent's positions that are arising from oneself, from another and so on. If he were 
to establish the proposition `non-arising' by denying arising from itself, there would be a 
fault that he establishes arising from another. As long as one does not have a proposition 
by only denying the opponent's position, he will not reach any other conclusion, which 
is reverse of his proposition, such as arising from another. 
This argument of Candrakirti is related to the third fault of Buddhapälita's reasoning 
of non-arising given by Bhdviveka. There Bhäviveka points out that the prasainga method 
that adduces undesired consequences in an opponent's inference leaves the possibility of 
an opposite conclusion, which is, in this case, arising from another and so on. Here 
Candrakirti conversely states that it is not appropriate for the Mädhyamika to use an 
inference autonomously because there cannot be acceptance of other theses. This suggests 
that Candrakrti considers that employment of inference leads to acceptance of the opposite 
conclusion, i. e. arising from another. In short, Candrakirti here points out the same fault 
that Bhäviveka points out in Buddhapilita's reasoning. This argument is caused in relation 
to the two kinds of negation. Bhäviveka explains, as follows: 
[3-17] 
This negation `not from themselves' (na svatas: Miilamadhyamakakärika, 
1: 1) should be understood in the sense of prasajyapratisedha, because it 
has negation as principal and because it is intended [by Nigirjuna] that 
cognition free from conceptualisation that has all knowable as an object 
is established by negating all nets of conceptualisation. 
If paryuddsa is adopted, it deviates from our doctrine because it teaches 
non-arising by affirming that "phenomena are non-arising" because it has 
affirmation as principal. It is because it is said in the scripture that if [one] 
practises non-arising of material things (gzngs, ra-pa), it is not the practice 
of the perfection of wisdom (shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa, prajild- 
püramita)so 
50 Prajiäpradipa (Walleser [1914] p. 10,8-15. CL Derge ed. No. 3853 tsha 48b6-49a1, Peking cd. 
No. 5253 tsha 58a3-7): 
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[3-18] 
Here [in the MidamadhyamakakarikJ, verse 1: 1] a restriction [with eva] 
should be placed as "Entities never (*naiva) arise from themselves " 
(dngos po rnams bdag las skye ba med pa kho na'o, *naiva svata rrtpannä 
bhävah). 51 If restriction is placed in a different way, the sentence should 
be] "[Entities] do not arise only from themselves" (bdag kho na las skye 
ba med, *na svata evotpannü). On the contrary, it is ascertained, "[Entities] 
arose from another. " Similarly, [if restriction is placed in a different way, 
the sentence should be] "[Entities] do not arise only from themselves" 
(bdag kho na las skye ba med, *na svata evotparn ä). On the contrary, it 
is ascertained, "[Entities] arise from themselves and another. " This is not 
maintained because it deviates from our doctrine 52 
In the first passage, Bhaviveka distinguishes two kinds of negation, namely 
prasaJyapratisedha and paryudäsa(pratisedha). The former is considered to have negation 
as principal and the latter affirmation as principal. Further explanation is shown in the 
second passage. Bhäviveka explains that if a negative na is used to negate only the 
predicate (utpanna in this case) and restrictive eva emphasises na, it will not establish 
bdag las ma yin zhes bya ba'i dgag pa 'di ni med par dgag pa'i don du ltd" bar bya ste/ dgag 
pa gtso the ba'i phyir dang/ 'di Isar rtog(2) pa ma lus pa'i dra ba dgag3 pas main par mi rtog 
pa'i ye shes shes bya'i') yul ma lus pa dang ldan pa 'grub par dgongs pa'i phyir ro(s)// ma yin 
par dgag pa yongs su bzung na ni de sgrub pa gtso the ba'i phyir chos roams ma skyes so zhes 
sgrub pas skye ba med pa ston pa'i phyir mdzad pa'i mtha' dang bral bar 'gyur te/ lung las 
gzugs kyi Skye ba mcd pa la spyod na sties rab lyi plia rol tu phyin pa la spyod pa ma yin no 
zhes 'byung ba'i phyir ro// 
(1) D: Ita, Ed, P: blta. (2) 1): rtogs, Ed, P: rtog. (3) D: dgag, Ed, P: dgags. (4) D: shes bya'i, 
Ed, P: zhes bya ba'i. (5) D, P: phir ro, Ed: phi ro. (6) D, P: yongs su, Ed: yong su. 
S' Cf. Prasannapadd (La Vallee Poussin [1903-13] p. 13,4): 
nanu ca naiva svata utpann i, ity avadl ryamäne 
52 Prajnapradipa (Walleser [1914] p. 10,15-18. Cf. Derge cd. No. 3853 tsha 49a1-2, Peking ed. No. 
5253 tsha 58a7-bl): 
'dir dngos po mars bdag las skye ba med pa kho na'o zhes nges par gzung bar bya'o// gzhan 
du nges par gzung' na bdag kho na las skye ba med de/ (2-io na ci zhe na/ gzhan las skye'o 
zhes bya bar nges par 'gyur ba dang/ de bzhin du bdag kho na las Skye ba med dell) 'o na ci 
the na/ bdag dang gzhan las skye'o zhes hya bar nges par 'gyur bas de yang mi bzlhed de/ 
mdzad pa'i mtha' dang bral ba'i phyir ro// 
(1) D: gzung, Ed, I': bzung. (2) D: omit. 
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the opposite. However, if a. restrictive eva is used to limit negation only to `from themselves' 
(svatas) and exclude anything else from negation, it can become affirmation of `from 
another' and so on. The two kinds of negation is also explained in the Tarkajväld in a 
slightly different way: 
[3-19] 
If one asks what is the difference between these two [kinds of negation, 
namely] prasajyapralisedha (med par dgag pa) and parycrdäsapratisedha 
(ma yin par dgag pa), [it is answered as follows]: 
Paryuddsapratisedha is, by negating the nature of a thing, to affirm 
the nature of another thing which is similar to that [thing] but different 
from that [thing]. To explain, it is just like by the negation "This is not a 
Brahman, " it establishes that [he] is a Südra poor in penance, learning and 
so on, who is not a Brahman, similar to him but different from him. 
Prasajyapratisedha is merely to negate only the nature of a thing. It 
does not, however, establish the nature of a thing similar to it but different 
from it. To explain, it is just like [negation] "A Brahman should not drink 
wine" merely negates only that. It does not, however, mean that [he] 
should or should not have drink different from it 53 
Thus prasajyapratisedha is negation in nature and does not establish a different 
conclusion. On the other hand, paryuddsa, although it is negation, establishes a different 
(usually the opposite) conclusion because it is affirmation in nature. If the negation 
"Entities do not arise from themselves" is paryudüsa, it affirms arising from another. As 
53 Tarkajvald (Derge ed. No. 3856 dza 59b4-6, Peking ed. No. 5256 dza 63a6-bl): 
med par dgag pa dang ma yin par dgag pa zlies bya ba de gnyis") kyi bye brag ji Ita bu zlºe na/ 
ma yin par dgag pa ni dngos po'i ngo bo nyid dgag pas dc dang 'dra ba dc las gzhan pa'i dngos 
po'i ngo ho nyid sgrub par byed pa ste/ dper na 'di brain ze ma yin no zlies dgag pas brain ze 
de 'dra ba dc las gzhan pa brain ze ma yin pa dka' thub dang thos pa la sogs pas dman pa'i 
dmangs(2) rigs yin par bsgrubs pa Ita bu'o// med par dgag pa ni dngos po'i ngo bo nyid tsam 
zhig 'gog par zad kyi de dang 'dra ba de ma yin pa gzhan gyi dngos po sgrub par mi byed pa 
ste/ deer na brain zes chang btung bar mi bya'o zhes hya ba de tsam zhig 'gog par zad kyi de 
las gzhan pa'i btung ba btung ngo zhe 'am mi btung ngo zhes mi brjod pa Ita bu'o// 
(1) D: gnyis, P: grangs (2) D: dmangs, P: omit 
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it is expressed in verse 18: 9 of the Miülainadhyamakakdrikä, 54 the ultimate truth is free 
from conceptual construct (vikalpa) or discriminative thought (prapanca). By negating 
wrong ideas, it is possible to eliminate conceptual construct. However, if negation is 
paryuddsa, because affirmation that has a conceptually constructed content is involved 
in it, it is not possible to eliminate conceptual construct. It is, therefore, important for the 
Mdhyamikas to understand negation as prasajyaprati sedha. Now it is clear that when 
Bhäviveka criticises Buddhapalita, lie points out that Buddhapilita's negation is not 
prasajyapratisedha but paryuddsa. On the other hand, when Candrakirti supports 
Buddhapälita and replies to Bh, viveka's objection, he says, "It is not appropriate for a 
Madhyamika to use inference autonomously by himself, because there cannot be acceptance 
of other theses. s55 This shows that Candrakirti considers that inference can be only 
paryudäsa, that affirms a contradictory conclusion or other theses, but not 
prasajyapratisedha. It is understood that Candrakirti regarded Buddhapzlita's negation 
as prasajyapratisedha, from the following passage in the Prasannapadä: 
[3-20] 
[Objection] When it is restricted [with eva] as "[Entities] never arise 
from itself, " an unacceptable [conclusion] "[Entities] arise from 
another" is reached. 
[Answer] It is not reached because arising from another is also negated 
because prasajyapratisedha is intended. 56 
This shows that Candrakirti agrees with Bhäviveka that negation of arising from 
oneself expressed in verse 1: 1 of the Millamadhyanzakakarika must be prasajyapratisedha. 
Bhäviveka insists that Buddhapälita's reasoning is faulty because it is not syllogistic 
inference but the prasafiga method and because it is not prasajyapratisedha but paryuddsa. 
s"See [3-8] (p. 128). 
ss [3-15] (p. 133) 
Prasannapa&j (La Vallee Poussin [1903-13] p. 13,4-6): 
nanu ca naiva svata utpannä iti avadlisryamänc parata utpannä ity anistam präpnoti I na 
pripnoti 1 prasajyapratiscdhasya vivaksitatvät parato 'py utpadasya pratisctsyamänatvät 
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Here it is not clear if Bhäviveka considered that the prasariga method could not express 
prasajyapratisedha. On the other hand Candrakirti seems to maintain that autonomously 
employed inference is always paryudasa. This is probably because Candrakirti considered 
that establishing something by inference always involves affirmation of a proposition. 
For Candrakirti, autonomously employed inference establishes, i. e. `affirms' the 
proposition <na svata utpannd> and cannot be prasajyapratisedha, which must be negation 
in nature. The prasatiga method, on the other hand, negates the opponent's proposition 
<svata utpannfi> and is prasajyapratisedha. This is what is meant by saying that the 
Mädhyamika should not have any proposition. 
The opposition between Bhiviveka and Candrakirti arose concerning verse 1: 1 in 
the Miilamadhyamakakürika. Here Bhäviveka insists that non-arising from oneself and 
so on should be understood as inference consisting of a proposition, an inferential reason 
and an example and as prasajyapratisedha which does not incur any affirmation of the 
opposite conclusion. On the other hand, Candrakirti also considers that negation of 
arising must be prasajyapratisedha, but maintains that the M idhyamika should not have 
any proposition because establishing, i. e. affirming, a proposition does not help to eliminate 
conceptualisation. This is supported by the words of N glrjuna and Aryadeva 57 
Nevertheless it is not the case that Candrakirti completely abandons syllogistic inference. 
A hypothetical opponent (a Svätantrika) insists that even though a proposition cannot be 
established in common for both sides in a debate, it is still necessary to show inference 
with the thesis, the inferential reason and the example: 
[3-211 
[Objection]: Because the Mädhyamikas do not autonomously set forth 
inference (svatantrancanandnabhidhüyitvdi) due to no establishment 
of a thesis, an inferential reason and an example, there may not be 
proving, by [the M idhyamikas] themselves, of the matter in the 
proposition that is negation of arising or refutation of an opponent's 
57 [3-15] and [3-16] (pp. 133-134) 
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proposition by inference established for both sides. However, when 
[the Mddhyamikas] impel an opponent's proposition to contradict 
inference by none but [the Mzdhyamikas] themselves (svata eva), 
there must be [proving of the matter in the proposition and refutation 
of the opponent's proposition] by means of a thesis and others, [i. e. 
an inferential reason and an example, ] [presented] by none but [the 
Mddhyamikas] themselves (svata eva) that are free from faults of a 
thesis, an inferential reason and an example. Therefore, because they, 
[i. e. a thesis, an inferential reason and an example, ] are not set forth 
and because the fault [mentioned by the opponent] is not avoided, 
that very fault [mentioned earlier remains]. 8 
[3-22] 
[Answer]: It is not like that. What is the reason? Because the one who 
58 Prasannapadd (La Vallee Poussin [1903-13] p. 18,5-9): 
mädhyamikän; tm paksahctudrstäntänitm asiddheli svatantränumänänabhidhäyitvlt svata 
utpattipratisedhapratijnärthasädltanan " niä bhfid ubhayasiddhena vanumanena parapratijna- 
niräkaranam I parapratijnäyäs tu svata eva anumiinavirodhacodanayätn(2) svata eva 
paksalietudrstäntäntäpaksälaraltitaih") paksädibhir bhavitavyam I tata§ ca tadanabhidhänät 
taddosaparihiirac ca sa eva dosa iti I 
(1) Ed: °pratijnatarthasadhanarn (emended according to MacDonald 12000] p. 172). (2) Ed: 
°codana}ä (emended according to *LaksanatXn. Yonezawa [1999]) (3) Ed: pakahetu- 
drskintadosarahitaih (emended according to MacDonald [2000] p. 172). 
MacDonald [2000] (p. 174) states: 
[T]he grammatical subject of bhavitavyam, if not taken to becodanayn, can only be paksddibhih, 
and construed with palsadibhih it yields the sense "there must be a thesis, etc. "; the preceding 
paksahetudrstantadosarahitaih (as found in LVP) modifies pakcadibhih, and cannot be taken 
together with bhavitavyam as forming the predicate to a logical subject assumed to be pakcädi. 
However the subject of bhavitavyam can be °sadhanam and °nirakaranam from the previous 
sentence, which seems to me to be the most appropriate. It seems svatantra is used in the sense of 
`to establish one's own view', in contrast to virodhacodand. Therefore here (Candrakirti's) Bhäviveka 
maintains that the Mädhyamika should not utilise inference to establish his own view (vvatantram) 
but can use it to show contradiction of opponent's proposition. 
With regard to the term svatantrinunuäna, we find svatantram anunidnam three times (La 
Vallee Poussin [1903-13] p. 16,2, p. 34,4, p. 34,4) and svatantrdnumündbhidhdyihüt twice (p. 
16,11, p. 18,5) in the Prarannapadý. I inclined to translate svatantram in adverval sense, i. e. as 
`autonomously' but not `autonomous'. At least, we cannot find a compound `svatantrnnumona' 
itself as a karmadharaya compound. Therefore I provisionally adopt, in some cases, a translation 
`autonomous inference' for svatantra anwnäna in this thesis, meaning `(any) inference which is 
autonomous', rather than for svatantrünumäna as a karmadharaya compound which implies a 
special kind of inference. 
Concerning the fault mentioned before, sec [3-12] (p. 131). 
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proposes a matter (artha) should show the opponent the argument by 
which the matter is known "according to his intention to produce 
certainty to others, just like the ascertainment to himself. "59 Therefore, 
first, it is the general rule that the proof of the matter maintained and 
proposed by [a proponent] himself should be accepted by none but 
the opponent 60 
Candrakirti thus refuses a compromise made by the Svätantrika who even discards 
`autonomous' use of inference. Nevertheless, he later accepts the Svätantrika's claim that 
the Midhyamika also should employ inference with the thesis, an inferential reason and 
an example although these inference, inferential reason and example are not established 
for the M idhyamika. This seems to be the point up to which he can make a concession, 
and as far as the argument in the Prasannapada is concerned, a compromise is made 
between the Sv itantrika and the Präsaiigika. Candrakirti gives an example of such inference 
that has a subject which is only recognised by the opponent in the Prasannapadd: 
[3-23] 
For one who maintains that they arise from themselves, things other than 
Spirit (purusa) - only after this [restriction, should the rest of syllogism 
follow] - do not arise from themselves. 
Because they themselves already exist. 
Like Spirit (purusa). 61 
"`' Pramüruuamuccaya, v. 4: 6ab (Derge ed. no. 4203 cc 8b7, Peking cd. no 5700 cc 9a3-4). Pointed 
out by MacDonald [2000] p. 174. 
6OPrasannapada (La Vallee I'oussin [1903-131p. 19,1-3): 
kim kiiranam I yasmdd yo hi yarn artharn pratijänite Lena svaniscayavad anyesäm niscayotpddan- 
ecchayä yayopapattyä asäv artho 'dhigatali saivopapattih parasmäy upadestavyä I tasmäd esa 
tsvan nyäyah yat parenaiva sväbhyupagatapratijnätärthasädhanam up5deyam 
61 Prasannapadä (La Vallee Poussin [1903-13] p. 22,3-4): 
purusavyatiriktiih padärthäh svata utpattivadinah I tata eva na svata utpadyante I svätmanä 
vidyamänatviit purusavat I 
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This is a good contrast to a similar inference given by Bhaviveka in the 
Prajiiapradipa: 
[3-24] 
Ultimately (don dam par, parainürthatas), internal sense fields (skyemched, 
äyatana) do not arise from themselves. 
Because they exist. 
Like the Universal Soul (caitanya). 62 
Even though Candrakirti succeeds in exhibiting syllogistic inference, there is a 
condition in the proposition "for one who maintains that they arise from themselves. " 
Since this condition shows that the proposition given here is not his own proposition, 
even though Candrakirti employs a syllogism it does not necessarily deviate from the 
Mdhyamikas's principle of no proposition. This kind of inference is employed in order 
to refute an opponent but not to eliminate conceptual construct by the Mzdhyamika 
himself. It can be regarded as an activity on the conventional level because Candrakirti 
accepts valid means of knowledge (prarnama), such as direct perception (pratyaksa) and 
inference (anumnna) only conventionally. 64 
On the other hand, Bh5viveka, too, imposes a condition `ultimately' (paramdrthatas) 
in his syllogistic inference. Here a question arises. What is the use of inference for 
Bh, viveka if the ultimate truth is not accessible to any conceptual activity including 
inference, and if establishment of a proposition consists of conceptual constructs? To 
62 Prajnapradipa (Walleser [1914] p. 11,1-2. Cf. Derge ed. 3853 tsha 49a2-3, Peking ed. 5253 tsha 
58b1-2): 
don darn par nang gi skye mched rnams bdag las skye ba med par nges te/ yod pa'i phyir dper 
na sties pa yod pa nyid bzhin no// 
Cf. Prasannapadü (La Vallee Poussin [ 1903-13] p. 25,9-p. 26,1): 
na paramärthata ädhyätmikäny dyatanäni svata utpannäni I vidyamdnatvät I caitanyavad iti I 
63 In order to prove a proposition through syllogistic inference, it is considered in Buddhist logic 
systematised by Dignäga and others that the proposition must be accepted by both proponents in a 
debate. See Yotsuya [1999] (pp. 73-74). Therefore, Candralirti's syllogistic inference does not 
satisfy the condition for valid inference in a strict sense. 
64 Prasannapada (La Vallee Poussin [1903-13] p. 73,9-p. 75,13) 
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answer this question, it is necessary to clarify the relation between the ultimate truth and 
inference for Bhzviveka. First, let us examine Bhäviveka's interpretation of the ultimate 
(paramnartha). In the Prajndpradipa on verse 24: 8 of the Mi lamadhyamakakdrikd, 65 he 
interprets the ultimate truth as follows: 
[3-251 
With regard to paraindrtha, it is paraindrtha because it is the object 
(artha) and is also ultimate (paraina) (karmadharaya compound). Or, it 
is paramartha because it is the object (artha) of the ultimate (parama) 
cognition which is non-conceptual (tatpurusa compound). It is the reality 
(de kho na, *tattva) whose definition is "being not dependent on others" 
(aparapratyayam, Mülamadhyamakakirika 18: 9)66 and so on. Due to being 
the truth (satya) which is nothing but paramürtha, it is the ultimate truth 
(paramdrthasatya), since it stays in that way for all times in all aspects. 
A non-conceptual cognition whose object is that [ultimate] is also 
parainartha due to its way of not having objects, because it takes paramartha 
[as the object]. The explanation of non-arising and so forth, which accords 
with elimination of that [object], and the wisdom arisien from hearing, 
thinking and meditation are also parainartha, because they are unmistaken 
due to being the means of understanding paramärtha (bahuvrihi 
compound). 7 
`' Mülamadhyamakakdril n, v. 24: 8 (La Vallee Poussin [ 1903-13] p. 492,4-5): 
dve satye samupasritya buddhänäm dharmadesanä I 
lokasamvrtisatyam ca satyam ca paramärthatah 11 24: 8 II 
66 [3-8] (p. 128) 
67 Prajn'dpradºpa (Derge ed. No. 3853 tsha 228a3-6, Peking ed. No. 5253 tsha 286a7-b3): 
don dam par ni de don kyang yin la/ dam pa yang yin pas don dam pa'am/ mam par mi rtog 
pa'i ye shes dam pa'i don yin pas/ don dam pa ste/ de kho na gzhan las shes pa ma yin pa la 
sogs pa'i mtshan nyid do// don dam pa nyid bdcn pa yin pas/ don darn pa'i bden pa std/ dc dus 
thams cad dang rnam pa [hams cad du de bzhin du gnas pa'i phyir rol/ mam par mi rtog pa'i ye 
shes de'i yul can yang yul mcd pa'i tshul gyis don dann pa ste/ de la don dam pa yod pa'i phyir 
ro// de 'gog pa dang rjes su mthun(') pa skye be med pa la sogs pa bstan pa dang/ thos pa dang 
bsams(2) pa dang/ bsgoms(3) pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyang don dam pa(') ste/ don darn pa 
rtogs pa'i thabs kyi phyir phyin ci ma log pa'i phyir ro// 
(1) D: mtüun, P: 'thun. (2) D: bsams, P: bsam. (3) D: bsgonzs, P: bsgom. (4) D: pa, P: par. 
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According to these passages, Bhiviveka interprets the compound paramd-rtha in 
different ways: as karmadhdraya, tatpurusa and bahuvrihi compounds. Of these, in the 
first interpretation, he takes paramärtha as the ultimate object. The second, as a tatpurusa 
compound, means the object of the ultimate cognition without conceptual construct 
(nirvikalpajnäna). Thus the first two interpretations are the ultimate object and the object 
of the ultimate cognition, which are explained as the reality defined in verse 18: 9 of 
Midmnadhyamakakürika. Therefore they are considered non-conceptual and cannot be 
expressed with words. He, then, explains paramartha as a bahuvrihi compound in three 
ways: (1) non-conceptual cognition whose object is that paramdrtha, (2) explanation of 
non-arising and so forth and (3) wisdom produced from hearing, thinking and meditation. 
Of these only the first one is considered non-conceptual. Not only the ultimate object but 
also the cognition of it is called paramartha. The second is regarded as the teaching of 
the Madhyamaka as Näg irjuna postulates in the very first verse of the 
Mülamadhyamakakdrikä, which is quoted earlier in this chapter. 68 According to 
Avalokitavrata, this conceptual paramartha interpreted as a bahuvrehi compound is called 
concordant ultimate truth (brdar brags pa'i don dam pa'i bden pa, 
*sdriketikaparamärthasatya). 69 This interpretation as a bahuvrihi compound may require 
some more explanation. In the TarkajvdlC4 Bhäviveka explains the meaning of paramdrtha, 
as follows: 
[3-26] 
As for [the term] parain rtha, because artha is what is to be known, 
artha means what is to be examined and to be grasped. Parama is the 
term denoting `absolute'. The compound paramartha is: 
(1) The ultimate object because it is the object (artha) and is 
ultimate (paraina). (kannadhäraya compound) Alternatively, (2) 
68 [3-10] (p. 130). 
69 Prajn"apradipatika (Derge cd. 3859 za 236h7, Peking ed. 5259 za 282b8). I use this term to 
denote interpretation of paramartha as a bahuvrihi compound that is not non-conceptual. 
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the object (artha) of the ultimate (parama). It is the object of the 
ultimate because it is the object of the ultimate cognition which is 
non-conceptual. (tatpurusa compound) Alternatively, (3) what is 
conformable to paraindrtha. It is conformable to paramartha 
because the wisdom which accords with understanding of 
paramürtha takes paramartha. (bahuvrihi compound) `Ultimately' 
(paramarthatas) is ultimately also at the level of that very ultimate 
[as a bahuvrihi compound]. 7° 
In this way Bhäviveka first explains the meaning of artha and parama. Then he 
interprets the compound paramartha in a similar way to the interpretations in the 
Prajndpradipa. These first two are explained as the ultimate object and the object of the 
ultimate cognition. These two are non-conceptual and are a designation of emptiness. 
However, the third interpretation does not indicate it, but `that which is conformable to 
paramdrtha' or `that which takes paramärtha'. This explanation is slightly different 
from that in the Prajnapradipa. There, non-conceptual cognition that takes paramartha 
as its object is also called paramartha. Here, however, the wisdom which is concordant 
with the understanding of parmnortha that takes paramärtha is called paramdrtha. The 
former is non-conceptual and the latter conceptual even though their expression is similar. 
Therefore, in the Tarkajvalä, the interpretation of paramürtha as cognition without 
conceptual construct (nirvikalpajnüna) is missing. 
The restriction `ultimately' in Bhäviveka's proposition7' is used in the sense of 
70 Tarkajvaiä (lida [1980] p. 82,33-p. 83,8. Cf. Derge ed. No. 3856 dza 59a7-b2, Peking ed. No. 
5256 dza 63a1-4): 
don dam pa zhes bya ba la don zhes bya ba ni shcs par bya ba yin pa'i phyir/ don de brtag par 
bya ba dang go bar bya ba'i tha tshig go/ dam pa zhes bya ba ni mchog ccs bya ba'i tshig gi 
sgra yin te/ don dam pa zlies bsdu ba ni/ 
de don yang yin la dam pa yang yin pas don dam pa'o// yang na dam pa'i don 
de mam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes darn pa'i don yin pas dam pa'i don to/ yang na 
don darn pa dang mthun pa ste don dam pa rtog pa dang rjes so mthun pa'i shes 
rab la don darn pa dc yod pas don dam pa dang mthun pa'o// don darn par na 
zhes bya ba ni don dam pa de nyid du'am ) don dam par ro// 
(1) D: 'ang, Ed, P: 'am 
71 Sec Bhäviveka's syllogistic inference, [3-24] (p. 141). 
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paramdrtha conformable to paramärtha, i. e. the concordant ultimate. According to the 
Prajil pradipa, the teaching of non-arising is considered to be this concordant ultimate. 
The teaching of non-arising is nothing but verse 1: 1 of the Mi lamadhyamakakdrikü, 
which Bhäviveka considers inference (aniandna) and refutation (dilsana). n Because the 
concordant ultimate is not non-conceptual but designated `ultimate' in the sense of being 
`conformable to the ultimate', inference concerning the ultimate can operate at this level. 
In this way, Bhuiviveka classifies the teaching of non-arising into the concordant 
ultimate, which is not the ultimate truth in a strict sense. As we have seen, Bhäviveka 
expresses that Nagärjuna's work consists of inference and refutation in the beginning of 
his commentary on the Mialainadhyamakakdrikd, and insists that N g5rjuna's teaching, 
non-arising, should be established through syllogistic inference. This explains the difference 
of attitudes towards inference between the Svatantrika and the Prisangika. The Svätantrika 
postulates the concordant ultimate in which the teaching of non-arising is included so 
that inference with regard to the ultimate can become valid. Thus the Svätantrika considers 
that establishment of non-arising through syllogistic inference which is also regarded as 
ultimate conforms to the ultimate truth where there is no conceptual activity. Therefore, 
this concordant ultimate is understood as an important characteristic of the two truths 
theory maintained by the Svätantrika. 
Candrakirti, on the other hand, interprets paramärtha only as the ultimate object 
(karmadharaya compound) as is seen in the Prasannapadü: 
[3-27] 
That which is an object (artha) and is ultimate (parama) is paramartha. 73 
Although it is not interpretation of the word paramärtha, in the Madhyamaki vatdra, 
he interprets the ultimate reality as `the object of correct perception' in a similar way to 
n [3-91 (p. 129) and [3-10] (p. 130). 
73 Prasannapadä (La Va11& Poussin [1903-13] p. 494,1): 
paramas cäsäv arthas ccti param5filiali I 
See Nasu 119991 p. 102, note 6. 
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the tatpurusa interpretation of paramdrtha: 
[3-28] 
All entities bear a twofold nature whose being is perceived by correct and 
wrong perception [respectively]. It is said that the object of correct 
perception is real (tattva) and that of wrong perception is the conventional 
truth. (v. 6: 23)74 
Thus Candrakirti accepts the interpretation of paramärtha as the ultimate object, 
i. e. as a kannadhdraya compound and he may also take it as the object of ultimate 
cognition, i. e. as a tatpurusa compound. He, however, does not adopt the interpretation 
as a bahuvrihi compound. It is probably worth noting that he, as Bh iviveka does, 
distinguishes different levels of paramartha in the Madhyamakuvatnrabhasya on verse 
6: 28: 
[3-29] 
Of these [conventional truth and mere convention], what is paramartha 
for ordinary people is just the mere convention (kun rdzob tsars, 
*samvrtiindira) for nobles whose objects are associated with appearance. 
However, what is emptiness of intrinsic nature of that [mere convention] 
is paramürtha for nobles. 
Paramartha for Buddhas is just intrinsic nature. Because it does not 
falsify, it is ultimate truth (don dann pa'i bden pa, *parainärthasatya) but 
it must be known individually by them. 
Because the conventional truth falsifies, it is not the ultimate truth. 75 
74 Madhyamakavatara, v. 6: 23 (as cited in the I3od1zicarya atärapanjikä, La Vallee Poussin [ 1901-14] 
p. 361,4-7): 
samyagmrsädarsanalabdhabhävam rüpadvayam bibhrati sarvabhäväh I 
samyagdrsäm yo visayali sa tattvam mrsädrsäm samvrtisatyam uktam 11 6: 23 II 
See Nasu [1999] p. 102, note 6. 
75 Madhyamakdtiatürabiuasya (La Vallcc 1'oussin [1907-12] p. 108,13-20): 
de la so so'i stye bo rnams kyi don dam pa gang yin pa de nyid 'phags pa snang ba dang bcas 
pa'i spyod yul can maws kyi kun rdzob tsam yin la/ de'i rang bzhin stong pa nyid gang yin pa 
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In this passage, Candrakirti first distinguishes mere convention (sanrvrti, näIra) 
and the conventional truth (samvritisatya). What is real for ordinary people is paramürtha 
for them but the mere convention for üryas. Here parainartha is used in the sense of an 
ultimate object (as a kannadhüraya compound). Emptiness of intrinsic nature of 
conventional existence is parmnürtha for dryas. This seems to be an explanation of the 
conventional truth. Again parmnartha is used in the sense of an ultimate object. Parain rtha 
for Buddhas is just intrinsic nature. While üryas perceive the emptiness of intrinsic 
nature of conventional existence, Buddhas perceive just intrinsic nature, i. e. emptiness. 
Here parainartha for Buddhas is meant to be non-conceptual and non-discriminative. 
Therefore it must be just emptiness, not emptiness of something that is discriminative. 
Although Candrakirti distinguishes three different levels of parainürtha, their difference 
are not related to use of inference, and parainartha is not interpreted as a bahuvrihi 
compound. 
Now the difference of understanding of paramartha between Bhäviveka and 
Candrakirti is very clear. Bhiviveka postulates, as an interpretation of paraindrtha as a 
bahuvrihi compound, the concordant ultimate which is the teaching of non-arising and 
others. Even though it is not parainartha in a strict sense, he regards it as paramartha 
because it is conformable to paramartha. By postulating this concordant ultimate, 
Bhiviveka provides inference with the locus where it can operate for the ultimate truth. 
On the other hand, Candrakirti does not interpret paramärtha as a bahuvrihi compound. 
Although paramartha for üryas seems to correspond to the concordant ultimate postulated 
by Bhäviveka, Candrakirti considers that it is the conventional truth because it falsifies! ' 
Thus Bhäviveka and Candrakirti disagree over the use of inference, and this disagreement 
is reflected in their understanding of paramdrtha. 
de ni de mams kyi don dam pa'o// 
sangs rgyas mams kyi don dam pa ni rang bzhin nyid yin thing/ dc yang bslu ba med pa 
nyid kyis don dam pa'i bden pa yin la/ de ni de reams kyi so sor rang gis rig par bya ha yin 
no// kfm rdzob kyi bden pa ni bslu bar byed pa nyid kyi phyir don dam pa'i bdcn pa ma yin 
no// 
76 Compare this to Jnnnagarbha's understanding of inference. Ile, there, explains that inference does 
not belie. See [3-31] (p. 150). 
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3.3 Later Svätantrikas' Use of Inference and the Two Truths 
The characteristic of the Svntantrika is found in Bhzviveka's interpretation of 
paramärtha as the concordant ultimate. In this section, we examine if this is accepted by 
the later Svatantrikas. In addition to this, it is worth noting the influence of Dharmakirti, 
who systematised Buddhist logic, on the Svdtantrikas. Although Dharmakirti's influence 
is not found in Bhäviveka's thought because he is later than Bhäviveka, it is so significant 
as to affect the later Svätantrikas. According to Matsumoto, the later Mädhyamikas can 
be defined as those who interpret Dharmakirti's logic and epistemology in line with the 
Madhyamaka view. " Matsumoto maintains that there was a controversy regarding the 
position of Dharmakirti between those who regarded him as a Yogäcära and those who 
considered that he was a Mädhyamika. The origin of disagreement in interpreting 
Dharmakirti lies in the verses 3: 3-4 of the Pramdnavdrttika: 
[3-30] 
What is capable of causal efficiency (arthakriyd) is here called ultimately 
real (paranOrthasai) and the other is conventionally real (sarnvrtisat). 
They have the characteristics of particular and universal. (3: 3) 
If one objects that everything is incapable, [I answer that] capability of 
seeds and so forth to sprouts and so forth is experienced. If one says that 
it is maintained at the conventional level, [I answer] it must be so. (3: 4)78 
In these verses, thus, there is a contradiction. In the former verse, causal efficiency 
is said to be ultimately real. On the other hand, capability of seeds to produce sprouts is 
said to be conventional in the latter. In other words, Dharmakirti says that while what has 
77'1'his is first suggested by Matsumoto [1980c] (pp. 101-102). 
79 Pranianavarttika, vv. 3: 3-4 (S 1k-ityäyana [1938] p. 54,9-10 and 12-13): 
arthakriyäsamartham yat tad atra paramärthasat I 
anyat samvrtisatproktam to svasämänyalaksane 11 3: 3 II 
asaktam sarvad iti ced b-ijidcr ankurädisu 1 
drstä sal tih matä2) si cet samvrtyästu yathM tatl 11 3: 4 II 
(1) Ed: sarvvam. (2) Ed: drstä [sakti]r mmatü. 
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causal efficiency is ultimate, causality is observed conventionally. According to 
Matsumoto, 79 the Yogzcaras are those who interpret Dharmakirti's thought in conformity 
with the third verse, and the Mädhyamikas are those who take the fourth verse as his real 
intention. It seems that the Svätantrika-Mdhyamikas such as Jnznagarbha, Szntaraksita, 
Kamalasila, Haribhadra and Jitzri interpret Dharmakirti's view in line with the latter 
way. Therefore although they adopt the idea of arthakriya in the verse 3: 3 of the 
Pramanavdrttika, they do not regard it as ultimate but as conventional so that it should 
distinguish the true and the false convention. Concerning the ultimate truth, these 
Sv itantrika-Mädhyamikas agree in classifying the teaching of non-arising into paramürtha, 
as Bhäviveka does. As a result they postulate two different levels of the ultimate. 
3.3.1 Jnänagarbha 
Jnznagarbha (ca. 8th C) is often classified by Tibetan doxographers as a Svltantrika 8° 
As we examined, Bhiviveka sets the concordant ultimate where inference operates. In 
the case of Jnänagarbha, inclusion of inference in paramürtha appears in his 
Satyadvayavibhaizga and his auto-commentary Vrtli. In these works, he explicitly states 
that reasoning (nyäya) is ultimate: 
[3-311 
Truth regarding the ultimate is the ultimate truth, and the meaning is that 
this is the truth which is accordant with reasoning (nyJya). 81 Why is this? 
79 Matsumoto [1980c] p. 101. 
90 See Mimaki [1982a] p. 27-38. 
8' Eckel [1987] (p. 110, note 7) points out that v 17 of the Satyadvayavibhariga is quoted in the 
AbhisamaAIagzkdrdlokd of Ilaribhadra, from which we know the original Sanskrit of rigs pa. 
Satyadvayavibhariga, v. 17 (Eckel [1987] p. 173,6-11): 
1. 'un rdzob de bzhin nyid gang yin// de nyid dam pa'i don gyis bzhad// 
tha dad min phir rigs de yang// ji liar snang ba bzhin du gnas// 17 // 
Abhisamayeilamkürälokd (Wogihara [1932] p. 407,25-26): 
samvztcs tathatä yaiva paramärthasya si math 
abhedät so 'pi hi nydyo yathddarsnam 5sthitah 11 
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Reasoning that does not falsify is ultimate (v. 4ab)82 
Ascertainment of objects by means of reasoning does not falsify. Therefore 
cognition produced by a three-fold inferential mark is also paramartha, 
because it is ultimate (parama) and is also a means (artha). The object 
determined by it is also paramürtha, it is treated just as *pratyaksa and 
83 so on [, which can mean an object of direct perception (pratyaksa)]. 
[3-32] 
Because the negation of arising and so forth is conformable to 
reality (yang dag pa, *tattva), it is held to be [the ultimate]. It is 
clear that there is no negation in reality (yang dag tu, *tattvatas) 
because there is no object of negation. (v. 9)g' 
Jnznagarbha's explanation is somewhat different from Bhäviveka's and difficult 
to understand. He explains that cognition produced from inference is paraniärtha. 
Jnfnagarbha puts more emphasis on inference than Bhäviveka because he explains the 
ultimate truth on the basis of reasoning, i. e. inference that does not falsify, " by describing 
the ultimate truth as `accordant with reasoning'. It is also shown that not only is cognition 
produced from inference but also its object is considered to be ultimate. 
82 Cf. Abhisamayälamkäralokd (Wogihara [1932] p. 636,14-15): 
avisamvädako nyäyah paramärtha iti 
Also see [3-511 (p. 166) in 3.3.5. 
83Satyadvayavibhangavrtti (Eckel [1987] p. 156,15-24): 
don dam par bden pa ni don dam pa'i bden pa std de ni rigs pa'i rjes su 'gro ba can gyi bden 
pa nyid ces bya ba'i tha tshig go// gang gi phyir/ 
slu ba med pa(') rigs pa ni// don dam yin te/ (4ab) 
rigs pa'i stobs kyis don la nges pa ni slu bar mi 'gyur te/ de'i phyir tshul gsum pa'i rtags kyis 
bskyed pa'i rtogs pa gang yin pa de ni dam pa yang yin la/ don yang yin pas don dam pa'o// 
des gtan la phab pa'i don kyang don dam pa ste/ mngon sum la cogs pa bzhin du brjod do// 
(1) Ed: pas, Em: pa. See the previous note. 
84 Satyadvayavibhanga, v. 9 (Eckel [1987] p. 161,3-12): 
skye la sogs pa bkag pa yang// yang dag pa dang mthun phyir 'dod// 
dgag bya yod pa ma yin pas// yang dag tu na bkag med gsal// 
$5 Remember that Candrakirti also considers that the ultimate truth does not falsify. See 3.2. 
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He does not mention which ultimate reasoning is. According to the sub-commentary, 
however, verse 4 is an explanation of the ultimate conformable to the ultimate (don dam 
pa dang inthun pa'i don dam pa, paramürtheinukitlaparantärtha). 86 It is perplexing that 
Jn-nagarbha does not take artha in the sense of an object as Bh3viveka does. He seems 
to interpret it as a karmadharaya compound in the sense of the ultimate (parama) means 
(artha) g' Bhäviveka, on the other hand, takes paramärtha primarily as a karmadharaya 
compound in the sense of `ultimate object', and cognition is secondary as a bahuvrihi 
compound in the sense of `that which takes the ultimate object'. For Jnänagarbha, however, 
the object of paramdrtha is parainärtha in the secondary sense in the way not only direct 
perception (pratyaksa) but an object of direct perception is also called pratyaksa. This 
interpretation of paraniartha is peculiar in that Jiiänagarbha does not understand the 
concordant ultimate as a bahuvrihi compound. In verse 9, on the other hand, lie explains 
the negation of arising is the concordant ultimate which is conformable to reality. 88 This 
corresponds to the explanation of the concordant ultimate given by Bhzviveka in the 
7arkajvül« and the Prajnüpradipa. It is, therefore, certain that Jnanagarbha postulates 
the concordant ultimate that is non-arising and so forth even though his interpretation of 
paramartha in the commentary on verse 4ab is somewhat different from that of Bhlviveka. 
On the other hand, he defines the conventional truth as follows: 
[3-33] 
Only what is `consistent with seeing' (ji liar snang, yathddarsana)89 
is the conventional and the other is opposite, [i. e. the ultimate 
truth]. (v. 3cdro 
'6 Satyadvayavibhangapanjika (Derge ed. No. 3883 sa 18b3-4, Peking ed. No. 5283 sa 6a4-5). See 
Eckel [1987] p. 112, note 9. 
87 Here, artha is not used in the sense of an `object' as is known from the similar example of direct 
perception. I therefore interpret it as a means, although I am not entirely sure. See Apte [1957] (p. 
224). Eckel [1987] (p. 115 note 14) also discusses this interpretation of Jntnagarbha. 
It should be noted that it is pointed out by Matsumoto [1997] (p. 346) that reality (tattva) is often 
used to denote the non-conceptual ultimate rather than paranilirt/ra. 
89 Regarding yathadarIana, sec footnote 81 on p. 150 as well as Eckel [1987] (p. 110, note 7). 
9OSaty, ulvayavibhanga, v. 3 cd (Eckel [1987] p. 156,4-5): 
ji Itar snang ba 'di kho na// kun rdzob gzlhan ni cig shos yin// 3cd // 
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Moreover, Jnänagarbha explains that the convention is twofold in verse 12 of the 
Satyadvayavibhariga 
[3-341 
It is also taught that the convention is twofold: 
Although [they are] similar in appearance, according to their 
capability and incapability of causal efficiency, the distinction of 
the convention as true and untrue is made. (v. 12) 
Although cognitions are similar in appearance, i. e. a manifest image, 
having been ascertained by whether or not it falsifies regarding causal 
efficiency (arthakriya) corresponding to seeing, water and others and a 
mirage and others are [respectively] understood by the world as true and 
untrue. 91 
Jnänagarbha first defines the convention (sainvrti) as `consistent with seeing' in 
verse 3cd. This is further distinguished into the true and the untrue depending on their 
capability of causal efficiency (arthakriyä). Water and a mirage are similar in appearance 
but the former has causal efficiency (arthakriyd) to relieve thirst, for example, and the 
latter does not. He thus adopts causal efficiency (arthakriyd) as the criteria which 
distinguishes conventional phenomena into true and untrue. This should be compared 
with verse 3: 3 of Dharmakirti's Prainanavärttika, which explains that what has causal 
efficiency (arthakriyd) is ultimately real (paramürthasat) and what does not is 
91 Satyculvayavibhafiga, v. 12 and its Vrtti (Eckel [1987] p. 163,2U-29): 
yang kun rdzob ni mam pa gnyis su bstan te/ 
snang du 'dra yang don bycd dag// nus pa'i phyir dang mi nus phyir// 
yang dag yang dag ma yin pas// kein rdzob kyi ni dbye ba byas// 12 // 
zhcs bya ba'o// sties pa gsal ba'i mam pa snang ba can du 'dra yang/ ji liar snang ba bzhin du 
don bycd pa la slu ba dang mi slu ba yin par ngcs par byas nas chu la cogs pa dang smig rgyu 
la sogs pa dag 'jig rten gyis yang dag pa dang yang dag pa ma yin par rtogs so// 
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conventionally real (sanrvrtisat). 92 As we have seen, Dharmakirti, on the one hand, 
explains in verse 3: 3 of the Pramünavarttika that causal relation is ultimate but, on the 
other hand, accepts that it is conventional in verse 3: 4. Here Jnznagarbha re-interprets 
verse 3: 3 so that it conforms to verse 3: 4, which is acceptable for the Mädhyamika. 93 
Then he states, in verse 14 of the Satyadvayavibhariga, that four alternative ways of 
arising are impossible ultimately to show that causal relationship is conventional but not 
ultimate: 
[3-35] 
There cannot be any causal relationship [ultimately], as below: 
Many [entities] do not produce one entity. Many [entities] do not 
produce many [entities]. One [entity] does not produce many 
entities. One [entity] does not produce one [entity], either. (v. 
14)9' 
Thus Jnänagarbha considers that reasoning, i. e. cognition produced by a three-fold 
inferential mark, is the concordant ultimate and that causal relationship is conventional. 
This is a reflection of Jnznagarbha's adaptation of Dharmakirti's logic and, at the same 
time, of his Madhyamaka interpretation of Dharmakirti's epistemology and ontology. 
3.3.2 Bodhisattvacaryävatäravyäkhydnapafijikä 
As Saito's study95 shows, the anonymous author of the Bodhisativa- 
92 Sec Eckel [1987] (pp. 51-58). 
93 here, I follow Matsumoto who defines the later Mädhyamikas as those who interpret verse 3: 3 of 
the Pramünavarttika in the way it conforms to verse 3: 4. Matsumoto [1980c] (p. 104), quoting the 
same verse, discusses that it is likely that this verse is the objection to Devendrabuddhi, who 
understand verse 3: 3 of the Pramdnavarttika literally. 
91Satyadvayavibhanga, v. 14 and its Vrtti (Eckel [1987] p. 165,15-19): 
rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po yang rig pa ma yin tc 'di star I 
du mas dngos po gcig mi bycd // du mas du ma byed ma yin // 
gcig gis du ma'i dngos mi byed // gcig gis geig byed pa yang min// 14 // 
95 Saito [20001 (p. 99, note 9). 
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carjydvatiiravydkhydnapanjiki7 follows the view of Jnänagarbha in terms of his 
understanding of the two truths. First, when he comments on the second half of verse 8: 2 
of the 9-chapter version of the Bodhisattvacaryavatära of Aksayamati, which introduces 
the two truths, he explains the ultimate truth as follows: 
[3-36] 
The ultimate is not accessible for apprehension (blo). Apprehension 
and words are conventional. (v. 8: 2cdr' 
[3-37] 
Then [if one asks] how this ultimate is not accessible for apprehension, [I 
answer] the ultimate is consistent with reasoning, and no entity remains 
established if it is examined with reasoning 9' 
[3-381 
Also because it is said in the Satyadvaya[vibhangabhqsya]: 
"Because [it is] reality (*iauva), it is neither empty, [nor non- 
empty]... "" 
and so on, if it is examined with reasoning, apprehension and words [can] 
never have referent because [an entity] is never established. 99 
96 Bodhisatt acarydvatära, 9-chapter version, 8: 2cd (Saito [2000] p. 49,9-10): 
don dam blo'i spyod yul myin// blo dang sgra ni k-un rdzob yin// 8: 2 cd// 
nl Bodhisattvacar)idvatüravydkhyanapanjika (Saito [1993] p. 58,22-24): 
'on to don dam pa de ji Itar blo'i spyod yul ma yin snyam pa la/ don dam pa ni rigs pa ji Ita ba 
bzhin du yin la/ rigs pas dpyad na dngos po gang yang ma grub std/... 
Between this passage and the next, i. e. the quotation from the Satyadvayavibluuigab/iasya of 
Jnänagarbha, there are quotations from the Larikavatdrasütra and from Niigärjuna, which I omit 
here. 
99 '111is quotation is from theantarasloka on verse 1la of the Satyadvayavibharigavrtti (Eckel [1987] 
p. 162,4. Cf. Saito [20001 p. 98, note 6): 
de nyid phyir na de stong min// mi stong ma yin yod med min// 
mi slye ma yin skye min zhes// de la sogs pa bcom Idan gsungs// 
99 Bodhisattacar)iýivatdravyäkhyfznapanji (Saito [1993] p. 59,8-12): 
bdcn pa gnyis las lyang! 
de nyid plhyir na de stong min// 
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[3-39] 
Alternatively, because the ultimate is simply the elimination of 
discriminative thought that is superimposed on [entities] dependent on 
other [entities], apprehension and words [can] never have referent at that 
[ultimate]. "' 
In this commentary, the anonymous commentator distinguishes two kinds of 
ultimate: the ultimate `consistent with reasoning' (rigs pa ji Ita ba bzhin du, *yathänyäya) 
and the ultimate that is simply elimination of discriminative thought. As Saito points 
out, 101 understanding of the ultimate as `consistent with reasoning' is quite similar to 
`accordant with reasoning' (rig pa'i rjes su 'gro ba can, *nyüyünr(sdrin) in the Satyadvaya- 
vibhatiga of Jnznagarbha. 1°2 His debt to Jii nagarbha is ascertained also from his quotation. 
This ultimate accordant with reasoning is considered as interpretation of the concordant 
ultimate in the Satyadvayavibharigabhüsya. The same is applied in this text since he 
gives an explanation of the non-conceptual ultimate afterwards, saying that the ultimate 
is simply the elimination of discriminative thought. Thus we find that the anonymous 
commentator interprets the ultimate in the Bodhisattvacaryävatära in line with the 
Svätantrika interpretation. This does not necessarily mean that Aksayamati (Säntideva? ), 
the author of the Bodhisauvacaryavatnra, is a Svätantrika. However, if we consider the 
fact that Tibetan doxographers almost unanimously classify Sintideva as a Pr isangika, 
this is quite an exceptional case. 
In addition to this, the anonymous commentator defines the conventional truth as 
`consistent with seeing', as follows: 
zhcs bya ba la cogs pa gsungs pas gang Itar yang ma grub pa'i phyir/ rigs pas dpyod na blo 
dang sgras ji ltar yang yul du byar mcd do// 
10°Bodhisathacaryütiatarav; ükhyünapanljika (Saito [1993] p. 59,13-16): 
yang na don dam pa zhes bya ba ni / gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid la/ sgro btags pa'i spros 
pa main par chad pa tsam du zad pas/ dc la ni blo dang sgras ji Itar yang yul du byar med de/ 
dgag pa tsam ni ci yang ma yin pa'i phyir ro// 
101 Saito [2000] (p. 99, note 9). In the Bodhisaltvacaryiivataravyakhyanapanjikä, the ultimate and 
conventional truths are defined respectively as `consistent with reasoning' and `consistent with 
seeing'. Saito points out that this interpretation basically follows Jnänagarblia's. 
102 See Eckel [1987] p. 156,15-16. 
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[3-40] 
It is [Aksayamati's] thought that [apprehension and words are conventional] 
because the convention is consistent with seeing (ji liar snang, 
yathadarsana). Because it should be understood accurately in other 
Madhyamaka treatises, further [discussion will] not be made here. 103 
As was previously mentioned in this thesis, 'oa not only does he define the 
conventional truth as `consistent with seeing', but also considers that it has the ability of 
causal efficiency (arthakriya). Thus, this anonymous commentator interprets the two 
truths in a similar way to JMnagarbha. According to the commentator, in addition, 
Aksayamati is an externalist Mädhyamika. In the BodhisativacatydvataravyCikhyiina- 
paiijika, therefore, Aksayamati, the author of the Bodhi sativacaryüvatära, is understood 
as a Svitantrika who maintains existence of self-awareness and of external objects 
conventionally. This view could properly called the Sauträntika-Sv3tantrika-Madhyamaka. 
It may suggest that the commentator himself also maintains this Svätantrika view close 
to Jnänagarbha. We can tentatively assume that JMnagarbha was considered an externalist 
Midhyamika, too, even though it is not impossible that the commentator did not consider 
that the views of Aksayamati and Jfl nagarbha agree on conventional existence. 
3.3.3 Säntaraksita 
In terms of the concordant ultimate and causal efficiency (arthakriyü), Szntaraksita 
also has a similar view to Jnänagarbha. Although Szntaraksita, in the Madhyamakalamkara, 
does not mention reasoning or inference when he explains the ultimate truth, he considers 
the teaching of non-arising as the concordant ultimate in almost the same way as verse 9 
of Jnanagarbha's SatyadvayavibhaAga: 'os 
1 D3 Bodhisattvacary i, atäravytikhnapaiijikü (Saito [1993] p. 60,5-8): 
kun rdzob ni ji Itar snang bzhin yin pa'i phyir ro snyam du bsam pa'o// zhib tu ni dbu ma'i 
bstan bcos gzhan dag las kyang shes par bya ba yin pa'i phyir/'dir rgya ma bskyed do// 
104 See [2-27] (pp. 93-95) in 2.9. 
105 [3-32] (p. 151) 
157 
Chapter 3 Svätantrika and Prdsangika 
[3-41] 
Therefore, there is no entity which is established in reality. Tathägatas, 
therefore, taught the non-arising of all phenomena. (v. 69) 
Because it is conformable to the ultimate ((lam pa'i don dang mthun pa, 
*paramarthünukilla), this [teaching of non-arising] should be called 
ultimate. In reality (yang dag tit, *tattvatas), the [ultimate] is free from all 
accumulation of discriminative thought (spros pa, *prapairca). (v. 70)'06 
Here it is clear that Szntaraksita mentions two different paramärtha: `that which 
is conformable to paramartha' (para, n rthanukida) which is the teaching of non-arising, 
and paramartha which is free from discriminative thought (prapanca). This is also in 
line with Bh iviveka's two different ways of. interpretation of parainärtha: parain rtha 
that is free from discriminative thought and paramnrtha that is conformable to parainärtha, 
in which teaching of non-arising is included. In the Madhymnakdlamkdra, verse 64, on 
the other hand, S5ntaraksita defines the true convention: 
[3-42] 
It is understood that that which is pleasing only as long as it is not 
examined, which is characterised by arising and cessation and which has 
the nature of capability of causal efficiency (arthakriyd) is [true] convention. 
(v. 64)107 
Thus Säntaraksita too sets the concordant ultimate and regards what has causal 
efficiency (arthakriyü) as conventional. This is also relevant to the interpretation of the 
106 Madhyaznakalamkara, vv. 69-70 (Ichigö [1985b] p. CXXVI, 9-16): 
de phyir yang dag nyid du na// dngos po gang yang gmb pa med// 
de phyir dc bzhin gshegs mains kyis// chos mains thams cad ma skyes gsungs// 69 
dam pa'i don dang mthun") pa'i phyir// 'di ni dam pa'i don zhcs bya// 
yang dag tu na spros pa yi// tshogs mains kun las de grol yin// 70 // 
(1) Ed: 'tlzun. 
107Madhyamakälamkara, v. 64 (IcbigO [1985b] p. CXXV, 13-16): 
ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' z hing// skye dang 'jig pa'i chos can pa// 
don byed pa dag nus reams kyi// rang bzhin kun rdzob pa yin rtogs// 64 // 
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Prmndnaviirttika, verse 3: 3-4, in the same way as the Satyadvayavibhanga, verse 12 of 
Jffnagarbha. This is understood from the following verses of the Madhyainakdlamküra: 
[3-43] 
That which is pleasing as long as it is not examined is also the arising of 
each subsequent similar result depending on each previous cause of its 
own. (v. 65) 
Therefore it is right also to say, "If there is no conventional cause, it is 
irrational. " If its material cause (nyer len pa, *upüdüna) is real, explain it. 
(v. 66)108 
These verses are considered to be Säntaraksita's interpretation of the 
Pramünavdrttika, verse 3: 3-4. '09 Here Säntaraksita insists that causality is conventional 
but denies the view that causality does not exist even conventionally as well as the view 
that it does exist ultimately. Therefore, it is concluded that Sintaraksita accepts the 
concordant ultimate, that is to say, non-arising, apart from non-conceptual ultimate, and 
understands that arthakriyä is the criterion to distinguish the true convention from the 
false convention but not the ultimate from the conventional. 
His debt to Dharmakirti is found in his reasoning on emptiness. In the 
Madhyamakdlamküra, Säntaraksita attempts to establish lack of intrinsic nature at the 
ultimate level, as follows: 
[3-44] 
The entities postulated by others and us lack intrinsic nature in reality 
because they lack one intrinsic nature and many, like a reflection. (v. 1)"0 
'°8 M, Madhyamakalamkära, vv. 65-66 (Ichigö [1985b] p. CXXV, 17-24): 
brtags pa ma byas nyams dga' ba'ang// bdag rgyu snga ma snga ma 1a// 
brtcn nas phyi ma phyi ma yi // 'bras bu dc 'dra 'byung ba yin// 65 // 
de phyir lam rdzob rgyu med na// rung min zhes pa'ang legs pa yin// 
gal to 'di yi nyer len pa// yang dag yin na de smros steig// 66 
109 [3-30] (p. 149) 
1°Madhyamaknlamlcüra, v. 1 (Ichigö [1985b] p. CXIII, 5-8): 
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Later in the same text, Santaraksita expounds this theory of `lack of one intrinsic 
nature and many' by examining existence that is proclaimed by others. Then he concludes 
in verse 61, as follows: 
[3-45] 
When a thing is examined, then it does not have one [intrinsic nature]. 
What does not have singleness does not have plurality. (v. 61 )"' 
In the commentary on this verse, he quotes two and three halves of verses from 
the third chapter of the Pramänavdrttika in order to reinforce his argument: 
[3-46] 
The nature with which entities are recognised does not exist in reality, 
because they do not have one nature or many. (v. 3: 360) 
If singleness is not possible in objects appearing in various ways, how is 
that one cognition that has appearance in various ways [possible]? (v. 
3: 208) 
The further things are examined, the more they are destroyed. (v. 3: 209cd) 
Therefore, because of lack of characteristics, lack of intrinsic nature is 
proclaimed. (v. 3: 215cd) 
That which the wise teach is obtained clearly. (v. 3: 209ab? )12 
bdag dang gzban snira'i dngos 'di dag// yang dag tu na gcig pa dang// 
du ma'i rang bzhin brat ba'i pbyir// rang bzhin med de gzugs bmyan bzliin// 
Quoted in the Bodhicaryüvatdrapaiijika (La Vallee Poussin [1901-14] p. 358,1-2): 
nihsvabhävä ami bhäväs tattvatah svaparoditäh II 
ckänekasvabhävcna viyogät pratibinibavat II 
Madhyamalalaml dra, v. 61 (Ic}igö [1985b] p. CXXV, 1-4): 
dngos po gang gang main dpyad pa// de dang de la geig nyid med// 
gang la geig nyid yod min pa// de la du ma nyid kyang med// 61 // 
112 Madhyamakilamkiiravrtti (Ichigo [1985b] p. 178,2-15): 
gang gis dngos mams nges brtags nas// yang dag tu na dngos dc med// 
'di liar de dag geig pu dang// du ma'i rang bzhin yod ma yin// (=1'ramýinaveir11ik(,, v. 3: 360) 
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Thus Sintaralsita quotes verses from the Pramämavärttika of Dharmakirti to show 
the validity of his reasoning. It is not entirely clear if he considers that Dharmakirti is 
indeed a M5dhyamika. Anyhow, Säntaraksita manipulates Dharmakirti's words so that 
they fit his view of the Madhyamaka. 
In Säntaraksita's works, we find the characteristic of the Svitantrika in his 
explanation of the ultimate truth and his debt to Dharmakirti in his definition of the 
conventional truth as well as in his reasoning of lack of intrinsic nature. He evidently 
distinguishes the two levels of ultimate truth, the non-conceptual ultimate truth and the 
concordant ultimate truth. On the other hand, his distinction between the true convention 
and the false convention is made according to the ability of causal efficiency that is 
utilised by Dharmakirti to distinguish the ultimately real and the conventionally real. His 
reasoning of lack of intrinsic nature has influence from Dharmakirti in terms of denial of 
one nature and many. 
3.3.4 Kamalas'I a 
Kamala§ila (ca. 740-797), a direct disciple of Säntaraksita, also interprets 
sna tshogs dngos po don manis la// gal to gcig nyid mi rigs na// 
de blo sna tshogs snang ba yang// ji Ita bur na geig pur 'gyur// (=P. V. v. 3: 208) 
ji Ita ji Itar don bsams pa// delta de Itar mam par 'brau/ (=P. V. v. 3: 209cd) 
de bas mtshan nyid stong pa'i phyir// rang bzhin med par rab bshad ces// (=P. V. v. 3: 215cd) 
mkhas pa reams kyis gang gsungs pa// de ni gsal bar 'ongs pa yin// (=P. V. v. 3: 209ab? ) 
Cf. Pranzänavürttiha(Säühityäyana [1938] p. 82,20-21, p. 70,12-15 and p. 71,4): 
bhäv i yena nirüpyante tadrüpam nästi tattvatali I 
yasmäd ekam anekam vii rüpam tesäm na vidyate 11 3: 360 II 
citrävabhäsesv arthesu yady ekatvam na yujyate I 
saiva tävat kadham buddhir ekä citrävabhäsini 11 3: 208 II 
idarn vastubaläyätam yad vadanti vipascitah II 
yathä yathärthäs cintyante visiryante(l) tathä tathä II 3: 209cd II 
ato lal: sanasiunyatviin nihsvabhäväh prakäsitäh II 3: 215cd II 
(1) Ed: artiua vidyante vivicyante. Cf Sänkrtyäyana [1938] p. 70 note 4. 
Ejima [1980a] (pp. 223-226) reports that Säntaraksita quotes the Pramänatiärttika, vv. 3: 360, 
209,21 Ocd and 216 (3: 360,208,209cd and 215 in his numbering) in the Madhyamakdlamkdravrtti 
and examines the relation between verses 1 and 61 of the Madhyamakdlamkära and verse 3: 360 
of the Pramnnavarttika. It is worth mentioning that Ejima points out that Kamalasila in the 
Madhyaniakälamkdrapanjika explains that these verses of Dharmakirti are stated when he explains 
the view of the Yogiici. ra and that they concern the imagined nature but not the perfected nature. 
Thus Kamala. ila considers that they do not directly relate to lack of intrinsic nature. 
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paramürtha as a bahuvrihi compound in the Bhavandkrama and the Madhyamaküloka: 
[3-47] 
And it is taught [in the DhannasamgFtisirtra] that non-arising is the truth 
because it is conformable to the ultimate truth (paramürthdnukiilaivat). 
However, ultimately there is neither arising nor non-arising. It (the ultimate 
truth) is beyond all common usage (v)yavahara). 13 
[3-48] 
Thus this non-arising also should be called the ultimate because it is 
conformable to the ultimate, but not in actualities (dngos sit, *vastutas). 
For, actually, the ultimate is beyond all discriminative thought (spros pa, 
*prapafca). "a 
Kamalasila thus understands that non-arising is the concordant ultimate both in 
the Bhavandkraina and the Madhyanaakdloka in the sense of paramürthänukfila, and 
distinguishes it from paramürtha in a strict sense, i. e. that free from discriminative 
thought (prapan"ca). Furthermore, lie gives a detailed account in the Madhyamakälamkara- 
panjika on verse 70 of the Madhyamakdlamkära, which is previously quoted: "' 
[3-49] 
Then one [rnight criticise]: 
If apprehension (blo) produced by a three-fold inferential mark 
is meant by the word `ultimate' (parain rtha), "6 then because it 
I" ßiiavannkrama ('I'ucci [1958] p. 199,7-9): 
ctac ca paramärthänukülatväd anutpädal} satyam ity uktam I paramärthatas tu notplido nilpy 
anutpädah I tasya sarvavyavahäratitatvät 
14Madhyamakuloka (berge ed. 3887 sa 149a5, Peking ed. 5287 sa 161b4-5): 
de liar na stye ba med pa 'di yang don dam pa dang mthun pa'i phyir don dam pa zhes bya'i 
dngos su ni ma yin te/ dngos su ni don dam pa spros pa thams cad las 'das pa'i phyir roll 
15[3-41] (p. 158) 
116 Ichigö [1985b] (p. 233) points out the similarity of the expression `cognition produced by a 
three-fold inferential mark' to that in the Satyadvay'avibharigavrtti, ad. v. 4ab (Eckel [1987] p. 
156), which is previously quoted in this thesis ([3-31] p. 150). 
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also is conventional, how [can it simultaneously] be ultimate? 
Also if entities' lack of intrinsic nature is established by means of 
that [apprehension], then by what should that [apprehension] be 
established? It is not possible to establish it from that [apprehension] 
itself because of contradiction of the activity on itself. Nor is it 
from other valid means of knowledge because of the undesired 
consequence of infinite regress. If [you say that lack of intrinsic 
nature] is established [for everything] except for that one 
apprehension, then selflessness of all objects is not established. 
The criticism that is mentioned above is rejected in this way: 
That [apprehension] can also be ultimate because it is conformable 
to the ultimate but a lack of intrinsic nature is also established by 
it alone. There is no contradiction of operation on itself because 
state of having no intrinsic nature is established for all phenomena 
universally. For apprehension is also included in this universal 
characteristics. 
For example, when there is a proof for destruction concerning 
all phenomena by reasons of their existence and so on, this does 
not leave out [the proof] itself. In this case also, thus, the objection 
is not appropriate because [apprehension] is similar to this 
[example]. "7 
"' Madhyaniakdlamkdrapanjik- i, ad. v. 70 (Ichigb [1985a] p. 233,11-p. 235,4): 
des na gang la la gal to tshul gsum pa'i rtags kyis bskyed pa'i blo don dam pa'i sgrar brjod na 
ni de'i tshe de yang kun rdzob kyi ngo bo yin pa'i phyir ji Itar na don dam pa nyid yin! gal to 
yang de'i dbang gis dngos po mams rang bzhin med pa nyid du roam par 'jog na de yang gang 
gis bzhag par bya/ de nyid kyis bzhag tu ni rigs pa ma yin te/ rang gis bdag nyid la byed pa 
'gal ba'i phyir ro// 
tshad ma gzhan gyis kyang ma yin te/ thug pa med par that bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro/ji ste 
blo de gcig pu ma gtogs par 'jog go zhe na/ 'o na ni yul thams cad bdag med par ma bsgrubs 
par 'gyur ro 
zhes rgol ba gang yin pa de yang 'di nyid kyis tan btab pa yin te/ de yang don dam pa 
dang mthun pa'i phyir don dam pa nyid yin la rang bzhin med pa yang dc nyid lyis roam par 
'jog go/ rang gis bdag nyid la byed pa 'gal ba yang mcd de/ spyi'i ngo bor chos thams cad rang 
bzhin med pa nyid du roam par 'jog pa'i phyir tat blo'i rang gi ngo bo yang spyi'i mtshan nyid 
der 'dus pa'i phyir ro// 
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Kamalasila, thus, explains that apprehension produced by a three-fold inferential 
mark is the concordant ultimate, and maintains that even though it lacks intrinsic nature, 
it is possible to establish lack of intrinsic nature in all phenomena. This explanation of 
the concordant ultimate is similar to Jnänagarbha's. Jnänagarbha explains that both 
cognition produced by a three-fold inferential mark and its object are called ultimate. As 
understood from the Bhavanäkrama and the Madhyamakdloka, Kamalasila considers 
that non-arising is the concordant ultimate because it is conformable to the ultimate 
(paramarthanukula), and distinguishes it from the ultimate free from discriminative 
thought (l)rapaiica). This explicitly shows the Svätantrika attitude towards inference. 
Here apprehension produced by a three-fold inferential mark as well as non-arising 
(anutpäda) or lack of intrinsic nature (nihsvabhäva), which is understood through that 
apprehension, is called ultimate because they are conformable to the ultimate. Thus 
Kamalafila's view on the ultimate truth is basically the same as that of Jn5nagarbha and 
Säntaraksita in terms of his distinguishing the non-conceptual ultimate and the concordant 
ultimate. 
Concerning the conventional truth, on the other hand, he analyses in the 
Madhyamakdloka the problem of arthakriyü caused by the inconsistency of verse 3: 3 
and 3: 4 of the Pramelnaviirttika as follows: 
[3-501 
Acäryas [such as Dharmakirti], concerning those who cannot enter the 
very profound ocean by Way of the ultimate, in order to wash off the dirt 
of wrong views such as permanence and annihilation, for the purpose of 
guiding an ignorant person, taught this definition of the ultimate, "that 
which has causal efficiency is ultimately real" (Prainanavärttika, v. 3: 3), 
according to what is widely known [in the world], in conformity with 
dper na therms cad la yod pa la sogs pa'i gtan tshigs maws kyis 'jig pa nyid shes par 'gyur 
ha na bdag nyid spangs nas ma yin pa ]tar 'dir yang de dang 'Ora bar klan kar mi rung ngo// 
Cf. Abhisamayrülamkdrä[oka (Wogiliara [1932] p. 636,14-26). See footnote 122 (p. 167) below. 
164 
Chapter 3 Sºätantrika and Prdsaiigika 
equipment of merit and wisdom. But it should be understood that it is not 
in order to teach correctly the ultimate that is the exclusive aim because 
that [causal efficiency] does not exist ultimately as it is explained previously. 
Therefore, it is said in the Pramanavarttika, "it must be so" (v. 3: 4). h15 
Here KamalasT1a clearly expresses his position that he does not take the statement 
"that which has causal efficiency is ultimately real" in the Prain0navürttika, verse 3: 3 
literally, but understands it in line with verse 3: 4. What is widely known in the world 
(lokaprasiddha) is the definition of the convention. Therefore what causal efficiency is 
real for ordinary people. He seems to consider that Dharmaldrti's view accords with the 
Madhyamaka view of the two truths because in verse 3: 3 of the Pramanavarltika, 
Dharmakirti's real intention is not expressed but he teaches it in order to eliminate wrong 
views and to guide an ignorant person. 
To sum up, with regard to the ultimate truth, Kamalasi1a distinguishes two types 
of paramartha. One is the non-conceptual ultimate and the other is the concordant 
ultimate. Therefore he is regarded as a Svätantrika. He attempts to reconcile verse 3: 3 of 
the Pramdnavdrttika to the Madhyamaka view, which does not accept causal efficiency 
ultimately. 
3.3.5 Haribhadra 
Previous studies19 show that the Abhisamaydlamk«ralokä of Haribhadra (ca. 800) 
18 MadhyamakWloka (Derge ed. No. 3887 sa 209a2-b7, Peking ed. No. 5287 sa 231a6-bl): 
slob dpon roams kyis ni gang dag don dam pa'i tshul gyis(l) rgya mtsho shin tu zab mo la 'jug 
par mi nus pa dc dag la rtag pa dang chad pa la sogs par lta ba dam pa ma yin pa'i dri ma bkru 
ba'i phyir byis pa'i skye bo gzud pa'i don du don dam pa'i mtshan nyid bsod nams dang ye 
shes kyi tshogs dang mthun pa ji itar grags pa don bya ba byed pa gang yin pa de ni 'dir don 
dam par yod pa'o zhes bya ba 'di bshad kyi/ geig tu nges pa'i don dam pa yang dag par shes 
par bya ba'i phyir ni ma yin no shes bya bar rtogs par bya ste/ de ni don dam par med pa'i phir 
ji Itar sugar bshad pa bzhin no// dc nyid kyis phyir roam 'grcl las /ji Ita ba de Ita yin du zad do 
shcs bshed do// 
(1) D: gyis, P: gyi. 
Relationship between this passage and the Pramnnavärttika, v. 3: 3-4 is pointed out by Matsumoto 
[1980c] (pp. 108-109), and is also discussed in Kaneko [1998] (pp. 25-26). 
19 Amano [1967], Moriyama [1989] and Kaneko [1998]. 
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contains many passages parallel to the works of Jnanagarbha, S, ntaraksita and Kamalasila, 
and therefore his view is placed in the same line as theirs. When he mentions the 
concordant ultimate and causal efficiency, his understanding seems to be indebted to 
these predecessors. Haribhadra's explanation of the concordant ultimate is almost identical 
with Kamalasila's which is quoted above: '20 
[3-511 
[Objection]: `Ultimately' (paraniarthatas) is a meaningless adverb. To 
explain, in [the statement] "reasoning which does not falsify is ultimate", 
the word ultimate (paramartha) designates apprehension (buddhi) 
produced from a three-fold inferential mark. 121 In this case, because 
this [apprehentsion] also is conventional, how [can it simultaneously] 
be ultimate? Also if entities' lack of intrinsic nature is established by 
means of such [apprehension], then how can [a lack of intrinsic nature] 
be established for that apprehension? It is not possible to establish it 
from that [apprehension] itself because of the contradiction of operation 
on itself. Nor is it from other valid means of cognition because of the 
undesired consequence of infinite regress. So [a lack of intrinsic nature] 
is established [for everything] except for that one apprehension. 
Therefore, the selflessness of all objects has not been proved. 
[Answer]: This is right. However, the apprehension in question can be 
ultimate because it is conformable to the ultimate which is free from 
all discriminative thought. And also a lack of intrinsic nature is 
[established] by it alone. There is no contradiction of operation on 
itself because the state of having no intrinsic nature is established for 
all phenomena universally. For, in this case, too, that apprehension is 
included in universal nature. For example, there being a proof for 
destruction concerning all phenomena by reasons of their existence 
120 [3-49] (pp. 162-163). 
121 See verse 4ab of Jnlnagarblia's Satyadvayavibhanga, [3-311 (p. 150) in 3.3.1. 
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and so on, this does not leave out [the proof] itself. Thus it should not 
be criticised122 
In this way, Haribhadra accepts apprehension produced from a three-fold inferential 
mark as the ultimate in the sense of that which is conformable to the ultimate that is free 
from discriminative thought (prapanca). We find parallel passages in Kamalasila's 
Madhyamakdlamkdrapanjikd. However, the phrase, "reasoning which does not falsify is 
ultimate", which is quoted from the Satyadvayavibhariga of Jnznagarbha is not found in 
the Madhyamakdlamkdrapanjikd. Here, `reasoning' is rephrased as apprehension produced 
from a three-fold inferential mark. Therefore what Haribhadra considers to be the 
concordant ultimate is not only the fact that all phenomena lack intrinsic nature, but also 
reasoning of it. This also corresponds to Bhäviveka's definition of the concordant ultimate, 
`explanation of non-arising and so on'. It should also be noted that these passages are 
related to the validity of the term `ultimately' (paranzürthatas). As we have seen, the 
term is also used in Bhzviveka's inference. In this way, we can see Haribhadra's debt, as 
a Svätantrika, to Bhäviveka, Jnänagarbha and Kamalasila. 
Concerning the convention, on the other hand, he distinguishes the true convention 
and the untrue convention 
[3-52] 
Then, having pointed out that what are capable and incapable of proper 
causal efficiency are the two conventional truths by distinction of true 
"Z Abhisamayrilagthärülokd (Wogihara [1932] p. 636,14-26): 
nanu paramärthata iti viscsanam anarthakam I tathä by avisamvädako nyäyah pammärtha iti 
paramärthasabdcna trirdpalingajanitä buddhirablridhiyate I tadel tasyd api samvrtirüpatvät katham 
paramärthatvam I yadi ca tadvasäd bhäväniim nihsvabhävatvam vyavasthäpyate tadä tasyas ca 
buddheh kuto vyavastlhilpan yam I na tata eva stliäpayitum yuktam sviitmani vrttivirodhäf1) I 
näpi pramänäntarato 'navasthsnaprasangät I atha täm ekäm buddbim muktvli vyavasthäpyate I 
na tarhi sarvavisayanairätmyam pratip'aditam bhavatiti II 
sädlrv etat I kimtu sakalaprapancaparivarjitaparamärthasyänukülaty: id yathoktabuddheh 
paramärthatvam I nihsvabhävatii 'pi ca tata eva I na ca svätmani vrttivirodhah sämänyarupena 
sarvadharmiinäm nihsvabhävatä vyavasthäpan: it I tatra ca sämänyalaksanc tadbuddhi- 
riipasylintargatatviid yathd sarvadliarnesu sattviidihctubhyo vinäsitvapratyayo bhavan nätm: umm 
virahayya bhavatiti acodyam II 
(1) Ed: svälma-nivrlli-virod{üit. Cf. Bodhicaryrivatarapanjikü (La Vallcc Poussin [1914] p. 
392,1-2) 
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and untrue, depending on its own previous successive causes that are 
pleasing only as long as they are not examined and having remained in 
the true convention, one, in consistency with seeing (yathddarsanam), 
should undertake giving and so forth, as if he is an illusory man, and 
ultimately (paramarthatas) cultivate non-arising 123 
Haribhadra thus uses `in consistency with seeing' (yathJdarsanam) that defines 
the convention in the opposing sense to ultimately (parain rthatas). He shows that the 
conventional truth is divided into two according to capability and incapability of causal 
efficiency (arthakriyq). This is almost a prose explanation of verse 65 of the 
Madhyamakdlamkära of S5ntaraksita. 12' He is also aware of the problem caused by the 
Pra, n naväritika, verse 3: 3: 
[3-531 
In order to deny the attachment of people who understand that a Tath5gata 
arisen in dependence by relation between causes and results reached through 
the valid means of knowledge is real, based on the statement "That which 
has causal efficiency is here ultimately real" (Pramünavarttika, verse 
3: 3ab) [Dharmodgata] says [to Sadäprarudita in the Astasahasrika 
PrajIiapüramitü], "Just as if, son of a good family, a flute... " 125 
It seems that Haribhadra here maintains that a Tathägata that appears in front of 
"3AbhisamaAlam, ardlolü (Wogihara [1932] p. 594,20-24): 
tadanu samyagarthakriydsu yogyam ayogyam tathyätathyabhedena samvrtisatyadvayam 
avicäraikaramyapürvapnrvasvak xranädlnnam nirdisya tathyasamvrtau sthitvii yathädarsanam 
mäyäpurusencva d dy äcaritavyam paramärthato 'nutpädas ca bhävayitavyali II 
'Z' Sec [3-43] (p. 159) in 3.3.3. 
'25Abhisama)nlamkdrnlolä (Wogihara [1932] p. 969,18-21): 
yad arthalcriyäsamartham tad atra paramärthasad I (=Pramfnavdrttika, 3: 3ab) 
iti vacanät pramänopapannakäryakäranasambandhabalät pmtlyasamutpanna cva tättvikas 
tathägata ity aupalambhikajan5b1iinivcsanisedhartham äha I tad yatha'pi näma kulaputra vinäyä 
ity hdi 
See Kaneko [1998]. 
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people and carries out activity is indeed conventional. He considers that that which has 
causal efficiency belongs to the conventional truth. However he is aware that people may 
be misguided by Pramr7navilrttika, verse 3: 3 and understand it is ultimately real. This 
means that he takes the Pramdnnavärttika, verse 3: 4 as the true intention of Dharmakirti. 
In this respect, too, Haribhadra follows Santaraksita and Kamalasila. 
3.3.6 Jitäri 
Jitäri (late 10th C-early 11th C), in the Sugatmnatavibhaügabhäsya, discusses the 
matter of causal efficiency in detail. He mentions the problem between verse 3: 3 and 3: 4 
of the Pramdnavdrttika and states as much as Dharmakirti is aM idhyamika. 12' Here an 
opponent raises an objection with regard to emptiness of the capability of causal efficiency 
because it contradict verse 3: 3 of the Praniänaviirttika. Jitäri explains as follows: 
[3-54] 
Moreover, then, if one asks why the capability of causal efficiency is 
empty because `what is to be proved' (bsgrub bya, *sddhya) should be 
established [by causal efficiency] if the Midhyamikas' establishment of 
`what is to be proved' (bsgrub bya, *sadhya) depends on means of proof 
(sgrub byed, 'xsädhaka/südhana), as is said [by Dharmakirti in the 
Pramänavürttika, 3: 3] "that which has capability of causal efficiency is 
here ultimately real", this is the answer: 
If causal efficiency belonged to the ultimate, this would happen, [but] 
because the agent and action lack one intrinsic nature and many, why is it 
that this [causal efficiency] belongs to the ultimate? There is no valid 
means of knowledge that establishes the relation between causes and results. 
But because there unobjectionably exists [the valid means of knowledge] 
that invalidates it, then the capability of causal efficiency is not appropriate 
for the definition of `ultimately real'. Because there is [too] much to be 
126 This is pointed out by Shirasali [1978] p. 438. 
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said about this, I leave it for a while. 
Concerning this, because the author of [Pra, näna]vdrttika (Dharmakirti) 
described the definition of ultimately real depending on common usage, 
this does not deviate from his intention. The supreme master of reasoning 
[Dharmakirti] is ultimately nothing but a Wdhyamika, because lie says: 
If [one objects] that everything is incapable, [I answer that] 
capability of seeds and so forth to sprouts and so forth is experienced. 
If one says that it is maintained at the conventional level, [I answer] 
it must be so. (Pramdnavdritika, 3: 4)127 
Jitäri thus understands that causal efficiency that is mentioned in the 
Pramdnavürttika, verse 3: 3 is actually conventional, on the basis of verse 3: 4 which 
states that causality is conventional. Following this verse, he quotes verses 3: 208,209, 
210 and 360 from the Pramanavarttika to show Dharmakirti is a Mädhyamika. Of these, 
verses 3: 208,209,360 are also quoted in the Madhyamakülamkdravrtti of Säntaraksita 
on verse 61.128 In this way, concerning his view of the convention and negation of one 
129 nature and many, he has a close relation to Säntaraksita and to Dharmakirti. 
'27Sugatamatavibharigabhäsya (Dcrge cd. No. 3900 a 64a7-b3, Peking ed. No. 5868 nyo 353b6-354a4): 
gzhan yang 'o na gal to An ma pa mams kyi bsgrub bya grub pa sgrubPt byed la rag ]us na 'o 
na bsgrub bya grub par byed pas don bycd nus pa ji Itar stong pa yin te/ 
don byed nus pa gang yin pa/ dc 'dir don dam yod pa yin/ 
zhes gang gsungs pa'o z is na/ brjod pa/ gal to don byed pa don dam pa pa yin na 'dir 'gyur ba 
zhig na bycd pa p(T) dang las dag geig dang du ma'i rang bzhin gyis stong pas na 'di don dam 
pa pa zhes bya ba ji Itar yin/ rgyu dang 'bras bu'i ngo bo sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma ni ci 
yang med la/ gnod par byed pa ni kha na ma tho ba med par yod pas na da ') don byed nus pa 
don dam par yod pa'i mtshan nyid du mi rigs so// 'di ni brjod par bya ba mang bas re zliig 
bzhaj 4) std 'dir mam 'grel mdzad pas ni tha snyad la brten pa'i don dam par yod pa'i mtshan 
nyid gsungs pa yin pas de'i dgongs ba dang mi 'gal lo// rigs pa'i dbang phyug mchog de ni 
don dam par na dbu ma pa kho na stc 
gal to thams cad nus med na// sa bon sogs ni mug sogs la// 
nus mthong gal tc de kun rdzob// 'dod na ji ltaa delta yin// 
zhcs gsungs pa'i phyir ro// 
(1) D: grub byed, P: sgrub byed. (2) D: byed po, P: byed pa po. (3) D: omit, P: da. (4) D: 
gzhag, P: bzlzag. (5) D: liar, P: lta. 
las Sec [3-46] (p. 160). 
'9 Shirasaki [1978] shows a close relation between Jitari and Iintaraksita based on these quotations 
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On the other hand, I have not found any discussion on the two levels of ultimate 
truths in Jitiri's works. Although there is no explicit passage in his works showing that 
he indeed postulates the concordant ultimate apart from non-conceptual ultimate, we can 
gather that he does, from an examination of his understanding of the four alternatives. 
Commenting on verse 8 of the Sugatamatavibhariga, he explains the meaning of the four 
alternatives based on existence and non-existence: 
[3-55] 
Then if [one asks] how do the Mädhy mikas, who deny that consciousness 
established by the Yog iciras is the reality after refutation of external 
objects, [establish] the reality, [I answer]: 
Neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both existent and non- 
existent, nor even the nature of neither [existent nor non-existent]. 
The Mädhyamikas know that the reality (tattva) is free from the 
four alternatives (catuskoti). (v. 8)130 
`The four alternatives' [and so on means that] the truth free from the four 
kinds [of alternatives] is suitable for those who practice the Way of the 
Madhyamaka. Here, `not existent' [means that] there is no nature of 
existence because existence of both the perceiving subject and the perceived 
object cannot be established. `Not non-existent' [means that] it is not the 
case that they are non-existent conventionally because it is impossible to 
deny the convention. Also the characteristics of the two with the nature of 
existence and non-existence are not [possible] because existence and non- 
from thePramdnavarttika. According to him, there are 10.5 verses which both Jitäri and Säntaraksita 
/ Karnalasila quote. Apart from these, 38 verses are quoted from the Pramrnatiürttika in the 
Sugatamatavibhangabhnsya. 
"o Sugatamatavibharcga, v. 8 (Derge ed. No. 3899 a 8a3, Peking ed. 5296 ha 64b7-8): 
yod min med min yod med min // gnyis kyi bdag nyid du yang med // 
mtha' bzhi dag las nges grol ba // dbu ma de nyid mkhas pa 'dod // 
Ilowever, the same verse in the Sugatamatavibhaügabhnsya is translated differently (Derge ed. No. 
3900 a 60b3, Peking ed. No. 5868 nyo 348b5-6): 
yod min med min yod med min // gnyi ga min pa'i bdag nyid min// 
de nyid tntha' bzhi las grol ba// dbu ma pa yis rtogs pa yin// 
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existence are contradictory. Also the nature of neither of the two different 
from existence and non-existence is not [possible] because, excluding the 
two, the nature whose arising is not denied cannot be established. 13' 
Here it is expressed that the ultimate truth for the Mzdhyamika is free from the 
four alternatives (catuskoti). It is, therefore, understood as non-conceptual without any 
discriminative thought (prapanca). When Jitäri explains why it is free from existence, he 
says that the perceiving subject and the perceived object are denied. This is the state 
where even the consciousness that Yogiczras hold to be existent is rejected. On the other 
hand, concerning why it is not non-existent, he says that it is not non-existent conventionally. 
This implies that Jitäri conventionally accepts, or more precisely, does not deny, existence 
but denies it ultimately. Nevertheless, the truth for the Mädhyamikas is free from both of 
them. Therefore, Jitzri presupposes the non-conceptual ultimate free from the four 
alternatives, the convention which is not non-existent and the state of non-existence. 
This last state is nothing but the concordant ultimate where the Svätantrikas establish 
non-arising by means of reasoning. This will become clearer when we compare Jiffiri's 
commentary on verse 8 of the Sugatamtavibhariga with Bodhibhadra's commentary on 
verse 28 of the Jnänasarasamuccaya. These two verses are almost identical. Bodhibhadra 
explains verse 28 of the Jnana sara samuccaya as follows: 
'31Sugatamatavibhaiigabhasya (Z)erge cd. No. 3900a 60b2-5, Peking ed. No. 5868 nyo 348b5-349a1): 
ji ste phyi rol gyi don sun 'byimgl) ste mal 'byor spyod pas mam par gzhag(2 pa'i mam par 
shes pa yang de kho na yin pa spong ba'i dbu ma pa mains de klio na ji Ita bu zlhig tu lta the 
na/ 
yod min med min yod med min/ / gnyi ga min pa'i bdag nyid min// 
de nyid mtha' bzhi las grol ba/ / dbu ma pa yis rtogs pa yin// 8 // 
mtha' bzhi ste/ ream pa bzhi las grol ba'i de kho na dbu ma'i sgrub pas spyod pa reams lyi 
rigs pa yin no/ / 'di ltar yod min te/ yod pa'i bdag nyid ni ma yin te/ sties pa dang sties bya 
gnyi ga yod pa mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro// med min kun rdzob tu yang med pa ma yin te/ lain 
rdzob la bsnyon") gdab par mi nus pa'i phyir ro// yod pa dang med pa'i bdag nyid kyis gnyi 
ga'i ngo bo yang ma yin te/ yod pa dang med pa 'gal ba'i pbyir ro// yod pa dang med pa las 
gzhan pa(') gnyi ga ma yin pa'i rang bzhin yang ma yin te/ gnyis las phyi rol du(' gyur pa ma 
bsal ba'i rang bzhin mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro// 
(1) D, P: phyung, Em: 'byung. (2) D: gzlaag, P: bzizag. (3) D: bsnyon, P: brnyon. (4) D: omit, 
P: gzizan pa. (5) D: du, P: tu. 
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[3-56] 
If [one asks] what then these Mädhyamikas postulate, [I answer that] they 
do not postulate anything and it is said: 
Neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both existent and non- 
existent, nor even the nature of neither [existent nor non-existent]. 
The Madhyamikas know that the reality is free from the four 
alternatives (catuskoti). 132 
The conclusion of the Yogäcäras is existence and it also is not maintained. 
132 Jikinasürasamuccaya, v. 28 (Miniaki [2000] p. 241): 
na san näsan na sadasan na cäpy anubhayätmakam 
catuskotivinirmuktam tattvam midlhyamikä viduh 1128 II 
Ilowever, the Tibetan translation of this verse is problematic (Mimaki [1976] p. 188,20-23, Derge 
ed. No. 3851 tsha 27b3-4, Peking ed. No. 5251 tsha 30b2): 
yod min med min yod med min // gnyis ka'i bdag nyid kyang min pas // 
mtha' bzhi las grol dbu ma pa // mkhas pa mam kyi de kho na'o // 
In the translation, the fourth alternative has only one negative. The first three are `not existent', 
not non-existent' and `neither existent nor non-existent'. To complete the four alternatives, the 
fourth should be `not neither existent nor non-existent'. However the translated verse has "not even 
the nature of both [existent and non-existent]" (gnyis ka'i bdag nyid k-yang min). The same problem 
is seen in the Tibetan translation of the same verse quoted in the Bodhicarydvatarapan`jikä (Dcrgc 
ed. No. 3872 la 191a6-7, Peking ed. No. 5273 la 213a8): 
yod min med min yod med min/ / gnyis kyi bdag nyid du yang med// 
mtha' bzhi dag rages grol ba/ / de nyid dbu mar mkhas reams bzhed// 
The fourth alternative is translated as gnyis kyi bdag nyid du yang med (not even the nature of the 
two). This is quite similar to the fourth alternative in the Jiwnasdrasamuccaya, verse 28, which is 
gnyis ka'i bdag nyid kyang min pas in terms of its having only one negative. 'I'lie original Sanskrit 
of the verse quoted in the Bodhicarynvatärapaiijikä is, however, as follows (La Vallee Poussin 
[19141 p. 358,10-11): 
na san n: ssan na sadasan na cäpy anubhayätmakam I 
catuskotivinirmuktam tattvam mldhyamikd viduh II 
In this verse, the fourth alternative has two negatives as na cäpy anubhayätmakam (not even the 
nature of neither of the two). 
Similarly, the fourth alternative has only one negative in the Sugatamatavibhariga, v. 8 but the 
same verse in the Sugatamatavibhafigabhasya has two. 
Sugatamalavibhariga, v. 8 (Derge ed. No. 3899 a 8a3, Peking cd. 5296 ha 64b7-8): 
yod min mcd min yod mcd min // gnyis kyi bdag nyid du yang med // 
mtha' bzhi dag las nges grol ba // dbu ma de nyid mkhas pa 'dod // 
Sugatamatavibha, igabhiuya (Derge ed. No. 3900 a 60b3, Peking ed. No. 5868 nyo 348b5-6): 
yod min med min yod med min // gnyi ga min pa'i bdag nyid min// 
dc nyid mtha' bzlii las grol ba// dbu ma pa yis rtogs pa yin// 
This inaccuracy of the Tibetan translation is probably the cause of confusion in Bodhibhadra's 
commentary on the Jiuanasürasamuccaya. Also see the next footnote. 
173 
Chapter 3 Svdtantrika and Prruafigika 
The Lok5yata and others [hold] non-existence and it also is not maintained. 
If one says that then he holds the two as one, it is said that neither 
existent nor non-existent because an undesired consequence arises due to 
both faults. If they have the nature deprived of the two, it is said that even 
not the nature of [n]either because the third group [could] arise. "' 
Bodhibhadra thus does not understand the four alternatives in connection with the 
levels of the truths. This becomes clearer from his account following the passage above: 
[3-57] 
Thus being free from the four alternatives (mtha' bzhi, catiqkoti) described 
above, those who avoid them are, at the level of the conventional truth, 
the Midhyamikas because they avoid extremes (mtha', koti)... 134 
133 JMnasärasamuccayanibandhana (Mimaki [1976] pp. 204,23-206,4, Derge ed, No. 3852 tsha 
44a2-4, Peking cd. No. 5252 tsha 51a7-b2): 
'o na dbu nia pa de dag ci zhig khas len the na/ ci yang khas len pa ma yin te/ 
yod min med min yod med min/ / gnyis ka'i bdag nyid kyang min pas// 
mtha' bzhi las grol dbu ma pa/ / mkhas pa mams kyi de kho na'o// 
zhes smos te/ mal 'byor spyod pa ba'i mthar thug pa ni yod pa ste/ de yang 'dod pa min la/ 'jig 
rten rgyang phan pa la sogs pa ni med pa ste de yang 'dod pa min te/ *de Itar na gnyi ga gcig 
par khas len no The na/ yod med min z hes smos te/ nyes pa gnyi gar that bar 'gyur ba'i phyir 
ro// 
gal to de dag gnyis dang bral ba'i bdag nyid do The na/ gnyis ka'i bdag nyid kyang min 
pas zhes bya ba smos te/ phung po gsum par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro // 
*1 replaced the explanation of the third alternative with that of the fourth. The original is: 
gal to de dag gnyis dang bral ba'i bdag nyid do zhe na/ yod med min zhes smos te/ phung po 
gsum par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro// 
de liar na gnyi ga gcig par khas len no zhe na/ gnyis ka'i bdag nyid kyang min pas zbes 
bya ba smos te/ nyes pa gnyis kar thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir roll 
Here the answer gnyis ka'i bdag nyid kyang min pas zhes bya ha smos to must be for the question 
gal le de dag gnyi ga dang brat ba'i bdag nyid do zhe na. The question is what if they have the 
nature deprived of the two and the answer must be "not the nature deprived of the two", i. e. not the 
nature of neither. If we take into account that the fourth alternative is missing a negative in the 
Tibetan translation, this will become more convincing. It is also likely that the reason given for the 
third alternative phung po gsum par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro (because the third group [could] arise) 
misled Tibetan readers because it looks as if the explanation of the third alternative. However, the 
third alternative is considered a combination of the first and the second and not the third group. 
134 Jiuänasürascunuccayanibandhana (Mimaki [1976] p. 206,12-14, Derge ed, No. 3852 tsha 44a5-6, 
Peking ed. No. 5252 tsha 51b4-5): 
de Itar na mtha' bzhi po ji skad bstan pa las grol te/ de dag spangs pa ni mtha' mams spangs 
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Thus these two extremes, i. e. existence and non-existence, are denied at the level 
of the conventional truth. If we take into account that Bodhibhadra was a direct teacher 
of Atisa, it is very likely that he was not a Sv, itantrika. He indeed does not relate his 
interpretation of the four alternatives to the levels of truths. From this difference of 
interpretation of the four alternatives, we can indirectly assume that Jitzri also maintains 
the concordant ultimate. 
3.3.7 Summary 
In this way, concerning the ultimate truth, Bhäviveka, Avalokitavrata, Jnlnagarbha, 
Säntaraksita, Kamalasila Haribhadra and Jitzri, who are generally regarded as Svätantrikas, 
as well as the anonymous author of the Bodhisattvaivatdravyiikhyänapanjikü distinguish 
two levels of the ultimate. One is the concordant ultimate truth (brdar btags pa'i don 
dam pa'i bden pa, *sänketikaparamarthasatya) or the ultimate truth that is conformable 
to paramartha (don dam pa dang inthun pa, paramarthünukida), and the other the 
ultimate truth which is defined as free from discriminative thought (prapailca), free from 
conceptual construct (vikalpa) and beyond common usage (vyavahdra). The former is 
derived from the interpretation of paramartha as a bahuvrThi compound and includes the 
teaching of non-arising and so forth that are ascertained by cognition produced by a 
three-fold inferential mark. As seen in the Mitlamadhyamakakarikd, v. 1: 1, the teaching 
of non-arising is the main subject of the Madhyamaka teaching, and this teaching is 
carried out by means of syllogistic inference according to the Svätantrikas. It is, therefore, 
considered that inference is employed at the level of the concordant ultimate to bridge 
the gap between the conventional truth and the ultimate truth. This reflects the Svztantrika 
view that inference is an effective means to reach the ultimate truth. As Candrakirti only 
gives an interpretation as akarmadhüraya compound, which indicates the ultimate without 
pas lain rdzob kyi bden par dbu ma pa ste... 
Although koti in catuskoti also has the meaning of `extreme', I translate it as `alternative' throughout 
the present thesis because I could not find an English word that has both meaning. However, in this 
passage, koti is used more in the sense of `extreme' than `alternative'. 
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discriminative thought (prapanca), he does not regard inference and its locus, the 
concordant ultimate, as a means to bridge the conventional truth and the ultimate truth. 
Therefore, this can be used as a criterion to distinguish the Svätantrika and the Przsaügika. 
This inclusion of reasoning into the concordant ultimate reflects the debts of the 
later SwItantrikas to Dharmakirti. The Sv5tantrikas' attempt to prove non-arising involved 
adoption of Dharmakirti's system of logic. This must have made it possible for the 
Madhyamika to insist on the view of a lack of intrinsic nature of all phenomena against 
Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents through the accepted process of reasoning. 
At the same time, Dharmakirti's view of causality is also adopted by the Svltantrikas 
conventionally. They adopted the idea of causal efficiency to distinguish the true convention 
and the false convention by re-interpreting verse 3: 3 of the Prainanavdrttika in conformity 
to verse 3: 4 of the same text. Neither Bhiviveka nor Candrakirti distinguishes the convention 
in this way. This re-interpretation can be understood as Sv5tantrikas' efforts to show that 
they do not deviate from Dharmakirti's teaching. It is clear that Dharmakirti is highly 
regarded by the later Sv itantrikas, especially from the fact that Jitäri regards him as a 
Midhyamika. 
It is, furthermore, plausible that acceptance of Dharmakirti's view of causality 
conventionally meant acceptance of mind-only conventionally. The separation of the 
Svitantrika into the externalist and the internalist might have happened over interpretation 
of Jflänagarbha as far as Säntaraksita and the anonymous author of the 
Bodhisattvävataravyakhydnapanjika are concerned. While the former made a commentary 
on the Satyadvayavibhangabhüsya of Jflänagarbha from the view of the internalist 
M, 5dhyamika, the latter seemingly considers thatJnänagarbha is an externalistM5dhyamika. 
This uncertainty of his position is also reflected in Tibetan doxography of the Indian 
Mzdhyamika. Although Jflänagarbha's understanding of the conventional truth such as 
`consistent with seeing' is adopted by the later externalist Midhyamikas, we cannot find 
the characteristics of the Sv itantrika in the later externalist Mädhyamikas. In fact, the 
later Svztantrika teachers known to us are almost exclusively internalist, and we hardly 
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find an externalist Svitantrika in the late period. 135 Therefore becoming an internalist 
Mädhyamika might have been an inevitable consequence of being a Svätantrika. 
Keeping these points in mind, we now move on to the examination of the view of 
the later Prisangikas. 
3.4 Later Präsangika's View on Inference and the Two Truths 
Atisa (982-1055) is one of a few Indian teachers who are classified as a Pr isaiigika 
by Tibetan doxographers. After Candrakirti, there is no other famous Indian Madhyamaka 
teacher who is regarded as a Prisangika except S5ntideva (ca. 650-700). '36 In Säntideva's 
works, we cannot find any criticism of the Svätantrika although he seems to adhere to 
the prasariga method. There are hardly any clues in his works that enable us to decide 
that there was an opposition between the Svätantrika and the Präsangika. It is, therefore, 
necessary to examine Atiga's view of the two truths in order to judge whether or not 
Candrakirti's view was followed by later teachers and if there was an opposition between 
the two factions. 
3.4.1 Atisa's View on Inference and the Two Truths 
In the Satyadvaydvatära, Atisa presents his view on the two truths. This work is 
quite concise consisting of just 29 verses. However, it contains many elements that help 
our understanding of late Madhyamaka thought. Lindtner and Ejima have already 
undertaken extensive studies of this work137 and much of following is indebted to them. 
However examination and a clear understanding of Atisa's theory of the two truths are 
indispensable in order to clarify the classification of the late Mädhyamikas into the 
Svätantrika and the Präsangika. We will, therefore, examine his view on the two truths in 
135 Regarding this matter, the date of the anonymous author of the Bodhisattºävataravyakhyänapaiijikd 
is very important. Regrettably, though, I have not found any evidence that can narrow his date. 
"6 For a Tibetan source, see translation of Wang skya's Grub pa'i mtha'i ream par bzhag pa in 
Lopez [1987] (p. 260) as well as Mimaki [1982a] (pp. 27-38). 
137 Lindtner [1981] and Ejima [1983]. 
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the Satyadvayavatdra. 
As we have seen in the previous sections, the Svitantrikas postulate the concordant 
ultimate and accept the idea of causal efficiency (arthakriyd) in order to distinguish the 
true and the false convention. Now, by examining the Satyadvayävatdra, we will attempt 
to find out whether there are any differences in Atisa's view of the two truths. In the very 
first verse, he distinguishes the two truths, which is translated as follows: 
[3-58] 
The teaching of Dharma by Buddhas should depend on two truths: the 
conventional truth of the world and the ultimate truth. (v. 1)138 
After this introductory verse Atisa goes on to explain the convention (sanrvrti) in 
verses 3 and 4, which we will examine later. Then he explains the ultimate truth in 
verses 4-9: 
[3-59] 
The ultimate is only one. Others hold that it is twofold. How can the 
nature of reality (chos niyid, *dhannatd), which cannot be established as 
anything, be two, three and so on? (v. 4) 
[The ultimate] is defined as non-arising, non-cessation and so forth 
according to the formula [given] by treatises. Because of the way in 
which different ultimates do not exist, there is neither a subject (chos can, 
*dharmin) nor its property (chos nyid, *dharma) [for inferential reasoning]. 
(v. 5) 
There is not any differentiation in emptiness. It can be expressed as a 
conventional designation that emptiness is seen if [it is seen] through 
cognition by way of no conceptual construct. (v. 6) 
138Satyadva}nvatüra, v. I (Ejima [1983] p. 361): 
sangs rgyas mains kyis chos bstan pa// bden pa gnyis la yang dag brten// 
'jig rtcn kun rdzob bden pa dang// de bzbin don dam bden pa'o // 1 // 
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It is said in the very profound sittras that the state of non-seeing is seeing 
the [ultimate truth]. In that [ultimate truth], there is no seeing or no seer. 
There is calmness without beginning or end. (v. 7) 
[The truth is] devoid of existence and non-existence, free from conceptual 
construct, free from objects, without locus, without staying, coming or 
going and does not admit comparison. (v. 8) 
[It is] inexpressible, invisible, unchangeable and unconditioned. If a Yogin 
understands it, the obscuration of the defilements and the knowable is 
eliminated. (v. 9)139 
Concerning Atisa's understanding of the ultimate truth, he maintains in verse 4 
that the ultimate is only one. As we have seen in the previous sections, 140 the distinction 
of the Svätantrika and the Präsangika can be made based on the definition of the ultimate 
truth (paramarthasatya). While Candra rti interprets paramärtha as a karmadharaya 
compound, Bhiviveka gives three different interpretations of the term paramartha: that 
which is ultimate (parama) as well as an object (artha) (interpreted as a karmadhäraya 
compound), that which is an object (artha) of ultimate [cognition] (parama) (interpreted 
as a tatpurusa compound) and that which takes paramdrtha or that which is conformable 
to paramartha (interpreted as a bahuvrihi compound). Even though paramürtha which is 
139 Salyadvaydvazara, vv. 4-9 (Ejima [19831 pp. 362-363): 
dam pa'i don ni gcig nyid de// gzhan dag ream pa gnyis su 'dod// 
cir yang nia grub chos nyid de// gnyis dang gsum sogs ga la 'gyur// 4 // 
bstan pa'i tshig gis sbyor ba yis// Skye med 'gag med cogs pas mtshon// 
don dam tha dad med tshul gyis// chos can med cing chos nyid med// 5 // 
stong pa nyid la tha dad ni// cung zad yod pa ma yin to// 
rtog med tshul gyis rtogs pas na// stong nyid mthong zhcs tha snyad gdags// 6 // 
ma mthong ba nyid de mthong bar// shin tu zab pa'i mdo las gsungs// 
de la mthong dang mthong byed med// thog nia tha nia med zhi ba// 7 // 
dngos dang dngos mcd mam par spangs// ream par ttog mcd dmigs pa brau/ 
gnas pa med pa gnas med pa// 'gro 'ong med cing dpe dang brau/ 8 // 
brjod du med pa bltar med pa// 'gyur ba med pa 'dus ma byas// 
mal 'byor pa yis de rtogs na// nyong mongs sties bya'i sgrib pa spangs// 9 // 
140 Sec 3.2 (p. 128 ff. ) and 3.3 (p. 149 ff. ). 
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conformable to parainärtha, the concordant ultimate, is not the ultimate truth in a strict 
sense, the Sv tantrikas give it the name paramärtha. According to the Svitantrikas, the 
teaching of non-arising belongs to this concordant ultimate and inference is employed to 
prove non-arising at this level of the ultimate. Atisa obviously does not accept the 
interpretation of paramärtha as that which is conformable to paramdrtha 
(paramdrthänukiila) given by Bhmviveka and other Svztantrikas. It is evident that the 
only ultimate maintained by Atisa is non-conceptual as expressed in verses 6,8 and 9. 
With regard to non-arising, however, he considers that it should belong to this non- 
conceptual ultimate as described in verse 5. There is, thus, a difference in interpretation 
of the ultimate between Atisa and the Svätantrika teachers in that the former maintains 
that the ultimate is only one, and non-arising is a characteristic of it, but the latter hold 
that non-arising belongs to the concordant ultimate but not to the non-conceptual ultimate. 
In this regard, Atisa definitely understands the ultimate in a different way from the 
Svztantrikas. 
The most fundamental difference between the Sv5tantrika and the Prdsangika is 
whether or not they adopt inference (anumana) as a means to reach the ultimate. Concerning 
this point, too, Atisa is regarded as a Pri sangika. His negative attitude towards the valid 
means of knowledge (prainana), including inference (amumäna), is seen in verses 10-13: 
[3-60] 
A fool who sees this side says that Buddhists accept these two: direct 
perception and inference [and] understand emptiness by the two. (v. 10) 
[If they did, ] it would follow that even outsiders and the Srävakas understand 
the nature of reality (chos nyid, *dhannata), not to mention the proponents 
of representation[-only], and the Mädhyamikas would be no different 
[from them]. (v. 11) 
Therefore, all doctrines would also agree because they understand [the 
doctrines] through the valid means of knowledge. Because all reasonings 
are not in agreement, does the nature of reality (chos nyid, *dhannatd) 
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which is understood through the valid means of knowledge not become 
manifold? Direct perception and inference are unnecessary. The learned 
make use of [them] to refute the objection of outsiders. (vv. 12-13)14' 
Atisa here denies the view that Buddhists accept direct perception (pratyaksa) and 
inference (anumana) to understand emptiness. He argues that if the valid means of 
knowledge (pramana) are perfectly reliable, everyone who resorts to them should have 
the same view. It is, however, not the case. He therefore denies the validity of them. 
Nevertheless, he does not reject them entirely. The purpose of inference is confined to 
`refute the objection of outsiders', as is seen in verse 13. 
As Ejimal'z points out, the same attitude is seen in the Bodhirnargapradipapanjika: 
[3-611 
Why were many treatises composed by Dharmalrti, Dharmottara and 
others? The learned composed [them] to refute the objection of outsiders. "' 
In this way, the purpose of composing texts concerning the valid means of 
knowledge (pramana) is, according to Atisa, to refute outsiders but not to attain the 
ultimate truth. It seems that he mentions Dharmakirti and Dharmottara as authors of 
these treatises. However, it is not clear if `others' include the Svitantrikas, especially 
Bhlviveka. Although it is not clear if this is criticism of the Svätantrika, his negative 
141 Satyculva)dvatära, vv. 10-13 (Ejima [1983] pp. 363-364): 
mngon sum dang ni rjes su dpag// sangs rgyas pa yis de gnyis gzung// 
gnyis pos stong nyid rtogs so zlies// tshu rol mthong ba'i rmongs pa smra// 10 // 
mu Stegs nyan thos roams kyis kyang// chos nyid rtogs par thal bar 'gyur// 
mam rig pas Ita smos ci dgos// dbu ma pa la mi mthun med// 11 // 
des na grub mtha' thams cad kyang// tshad mas 'jal phyir mthun par 'gyur// 
rtog ge thams cad mi mthun pas// tshad mas gzhal ba'i chos nyid kyang// 12 // 
mang po nyid du mi 'gyur ram// mngon sum rjes dpag dgos pa med// 
mu Stegs rgoi ba bziog pa'i phyir// mkhas pa mams kyis byas pa yin// 13// 
142 Ejima [1983] p. 371. 
"' Bodhimdrgapradipapanjikü (Derge ed. No. 3948 khi 282b5, Peking ed. No. 5344 ki 326b6-7): 
chos grags chos mchog la sogs pas// gzhung mang byas pa ji lta bull 
mu Stegs rgol ba bzlog pa'i pliyir// mkhas pa roams kyis byas pa yin// 
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attitude towards the valid means of knowledge (pramiina) is evident. This limitation of 
the use of inference reminds us of Candrakirti's use of syllogistic inference in the 
Prasannapadä, where he employs syllogistic inference whose proposition is not his 
own. 14' Thus Atisa does not maintain the concordant ultimate or inference as an effective 
means to attain emptiness. 
He, in addition, refers to Candralrti in verse 15 and 19: 
[3-62] 
If one asks who understood emptiness, [I reply] Nägärjuna, who was 
predicted by the Tath, gata and saw the truth of the nature of reality, and 
his disciple Candrakirti. (v. 15)145 
[3-63] 
The acürya Candrakirti says as follows: 
Those who do not know the distinction of the two, the conventional truth 
as a means and the ultimate truth as the purpose, get a bad birth because 
of erroneous conceptualisation. (v. 19)"6 
Thus Atiga considers that Candrakirti, who was Nzgdrjuna's disciple, understood 
emptiness. Atisa does not hold the concordant ultimate and does not adopt the valid 
means of knowledge (prarndna) including inference (anutnama) in order to reach emptiness. 
'4-' See discussion in 3.2 (p. 128 ff. especially pp. 139-142). 
145 Satyadvayavatdra, v. 15 (Ejima 11983] p. 364): 
stong nyid gang gis rtogs she na// de bzhin gshegs pas lung bstan zhing// 
chos nyid bden pa gzigs pa yi// klu sgrub slob ma z1a grags yin// 15 
146 Satayadvayävatära, v. 19 (Gjima [1983] pp. 365-366): 
slob dpon zla grags 'di skad du// 
thabs su gyur pa lain rdzob bden pa dang// thabs las byung ba don dam bden pa dag// 
gnyis po'i dbye ba gang gis mi shes pa// de dag log par rtogs pas ngan 'gror 'gro// 19 
Madhyamakävatära, v. 6: 80 (La Vallee Poussin [1907-11] p. 175,3-6): 
tha snyad bdcn pa thabs su gyur pa dang// don dam bdcn pa thabs byung gyur pa stell 
de gnyis mann dbye gang gis mi sties pa// de ni mam rtog log pas lam ngan zhugs// 6: 80 // 
Quoted in the Subhäsitasamgraha (Bcndall [1905] p. 22,7-10): 
upäyabhütam vyavahärasatyam upcyabhütam paramdahasatyam I 
tayor vibhägam na paraiti yo vai mithyävikalpaili sa kumärgayätah 11 
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This evidence indicates that Atisa can be classified as a Präsangika. 
On the other hand, there is some perplexing evidence which opposes this conclusion. 
Firstly, Atisa's definitions of the conventional truth obviously differ from those of 
Candrakirti. Candrakirti gives the following interpretations ofsamvrti in the Prasannapadü. 
[3-641 
Samvrti means covering completely because samvrti is said to be ignorance 
for it completely covers the reality of all things. Samvrti alternatively 
means the origination from each other through being in dependence on 
each other. Or rathersamvrti means conventional symbols, common usage 
of the world. "' 
Here Candrakirti interprets salnvrti in three different ways: (1) concealment of the 
true nature of things, i. e. ignorance, (2) interdependent origination, and (3) conventional 
symbols (samketa) or common usage of the world (lokavyavahära). Atisa, on the other 
hand, explains the true convention, as follows: 
[3-65] 
The convention (kun rdzob, *samvrfi) is held to be twofold: the false and 
the true. The former is twofold: the moon [reflected on] water and 
imagination of wrong doctrines (grub intha', *siddhanta). (v. 2) 
A phenomenon which is pleasing only as long as it is not examined, 
which arises and ceases to exist and which is capable of causal efficiency 
is held to be the true convention. (v. 3)148 
147Prasannapada (La Vallee Poussin [1903-13] p. 492,10-12): 
samant5d varanam samvitih I ajndnam hi samantAt sarvapadärthatattvdvacchädanät samvrtir 
ity ucyate I parasparasamlbhavanam vä samvriir anyonyasamd. srayenety arthali I athavä samvitih 
samketo lokavyavahära ity arthah I 
"s Satayadvaydvatära, vv. 2-3 (Ejima [1983] p. 362): 
kun rdzob rnatn pa gnyis su 'dod// log pa dang ni yang dag go// 
dang po gnyis to chu z1a dang// grub mtha' ngan pa'i rtog pa'o// 2 // 
ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' ba'i// skye ba dang ni 'jig pa'i chos// 
don byed nus dang ldan pa ni// yang dag kun rdzob yin par'dod// 3 // 
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In verse 2, Atisa distinguishes the true and the false convention. He does this 
according to their capability or incapability of causal efficiency as seen in verse 3. He 
also defines the true convention as (1) pleasing only as long as it is not examined, (2) 
arises and ceases to exist, and (3) capable of causal efficiency. This is almost identical 
with the definition of the true convention given by Säntaraksita but not one given by 
Candrakirti. In the Madhya nakalamkara, verse 64, Szntaraksita explains as follows: 
[3-66] 
It is understood that that which is pleasing only as long as it is not 
examined, which is characterised by arising and cessation and which has 
the nature of capability of causal efficiency is the [true] convention. (v. 
64Y49 
Moreover, as in verses 21-3 of the Satyadvayävatara, Atisa defines the convention 
(sanivrti) as `consistent with seeing' (ji liar snang ba, yathi7darsana): 
[3-67] 
If this convention which is `consistent with seeing' (ii Itar snang ba, 
yathadarsana) is examined logically, nothing is acquired. The state of 
non-acquirement is the ultimate and the nature of reality (chos nyid, 
*dhannatä) which stays perfect. (v. 21) 
The convention, which is `consistent with seeing', is established as being 
produced by causes and conditions, . If it were impossible to establish it, 
by who would the moon in water and the like be produced? (v. 22) 
Therefore, all appearances are established as being produced by various 
causes and conditions. If the continuance of conditions is interrupted, it 
149A1adhyamakdlamkdra, v. 64 (Iclvgo [1985b] p. CXXV): 
ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' thing/I skye dang 'jig pa'i chos can pa// 
don byed pa dag nus mains kyi// rang bzhin kun rdzob pa yin rtogs// 64 // 
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does not arise even conventionally. (v. 23)150 
Thus Atisa considers that the convention is `consistent with seeing' and it is 
produced by causes and conditions. The idea of `consistent with seeing' is not seen in 
Candrakirti's works, but in Jnznagarbha's Satyadvayavibhariga: 
[3-68] 
Only what is consistent with seeing is the conventional and the other is 
opposite, [i. e. the ultimate truth]. (v. 3. cd)'s' 
Moreover, Atisa classifies the convention, i. e. what is consistent with seeing, into 
the true convention and the false convention in verse 2 and 3 of the Satyadvayi7vatära. 
The true convention is, as shown above, defined as `capable of causal efficiency'. An 
example of the false convention is images reflected on water, which do not have causal 
efficiency. This is different from the view of Candrakirti who postulates the mere convention 
and the conventional truth. 112 Atisa's understanding of the convention is close to that of 
Jflinagarbha, who explains that the convention is twofold depending on its ability of 
causal efficiency in the Satyadvayavibhangavrtti: 
[3-69] 
It is also taught that the convention is twofold: 
Regardless of similarity in appearance, the distinction of the 
1 S0Satyadvayavatära, vv. 21-23 (vv. 22-24 in Ejima [1983] p. 366): 
kim rdzob ji Itar snang ba 'di// rigs pas brtags na 'ga' mi rnycd// 
ma rayed pa nyid don dam yin// ye nas gnas pa'i chos nyid do// 21 // 
rgyu rk-yen dag gis bskycd pas na// kun rdzob ji ltar snang ba grub// 
gal to grub par mi rung na// clm zla la sogs su yis bskycd// 22 // 
des na rgyu rk-yen sna tshogs kyis// bskyed pas snang ba thams cad grub// 
rk-yen maws rgyun ni chad gym na// lain rdzob tu yang mi 'byung ngo// 23 // 
Ejima's numbering becomes different from mine after verse 20. 
15' Satyadvayavibhanga, v. 3 cd (Eckel [1987] p. 156): 
ji liar snang ba 'di kilo na// kun rdzob gzhan ni cig silos yin// 
152 See 3.2. 
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convention as true or untrue is made according to their capability 
or incapability of causal efficiency. (v. 12) 
Cognitions are similar in appearance, i. e. a manifest image. But having 
been ascertained by whether or not it falsifies causal efficiency 
corresponding to appearance, water and others and a mirage and others 
are understood by ordinary people as true or untrue. 153 
In this way, Atisa's understanding of the conventional truth is in line with that of 
the Svätantrikas such as Jnänagarbha and Säntaraksita who interpret verse 3: 3 of 
Dharmakirti's Pramänavarttika from the Madhyamaka point of view. It may be the case 
that Dharmakn-ti was sö highly regarded among the M5dhyamikas that they, regardless 
of being a Svztantrika or a Präsangika, all adopted this view of the conventional. Atisa, 
anyhow, does not strictly follow Candrakirti's view in terms of the definitions of the 
convention. 
Secondly, Atiga quotes Bhnviveka to explain his view of the two truths in verse 
14, and verse 20 is also quoted from the Madhyamakahrdayakärikä: 
[3-70] 
The ücrya, learned Bhavya says that [the ultimate] cannot be clearly 
understood even from scriptural authority [or] by [either of] two thoughts: 
that with conceptual construct or without conceptual construct. (v. 14Y54 
153 Satyadvayavibhariga, v. 12 and its Vati (Eckel [1987] p. 163): 
yang kun rdzob ni mam pa gnyis su bstan te/ 
snang du 'dra yang don byed dag// nus pa'i phyir dang mi nus phyir// 
yang dag yang dag ma yin pas// kun rdzob lyi ni dbye ba byas// 12 // 
zhes bya ba'o// sties pa gsal ba'i ream pa snang ba can du 'dra yang/ji Itar snang ba bzhin du 
don byed pa la slu ba dang mi slu ba yin par nges par byas nas chu la sogs pa dang smig rgyu 
la sogs pa dag 'jig rten gyis yang dag pa dang yang dag pa ma yin par rtogs so// 
See 3.3.1 for Inänagarbha's view on the two truths. 
15t Satayadvaydvatdra, v. 14 (Ejima [1983] p. 364): 
lung las kyang ni gsal po ru// rtog bcas rtog pa med pa yi// 
shes pa gnyis kyis mi rtogs shes// slob dpon mkhas pa bha bya gsung// 14 
Ejima [1983] (p. 384 note 11 and p. 389 note 65) points out similarity between päda be and verse 
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[3-711 
Without depending on common usage (tha snyad, vyavahnra), the ultimate 
is not understood. Without a ladder of true conventions, it is impossible 
for a learned man to reach the top of the palace of reality. (v. 20)155 
Although Atiga quotes from Bhäviveka, since these are not verses that support 
the use of inference to prove emptiness, they may be negligible in terms of evidence to 
distinguish the Svitantrika and the Prisailgika. Nevertheless, it is clear that he does not 
regard Bhiviveka and Candrakirti as rivals who have opposing views concerning the two 
truths. 
These points are remarkable in that while Atisa is aware of controversy over the 
interpretation of paramürtha, he does not mention any opposition between Bhäviveka 
and Candrakirti who are regarded as a SvAtantrika and a Prisangika respectively. This 
conformity of Bhäviveka and Candrakirti is also found in the accounts of his lineage. 
Therefore we now move on to an examination of his understanding of the Madhyamaka 
lineage that descends from Nägirjuna to Atisa himself. 
3: 285cd of the Madhyamakahrdayakärikä as well as the verse 5: 6 of the Madhyamakaratnapradipa. 
Madhyamakahrdayakdrikä, v. 3: 285cd (Lindtner [2001] p. 39,16): 
savikalpävikalpena jnänenäpy esa durdrgah I 
MadhyamakaratnapradFpa, v. 5: 6 (Dcrge ed. No. 3854 tsha 272a6, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 
342b6): 
rtog bcas rtog pa med pa yi// shes pa gnyis kyis 'di mi rtogs// 
sgra dang tshad ma'i tha snyad dag// de don bsgom la dgos pa med// 
155 Satyadvayavatara, v. 20 (Pjima [1983] p. 366): 
tha snyad la ni ma Men par// dam pa'i don ni rtogs mi 'gyur// 
yang dag kun rdzob mains kyi skas// med par yang dag khang chen gyi// 
steng du 'gro bar byed pa ni// mkhas la rung ba ma yin no// 20 // 
Mülamadhyamakakürikd, v. 24: 1Oab (La Vallee Poussin [1903-13] p. 494,12): 
vyavahärarn anäsritya paramärtho na desyate 
Abhisama)rilamkürälokä (Wogihara [1932] p. 169,19-20): 
tathyasamvrtisopanam antarena vipascitah I 
tattvapriisädasikharärohanam na hi yujyate I 
Madhyamakahrdayakdrikd, 3: 12 (Ejima [1980a] p. 270): 
tattvapräsädasikhararohanam na hi yujyate I 
tathyasamvrtisopanam antarcna yatas tatah 11 3: 12 II 
See Pjima [1983] (p. 385 note 18). 
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3.4.2 Atisa's Understanding of the Madhyamaka Lineage 
In the Satyadvayüvatara, Atisa does not mention any opposition between Bhiviveka 
and Candrakirti. It seems that it is not problematic for Atisa to give their names side by 
side as his teachers. The same is observed in Atisa's account on his lineage in the 
Bodhimärgapradipapanjika. He mentions both Bhäviveka and Candrakirti as teachers in 
his lineage: 
[3-72] 
The learned in the continent of Jambu declare: 
The noble Asaciga explained a method of teaching. He taught that 
the meaning of prajnüpürainiti was representation-only 
(*vijitaptirnätra). 
At present the guru Svarnadvipa and the guru Santi pa (Ratnäkarasänti) 
hold in this way. 
The «cärya Nägärjuna explained the essence of teaching. He 
understood that the meaning of prajnäpdramitd was the meaning 
of the great Madhyamaka, which transcends existence and non- 
existence. 
It is said in this way in the lineage of other learned men. At present, the 
guru Bodhibhadra and the reverend Kusulu pa hold in this way. 
The nectar of the venerable noble Nägärjuna had satisfied Aryadeva, 
Candrakirti, Bhavya and Säntideva, down to Bodhibhadra. A little 
has been sprinkled even on me. "' 
'16 Bodhinuargapradipapaiijika (Derge ed. No. 3948 khi 280a4-7, Peking ed. No. 5344 ki 323b4-8): 
'dza(') mbu'i gling na mkhas ba dag ni 'di skad du/ 'phags pa thogs med gyis(2' bstan pa'i mam 
grangs bshad pal des shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i don mam par rig pa tsam du gsungs 
shing/ da Itar bla ma su wa rnna dw'i pa dang/ bla ma sh'an ti pa yang dc ]tar dgongs so// 
slob dpon klu sgrub kyis ni bstan pa'i snying po bshad del des sties rab kyi pha rol tu 
phyin pa'i don yod pa dang med pa las 'das pa'i dbu ma Chen po'i don thugs su chud cing/ 
mkhas pa gzhan gyi rgyud la yang de Itar gsungs so// de liar bla ma byang chub bzang Po 
dang/ rje btsun ku su lu pa yang de Isar dgongs so// 
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Here Atisa clearly shows that both Bhavya (Bhäviveka) and Candrakirti are in his 
lineage. It is also known that Bodhibhadra is his teacher. Then when he explains the 
words in verse 51,157 he states as follows: 
[3-73] 
The very [meaning of] `Müla' should be explained. The `Mida- 
madhyamaka' means the root (müla) of wisdom of the Madhyamaka. 
"And so forth" refers to the Akutobhayd, the Yuktisastikä, the 
Vigrahavyavartani, the Sisnyatdsaptati, the Ratnävali, the 
MahdydnavimsikC4 the Aksarasataka, the Salistambhavrtti and so forth. 158 
"And so forth" also refers to the teaching written by the true disciples of 
the noble äciirya [Niglrjuna], the reverend Aryadeva, the acärya 
Candrakirti, the ücürya Bhavya Bhäviveka (bha bya snang bran, the 
dcürya S5ntideva and so forth. And the reverend Aryadeva wrote the 
Mahämadhyamakavaidalya, theHastaväla, theArigulikalpavyakhyuna, the 
Jn n. asürasamuccaya and so forth. The dcdrya Candrakirti wrote the 
Madhyamakdvatdra and the Yuktisastikävrtti, the Madhyamaka 
Pancaskandha[prakarana], the Prasannapadd, and so forth. The acarya 
Bhavya Bhäviveka (bha bya snang bral) wrote the Madhyainaka 
T'arkajvtld, the Prajndpradipa and so forth. 159 
'phags pa klu sgrub zhal gyi bdud rtsi des// a'a rya de ba z1a grags bha bya dang// 
zhi ba'i Iha dang byang chub bzang po'i bar// tshim par gyur ba bdag la'ang cung zhig 'thor// 
(1) D: 'dza, P: dza. D: gyis, P: kyi. 
'57 Bodhipathapradfpa, v. 51 (Drege ed. No. 3947 khi 240a7, Peking ed. No. 5343 ki 276b7-8): 
In the reasoning of Sanyatdsaptati and the Mülamadhyamaka and so forth, 
the proof that the intrinsic nature of entities is empty is mentioned. 
stong nyid bdun bcu'i rigs pa dan // dbu ma ttsa ba so s las }. yang// 
dngos po reams kyi rang bzhin ni)// stong pa nyid du( grub bshad pa// 
(1) D: ni, P: gyi (2) D: du, P: ni. 
Lindtner [1981] (p. 209) takes rigs pa as Yukti[sastikäkärikd]. 
iss On these texts ascribed to Nägärjuna, see Lindtner [1981 ] p. 212, note 13. 
1S Bodhimargapradrpapaiijikä (Doge ed. No. 3948 khi 280b2-6 Peking ed. No. 5344 ki 324a4-bl): 
rtsa ba nyid bshad par bya ste/ dlxi ma'i rtsa ba zhes bya ba ni dbu ma'i rtsa ba shes rab boll 
sogs zlies pas ni ga las(') 'jigs med dang/ rigs pa drug cu pa dang/ rtsod pa bzlogt2 pa 
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In this way, Atisa shows that Bhavya Bhzviveka is in his lineage together with 
Candrakirti. He does not mention any difference in their position. Additionally, 
Bodhibhadra, whom Atisa mentions as his direct teacher, does not mention Candrakirti 
when he classifies the Mädhyamikas into the externalists and the internalists. '6° According 
to Atisa, Bodhibhadra is in the lineage that descended from Nigärjuna through Candrakirti 
to Atisa himself. If we assume that Atisa adopts the Pr5sai gika view taught by Bodhibhadra, 
it is indeed strange that Bodhibhadra, whose teaching Atisa follows, mentions Bhavya 
(Bhäviveka) as the representative figure of the externalist Mädhyamikas, but not 
Candrakirti. 
Lastly and most significantly, even though Atisa translated 104 texts into Tibetan, 
together with Tibetan translators, he translated only two works of Candrakirti, the 
Pancaskandhaprakarania and the `Trisaranasaptati, 161 which are not currently regarded as 
his major works. On the other hand, he translated the Madhyamakahrdayakarika, a 
genuine work of Bhäviveka, and its commentary, Tarkajväld, as well as the 
Madhyamakdrthasamgraha and the Madhyamakarainapradipa, which are ascribed to 
him but not currently regarded as his genuine works. This is very strange if he is a 
Pr5saimgika, who is supposed to follow Candrakirti rather than Bh3viveka. In this way, 
while it seems that he is negative on the usage of the valid means of knowledge (pramana), 
dang/ stong pa nyid bdun cu pa dang/ rin po che'i phreng ba dang/ theg pa cen po nyi shu pa 
dang/ tshig brgya pa dang/ sa'a In Ijang pa'i 'grel pa la sogs pa'o// 
yang na cogs zhhes pa ni slob dpon 'pliags pa'i dngos kyi slob ma rje btsun a'a rya de ba 
dang/ slob dpon zla grags dang/ slob dpon bha bya snang bral dang/ slob dpon zhi ba'i Ilia Ia 
sogs pas mdzad pa'i bstan bcos te/ de yang rje btsun a'a rya de bas ni dbu ma main par 'thag 
pa clien po dang/ lag pa'i tshad dang/ sor mo Ita bu'i bshad pa dang/ ye slies snyin po kun las 
btus pa la sogs pa mdzad do// 
slob dpon zla grags kyis/ dbu ma Ia 'jug pa dang/ rigs pa drug cu pa'i 'grcl pa dang/ dbu 
ma phung po Inga pa dang/ tshig don gsal ba Ia sogs pa mdzad do// 
slob dpon bha bya snang bral gyis(3) dbu ma rtog ge 'bar ba dang/ sties rab sgron ma Ia 
Sogs pa mdzad do// 
(1) D: las, P Ia. (2) D: bzlog, P: dog. (3) D: snang bra! gyis, P: snang. 
16° Ile names Sdntaraksita and Bhavya (Bhäviveka) as the intemalist and the externalist Mädhyamikas 
respectively. See section 2.3 (p. 65 ff. ) in this thesis 
161 The Pancaskandhaprakarana (Derge ed. No. 3866, Peking ed. No. 5267) and the Trisaranasaptati 
(berge ed. No. 3971, Peking ed. No. 5366) See Ruegg [1981a] p. 111 and p. 105. He regards the 
Trisaranasaptati as a work of the Vajrayinist Candrakzrti. 
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including inference, in order to reach the ultimate truth and therefore regarded as a 
Pr5sangika, some evidence shows that he does not follow Candrakirti but espouses 
Bhiviveka. 
In addition to this, we find a very interesting classification of the Madhyamaka 
teachers in Atisa's Ratnakarandodghita Madhyamakopade. a. According to Miyazaki's 
study, Atisa classifies Buddhist teachers into five exoteric and five esoteric branches 
according to their works. His classification of the five exoteric branches and distribution 
of Indian teachers are as follows: 
[3-74] 
The former ücüryas wrote their respective views. 
The äcdryas Dignäga, Dharmakirti and others wrote texts on the valid 
means of knowledge (tshad ma, *pramäna) in detail. 
The dcdryas Dharmatr, ta, Buddhadeva, Vasumitra, Ghosaka, Manojna(? ) 
and others wrote scriptural authorities (*Jgama) of the Srävaka Vaibhäsika 
in detail. 
The äcaryas Subhagupta, Dharmottara, the early Vasubandhu and others 
wrote texts of the Srävaka Sauträntika in detail. 
The ücäryas Asaiiga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, Prajn, karagupta, Kalinka, 
Devendrabuddhi, the up-saka guru Asvabh-va and others wrote texts of 
the S3k5ra and the Niräkära [Yog, cara] in detail. 
The dcäiryas Bhavya, Buddhapälita, Devasarman, Avalokitavrata, 
S5ntaraksita, Kamalasila and others wrote texts of the Madhyainaka in 
detail. 
The ücärya Candragornin, the i7carya Süra, the ücärya S garamegha, the 
acdrya Säntideva, the äcarya Luntaka(? ) and others wrote, for novices 
just after generation of mind (*ciuopa(da), texts of very extensive practice 
beginning from four infinities (*apramänta) and the four things of attraction 
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(*samgrahavastu), up to praj0paramitd in detail. 
Those texts written by the five äcaryas, the dcdrya noble Nägärjuna, the 
äcärya Aryadeva, the dcarya Maticitra, the dcärya Kambala and the 
ücürya Candrakirti, are the foundation (phyi mo, *malrika) of all the 
Madhyamaka texts. Because they are the roots (rtsa ba, * mitla) of all the 
Madhyamaka texts, there is no rival. 162 
Atisa thus distinguishes teachers of exoteric Buddhism into five: (1) the authors of 
the texts on the valid means of knowledge (pramäna, ishad ma), (2) the authors of the 
ügamas of the S`rävaka Vaibhäsika (nyan rhos bye brag tu smra pa), (3) the authors of 
162 Ratnakarandodghüita (Miyazaki [1993] pp. 19-20, Dcrge cd. No. 3930 ki 112b3-113a1, Peking 
cd. No. 5325 ha 126a2-b2): 
sngon gyi slob dpon mams kyis phyogs re re mdzad de/ 
slob dpon phyogs kyi glang po dang/ dha rma k'i rti la sogs pas tshad ma'i 
gzhung rgyas par mdzad do// 
slob dpon clios skyob dang/ slob dpon Sangs rgyas Ilia dang/ dbyig bslies dang/ 
dbyangs sgrogs dang/ yid 'ong la sogs pas nyan thos bye brag tu smra ba'i lung 
rgyas par mdzad do// 
slob dpon dge bsrungs dang/ chos mchog dang/ dbyig gnycn snga ma la sogs 
pas nyan thos mdo sde pa'i gzhung rgyas par mdzad do// 
slob dpon thogs med dang/ dbyig gnyen dang/ blo brtan dang/ sties rab 'byung 
gnas sbas pa dang/ ka li ngka dang/ lha dbang blo dang/ dgc bsnycn btsun pa 
ngo bo nyid med pa la sogs pas ni mam bcas mam med kyi gzhung rgyas par 
mdzad do// 
slob dpon bha bya dang/ bu ddha p'a li to dang/ de ba shar ma dang/ spyan ras 
gzigs brtul zhugs dang/ sh'a nta ra kslri to dang/ ka ma la sh'i la la sogs pas ni 
dbu ma'i gzlmng rgyas par mdzad do// 
slob dpon tsa ndra go mi dang/ slob dpon dpa' bo dang/ slob dpon rgya mtsho 
sprin dang/ slob dpon sh'a nta dc ba dang/ slob dpon lu nta ka la sogs pas senis 
bskycd ma thag pa las dang po pa'i phyir tshad mcd pa bzhi dang/ bsdu ba'i 
dngos po bzhi dang/ pha rol tu phyin pa la sogs pa ji liar nyams su blang ba'i 
spyod pa rgya chen po'i gzhung rgyas par mdzad do// 
slob dpon 'phags pa klu sgrub dang/ slob dpon a'a rya de ba dang/ slob dpon ma 
ti tsi tra dang/ slob dpon ka mba la dang/ slob dpon zla ba grags pa dang/ slob 
dpon Inga bos mdzad pa'i dbu ma'i gzhung de dag ni dbu ma'i gzhung thams 
cad lyi phyi mo yin no// dbu ma'i gzhung thams cad lyi rtsa ba yin pas 'gran 
zla med pa yin no// 
Concerning the Sanskrit names of teachers, I followed Miyazaki [1993). Ile explains that Candrakirti 
is classified into the müla authors because Atisa considers Tantrism more important as he translates 
a work of Tantrist Candrakirti. In my opinion, however, Ati§a just thought Candrakirti was a 
predecessor of Bhäviveka. 
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the texts of the Sravaka Sautrzntika (nyan rhos nido sde pa), (4) the authors of the texts 
of the Säkdra (main bcas) and the Niräk, ra (mnam med) Yog5c, u-a and (5) the authors of 
the texts of the Madhyamaka. Then the authors of Madhyamaka texts are again divided 
into three. (1) Bhavya, Buddhapzlita, Devasarman, Avalokitavrata, Säntaraksita and 
Kamalasila are classified under the authors of texts of the Madhyamaka (dBu ma). (2) 
Candragomin, Süra, Sägaramegha, S5ntideva and Luntaka are regarded as the authors of 
the texts of practice. (3) Nägärjuna, Aryadeva, Maticitra, Kambala and Candrakirti are 
considered the authors of the root texts of all the Madhyamaka texts. 
Unfortunately, Atisa does not mention what they postulate and it is not clear what 
is the criterion of this classification. This is neither classification of the Svätantrika and 
the Präsangika nor that of the externalist and the internalist. However, if we pay attention 
to the Madhyamaka (1) and (3), we realise some important points. The texts of the five 
Madhyamaka teachers in (3) are explained to be the foundation (phyi mo) or the roots 
(müla, rtsa ba) of all the Madhyamaka texts. The termphyi ino is used in the classification 
of the Madhyamaka of the fundamental texts (gzhung phyi 'no'i dbu ma pa) and the 
partisan Madhyamaka (phyogs 'dzin pa'i dbu ma pa) by Tsong kha pa, for example. 163 If 
Atisa and Tsong kha pa use the term in the same way, those teachers in (1) can be 
regarded as the partisan Mzdhyamikas. Bhäviveka in the Prajiiäpradipa criticises 
BuddhapMlita, and Sintaraksita distinguishes the externalist Mädhyamikas and the 
internalist Mädhyamikas in the Madhyamakülamkara and its Vrtti. 16' Avalokitavrata and 
Devasarman are considered by Atisa the two commentators on Bhäviveka's Prajiapradipa 
in the Bodhimargapradfpapanjika. 165 Kamalasila is a disciple of Säntaraksita. In this 
way, it is likely that these teachers were thought to have had different views in some way 
and therefore to be partisan. On the other hand, the five teachers who are the authors of 
the root texts are problematic. As Tibetan accounts describe, it is considered that at the 
163 Lam rim then mo (p. 571,17-19). 
163 See the second chapter of the present thesis (p. 54 ff. ). 
'65 Bodhimärgapradipapanljikd (Derge ed. 3948 khi 281a1-2, Peking ed. No. 5344 ki 324b3-4): 
dc la shes rab sgron ma la t'i ka then po gnyis yod de/ a'a ts'a rya spyan ras gzigs brad zhugs 
kyis mdzad pa dang/ a'a ts'a rya de ba sha rmas mdzad pa'i dbu ma dkar po 'char ba'o// 
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time of Nigarjuna and Aryadeva, the Mädhyamikas did not have different doctrinal 
views. However, Candrakirti is regarded as a Prisangika because he criticised Bhaviveka's 
usage of inference. Moreover, Kambala is sometimes regarded as a Niräklra-Cittamltra 
and sometimes classified as a Nir5kära-M5dhyamika. 166 
Now, if we integrate Atiga's classification of the Madhyamaka teachers in the 
Bodhimdrgapradipapanjikd and Ratnakarandodghiýta, we can conclude that Atiga places 
himself at the end of the Madhyamaka lineage from Nägärjuna through Aryadeva, 
Candrakirti, Bhavya, and Säntideva to Bodhibhadra. This is peculiar in that he places 
Candrakirti before Bhavya. He classifies Candrakirti as an author of the mida texts of all 
the Madhyamaka texts and Bhäviveka as an author of Madhyaniaka texts. It seems 
therefore that Bhäviveka is the first partisan Mädhyamika. This is supported by the 
accounts of Bodhibhadra, Atisa's direct teacher, who mentions Bhäviveka and Säntaraksita 
as representative figures of externalists and internalists respectively in the Jflänasära- 
samuccayanibandhana. 167 Assuming that Bodhibhadra shares the same understanding of 
the Madhyamaka lineage, he may well regard Bhäviveka as the representative of the 
externalist Madhyamaka because Candrakirti is understood to be one of the authors of 
the müla texts. 
Putting the pieces together, Atisa's understanding of the Madhyamaka lineage can 
be shown as follows: 
N gzrjuna-Äryadeva- Candrakirti-j 
Bhavya -Buddhap5lita(? )168 Santideva- Bodhibhadra - Atiga 
S, ntaraksita - Kamalasila 
166 See Lindtner [1985] (pp. 111-112). Kurihara [1991] (p. 42) points out that the Grub mtha' chen 
mo, the lCan skya grub mtha', the Grub mtha' rin then phreng ba and the Grub mtha'shel gyi nie 
long classify Kambala as a Niräkära-Mädhyamika. 
167 Sec 2.3 (p. 65 ff. ). 
168 It is not clear how Atisa considers Buddhapälita. It may be the case that he considers that 
Ruddhapslita was later than Bhavya, because lie places Buddbapälita after Bli viveka in the 
Ratnakarandodghnta, which is quoted previously (passage [3-74] p. 191). 
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In this way, Atisa does not seem to distinguish the Sv itantrika and the Pr5sarigika 
among the externalist Mädhyamikas and places himself in the externalist lineage. However 
it is not clear how he understood the passages in the Prasannapadd with which Candrakirti 
criticised Bhzviveka. It is also not clear, from the examination of Atisa's works alone, 
why Candrakirti, Maticitra and Kambala are included in the authors of the mirla texts and 
whether they were really the writers of the in la texts. 
To sum up, judging from the facts that Atisa does not postulate the concordant 
ultimate, that he does not accept praindna as a means to reach the ultimate, that he 
quotes from Candrakirti and that he regards Candrakirti as a teacher in his lineage, we 
may regard Atisa as a Präsarigika. Nevertheless, there are many pieces of evidence that 
indicates the contrary. Atisa states that Bhdviveka (or Bhavya) belongs to the very same 
lineage Candrakirti belongs to and refers also to Bhäviveka in his works. His teacher, 
Bodhibhadra, regards Bhavya, not Candrakrrti, as a representative figure of those who 
hold the existence of external objects. Atisa, in addition to this, does not translate any 
works of Candrakirti but two that are not regarded as his major works. Furthermore, his 
definition of the conventional truth is very similar to those given by Szntaraksita and 
Jii nagarbha although he is indeed a Prisangika in that he rejects the concordant ultimate 
and is against the use of pramana to attain emptiness. It seems that Atisa's view on the 
two truths is based on the ideas of Candrakirti, Bhäviveka and Säntaraksita, who are 
respectively regarded by Tibetan scholars as a Prlsangika, a Sauträntika-Sv, tantrika and 
a Yogzczra-Svätantrika. It is, therefore, extremely difficult to decide whether he is a 
Prasaingika or not because different pieces of evidence lead in opposite directions. Also it 
seems to be almost impossible to explain the late Madhyamaka history on the basis of a 
simple dichotomy between the Svätantrika and the Präsangika, which follow Bhäviveka 
and Candrakirti respectively. In addition to this, Atisa's explanation of his lineage and 
his classification of the Madhyamaka teachers are different from the classification accepted 
by modern scholars. He includes both Candrakirti and Bhäviveka in his lineage in the 
Bodhirnargapradipapaiijika and classifies Candrakirti as an author of the inilla 
Madhyamaka texts but Bhäviveka and Buddhapälita as authors of the (ordinary) 
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Madhyamaka texts in the Ratnakarandodghäta. He does not seem to have the idea that 
the Madhyamaka was divided into two after Bh5viveka and Candrakirti. From these 
works of Atisa, therefore, we find both types of evidence, each suggesting that there was 
and was not the dichotomy of the Svdtantrika and the Pr saiigika among the externalists 
in India. 
There are, in my opinion, two different hypotheses which may solve this problem 
and explain Atisa's position and the late Indian Madhyamaka classification. The first one 
is the theory that there was no distinction between the Svätantrika and the Przsangika as 
Atisa includes both Bhäviveka and Candrakirti in the single lineage that descends to 
himself. As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, this is a quite tempting hypothesis 
because there is little evidence which shows the dichotomy of the Svätantrika and the 
Präsaiigika in terms of both the history of the Tibetan translation of texts in the earlier 
dissemination of Buddhism into Tibet, and reference to this classification by Indian 
Madhyamaka teachers before the 9th C. This point does not contradict the fact that 
Atisa's understanding of the Madhyamaka lineage does not seem to be based on the 
dichotomy of the Svätantrika and the Przsangika. In this case, this classification of the 
Madhyamaka may have been made up by Tibetan translators of the later dissemination, 
even though Tsong kha pa does not agree with it. If this is the case, however, it is still 
necessary to explain how the difference of the view on the two truths is dealt with by 
Indian Mädhyamikas, because, as we examined, there are two different views that disagree 
on interpretation of the concordant ultimate. Furthermore, if we classify Atisa simply 
according to his attitude towards inference, regardless of the fact that he follows the 
Svätantrika teachers in some points, he is no doubt a Präsangika. Then, we also have to 
explain how the current within the externalist Madhyamaka changed frone the Svätantrika 
which was the main stream at least until the end of the 8th C to the Prasatigika which 
became popular after 1000 AD. 
The other hypothesis is the theory that there were Präsangikas who were not 
`pure' Przsangikas. In other words, there was a Przsangika system which does not 
strictly follow Candrakirti's. This might sound abrupt, but it seems to me that the attitude 
of Atisa towards formal logic is surely that of the Przsaegika. This theory could also 
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explain most of the problems surrounding Atisa's position. 
The clue which may solve this problem is the existence of (at least) two Bhzvivekas: 
one is the author of the Prajnipradipa and the Madhyamakahrdayakärikd, and the other 
of the Madhyamakaratnapradipa, 169 whom I henceforth call Bhzviveka and Bhavya 
respectively for the purpose of convenience. As is stated in the Bodhimdrgapradipapaiijika, 
Atisa mentions the lineage of his teachers: Nzgärjuna, Aryadeva, Candrakirti, Bhavya- 
Bhzviveka, Säntideva and Bodhibhadra. If we assume that this is in a chronological 
order, it is very likely that he regarded Bhavya-Bhäviveka as later than Candrakirti. This 
suggests that he attaches importance to the Madhyarnakarainapradipa of Bhavya, which 
refers to Candrakirti on many occasions. To give an example, verse 6: 80 of the 
Madhyamakdvatcra, which is quoted in the Satyadvaydvatära1° is also quoted in the 
Madhyamakaratnapradipa of Bhavya. "' In addition to this, the five mWa teachers Atisa 
169 77irough the examination of quotations, Yamaguchi [1943] concludes that the Madhyamakaratna- 
pradipa is not a genuine work of I3hävivcka. 
170 Verse 19 of the Satyadvayavatara. Sec 3.4.1, passage [3-63] (p. 182). 
171 Madhyamakaratnapradipa (berge cd. No. 3854 tsha 261a2-3, Peking ed. No. 5254 tslia 328a5. 
Cf. p. 182, note 145). Another significant example is a quotation of verses 6: 4-5 from the 
Madhyamaknvatdra(La Vallee Poussin [1907-11] p. 78,2-13): 
so so Skye bo'i dus na'ang stong pa nyid thos nas// 
nang du rab tu dga' ba yang dang yang du 'byung// 
rab tu dga' ba las byung mchi mas mig brlan zhingl/ 
lus kyi ba spu Idang bar gyur ba gang yin pa// 6: 4 // 
de la rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas blo yi sa bon yod// 
dc nyid nye bar bstan pa'i snod ni dc yin tc// 
de la dam pa'i don gyi bden pa bstan par bya// 
de la de yi rjes su 'pro ba'i yon tan 'byung// 6: 5 // 
'Thc original Sanskrit is found in the Subhüsitasamgraha (Bendall [1905] p. 13,19-25): 
prtagjanatve 'pi nisamya snnyatäm pramodam antar labhate muhur muhuh I 
prasädajäsrävaniptalocanah tannruhotphullatanus ca jäyate II 
yat tasya sambodhidhiyo 'sti bijäm tattvopadcgasya ca bhäjanam sah I 
äkhyeyam asmai paramhthasatyam tadanvay5s tasya gunä bhavanti II 
These verses are quoted in the Madhyamakaratnapradipa, as follows (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 
277b5-6, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 349b7-8): 
so so skye bo'i this na stong nyid thos(')// nang gi dga' ba yang dang yang ni 'byung// 
dga' ba las byung mig ni mchi mas gang// lus kyi ba spu Idang ba'ang skye bar 'gyur// 
gang yin dc la byang chub sa bon yod// don dam bden pa dc la bstan par bya// 
dc rtogs<2} pa yi yon tan de las byung// 
(1) D: rhos, P: thob. (2) D: riogs, P: rtog. 
They are quite different from the Tibetan translation of the Madhyamakävatära shown above. The 
quotation of the same verses is found in the Bodhimargapradipapanjikü of Atisa (Derge ed. 3948 
Mii 269a7-bl, Peking ed. No. 5344 ki 310b8-311al): 
so so skye bo'i dus na stong nyid thos// nang gi dga' ba yang dang yang du 'byung// 
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mentions in the Ratnakarandodghata are all found in the Madhyamakarainapradipa. 
Maticitra is mentioned by name in the seventh chapter12 and verse 13 of Kambala's 
Alokamnlä is quoted in the fifth chapter. 13 It is evident that Atisa regards Nzg5rjuna, 
Aryadeva, Maticitra, Kambala and Candrakirti, who are found in the 
Madhyamakarainapradipa of Bhavya, as the authors of the mala Madhyamaka texts and 
seemingly considers that the Madhyamaka was divided into different branches after 
Bhiviveka. Atisa's dependence on the Madhyamakarainapradipa can also be known 
from the history of his translation. Among the works ascribed to Bhavya or Bhzviveka 
which were translated into Tibetan by Atisa, the Madhyamakaratnapradipa is the first 
one which was translated when he was still in India. 74 In the Madhyamakaratnapradipa, 
moreover, Bhavya refers to the Pancaskandhaprakarana"5 of Candrakirti by name and 
quotes on four occasions from the Trisaranasaptati16 of Candrakirti. They are the only 
works of Candrakirti translated by Atisa 1" 
Therefore, it is almost certain that Atisa has the later Bhavya in mind when he 
mentions Bhavya-Bhäviveka"g in the Bodhimärgapradipapanjikä even though it seems 
that Atisa does not realise that Bhzviveka, the author of the Prajimpradipa and the 
dga' ba las byung mig ni mchi mas gang// lus kyi spu Idang ba yang skye bar 'gyur// 
gang yin de la byang chub sa bon yod// don dam bden pa de la bstan par bya// 
der rtogs pa yi yon tan de ]as 'byung// 
This difference may have been caused in the process of translation and the original Sanskrit may 
have been the same. Ilowever, lack of pdda b in verse 6: 5 quoted in the Madhyamakaratnapradipa 
and the Bodhimürgapradipapannjikd seems to suggest more relation between the two texts. It may 
be, on the other hand, nothing significant if we consider the fact that the Madhyamakaratnapradipa 
was translated into Tibetan by Atiga. 
12 Madhyamakaratnapradipa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 282a2, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 355b2). 
'11iis is pointed out by Yamaguchi [1943] p. 87. 
"' Madhyamckaratnapradipa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 272b4-5, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 343a2-3). 
This is pointed out by Lindtner [1982a] p. 175. 
"a Inaba [1966] pp. 24-33. 
15 Madhyamakarainapradipa (Dergc ed. No. 3854 tsha 266b4, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 335b3). 
176 Madhyamakaratnapradipa (Dcrge cd. No. 3854 tsha 284b6, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 327b2-3 
[=v. 3 of the Trisaranasaptati], D. 272a7-bl, 275b6, P. 342b5,347a6 [=v. 28] and D. 284b6, P. 
359a3 [=v. 4]). See Lindtner [1982a] p. 175. 
"7 Inaba [1966] p. 23 and p. 31. 
178 lijima [1983] and Lindtner [1981] point out that Atisa's Satyadvayrivatära has close relation to 
Bhavya's Madhyamakaratnapradfpa. 
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Madhyamakahrdayakdrika, and Bhavya who wrote the Madhyamakaratnapradipa are 
not identical. In this case, Bhavya's view which Atisa assumes and Bhäviveka's view 
that we know as a Svätantrika may not possibly be the same and reference to Bhavya by 
Atisa probably amounts to little regarding the classification of Atisa as a Pr5saiigika. 179 
On the other hand, it should be noted that Atisa may not have been very interested in 
Candrakirti himself. It is probably because Bhavya mentions the Trisaranasaptati and 
recommends reading the Pan"caskandhaprakarana that Atisa translated these works of 
Candrakirti into Tibetan. If he considered Candrakirti's works more important than those 
of Bhäviveka's, he would have translated other works of Candrakirti, especially the 
Madhyamakävaiara and the Prasannapadü into Tibetan although we have to note that 
the Trisaranasaptati and the Pancaskandhaprakarana as well as the Madhyamaküvatdra 
are considered Candrakirti's own works that are not commentaries on his predecessors'. "' 
In order to assure ourselves of this matter, it is now necessary to examine the view of the 
two truths in the Madhyamakaratnapradtpa of Bhavya. 
3.5 Bhavya 
In the previous section, I examined Atisa's view of the two truths in order to 
decide his position in terms of the Svatantrika-Prasangika distinction. Assuming that the 
Midhyamikas who do not accept the concordant ultimate are the Präsangika, as we 
discussed above in this chapter, Atisa is classified as a Präsangika. However, some 
evidence shows that he considers Bhäviveka, whom he does not distinguish from Bhavya, 
more important than Candrakirti. I hypothesised that Atisa followed Bhavya's position 
that was expressed in the Madhyamakaratnapradipa, which was possibly different from 
that of Bhäviveka expressed in the Prajnäpradipa and the Madhyamakahrdayakärikä. In 
this section, therefore, we will examine the view of the two truths expressed in the 
Madhyamakaratnapradipa and compare it with those in the Madhyamakahrdayakdrikü 
179 Even if we take this position and assume that Atisa considers that the final position of 
Bhavya/Bhäviveka is expressed in the Mad hyamakararnapradipa, it is not clear how lie reconciled 
two different views of Bhavya and I3häviveka, whom he does not distinguish. 
'8Ö Therefore it is also possible that Indian teachers at Atiga's time, unlike modern scholars, considered 
the Trisaranasaptati and the Pan"caskandhaprakarana were the main works of Candraldrti. 
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and the Satyadvayavatära. ' Substantial studies on the Madhyamakaratnapradipa have 
already done by Yamaguchi, Hasuba, Lindtner, Ejima and Miyazaki. "' Hasuba, Lindtner 
and Ejima have already translated the satyadvaya chapter. 182 Therefore, I will show only 
passages relevant to the matter concerning us. 
With regard to the date of this text, we do not know for certain when it was 
written. It is impossible to trace from the author because it is ascribed to Bhavya, who 
has traditionally been understood as Bhäviveka. As a result, it has to be decided by 
examining the contents and the history of translation. As we have seen, in the fifth 
chapter of the Madhyamakaratnapradipa, Bhavya mentions the distinction of the externalist 
and the internalist within the Madhyamaka, which must have occurred after Säntaraksita 
(724-788). Also his definition of the conventional truth is very similar to that of Säntaraksita. 
Therefore, Bhavya is, in all probability, after Szntaraksita. It also quotes from Padmavajra's 
Guhyasiddhi Saraha's Dohakosa, N gärjuna's Pahcakraina and Aryadeva's 
Svddisthanakramaprabheda. Although it is not certain exactly when these texts were 
written, it is considered to be around the 9th C. 183 On the other hand, Atisa (982-1055) 
translated the Madhyamakarainapradipa. According to its postscript, he translated it in 
Somapuri. This means that it is before he left India for Tibet in 1040. Therefore, the 
Madhyamakaratnapradipa is tentatively placed between the later half of the 9th C and 
the beginning of 11th C. If we take into consideration that it can take a considerable 
duration of time for a forged work to obtain authenticity, it is most probable that it was 
composed in the late 9th C or in the first half of the 10th C. 
18' Yamaguchi [1941], Ilasuba [1966], Lindtner [1981], Ejima [1983] and Miyazaki [1993]. 
182 See Lindtner [1981] pp. 169-177, Ejima [1980b] and [1983] pp. 374-382. Ejima [1983] examines 
the relationship between the Satyadvayavatüra and the Madhyamakaratnapradipa. Ilere I mainly 
follow his study and there is not much to add concerning their relationship. however, lie does not 
give a conclusion concerning the historical position of the Madhyamakaratnapradepa and leaves it 
as a point to be examined in the future. Lindtner [1982a], on the other hand, considers that the 
author of the Madhyamakaratnapradipa is the same as that of the Prajnäpradtpa and the 
Madhyamakaknrikä (whom he calls Bhavya). Nevertheless, the view on the two truths in the 
former seems to me to be different from that in the latter two. 
'T'herefore, although the most of this section overlaps with the studies of Lindtner and Ejima, it 
is necessary to show the similarity of the two texts here again in order to ascertain the view of the 
two truths and the historical position of Bhavya and the Madhyamakaratnapradipa. 
183 Iladano maintains that the date of Jnanapäda, the teacher of Padmavajra is ca. 750-800 and 
Padmavajra's date is the late 8th C to the early 9th C. 
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The Madhyamakaratnapradipa consists of 9 chapters. Of these, the first one is 
allotted to an examination of the two truths. As already pointed out by Ejima, its contents 
are strikingly similar to those of Atisa's Saiyadvayävatdra, which also deals with the two 
truths. Atisa's view on the two truths is rather strange in terms of its having both 
characteristics of the Svatantrika and the Przsaiigika. While Atiga does not accept the 
concordant ultimate in line with Candrakirti, his explanation of the conventional truth is 
quite similar to those of Jnznagarbha and Säntaraksita. He considers the conventional 
truth to be `consistent with seeing' as Jnänagarbha does, and defines the true convention 
as (1) pleasing as long as it is not examined, (2) subject to arising and cessation and (3) 
capable of causal efficiency, in the same way as S, ntaraksita. As Ejima points out, 18' 
these characteristics are also found in the Madhyamakarainapradipa. For example, the 
definitions of the conventional truth are very similar to that in the Satyadvayavatdra: 
[3-75] 
That which is pleasing as long as it is not examined, arises from a cause 
and is capable of causal efficiency, like a stem of plantain, is the [true] 
convention (samvrti) of those who see this side, 185 
In this way, the convention is defined as (1) pleasing as long as it is not examined, 
(2) causally produced and (3) capable of causal efficiency in theMadhyamakarainapradipa 
in a similar way to the Satyadvaydvatära of Atisa. Although these definitions are 
generally regarded as those of the Yogäcara-Mädhyamikas because they are found in 
'84 Ejima [1983] pp. 374-382, especially p. 380. 
'85 Madhyamakaralnapradipa (Derge cd. No. 3854 tsha 260a2, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 326b7-8): 
chu skiing gi ni phung po bzhin// ma brtags nyams dag'i mtshan nyid can// 
rgya las skyes dang don byed nus// tshu rol mthong ba'i bim rdzob yin// 
Cf. the Satyadvayävatara, v. 3 (3.4.1, passage [3-65] p. 183): 
A phenomenon which is pleasing only as long as it is not examined, which arises and ceases to 
exist and which is capable of causal efficiency is held to be the true convention. 
ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' ba'i// skye ba dang ni 'jig pa'i chos// 
don byed nus dang Idan pa ni// yang dag kun rdzob yin par 'dod// 3 // 
The similarity of these two verses is pointed out in Ejima [1983] p. 387, note 42. 
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Sintaraksita's Madhyauiakülamküra, "' it seems that they are widely accepted by the late 
Midhyamikas irrespective of their view on conventional existence. Bhavya also describes 
the conventional truth as `consistent with seeing': 
[3-76] 
The convention is entities "consistent with seeing" (ji liar snang ba) such 
as material things (gzugs pa, *rilpa). 187 
There are also some passages which seem to be taken from the 
Madhyamakahrdayakdrika and the Prajüäpradipa. However, as Ejima points out, these 
passages are re-arranged so that they mean that prainäna is unimportant. In the fifth 
chapter of the Madhyamakaratnapradipa, Bhavya states as follows: 
[3-77] 
This [ultimate truth] is not understood by two cognitions: that with 
conceptual construct and that without conceptual construct. The common 
usage (Ma snyad, *vyavahdra) of verbal authority (sgra, *sabda) and the 
valid means of knowledge (thsad ma, *pramana) are not necessary for 
cultivation towards the goal. 188 
'86 The definition based on art{uikriyi is found in Jnänagarbha's Satyadvayavibhanga and can be 
traced back to Dliarmakirti. Sec Eckel [1987] p. 54, and 3.3 of the present thesis. 
'87 Madhyamakaratnapradipa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 260b5, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 327b7): 
kun rdzob ces bya ba ni gzugs la sogs pa ji ltar snang ba'i dngos po'o// 
188 Madhyamakaratnapradfpa (Derge cd. No. 3854 tsha 272a6, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 342b6): 
rtog bcas rtog pa med pa yi// shes pa gnyis kyis 'di mi rtogs// 
sgra dang tshad ma'i tha snyad dag// de don bsgom la dgos pa med// 
Bjima [1983] (p. 384, note 11), gives the original verse in the Madhyamkahrdayakürikä, v. 3: 285: 
savikalpävikalpena jnänenäpy esa durdrsah II 
It is difficult to sec this [dharmalaya] with thought either with conceptual construct or without 
conceptual construct. 
According to Ejima, this verse of the MadhyamkahrdayaWriW concerns the dharrnakdya. It does 
not seem, therefore, that it mentions the connection between the ultimate truth and the valid means 
of knowledge. However, Bhavya quotes this half verse and utilises it to deny accessibility to the 
ultimate truth by the valid means of knowledge. 
Cf. Satyadvayüvatüra, v. 14 (3.4.1 passage [3-70] p. 186): 
The acarya, learned Bhavya says that [the ultimate] cannot be clearly understood even from 
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On the occasions when one refutes the objection of outsiders and a treatise 
is large, verbal authority and the valid means of knowledge should be 
mentioned, as written by previous teachers. 's9 
In the Madhyamakarainapradipa, it is explained that verbal authority (sabda) and 
the valid means of knowledge (pramäpa) are not necessary for cultivation of the reality 
and only used to refute outsiders. It seems to me that Bhavya accepts them conventionally 
and denies their validity ultimately. Atisa probably holds the same view in the 
Satyadvaydvatära and the BodhimdrgapradTpapanjika. He states in the latter, as follows: 
[3-78] 
Why were many treatises composed by Dharmakirti, Dharmottara and 
others? The learned composed [them] to refute the objection of outsiders. 
(=[3-61 11)190 
In this verse, Atisa mentions Dharmakirti and Dharmottara. Verbal authority (sabda) 
and the valid means of knowledge (pramäna) that Bhavya mentions are replaced by 
`many treatises composed by Dharmakirti, Dharmottara and others' in the 
Bodhimargapradipapah-jika of Atiga. Ejima understands that Atisa here criticises 
Dharmaldrti and Dharmottara. However he does not consider that `others' include 
Bh5viveka, Jnznagarbha, Sintaraksita, Kamalaszla and Srigupta, who accept the concordant 
scriptural authority [or] by [either of] two thoughts: that with conceptual construct or without 
conceptual construct.. 
lung las kyang ni gsal po ru// rtog bcas rtog pa med pa yi// 
shes pa gnyis kyis mi rtog sties// slob dpon mkhas pa bha bya gsung// 14 // 
See Ejima [ 1983] pp. 389-90, note 65. 
189Madhyamakaratnapradipa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 272b1-2, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 342b6): 
pha rol rgol ba bzlog pa dang// bstan bcos chen po'i dus dag tu// 
sngon gyi mkhas pas bkod pa bzhin// sgra dang tshad ma'ang smra bya// 
Cf. Sat yadvayezvatüra, v. 13cd: 
The learned make use of [pramnna] to refute the claim of outsiders. 
mu stegs rgol ba bzlog pa'i pliyir // mkhas pa reams kyis byas pa yin// 13cd // 
190 Bodhimargapradipapanjikü (Derge ed. No. 3948 khi 282b5, Peking ed. No. 5344 ki 326b6-7): 
chos grags chos mchog la sogs pas// gzlmng mang byas pa ji Ita bu// 
mu stegs rgol ba bzlog pa'i phyir// mkhas pa reams kyis byas pa yin// 
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ultimate. '' As the reason for this, Ejima points out the fact that when Atisa gives the 
four kinds of reasoning to prove lack of intrinsic nature in the same text, he accepts the 
reasoning of Sdntaraksita192 and Sr gupta. Nevertheless this is not tenable if Atisa here 
follows Bhavya because we find a similar expression again in the seventh chapter of the 
Madhyamakaratnapradipa: 
[3-79] 
On occasions when one refutes the claims of outsiders, a large treatise is 
written and a large dispute should happen, the Madhyamaka texts of 
reasoning should be mentioned 193 
In this verse, instead of verbal authority and the valid means of knowledge or 
many treatises composed by Dharmakirti, Dharmottara and others, the Madhyamaka 
texts of reasoning (rigs pa'i dbu ina'i gzhung) are mentioned. Again they are not regarded 
as an effective means to reach the ultimate truth, but as a means to refute outsiders and 
so forth. Even though Bhavya does not mention who the authors of these texts are, it is 
likely that they are the Svitantrikas. Therefore if Atiga expresses the same view in the 
BodhimJrgapradfpapanjika, he may include the Midhyamikas who wrote the texts 
concerning reasoning in `others'. It should also be pointed out that Bhavya does not 
necessarily criticise the Madhyamaka texts of reasoning in this verse. On the contrary, 
this verse should be understood as his acceptance of these texts at the conventional level. 
It is neither the Madhyamaka texts of reasoning nor the treatises composed by Dharmakirti, 
Dharmottara and others, but those who consider that these texts are valid to attain the 
ultimate truth that are here criticised by Atisa. 
In theMadhyamakaratnapradipa, thus the valid means of knowledge and reasoning 
191 Ejima [1983] pp. 371-372 and [1980a] pp. 239-246. 
192 This is the reasoning of `lack of one intrinsic nature and many' which is quoted as [3-44] (p. 159). 
Also sec Tillemans [1984] (p. 361 and p. 371 note 16). 
19' MadhyamakaratnapradFpa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 281a3, Peking ed. No. 5254 tslia 354a5-6): 
pha rol rgol ba bzlag pa dang// bstan bcos clien po'i gzhung dang nil/ 
rtsod pa eben po byung dus su// rigs pa'i dbu ma'i gzhung smra bya// 
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are constantly given only a low position in the conventional world. In addition to this, 
Bhavya's definitions of the ultimate truth lack the most important mark of the Sv, tantrika: 
[3-80] 
Artha [of paramnrtha] means what is to be examined and to be grasped. 
Parama is ultimate. Alternatively (1) [paramärtha means] the ultimate 
object because it is the object and is ultimate. (kannadhdraya compound) 
Alternatively (2) [parainartha means] the object of the ultimate. It is the 
object of the ultimate because it is the object of the ultimate wisdom. 
(tatpuru, ca compound) The truth should not falsify. 194 
These interpretations of the ultimate (paramirtha) are almost identical with those 
in the Tarkajväld, except that there is no interpretation as a bahuvrihi compound which 
is a sign of the Svitantrika interpretation of the ultimate truth. This implies that Bhavya 
composed a treatise based on Bhäviveka's works but eliminated the Svätantrika elements. 
It is therefore appropriate to classify Bhavya, the author of the Madhyamakaratnapradipa, 
as a Prisangika in that he does not accept the concordant ultimate. It is also conceivable 
that it is absolutely necessary for Bhavya to admit that `the Madhyamaka texts of 
reasoning"" should be mentioned when one refutes outsiders in order to keep consistency, 
to a certain extent, because while inference is positively employed in the Prajndpradipa 
and the Madhyamakahrdayakarika, the Madhyamakaratnapradipa, which is supposed to 
be composed by the same author is written from the point of the view of the Präsaügika. 
Thus it is evident that Atisa follows the Madhyamakaratnapradºpa of Bhavya 
who can be regarded as a Przsaiigika, concerning the two truths. Even though Atisa's 
definitions of the convention are almost identical with that of the Svätantrika, they are 
193Madhyatnakaratnapradipa (Derge ed. No. 3854 tsha 260b6-7, Peking ed. tsha 327b8-328a1): 
don zhes bya ba ni brtag par bya ba dang/ go bar bya ba'o II dam pa ni mchog go / yang na 
don yang yin la / dam pa yang yin pas don dam pa'o // yang na dam pa'i don de ye sues dam 
pa'i don yin pas na dam pa'i don no II bden pa ni mi bslu ba'o// 
Compare this with the Tarkajväld, passage [3-26] (p. 144). 
195 Also this can be the first reference to the Svätantrika by the Pr tsangil: a after Candra ti. 
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nothis original but traced back to Bhavya. In addition, his understanding of the Madhyainaka 
lineage is very strange at a glance, but it can be explained clearly depending on the 
Madhyanrakaratnapradipa. Here being a Präsangika does not necessarily mean to be a 
follower of Candrakirti. I rather define it as a Mädhyamika who does not accept the 
concordant ultimate and accepts the valid means of knowledge (pramdna) including 
inference (anumana) only for conventional purposes, such as the refutation of outsiders. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Generally speaking, both by Tibetan doxographers and modern scholars, the history 
of the Madhyamaka has been explained in the following simple way: After Nägärjuna 
founded the Madhyamaka, there was no distinction until Bhäviveka criticised Buddhapälita, 
and Candrakirti, in support of Buddhapälita, objected to Bhäviveka's use of inference. 
This created the distinction of the Svitantrika of Bhlviveka and the Prnsangika of 
Candrakjrti. Then Säntaraksita founded the Yogzcära-Sviitantrika-Madhyamaka by 
postulating mind-only conventionally and the Svätantrika was divided into two, the 
internalist and the externalist, namely the Yogic, ra-Madhyamaka and the Sauträntika- 
Madhyamaka. This can be shown as follows: 
Candrakirti Atisa (Präsangika) 
Nzgirjuna-Aryadeva 
Bhäviveka (Sauträntika-Svztantrika) 
Säntaraksita - Kamalasila (Yogäcära-Svätantrika) 
As we discussed in the first chapter, however, there has been a doubt about 
existence of the Svätantrika and the Präsarngika distinction in India after Candrakirti. At 
least, we have not found the term `Svätantrika' and `Prisatigika' in Indian sources in a 
strict sense. Nevertheless, it is evident that there were sharply divided opinions on how 
to interpret the ultimate (paramäirtha) at the time of Atiga. The Svätantrika teachers 
whom I mentioned in this chapter, Bhäviveka, Avalokitavrata, Jnänagarbha, the anonymous 
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author of the Bodhisattvacaryavataravyakh)yänapanjikc, Szntaraksita, Kamalasila, 
Haribhadra and Jitäri, distinguish the concordant ultimate, which is teaching of non-arising 
from the non-conceptual ultimate. They mostly explain the former ultimate as `one 
which is conformable to paramartha' (paramürthünuküla), consistent with reasoning 
(*yathänyäya) or the concordant ultimate (*sariketikaparamärtha), and secure the validity 
of inference at the ultimate level. On the other hand, Candrakirti, a Pr5satigika, maintains 
only one paramdrtha, which is beyond any conceptualisation. Since the Svätantrikas, 
too, concede that paramärtha is free from any conceptual activity, disagreement between 
the two sides is based on the use of inference as a means to reach the ultimate truth and 
on inclusion of it in paramcrtha as the concordant ultimate. The system of Bhzviveka, 
which postulates different levels of the ultimate, is followed by many Svätantrika teachers, 
with some modification, throughout the middle and the later period of the Madhyamaka. 
Although they are classified into the Svätantrika according to their understanding 
of the ultimate, they have different views on the convention. While it is not clear who is 
the first to maintain the mind-only conventionally among the Svätantrikas, it is generally 
accepted that Sdntaraksita is the founder of the Yogäcära-Madhyamaka. Säntaraksita 
himself, on the other hand, comments on the Satyadvayavibhanga of Jnänagarbha from 
the point of view of the internalist Madhyamaka. Also Jnänagarbha himself seems to 
have held the internalist view as well. Jii nagarbha is, nevertheless, often regarded as an 
externalist Mädhyamika by dGe lugs doxographers of Tibet and probably also by the 
anonymous author of the Bodhisattvacaryävataravyäkhyünapanjiki7. Therefore, it may 
be the case that the bifurcation of the internalist and the externalist occurred because of a 
dispute over how to understand Jnänagarbha's view. 
While we are able to trace the Svätantrika thought reasonably well back to Indian 
sources, it is difficult for us to do the same with regard to the Pr5saiigika thought. 
Although the Präsaiigika has been regarded as the main stream of the Madhyamaka in 
Tibet since Tsong kha pa, there are hardly any distinctive traces of it in India for some 
200 years after Candrakirti (ca. 600-650) until Bhavya (ca. 9-10th Q. Ye shes sde (early 
9th C), in the 17a ba'i khyad par, one of the earliest doxographical accounts written in 
Tibet, does not mention Candraldrti but Bhiviveka, Säntaraksita and Kamalasila. 
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Additionally, during the earlier dissemination of Buddhism into Tibet, only one work of 
Candralirti was translated into Tibetan. Sintideva, the author of the Bodhicaryavatdra, 
is the only Indian teacher after Candrakrti before the 9th C who is widely considered as 
a Priisangika. The older version of the Bodhicaryavatara, which consists of 9 chapters 
and is ascribed to Aksayamati, is commented upon by the above mentioned anonymous 
commentator from the point of the view of the Svitantrika. There is, thus, virtually no 
clue that indicates what happened to the Präsaiigika before the 9th C. It is therefore 
impossible for us to know whether or not it kept a separate lineage from the Svätantrika. 
Anyway, we can assume that Candrakirti did not win popularity for a long time. It is, 
however, not difficult to explain why there are many accounts of Bhäviveka but not of 
Candrakirti. 
By Dignäga (5-6th C) and Dharmakirti (ca. 600-660), Buddhist logic was 
systematised. After Dignäga, use of formal logic in the form of syllogism was considered 
necessary to prove the legitimacy of one's view. In this period, the Mzdhyamikas who 
took advantage of inference to explain non-arising taught by Nzgirjuna, followers of 
Bhäviveka, were able to dispute with their rivals. On the other hand, Candrakirti who 
was not positive in his use of inference might have been easily underestimated. The 
systematisation of Buddhist logic and epistemology by Dhannakirti probably caused 
further changes in the Madhyamaka. As we examined in this chapter, it is those who 
interpreted Dharmakirti's theory from the Madhyamaka point of view who are later 
called the Yogäczra-Svätantrika-Mädhyamikas. ýäntaraksita quotes many verses from 
Dharmakirti in the Madhyamakülarnküravrtti and Jitäri regards him as a Mzdhyamika in 
the Sugatainatavibhanigabadsya. To follow Dharmakirti's theory conventionally may 
have meant acceptance of mind-only conventionally. This may possibly have resulted in 
establishment of the internalist Madhyamaka, which is generally called the Yogäcära- 
Madhyamaka. 
We do not know thus if the externalist Mädhyamikas formed two distinct lineages, 
the Svätantrika and the Pr5sangika, but, if they did, the situation seems to have changed 
towards the time when the Madhyamakarainapradipa was composed. This forged work 
was most probably intended to make everyone believe that Bhzviveka was indeed a 
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Präsangika, and to integrate the two factions, although it is not known whether this 
current of integration was created depending on the Madhyamakaratnapradrpa or had 
existed before it. Once this text became authoritative, the valid means of knowledge 
(pramaya) was adopted by the externalist M idhyamikas only to refute outsiders but not 
as means to reach the ultimate. If we take into account that no work of the externalist 
Svztantrika-Madhyamaka written after 1000 AD. is known to us, we can tentatively 
assume that the two branches of the externalist Mädhyamikas, if they had existed, were 
integrated, in the way we can see in the Madhyamakaratnapradipa and the 
Satyadvayüvatdra, which can be called Präsangika in the sense that they do not regard 
inference as a means of cultivation towards the ultimate. On the other hand, if the 
externalist Mädhyamikas did not form two factions after Candrakirti, they may have 
altered their view from the Svätantrika of Bhäviveka to the Präsangika of Bhavya, in 
opposition to the internalist Madhyamaka. 
Either way, Dharmakirti's logic and epistemology and the systematisation of the 
internalist Madhyamaka played an important role in deciding the direction of the externalist 
Madhyamaka in the late period. It should be noted that even though the externalist 
Mädhyamikas were probably almost exclusively Pr, ýsacigika after the 10th C, their view 
was not the same as that of Candrakirti, especially concerning the definition of the 
conventional truth. On the other hand, the Svätantrika seems to have become almost 
exclusively internalist. 
Thus if the Madhyamakarainapradipa was widely regarded as an authoritative 
work of Bhäviveka in India, it is possible for us to explain why we can hardly find any 
evidence of the distinction between the Svätantrika and the Pr isaiigika in the late 
Madhyamaka works and why Candrakirti obtained popularity after 1000 AD. 
To conclude, it seems that what actually happened in the Indian Madhyamaka 
history after Bhäviveka and Candrakirti is more complicated than is generally understood. 
In the middle period, while Candrakirti was not recognised, Bhäviveka appears frequently 
in the history. It is not certain if the Präsangika thought had a separate lineage in this 
period. After the 10th C, on the other hand, trace of the externalist Svitantrika-Madhyamaka 
is hardly found and Candrakirti reappears in the history. The latest text that contains the 
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extemalist Sv3tantrika view is, as far as I know, the Bodhicarya vatýiravyärkhydnapanjikä. 
The earliest text that clearly mentions Candrakirti and the Prdsangika thought is the 
Madhyamakaratnapradipa (ca. late 9th-10th Q. Therefore it is plausible that this presumed 
shift of the externalist view happened around the 9th C. This seems to be the result of 
integration of the externalist Svltantrika and the Prisangika or the externalist Svitantrika 
altering its view into that of the Prisangika. We can assume, therefore, that the externalist 
Madhyamaka was the Präsangika and the internalist Madhyamaka was the Svatantrika 
after this period. The Madhyamakarainaprafta is considered to have played a crucial 
role in this change. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, there was another shift from sakdra to 
nirdkJra in the externalist Madhyamaka. If we take both shifts into consideration, it is 
possible to draw the following conclusion. The externalist Madhyamaka maintained the 
conventional existence of external objects and self-awareness that is cognition with 
images, as is seen in the Bodhisattvacarydvatäravyäkhyanapaiijiki, and was Svätantrika 
at the early stage of the late Madhyamaka. This seems to have changed by the time of 
Atisa, so that it maintained conventional existence of external objects and cognition 
without images through denial of self-awareness, and became Pr5saiigika. The most 
likely explanation is that this was caused in contention with the internalist Madhyamaka 
which denied the conventional existence of external objects, maintained self-awareness 
that is cognition with images and was SwItantrika so that their thoughts hold a clear 
contrast. As a result of this, their position became as follows: 
external objects self-awareness üküra Präsangika/ 
Svätantrika 
Externalist existence of no self-awareness nirdkära Przsaiigika 
external objects 
Internalist no external objects self-awareness saki7ra Svätantrika 
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Now we can explain the reason why we cannot find the dichotomy of the Sv5tantrika 
and the PrIsarigika explicitly in Indian sources. There was probably no distinction of the 
SvAtantrika and the Przsaiigika in the externalist Madhyamaka after the 10th C as we 
examined in this chapter. The actual opposition existed between the internalist Madhyamaka 
and the externalist Madhyamaka. Because being the Svätantrika or the Pr, sangika was 
just an attribute of the internalist Mädhyamika or the externalist M5dhyamika, they were 
named according to their view on external objects and were probably not given another 
name that was only based on their view on inference. In addition, in the late period, this 
dichotomy did not exist in the externalist Madhyamaka, in the way we would expect 
from an opposition between Bhäviveka and Candrakirti. 
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As Ruegg mentioned it in the Literature of the Madhyainaka School of Philosophy 
in India, ' the classification of MIdhyamikas into the Myopamadvayavidin and the 
Sarvadharmlpratisthänavzdin is present in the Tativaratnävali of Advayavajra (ca. 11th 
C) It is, however, not entirely clear, from the very obscure description in the Tattvaratnavali, 
what is the difference of views between these proponents. Ruegg does not discuss much 
about what they postulate, either. As we examined in the first chapter, Tibetan accounts 
do not help for a definite answer due to their disagreement. Some dGe lugs teachers, 
such as 1Cang kya and 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, interpreting Tsong kha pa's description, 
regard this classification as a different way of describing the Svitantrika and the Prisaiigika. 
Others in the dGe lugs order deny validity of this classification. Tsong kha pa himself 
explains that this classification is based on different views of the ultimate truth according 
to some former teachers, and that these teachers consider it something to do with appearance 
(snang ba). On the other hand, according to Mi bskyod rdo rje, who belongs to the bKa 
brgyud pa, Advayavajra holds the view of the Niräkära-Yogäcära-Mädhyamika. In short, 
Tibetan accounts of this classification are divided into at least three different views. 
Some relate this classification to the Sviitantrika and the Priisangika in one way or 
another and some to the Sikira-Nir, 7ik5ra distinction. Others deny validity of this 
classification entirely. Fortunately, some other works written by Advayavajra survive. Of 
these, in the Pan"catathagatamudri7vivarana, he mentions a little more about this 
classification. Moreover, Ratnäkarasänti (B)2 seems to mention this way of classification 
in the Triyänavyavasthüna, but does not use the terms Mäyopamädvayav idin and 
Sarvadharmäpratisthiinavädin. The following sections are allotted to the examination of 
these Indian texts and others in order to ascertain the reliability of these Tibetan accounts 
and to clarify the difference of views between the Mäyopamädvayavädin and the 
' Ruegg [1981a] (p. 58 note 174). 
2 Ilayashi [1999] maintains that the Ratnäkaragänti who is the author of the PrajIiäpdramitopadesa 
and the Madhyamakdlamkdropadesa is different from the Ratnäkarasänti who wrote the Trifina- 
vyavasthdna In this thesis, I call the former Ratnäkara§änti or Ratnälarasänti (A) and the latter 
Ratnikarasänti (B), following Iiayashi's study. 
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Sarvadharmäpratisth navädin as well as who they are. 
4.1 Mäyopamädvayavädin and Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin 
described by Advayavajra 
4.1.1 Tattvaratnävali 
Advayavajra seems to have lived around the 11th C in Vikramasila. According to 
the Deb ther sngon po, he was a contemporary of Ratnakarasänti (A). 3 Therefore we 
know roughly when he lived but are not sure about his doctrinal position! As Ruegg 
reports, it is in the Tattvaratnavali that the classification into the M5yopam5dvayavidin 
and the Sarvadharmipratisthänavädin is mentioned. I will therefore, first present the 
translation of its passages that concern this classification: 
[4-1] 
The superior is the Mädhyarnika. Of the [Midhyamikas], the explanation 
of the Mäyopam idvayavädin [is as follows]: 
Neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both existent and non- 
existent, nor even the nature of neither [existent nor non-existent]. 
The Mädhyamikas know that the reality is free from the four 
alternatives (catuskoti). (v. 25) 
And this is its meaning. Not existent because [existence is] subject to a 
contradiction. Nor even non-existent because [it would result in] non- 
appearance. Nor even both because of the combination of both faults. Nor 
3 According to the Deb ther sngon po, Näro pa was a teacher of Ratnäkarasänti and Advayavajra 
(Roerich [1976], p. 380, the Deb Cher sngon po, 336,4-5). Iladano [1987] (p. 172,19-p. 173,5) 
places his lifetime between 986-1065 with 12 years tolerance. 
° Takada [1965] reports that Advayavajra expressed that he was a Sarvadharmäpratistliänavädin in 
the Caturmudropadesa. It is, however, not clear what his statement is based on. 
Some scholars 
have questioned the authenticity of the text because the name Advayavajra is mentioned in it. (See 
I-Iayashi [1999] p. 12, note 44) '1lierefom, it is possible that the Caturmudropadesa was composed 
by his disciple. On the other hand, I Iayashi [1999] holds that Advayavajra is a Mäyopamädvayavädin. 
Nevertheless, I consider that Advayavajra is a Sarvadharmäpmtisthänaviidin. This will be discussed 
later. 
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even neither of both because there would be no perception in that way. ' 
[4-2] 
On the other hand, this is the examination of the Sarvadharmzpratisthana- 
v5din: 
It is not maintained everything is permanent. And it is not postulated 
that they are annihilating. They are not a pair of permanent and 
annihilating. Nor [are they] neither which is without the two. (v. 
27) 
The wise know the reality of things when not abiding in any 
[position]. Then this mind which does not perceive its being mind 
is never conceptualisation. (v. 28) 
Because as long as there is superimposition on all [objects], all 
these never exist in any way, the teaching of Middle is without 
superimposition. How can there be denial or affirmation there? (v. 
29) 
Effortless cognition is said to be unthinkable. That which is 
unthinkable after being considered cannot be unthinkable. (v. 30) 
For a wise person by whom the world is understood as unproduced 
and apprehention (buddhi) is purified through his intelligence, the 
world is the truth of his own without an effort. (v. 31)6 
5 Tattvaratnävali (Ui [19521 p. 5,5-9): 
adhimätro mädihyamikali I tatra mäyopam5dvayav5dinali vivitih - 
na san näsan na sadasan na c ipy anubhayätmakam 
catuskotivinirmuktam tattvam mädhyamikä viduh 
asya cayam atthal} I na sad bsdhäyogit, asad api na c ibliäsanavasat, tathä dosadvandvs& 
ubhayam api na, näpy anubhayam tathäbodhäbhäväd iti 
(1) Ed. dosed dvandväd. 
6Tallvaratndvalf(Ui [1952], p. 5,13-23): 
sarvadharmäpratisthänav idindrp tv ayam vicärali - 
na matam säsvatam visvam na cocchedi sarnThiiam 
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It is not entirely clear what these two sub-schools maintain from these passages as 
well as what these passages mean. However, the point which draw our attention most is 
the difference between the four alternatives (catuskoti). The Mzyopamidvayavädins hold 
that the four alternatives are based on existence and non-existence. The four alternatives 
for the Sarvadharmapratisthänavädin are based on permanence and annihilation. Verse 
25 of the Tattvaratnavali is identical with verse 28 of the Jnmzasärasainuccaya. 7 
Bodhibhadra, in the commentary on verse 28 of the Jiänasarasamuccaya, introduces the 
externalist Mzdhyanükas and the intemalist Mzdhyamika. However, he does not mention 
the difference of the four alternatives. Therefore, it is not likely that the distinction of the 
Mäyopamädvayavädin and the Sarvadharmzpratisthtnav idin is the same as that of the 
internalist and the externalist. 
As seen in the first chapter, some dGe lugs doxographers identifies the 
Mäyopamädvayavädin and the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavzdin with the Svätantrika and 
the Präsangika. As we examined in chapter 3, nevertheless, it is very likely that the 
externalist Mädhyamika and the internalist Mldhyamika were the Präsangika and the 
Svztantrika around the 11th C, on the basis of the examination of Atiga's accounts. If this 
is the case, and if the externalist Mädhyamika and the internalist Mädhyamika both 
maintain the four alternatives based on existence and non-existence, the Mzyopamädvaya- 
§ä§vatocchedi no yugmam nänubhayam vinobhayam II (v. 27) 
sarvasminn apratisthäne vastutattvam vidur budhäh 
athaisä l alpanä naiva yä'ß cid vetti na cittatäm II (v. 28) 
yävaý2j sarvasamäropah sa sarvali sarvath i na hi I 
madhyamärtho niräropas taträpohavidln kutah II (v. 29) 
anäbhogam hi yaj jnänam tad acintyam pracaksate I 
samcintya yad acintyam vai tad acintyam bhaven na hi II (v. 30) 
yenäjätam jagad buddham buddhih suddhaiva bodhatah I 
nijam tasya jagat satyam anäbhogena dhimatah II (v. 31) 
(1) Em: yd, Ed: yac. (2) Ed. yo vit. Cf. Sekanirdesa v. 32 (Mikkyo [1991] p. 59). 
Verses 29,30 and 31 are respectively identical with verses 32,30 and 34 of the Sekanirdesa. 
7inänasürasamuccaya, v. 28 (Mimal: i [2000] p. 241,1-2): 
na san näsan na sadasan na c ipy anubhayätmakam 
catuskotivinirmuktam tattvam mädhyamil: Zi viduh 11 28 II 
See 4.2,2.3 and 3.3.6. 
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vädin and the Sarvadharmäpratisthznavidin cannot be respectively identical with the 
Svztantrika and the Prisangika. It is possible for us to be sure of this from the fact that 
this verse mentioning the four alternatives based on existence and non-existence is found 
also in the Sugatamatavibharigaknriký of Jitýi i8 and the Bodhicaryavatdrapanjikä of 
Prajnäkaramati 9 Jitäri is regarded as a Svätantrika as seen in the previous chapter. Also 
the dGe lugs doxographers accept it. 1° On the other hand, because we can safely assume 
that Prajntkaramati accepts the conventional existence of external objects, it follows that 
the externalist Midhyamikas maintain that the four alternatives are based on existence. 
Prajnäkaramati's position concerning the use of inference is not clear. However, he 
comments on the Bodhicarydvatdra following Candrakirti and it would not be acceptable 
for the dGe lugs doxographers that he is regarded as a Svätantrika. Both Jitäri and 
Prajnäkaramati adopt the four alternatives based on existence, which are maintained also 
by the Miyopamzdvayaviidin, and neither of them mentions any distinction in views of 
the four alternatives. Therefore, although dGe lugs teachers, such as 'Jam dbyangs bzhad 
pa and 1Cang kya, hold that the Mäyopamidvayavädin and the Sarvadharmäpratisthäna- 
vädin are other designations of the Svätantrika and the Präsangika, we cannot readily 
believe it. 
While the verse which gives the four alternatives based on existence is found in 
some other texts, " those based on permanence and annihilation, which the 
$ Shirasaki [1986] p. 15. 
Sugatamatavibhariga, v. 8 (Derge ed. No. 3899 a 8a3, Peking ed. 5296 ha 64b7-8): 
yod min med min yod med min // gnyis kyi bdag nyid du yang med // 
mtlia' bzhi dag las nges grol ba // dbu ma dc nyid mkhas pa 'dod // 
However, the same verse in the Sugatamatavibhaiigabhäsya is as follows (Derge ed. No. 3900 a 
60b3, Peking ed. No. 5868 nyo 348b5-6): 
yod min med min yod med min // gnyi ga min pa'i bdag nyid min// 
de nyid mtha' bzlii las grol ba// dbu ma pa yis rtogs pa yin// 
Shimsaki [1986] also shows that Advayavajra's commentary on this verse is similar to that on the 
verse 8 of the Sugatamatavibhangabhdsya by Jitäri. See passage [3-55] (p. 171) quoted above. 
9 Bodhicaryüvatärapanjika (La Vallee Poussin [1914] p. 358,10-11): 
na san n isan na sadasan na c ipy anubhayätmakam I 
catuskotivinirmuktam tattvam mädhyamikä viduh II 
10 dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, for example, classifies Jitäri as a Niräkära-Mädhyamika that is 
classified into the Svätantrika. See, 1.1. 
"Subiidsitasamgraha (Bendall [1905] p. 15,9-10): 
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Sarvadharm5pratisthänav3din maintains, are less common. It is, however, probably worth 
mentioning that Bhavya, in the Madhyaniakaratnapradipa, quotes the verses which teach 
the four alternatives based on existence and non-existence and those based on permanence 
and annihilation from a work of Aryadeva12 and that Atisa also mentions both kinds of 
the four alternatives in the Bodhiinargapradtpapanjika. 13 This may suggest that the 
distinction of the two kinds of the four alternatives is not important for Bhavya and 
Atisa. If we regard Bhavya and Atisa as Präsangikas, 14 this also shows that the Pr5sangika 
accepts both kinds of the four alternatives. Unfortunately, having mentioned both kinds 
of the four alternatives, they do not explain anything about the difference between the 
two and we need other clues in order to find out the difference. 
Thus we can find a criterion to distinguish Mäyopamadvayavädin and the 
Sarvadharm; apratisthanavädin in the Tattvaratnüvali, but it does not help us understand 
the views which they respectively hold or the difference in their views. Therefore, we 
now go on to examine the Pancatathügatamudravivarana, in which Advayavajra explains 
the views of the Mäyopamädvayavädin and the Sarvadharmäpratisthanavmdin. In the 
following section, the translation is first given in its entirety, although it is slightly long. 
na san näsan na sadasan na cäpy anubhayätmakam I 
catuskotivinirmuktam tattvam mädhyamikät viduh II 
Cf. San'adarsanasamgraha (Abhyankar [1924] p. 29): 
atas tattvam sadasadubhayänubhayätmakacatuskotivinirmuktam sünyam eva 
'Z Madhyamakaratnapradfpa (Derge ed. 3854 tsha 272a6-7, Peking ed. No. 5254 tsha 342b3-4): 
rje btzun a'a rya dc bas kyang// 
yod min rued min yod med min// gnyi ga med pa ma yin la// 
mu bzhi las ni mam grol ba// de nyid dbu ma pa yis rig// 
rtag pa ma yin chad pa min// rtag dang chad pa gnyi ga min// 
mtha' bzhi las ni mam grol ba// de don dbu ma pa yis rig// 
ces gsungs so// 
"ßodhinütrgapradipapanjikä (llerge ed. 3948 khi 282b6-7,1'eking ed. No. 5344 khi 326b8-327a1): 
yod min med min yod med min// gnyi ga min pa'ang ma yin pa'i// 
mtha' bzhi las ni mam grol ba'i// de nyid An ma pa yis rig// 
rtag min chad min rtag chad min// gnyi ga min pa'ang ma yin pa'i// 
mu bzhi las ni mam grol ba'i// de nyid dbu ma pa yis rtogs// 
14 For the position of ßhavya and Ati§a, see chapter 3. 
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4.1.2 Translation of Pancatathdgatamudrävivarana 
[4-3] 
Homage to Vajrasattva. 
Material things (rirpa) and other [constituents] which arise 
dependently, which are devoid of conceptualisation, which are 
empty, which are not substantially existent by nature, which are 
not subject to destruction, whose sole nature is various mind and 
which are the five Jinas are supreme. (v. 1) 
The five Tath igatas are the five constituents. Of these, the [first] four, 
[i. e. ri-tpa, vedand, samjnä and samskdra] are sealed with Aksobhya to 
explain the state of being representation-only (vijüaptimatrata). For this 
reason, the images of external [objects] are mind-only. Therefore, because 
of there being no perceived object, there is no perceiving subject, there 
remains only consciousness which is free from the perceived object and 
the perceiving subject, which is ultimately existent and which is mere 
awareness. For the Nir5k5rav5dins, nothing but this fundamental cognition 
spreading like the spotless autumn sky at midday should be realised. 
Also it is said: 
That [consciousness], which is empty of the imagined nature, 
without manifestation, without form and which is existence, 
awareness and mere pleasure is confused with the accumulation of 
subsequent images. (v. 2) 
It is said: 
[The dhannakaya is first] but the two ri paküyas are later. 15 
Moreover: 
15 Ratnagotraviblulga, v. 2: 61b (Johnston [1950] p. 88). 
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The dhannakäya of the great Sage is free from discriminative 
thought (prapafca) and from manifestation. The two rtipakayas 
produced from that [dhannakJya] remain like an illusion 
subsequently. (v. 3)16 
[4-4] 
[Objection]: Since [mind-only is] realised only through the mudrd of 
Aksobhya, why then does scriptural authority say Aksobhya is sealed 
with Vajrasattva? 
[Answer]: If one says that it is as much as to explain emptiness of 
conceptualised images, [I answer] it is not, because it has already 
been realised through the previous mudrä [of Aksobhya] alone. 
Therefore, it should be understood that in the way consciousness is 
fundamental and other[s] are subsequent by the mudrd of Aksobhya alone, 
in that way consciousness, in turn, is subsequent and vajra is fundamental 
by the mudrd of Vajrasattva. 
It is said in the Vajrasekhara: 
The essence which is firm, without a gap, whose characteristic is 
unbroken and inseparable; that is emptiness which is neither burnt 
nor perishable; [it] is said to be vajra. (v. 4)17 
If [it is understood that] material things and others are subsequent from 
the fundamental consciousness by the mudra of Aksobhya, then why, on 
earth, is it not understood that saliva is subsequent by the 'nudrd of 
vajra? If one says that saliva is also subsequent, then there would be the 
undesirable consequence of nihilism because there is no compassion. 
16 Quoted in the Tailvaratnüvali (v. 18, Ui [1952] p. 4,12-13) where this is shown as the doctrine of 
the Nirälära-Yogäcära. 
17 Also quoted in the Caturmudrüniscaya of Nägärjunagarbha (Mildyo [1989] p. 114,1-2). 
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But there should be- [compassion]. 
Emptiness is meant by vajra, and cognition-only by saliva. The 
identity of these two is realised from the nature of Vajrasattva. (v. 
5) 
The distinction of emptiness and compassion is like that of a lamp 
and its light. The sameness of emptiness and compassion is like 
that of a lamp and its light. (v. 6) 
Emptiness is not different from entities, and without that [emptiness] 
there is no entity. [There exists] the law of necessary connection 
[between them] just as [it exists] between the artificial and the 
impermanent. (v. 7) 
As there is no destruction of the convention when the truth is 
being stated, so the truth is not acquired without the convention. 
(v. 8) 
and so on. 
[4-51 
If [one argues] that there is thus the sameness of Aksobhya and Vajrasattva, 
[I answer] that if [one] does not abandon the nature of consciousness and 
others, the Citrzdvaitavzda will be best. 
It is said: 
My view is indeed that of the Säkära that is mind-only accompanied 
with various [images], empty of all conceptual constructs. Other 
respectable people assert the doctrine of the Middle, just like the 
sensation of grass for a walking person. (v. 9) 
But, the consciousness which is, for the Citrädvaitavädins, ultimately 
existent is not attractive because it is refuted that the consciousness whose 
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nature is Aksobhya that is citradvaita without the perceived object and 
the perceiving subject is substantially existent, because of the mudrä of 
Vajrasattva. 
Thus it is said: 
[Even] if consciousness [is shown to be] empty of the conceptual 
construct of material things and others because of the 'nudrd of 
Aksobhya, it is refuted that it is substantially existent because of 
the mudraof Vajrasattva. (v. 10) 
Besides, it is not the case that emptiness of constructed images of 
representation-only is taught by [the mudrd of] Vajrasattva, because 
as above it is not settled. (v. 11) 
In this way, because the cause of pain (salya) that it (consciousness) is 
ultimately existent vanishes, the doctrine of the Madhyamaka realised by 
the awareness in the non-dual stream effortlessly combined 
(anübhogayuganaddhadvayavahi) characterised by non-abiding in any 
position is best. And this is understood through the kindness of a good 
teacher. 
[4-6] 
If [one says] as an objection that if there is realisation of awareness in 
this state, there is an opportunity that it is the M5yopam5dvayaväda, and 
it is not `non-abiding in any position', [I answer] it is not [the case]. 
That which arises in dependence does not arise by nature. How is 
it that that which does not arise by nature arises? (v. 12)18 
And awareness arises in dependence. Therefore there is only awareness 
whose footing is unproduced, and which is not abided in. Moreover: 
18 Yuktisastikä, v. 19 (Lindtncr [1982b] pp. 108-109). 
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Awareness is indeed unproduced. Also being substantially existent 
is as such. But the Sage taught the world has the nature of Vajrasattva. 
(v. 13) 
Moreover, Manjusri is asked by the Tathägata: 
Which is this unthinkable element? 
Manjusri answers: 
The element which is not to be thought, not accessible by mind, 
not to be ascertained by mind and not to be perceived by mind and 
consciousness is said to be the unthinkable element. 
Moreover, 0, Bhagavat, nothing but mind is the unthinkable 
element. Why is that? It is because mind does not exist in non-mind. 
It is because mind is the state not to be thought, for mind perceives 
according to reality. Then all images of the Bhagavat are the 
unthinkable elements. 
It is also said elsewhere: 
0, one whose thought is not conceptually constructed, whose mind 
is not abided in, who has no mindfulness nor mentation and who 
is not dependent, homage to you. (v. 14)'' 
In the Candrapradipa [it is said]: 
That which arises through causes indeed does not arise. Its arising 
is not by nature. That which arises depending on causes is said to 
be empty. One who thinks of emptiness is not intoxicated. (v. 
15)2° 
19 Sanabuddhavisayä atdrajnnndlokiilamknramaiu-iyatnasütra (Ms. 25b6-7, Derge ed. No. 100 ga 
299b6, Peking cd. No. 768 khu 328a2-3). Quoted in the Amaiwsikaradi ra of Advayavajra and the 
CatunnudränL caya of Nägärjunagarbha (Mikkyo [ 1989] p. 136,13-14 and p. 102,14-15). 
20Anavataptanügarajapariprcciuz. (Derge ed. No. 156 pha 230b2-3, Peking cd. No. 823, pu 238a6). 
Quoted in the Prasannapadd (La Vallee Poussin [1903-13] pp. 239,491,500 and 504), the 
Bodhicarya atarapanjikü (La Vallee Poussin [1914] p. 355,10-14) and Subluasitasamgraha (Bendall 
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[4-71 
In the Arya-Larikävatara [it is said]: 
If after one removed all errors, appearance (ninzitta) still arose, he 
would have that very error just as an impaired eye that is not 
faultless [always has an error]. (v. 16? ' 
Likewise: 
Let there not be abiding in consciousness. Therefore the Sage, for 
fear of this, having taught the truth (dhanna) again and again 
according to emptiness, divides the teaching. (v. 17)22 
It is also said in the Hevajra[tantra]: 
And intrinsic existence does not arise from the beginning and is 
neither real nor false. (v. 18)23 
Moreover, 
All tenets of those with subtle sense faculties (siiksmdksika) and 
sufficient intellect (aksäunadhi), when they are analysed, [would 
be] the same, if there were not the teaching of `emptiness' alone 
here, which divides the Buddhist and the non-Buddhist. (v. 19Y4 
Also denying emptiness [in the sense] of nihilism, he says: 
But those who see the true state (tathatü) in conformity to the 
doctrine of the Middle are indeed the knowers of reality (tattva) 
[1905] p. 21,22-p. 22,1) 
2' Lahkavatärasütra, v. 2: 169 (Nanjo [1923] p. 109,13-14). 
22Alokamald, v. 248 (Lindtner [1985] p. 2(4). 
"Ileiajratantra, v. I-iii-36ab (Snellgrove [1959] p. 56,32). 
24 Alokamdld v. 274 (Lindtner [1985] p. 204). This verse is also quoted in RämapMla's 
Sekanirdesapan"jikd (folio 12a, 1-2), Sahajavajra's Tattvadasakatikd (Derge ed. No. 2254 wi 165b5-6, 
Peking ed. No. 3099 mi 181a7) and Jitäri's Sugatamatavibharigabhäsya (Derge cd. No. 3900 a 
63b4, Peking cd. No. 5868 nyo 352b8-353a1). 
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and happy if (yacli) they perceive directly. (v. 20)25 
It is said in the Dükinivajrapaiijara: 
It is indeed the teaching of the Buddha, Dharma and Sangha in 
which mind which is not separated both from emptiness and 
compassion is cultivated. (v. 21 f6 
Therefore, because the five aspects which arise in dependence have the 
nature of five Tathägatas and because intrinsic nature is not separated 
from emptiness and compassion, it is established that the world is not 
separated from emptiness and compassion. 
This very meditation is not interrupted because of the teaching of a 
right teacher. 
By following the reality of mantra, as the continuity of flow of a 
river, like non-ceasing of the light of a lamp [incessant meditation 
is obtained]. (v. 22) 
Likewise the venerable Nägirjuna says: 
This temple palace is not the triple world. These people are not 
living beings. I am neither a human ruler here, nor object, nor 
sense faculties, nor earth, etc. Nor are there these material things 
and others because of the nature of reality ((Ihannatä). All these 
things are members of a mandala. 0 mind, why are you agitated 
for one who sees everything as mandalacakra? (v. 23) 
Everything is apparent only because they arise in dependence like 
the city of Gandharvas. Neither do they exist by nature, nor are 
they [imaginary] like a sky lotus. (v. 24) 
It is also said in the Hevajra[tantra]: 
25 Identical with theSekanirdesa, v. 31 (Milkyo [1991] p. 58,3-4). 
26 ndkinivajrapanjara (berge ed. No. 419 nga 54b7-55a1, Peking ed. No. 11 ka 289b7). 
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These phenomena are indeed nirvana [but] in the form of cyclic 
existence because of ignorance. (v. 25Y' 
Pancatathdgatamudri7vivarana completed 
4.1.3 Examination of Paücatathägatamudrävivarana 
In this text, Advayavajra mentions the names of four different proponents, namely 
the Niräk iravidin, the Citrädvaitavidin, the Miyopamädvayavidin and the 
Sarvadharmtpratisthänavädin. Of these the first two proponents are Yogäcdras and the 
latter two are Mädhyamikas. The Citrädvaitavädin is considered to hold the sakdra view. 
We also find the position of Advayavajra as well as the tenets of the Mayopam idvayavädin 
and the Sarvadharmäpratisthinaviidin in this text. As it is said "If [one says] as an 
objection that if there is realisation of awareness in this state, there is an opportunity that 
it is the Mäyopam, dvayavzda, and it is not `non-abiding in any position' 
(sarvaträpratisthana)" in [4-6], Advayavajra regards himself as the Sarvadharmz- 
pratisthinaviidin. This is supported by his word in [4-5], "In this way, because the cause 
of pain (salya) that it (consciousness) is ultimately existent vanishes, the doctrine of the 
Madhyamaka established by the awareness in the non-dual stream effortlessly combined 
(anabhogayuganaddhadvayavjhi) characterised by non-abiding in any position 
(sarvatrapratisthana) is best. " 
The views of these two proponents of the Madhyamaka can be known from the 
structure of this text. In this text, it seems that the procedure of practice is shown with 
seals (mudrd) of Tathägatas as symbols. First, the first four Tathzgatas, Vairocana, 
Ratnasambhava, Amitäbha and Amoghasiddhi, that correspond to riüpa, vedanJ, samjIiI 
and santskära, are sealed with Aksobhya to explain the state of being representation-only 
(vijfiaptimdtratü). Then this Aksobhya is sealed with Vajrasattva which is emptiness and 
compassion. This shows the procedure of practice from mind-only of the Yogäcära to 
emptiness of the Madhyamaka. 
27 IIevajratantra, v. II-iv-34ab (Snellgrove [1959] p. 66,15). 
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This text introduces the four different proponents according to their views on 
cognition. First in [4-3], the view of the Niräk ra-Cittam itra is shown and it is used to 
explain the seals of the four Tathägatas by Aksobhya: 
[4-3a] 
The five Tathiigatas are the five constituents. Of these, the [first] four, 
[i. e. ri? pa, vedanä, samjna and samsküra] are sealed with Aksobhya to 
explain the state of being representation-only (vijfiaptim5trat5). For this 
reason, the images of external [objects] are mind-only. Therefore, because 
there being no perceived object, there is no perceiving subject, there 
remains only consciousness which is free from the perceived object and 
the perceiving subject, which is ultimately existent and which is mere 
awareness. For the Nir ikaravädins, nothing but this fundamental cognition 
spreading like the spotless autumn sky at midday should be realised. 
Thus, Advayavajra explains the view of the Niräkäravzdin with the seals (mudrd) 
of the five Tathägatas. However Aksobhya, which shows mind-only, is again sealed with 
Vajrasattva, as shown in [4-4]: 
[4-4a] 
[Objection]: Since [mind-only is] realised only through the mudra of 
Aksobhya, why then does scriptural authority say Aksobhya is sealed 
with Vajrasattva? 
[Answer]: If one says that it is as much as to explain emptiness of 
conceptualised images, [I answer] it is not, because it has already 
been realised through the previous mudra [of Aksobhya] alone. 
While both the Yog5cära and the Mzdhyamika postulate emptiness, its meaning is 
different. The Midhyamika understands emptiness as emptiness of intrinsic nature in all 
phenomena. For the Yogczra, on the other hand, emptiness means emptiness of images 
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(akdra) of the subject and the object. Here the mind-only is symbolised by Aksobhya, 
and emptiness (and compassion) by Vajrasattva. The opponent argues, from the point of 
view of the Niräkara-Yogicdra that emptiness, symbolised by Vajrasattva, means emptiness 
of images. Advayavajra explains that emptiness of images is realised through the mudrd 
of Aksobhya. This may imply that Advayavajra, a Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin, holds 
the Niräkära view conventionally since he shows the stages from the Niräkäravädin of 
the Yogäcdra ([4-3]) to the Madhyamaka ([4-4]). 
Then he refutes the view of the Citrädvaitavädin, i. e. the Säkära-Yogäcära. Here 
he criticises the Citrädvaitavädins who postulate the ultimate existence of mind, as he 
says: 
[4-5a] 
If one argues that there is thus the sameness of Aksobhya and Vajrasattva, 
[I answer] that if [one] does not abandon the nature of consciousness and 
others, the CitrAdvaitavidda will be best. 
[4-5b] 
But, the consciousness which is, for the Citrädvaitavädins, ultimately 
existent is not attractive because it is refuted that the consciousness whose 
nature is Aksobhya that is citradvaita without the perceived object and 
perceiving subject is substantially existent because of the mudrd of 
Vajrasattva. 
Here in [4-5], the Citr5dvaitav, idins28 are considered to maintain the identity of 
Aksobhya and Vajrasattva. They are criticised by Advayavajra because they regard 
consciousness as substantially existent (vastusat). 
In [4-6], the hypothetical opponent mentions the view of the Mäyopamadvayavädin 
very briefly: 
As we know from verse 9 of the Paiicatathagatamudrävivarana, the Citrädvaitavädins are the 
Säkära-Yogäcäras. ([4-5] p. 220) 
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[4-6a] 
If [one says] as an objection that if there is realisation of awareness in 
this state, there is an opportunity that it is the Mzyopamdvayav, da, and 
it is not `non-abiding in any position', [I answer] it is not [the case]. 
It is clear from this passage that the distinction of the Mzyopamzdvayavädin and 
the Sarvadharmäpratisthlnavidin is based on the realisation of awareness. It is, however, 
not entirely clear what level this is about. While it is unlikely that a Mädhyamika would 
postulate something other than emptiness at the ultimate level, this may possibly be a 
distinction at the ultimate level, because this passage comes just after the refutation of 
representation-only held by the Citrädvaitavädin, which is considered conventional by 
the Mädhyamika. If this passage concerns the realisation of self-awareness at the ultimate 
level, this could justify the view of the former teachers which Tsong kha pa presents, to a 
certain extent 29 They understand that this distinction is based on how they assert the 
ultimate, and maintain that "the Mäyopamädvayavzdins, who assert that collection of the 
two, appearance and emptiness, is an ultimate truth" may be right even though the 
existence of cognition at the ultimate level does not necessarily guarantee the existence 
of appearance at the ultimate level. On this point, Advayavajra expresses his view in the 
Madhyamasatka: 
[4-8] 
The illumination (prakasa) is free frone the four alternatives, has the 
characteristic of falsity and non-dual like an illusion (mdyopamUdvaya). 
This tenet is associated with conception. (v. 3)30 
This shows thatmayopamadvaya is derived from the description of the illumination 
29 Sec 1.2, quotation [1-14] (p. 24). 
30Madhyamararka, v. 3 (Mikkyö [1988] p. 86,6-7): 
catuskotivinirmukaah prakäso 'filalaksanah I 
mäyopamädvayas caisa siddhänto manasamgatah 113 II 
Also see [4-14] with regard to the Mädhyunilas who postulate that illumination is false. 
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that is the basis of cognition. This distinction is considered to be based on cognition at 
the ultimate level because the illumination is free from the four alternatives. It is thus 
understood that the M5yopamzdvayav5dins ultimately accept illumination (prakasa) that 
is the nature of self-awareness without the duality of the perceiving subject and the 
perceived object, although it is said to be false. 
Then in [4-7] Advayavajra explains the view of the Sarvadharm, pratisthinavzdin. 
It is the most important to notice that verses 17 and 19 are quotations from the Alokamald 
of Kambala, who is regarded as a Nirlkara-M idhyamika by Sahajavajra. This fact could 
be an indication that the Sarvadhannäpratisthänavädin is the Niräkdra-Mädhyamika. We 
will discuss this point later in 4.3 when we examine the tenet of the 
Sarvadharmzpratisthznavädin. 
To conclude, the contents of the Pancatathagatamudravivarana is understood as 
follows: explanation of the stages from the Nirdkära-Yogäcära [4-3] to the 
Sarvadharmäpratisth, navzdin [4-4], refutation of the Citriidvaitavzdin [4-5], refutation of 
the Mäyopam idvayav idin [4-6] and explanation of the tenet of the 
Sarvadharmipratisthänavidin [4-7]. This shows that Advayavajra adopts the procedure 
of cultivation from the Nirakara-Vijnaptimätra to the Madhyamaka of the Sarvadharmä- 
pratisthlnavadin. From now on, therefore, examination of this classification is undertaken 
on the assumption that the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavzdin accepts the nirakära view 
conventionally. Although the MIyopamädvayav,! din may possibly hold the citradvaita 
view conventionally in contrast, this cannot be ascertained from this text because 
Advayavajra does not mention any relationship between the Mzyopamzdvayav5din and 
the Citrzdvaitavädin. 
4.1.4 Other Texts Related to the Classification 
Next, we look into passages of the Triyanavyavasthüna in which Ratn ikaraglnti 
(B) mentions the classification of the Madhyamaka which is based on two sets of four 
alternatives (caluskoti), in a similar way to that in the Tativaratnavali: 
[4-9] 
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The Way with profundity and extensiveness is of two types: that only 
with profundity and that with both profundity and extensiveness. They 
say `Mahäyäna' for both of them, and with regard to the distinction into 
two types [of Mahäyina] a former teacher also employs [the terms] 
Mahäyäna of Pzramit inaya and of Mantranaya 3' 
[4-10] 
By distinction of the Yog-5cara and the Mädhyamika, the Way only with 
profundity is of two types. The Yogiczras are again of two types by 
distinction of cognition with images (*"sakdra) and that without images 
(*nirükära). 32 
[4-111 
Likewise, the Mädhyamikas are of two types by distinction of those who 
assert that the convention is images of cognition and those who assert 
that it is latent impressions (bag chags, *vdsand). 33 
Triy-navyavastiana (Ilayashi [1996] p. 53,9-p. . 
54,1, Derge ed. No. 3712 tsu 101a3-4, Peking 
cd. No. 4535 nu 112a2-3): 
zab Ging rgya the ba dang Idan pa'i thcg pa ni rnam pa gnyis te/ zab pa 'ba' zhig dang Idan pa 
dang/ zab pa dang/ rgya the ba gnyi ga dang Idan pa'o// 'di dag nyid la theg pa chen po zhes 
brjod cing/ dbye ba rnam pa gnyis nyid la slob dpon snga mas pha rol tu phyin pa'i tshul dang/ 
gsang sngags kyi tshul gyi theg pa chen bo zhes kyang gzhag pa'o// 
Umino [1983b] points out that there is a close relation between the Triyanavyavast dna and the 
TattvaratnovalT. Ile maintains that the `former teacher' in [4-9] indicates Advayavajra since he 
classifies the Mahäydna into the Pdramitänaya and the Mantranaya in the Tattvaratnüval (Ui 
[1952] p. 3,8-9: ma/zäynnam ca dvividham, paramitünayo mantranayas ceti. ) Ile also mentions the 
similarity of the catuskotis. Sec footnote 38 below. 
32 TriAnavyavast ana (Ilayashi [1996] p. 61,8-13, Derge ed. No. 3712 tsu 103a3, Peking ed. No. 
4535 nu 114a6-7): 
mal 'byor spyod pa dang/ dbu ma pa'i dbye pas zab pa tsam dang Idan pa'i theg pa ni mam pa 
gnyis yin la/ mal 'byor spyod pa mains kyang/ shes pa ream pa dang bcas pa dang/ mane pa 
med pa'i bye brag') gyis mam pa gnyis so// 
(1) Ed: drag, D, P: brag. 
33 Triyänavyavasthana (Ilayashi [1996] p. 61,8-13, Derge ed. No. 3712 tsu 103a4, Peking ed. No. 
4535 nu 114a7-8): 
de bzhin du On ma pa yang kun rdzob sties pa'i rnam par smra ba dang/ de bag chags su smra 
ba'i bye brag') gis main pa gnyis so// 
(1) Ed: drag, D, P. brag. 
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[4-12] 
The Midhyamikas who assert the convention is images of cognition 
maintain that mind and cognition do not exist, through accumulation of 
reasoning of the ultimate, but consider that everything conventionally 
established in this way is nothing but the persistence of images which are 
mind and thought as object. Likewise, the contention of those who assert 
that the convention is latent impressions is that while the ultimate truth is 
as the former, what are conventionally established are nothing but latent 
impressions but mind does not appear as the nature of image and 
manifestation. 
These two agree on contention of the nature of dependent origination, 
negation of mind and self-awareness and application of reasoning. But 
some say that respectively the distinction of four alternatives is not the 
same because in order to refute other views these two respectively say: 
Existent, non-existent, both existent and non-existent and neither 
existent nor non-existent. 
and 
Eternal, non-eternal, both eternal and non-eternal and neither eternal 
nor non-eternal. 4 
it Triydnavyavasthana (llayashi [1996] p. 62,12-p. 63,11, Derge ed. No. 3712 tsu 103b2-6, Peking 
cd. No. 4535 nu 114b6-115a3): 
dbu ma pa kun rdzob shes pa'i main par smra ba roams ni don dam par rigs pa'i tshogs kyis 
seins dang ye sties dag yod pa ma yin par smra la/ kun rdzob tu 'di liar main par bzhag pa 
thams cad sems dang yid kyi main pa yul du gnas pa kho nar rtog go// 
dc bzhin du kun rdzob bag chags su smra ba mains kyi 'dod ba ni don dam pa'i bden pa 
snga ma Ita bu las kun rdzob tu main par bzhag pa roams ni bag chags mams kho na yin gyi/ 
sems ni main pa dang/ 'gro ba'i bdag nyid du snang ba ma yin no zhes par ro/ 'di gnyi gas rten 
cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i bdag nyid 'dod pa dang/ seins dang rang rig pa 'gog/ rigs pa sgrub 
pa ni mthun no// 
kha cig na re 'di gnyis kyis lta ba gzhan sel ba na rim bzhin du/ 
yod dang mcd dang yod med dang// yod med gnyi ga min pa ste// 
zhes bya ba dang/ 
flag dang mi flag flag mi flag// rtag dang mi nag gnyi ga min// 
-lies pas go rims bzhin du mu bzhi mam par flog pa mi 'dra'o zhes zer ro// 
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From this passage we understand that the Mädhyamikas are classified into two: 
the Mzdhyamikas who assert that the convention is images of cognition and the 
Mzdhyamikas who assert that convention is latent impressions (*vasand). Matsumoto 
identifies the former with the Sikora-M dhyamikas and the latter with the Niräkära- 
Madhyamikas 35 It is the SA; dravadin's view that what we think is the external world is 
indeed images which are nothing but mind, and that these images are real. On the other 
hand, the Niräkäravädin maintains that images are not identical with mind, that they arise 
as a result of latent impressions (vdsanü) and that these images are false. The two 
Madhyamaka proponents follow these views respectively at the conventional level, but 
neither proponent accepts the reality of mind ultimately. 
The other point that draws our attention is that these two proponents apply different 
sets of four alternatives to show emptiness. These sets of four alternatives are based on 
existence and permanence respectively. They are very similar to the different sets of four 
alternatives described in Advayavajra's YattvarainüvalF. According to Advayavajra, the 
Mäyopamädvayavädin employs the four alternatives based on existence and non-existence: 
[4-13] 
In the [Mädhyamika], the explanation of the Mäyopamadvayavädin [is as 
follows]: 
Neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both existent and non- 
existent, nor even the nature of neither [existent nor non-existent]. 
The Mldhyamikas know that the reality is free from the four 
propositions (catu ckoti). (v. 25)36 
35 Matsumoto [1980] quotes these passages from the Triyrznavyavasthäna in order to show that there 
was a distinction between the Säkära-Yogäcära-Mädhyarnika and the Niräkära-Yogäcära- 
Mädhyamilca. Ruegg [1981] (p. 123) also understands that this classification is that of the Sälcära- 
Mädhyamika and the NirdkAra-Mädhyamika. My discussion here mainly follows theirs in terms of 
understanding that the Mädhyamikas who assert that the convention is images of knowledge and 
the Madhyamilcas who assert that the convention is latent impressions are the internalist Säkära- 
Mädhyamika and the internalist Nit ära-M idhyamika respectively. 
36 See [4-1] (p. 213). 
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The Sarvadharm, pratisthänavidin, on the other hand, employs those based on 
permanence and annihilation: 
[4-14] 
On the other hand, this is the examination of the Sarvadharmiipratisthäna- 
v idin: 
It is not maintained everything is permanent. And it is not concluded 
that they are annihilating. They are not a pair of permanent and 
annihilating. Nor [are they] neither which is without the two. (v. 
27)37 
Therefore, while the Mäyopam idvayavidin mentioned by Advayavajra is identified 
with the Madhyamika who asserts that the convention is images of cognition described 
in the Triyanavyavasthdna, who is regarded as the internalist Säkära-Mädhyamika, the 
Sarvadharmäpratisthanavädin is identified with the Mädhyamika who asserts that the 
convention is latent impressions, who is regarded as the intemalist Niräkära-Mädhyamika 38 
This is also in line with our hypothesis that the Mäyopam, dvayavzdin and the 
Sarvadharmiipratisthänavädin respectively hold the sakdra and the nirdküra views 
conventionally. 
As I mentioned in the first chapter, Sahajavajra, a disciple of Advayavajra, indeed 
classifies the Madhyamaka into the Säkära-Madhyamaka and the Nirakära-Madhyamaka: 
[4-15] 
Or, "Neither Säkära nor Nirkära" (Tattvadasaka, v. 2a)39 means that the 
" See [4-2] (p. 214). 
Umino [1983b] points out similarity of the two sets of the four alternatives between Advayavajra's 
classification of the Mädhyamika and Ratnä1carasänti (B)'s. Nevertheless he does not consider that 
the proponents that convention is images of knowledge and the proponents that convention is latent 
impressions are the Sak-ära-Mddhyamika and the Niräkära-Mädhyamika. 
39Tattvadasaka, 2ab (Shastri 11 [1927] p. 59. Cf. Miklcyo [1991] p. 92): 
na sil: äraniräkäre tathatäm jnätum icchatal? I 
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Säk ira-Madhyamaka (rnam pa dang bcas pa'i dbu ma) and the Nir, k5ra- 
Madhyamaka (ream pa med pa'i dbu ma) are these two main [tenets] to 
be highlighted. 
For the previous venerable Szntaraksita and others accept only the 
S akra-Mad hyam aka... 
And the Nirakara-Madhyamaka is accepted by Kambala and others ao 
It is important that this statement is made by one of Advayavajra's disciples. 
Sahajavajra may classify the Madhyamaka in the same way as his teacher but call them 
in a different way. Here, the Säkära-Madhyamaka (rnam pa dang bcas pa'i dint ina) and 
the Nirzkara-Madhyamaka (rnamn pa med pa'i dbu mna) are the designations of views 
held respectively by ýäntaraksita and Kambala. Then it may also be the case that Säntaraksita 
is regarded as the Mayopamädvayavadin that accepts the Sakara-Madhyamaka and 
Kambala as the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin that accepts the Niräkära-Madhyamaka. It 
is not contradictory to our speculation that Advayavajra probably follows Kambala's 
view on the basis of the fact that in the Pancatathagatamudravivarana he quotes verses 
248 and 274 of the Alokamald of Kambala. 
This can be, nevertheless, very problematic if we consider that the distinction of 
the Mayopamidvayavidin and the Sarvadharmapratisthznavädin is based on how they 
postulate the ultimate truth, as we speculated from our examination of the 
Pancatathagatainudrdvivarana. According to Ratnikarasinti (B), the Midhyamikas who 
assert that the convention is images of cognition and the Madhyamikas who assert that 
the convention is latent impressions have different views on the conventional world, but 
40 Tallvadasakati7 (Dergc cd No. 2254 wi 164b5-6 and 165a6-7, Peking ed. No. 3099 mi 180a5-6 
and 180b8): 
yang na/ 
rnam bcas ma yin main med min // 
zbes bya ba ni mam pa dang bcas pa'i dbu ma dang/ ream pa med pa'i dbu ma gsat') bar bya 
ba'i gtso bo 'di dag go(2)// 
gang gi phyir zhi ba 'tsho'i zhal snga nas la sogs pas mam pa dang bcas pa'i dbu ma nyid 
khas fen par bycd dc /... 
main pa med pa'i dbu ma yang la ba'i na bza' can la cogs pas 11ias fen to/... 
(1) D: gsal, P: bsal. (2) D: gtso bo'i di dag go, P: gtso bo 'di dag go. 
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their views on the ultimate truth are the same. 
In the second chapter, we briefly looked at how Ratnkarasznti (A) classifies the 
M idhyamikas in the Madhyamakälamkäropadesa. There, lie distinguishes the Säkära- 
Mädhyamika and the Nir5k5ra-M5dhyamika. Therefore we now turn to the classification 
of the Mädhyamika shown by Ratnikaras inti (A) in order to compare it with those 
shown by Sahajavajra and Ratnikarasinti (B). Ratn5kara9inti (A), in the 
Prajnapdramitopade. a, rebuts an objection from the Säkäravädin as follows: 
[4-16] 
Of these, I have already refuted those that assert that external objects 
exist and the Mädhyamikas that assert that cognition possesses images 
(shes pa rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba dbn ma pa, *sjkürajninavädi- 
mädhyamika) because they are avoided due to its deviation from scriptural 
authority, treatises and the valid means of knowledge. Only the Cittamätra 
that asserts that images do not exist (ream par med par sinra ba'i seins 
tram pa, *nirakdravadicittamätra) is left. Why do they (de dag) 
[Midhyamikas] insist that illumination is false? If [they say] that [it is] 
like blue and so on because [illumination] is not different from images of 
blue and so on, which are false, [I answer] it is not established that 
[illumination] that is not superimposed is not different from [images that 
are false].. a' 
Here some maintain that illumination is not different from images. They 
consequently insist if images are false, illumination is false. On the other hand, it is not 
established, according to Ratnäkaragänti (A), that illumination is not different from images. 
41 Prajn"dparamitopadesa (Derge cd. No. 4079 hi 150a4-5 Peking ed. No. 5579 ku 170a4-6): 
de la phyi rol gyi don yod par smra ba dang/ shes pa roam pa dang bcas par smra ba On ma pa 
dag ni lung dang bstan bcos dang tshad ma dag las phyi rol tu gyur bas sugar bz! og zin to// 
mam pa med par smra ba'i Sems tsam pa 'ba' zhig Ins par 'gyur te/ dc dag kyis ci'i phyir gsal 
ba brdzun ba yin par 'dod do// 
sngon po la sogs pa'i mam pa brdzun pa dang tha mi dad pa'i phyir/ sngon po la sogs pa 
bshin no zhe na/ sgro ma btags pa'i tha dad pa med pa ni ma grub la/ 
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Here, the argument is clear. Nevertheless, past studies concerning this passage disagree 
on who `they' (underlined) are. Umino, Shirasaki and Katsura42 understand that `they' 
indicates the Nirmkara-Cittamätra that appear just before `they'. It seems that these scholars 
consider that the Cittamitra that asserts that images do not exist includes the Nirlkira- 
Yogäcära-Mädhyamika, who accepts `Cittamätra' conventionally. It is, to a certain extent, 
rational to conclude in this way because `they' consider that illumination (gsal ba, 
praküsa) which has to be real for the Yogäcära is false. `They' surely hold that images 
are false and look as if they postulate the niraküra view. This is nevertheless different 
from the views of the Niräkära-Mädhyamikas mentioned by Sahajavajra and of the 
Mädhyamikas who maintain that the convention is latent impressions (väsanä) mentioned 
by Ratnäkarasänti (B). According to Sahajavajra, the Niräkära-Mädhyamikas 
conventionally hold cognition (illumination) without the perceiving subject and the 
perceived object which the Nir ikira-Yog icaras consider ultimate 43 This means that 
when the Nirakära-Madhyamikas deny cognition's reality, they do not depend on the 
reason that illumination and images are not different because they do not accept this 
relation between illumination and images on the conventional level. The same is applied 
to the Mzdhyamikas who maintain that the convention is latent impressions mentioned 
by Ratnzkaras inti (B). They maintain that the conventional world that is images of 
cognition arises due to latent impressions. This means that if latent impressions (vasana) 
disappear, the images, too, disappear because of their causal relationship. Thus they do 
not postulate identity of images with cognition. 
On the other hand, Matsumoto takes `they' as the externalist Mädhyamikas and 
the Sdkira-Midhyamikas. " I consider, partly following Matsumoto, that `they' at least 
include the Säkära-Mädhyamikas because it is the proponents of the säküra view who 
42 Umino [1983a] (p. 15 note 21), Shirasaki [1992] (p. 109) and Katsura [1981] (pp. 452-3). 
43 We will examine this later in 4.3 (p. 259 ff. ). 
a' Matsumoto [1980b] (p. 156). However, he takes phyi rol gyi don yod par smra ba dang shes pa 
rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba dbu ma pa dag as the Mädhyamikas who assert that external 
objects exist and the Mädhyamikas who assert that cognition possesses images. However 
Ratnal: arasänti criticises those who assert external objects (not necessarily the Mädhyamika) before 
his refutation of the Säk ira-M idhyamikas. 't'herefore, I take `they' as the Säl ära-Madhyamaka and 
the externalist. 
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maintain that images are not different from illumination. Here `they' insist that illumination 
is false because images which are not different from it are false. After this passage 
Ratnikarasänti (A) himself shows that this reason that illumination is not different from 
images is the way of the S, k, ra: 
[4-17] 
Moreover, why do you maintain that existence of illumination is denied? 
If [you say] that it is maintained that dependent origination and the ability 
of causal efficiency are denied, [I ask] what is the valid means of knowledge 
(prainana) that causes to invalidate them. 
If [you say] that it lacks one [intrinsic nature] and many, [I answer 
that] there is no invalidation of ability because there is no invalidation 
concerning the intrinsic nature of illumination, even though it directly 
invalidates ability by means of invalidation concerning the intrinsic nature 
of material things. 
[Objecion]: It is not invalidation as long as intrinsic nature is concerned, 
even though it is [that] of blue and the like. If [you ask] why, [I 
answer that] there is no invalidation concerning the intrinsic nature of 
blue. 
[Answer]: If [you say] it would indeed have the ability, [I answer that] in 
this case because blue and illumination have no difference, the way of 
the sakdra would be accepted, and it is rejected before. 45 
Here the first opponent is the Madhyamika, who asserts the lack of intrinsic 
45Prajnüpciramitopculesa (Z)erge ed. No. 4079 hi 150b5-151 al, Peking ed. No. 5579 ku 170B-1710): 
gzlian yang l hyod gsal ba'i yod pa ci zhig dgag par 'dod/ rk-yen la brten to skye ba nyid dang/ 
don bycd nus ba nyid dgag par 'dod do the na/ 'di dag Ia gnod par byed pa'i tshad ma gang 
yin/ geig dang du nia dan bral ha yin no the na dc yang dngos po'i rang gi ngo bo la dngos su 
gnod pas nus pa la slings kyis gnod pa yin la gsal ba'i rang gi ngo bo la gnod pa med pa'i 
phyir/ nus pa la yang") gnod pa med par 'gyur ro// sngon po la sogs pa'i yang rang gi ngo bo 
tsam la gnod pa ma yin te/ 'o na ji liar zlie na/ sngon po'i rang bzhin la gnod pa med do// dc 
yang mus pa nyid yin no the na de Ita na ni sngon po dang gsal ba la bye brag med pa'i phyir 
mam pa dang bcas pa'i tshul klias blangs par 'gyur te/ de yang sugar bzlog zin no// 
(1) ll: yang, P: omit 
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nature. They establish it through the reasoning, `lack of one [intrinsic nature] and many. '46 
However, Ratnikarasänti (A) insists that it is only applied to material things which have 
spatiality. As we have seen in chapter 3, the ability of causal efficiency is the nature of 
the ultimate existence for the Yogzclra while it belongs to the true conventional for the 
Madhyamika. " It seems to me that the second opponent is the Slkzra-Yogäcära who 
maintains the reality of the intrinsic nature of images as well as that of illumination. He 
argues that if illumination which is not a material thing is not invalidated by that reasoning, 
then images of blue and the like cannot be invalidated because they are not material 
things, either. However, Ratnäkarasänti clearly denies the ability of causal efficiency of 
images such as blue. This means that he considers that images that have no ability are 
not real. On the other hand, he maintains the ability of illumination. Thus Ratnäkarasänti's 
view of the Nirdkära-Yogäcära is clearly expressed here as he considers that illumination 
is real while images are not. Most importantly, he understands that it is the way of the 
sdküra that accepts no difference between illumination and images such as blue. 
This view of the sakdra that images are not different from illumination is also 
found in the Madhyarnaküla nkäropadesa: 
[4-18] 
If some Yogäcäras and Midhyamikas who assert cognition with images 
argue: 
If blue and illumination were false and not false [respectively], it 
is not possible to be identical because of the difference of their 
characteristics. However, if they were not identical, blue and others 
could not be illuminated. [But they are illuminated. ] If blue and 
others are illumination, blue and so on are either not superimposed 
or the real because they are not superimposed or nothing but 
illumination of the real existence. 
4" Cf. Madhyamakdlamkdra, v. 1. Sec [3-44] (p. 159). 
47 Sec 3.3 (p. 149 ff. ). 
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[I answer].. 48 
[4-19] 
Moreover, with regard to this inferential reason "Images, which [you, 
Ratnäkarasänti, maintain] are false, are real because they are not different 
from illumination, " if [you argue] that they are not different by nature of 
things, [I answer that] it is not established. 49 
The S ik; ira-Yogäcära and the Säkära-M idhyamika maintain that images are not 
different from cognition. Therefore if cognition is real, images must be real. The process 
of reasoning is the same as the statement in passage [4-16], which says that illumination 
is false like blue and so on because it is not different from images of blue and so on, 
which are false. The conclusion is however totally opposite: real and false. Considering 
that the Szkära-Mädhyamika maintains the view of the Sftk5ra-Yog5c, ra conventionally 
but denies it ultimately, we understand that the Szkara-Midhyamika maintains the reality 
of cognition and image conventionally, and postulates the falsity of both ultimately, 
because cognition is not different from images. 
4.1.5 Summary 
To sum up, these two classifications, that of the Mzyopamzdvayav-idin and the 
SarvadharmäpratisthänavAdin and of the Mädhyamikas who assert that the convention is 
48 Mad1zyamakd1amharopadesa (Derge ed. No. 4085 hi 228a3-5, Peking ed. No. 5586 ku 262b6-8): 
mal 'byor spyod pa pa dang/ dbu ma pa sties pa mam pa dang bcas par smra ba kha cig na re/ 
sngon Po gsal ba dag brdzun pa dang brdzun pa ma yin par 'gyur na chos 'gal ba nyid kyis na 
de'i bdag nyid du 'thad par mi 'gyur la/ de'i bdag nyid ma yin na/ sngon po la sogs pa gsal bar 
mi 'gyur na / sngon po la cogs pa ni gsal ba yin no zhe na/ sgro ma btags pa'am dngos par 
'gyur ba'i gsal ba las gzlian ma yin pa'i phyir/ sngon po la sogs pa ni sgro ma btags pa'am/ 
dngos por gyur ba yin no zer te/... 
A parallel passage is found in the Prajndparamitopadesa (Dcrge cd. No. 4079 hi 148b1-2, Peking 
ed. 5579 ku 168a4-6). 
49Madhyamaknlamkaropadesa (Derge ed. No. 4085 hi 228b1-2, Peking ed. No. 5586 ku 263a5-6): 
gang yang gsal ba las tha mi dad pa'i phyir rnam pa brdzun pa yang dngos por 'gyur ro zhes 
pa'i gtan tshigs 'di la(') gal to dngos po'i rang bzhin du tha mi dad (1o zhe na gtan tshigs ma 
grub par 'gyur ro// 
(1) D: omit, P: la 
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images of cognition and the M5dhyamikas who assert that the convention is latent 
impressions (vdsand) are identified depending on the four alternatives that they respectively 
maintain. From this it is speculated that while the MAyopamädvayavzdin conventionally 
holds the sdküra view, the Sarvadharm, pratisth5nav5din conventionally accepts the 
nirakara view. 
We know of two Indian teachers, Ratn5ikaraginti (A) and Sahajavajra, who classify 
the Säkära- and the Niräkära-Mädhyamika/Madhyamaka. The former provides detailed 
accounts of the seikara view when he attempts to refute it, although he does not give any 
name of the Säkara-Mädhyamika or of the Niräkära-Mädhyamika. On the other hand the 
latter explains that Säntaraksita maintains the Säkära-Madhyamaka and Kambala the 
Nirik ira-Madhyamaka. Ratnäkaraslnti (A) considers that the SZk1ra-M idhyamika 
maintains that cognition and images are not different. On the other hand, Ratnäkarasänti 
(A), being a Niräkzra-Yogäcära himself, maintains that images do not have the ability of 
causal efficiency that is the characteristic of a real entity, while illumination does. 
This connection of three different ways of classification gives rise to a problem. 
According to Ratnäkarasänti (B), both the Mädhyamikas who maintain that the convention 
is images of cognition and the Mädhyamikas who maintain that the convention is latent 
impressions deny mind and cognition ultimately. In short, they both accept self-awareness 
conventionally and deny it ultimately. Therefore they do not disagree on the denial of 
self-awareness at the ultimate level. In that case, it is necessary to clarify at what level 
the Myopamädvayavadin establishes self-awareness. Advayavajra considers that the 
establishment of awareness is the criterion of the classification of the Mdyopam-dvayavädin 
and the Sarvadharm ipratisthänavidin and we provisionally concluded that the 
Mäyopamädvayavädin understands that there is illumination that is non-dual like an 
illusion at the ultimate level on the basis of the Madhyamakasatka. 
With regard to the matter of who are these proponents, it is plausible that the 
Mayopamädvayavzdin follows S, ntaraksita and the Sarvadharmzpratisthänavädin follows 
Kambala. It is then necessary to examine whether or not the view of s«kära is found in 
Sintaraksita and his followers. It is also necessary to find whether there is any connection 
between Kambala's view and Advayavajra's if we consider that the Sarva- 
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dharm5pratisthinavidin holds the niräkära view. In the following sections, therefore, we 
will examine the works of S intaraksita and his followers, and the relationship between 
Advayavajra and Kambala. 
4.2 Examination of Mäyopamädvayavädin 
It is ascertained that Advayavajra is a Sarvadharmäpratisthdnavädin through 
examination of the Pancatathagatannudravivarana. However, we do not know, for sure, 
who is the M5yopamädvayav5din. According to Tsong kha pa, Säntaraksita and Kamalas-ila 
are held to be Mzyopamadvayavzdins by some teachers. Also in the Grub intha' main 
bzhag rin then phreng ba of dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, Sintaraksita and Kamalasila 
are regarded as Silküra-Yogdcära-Midhyamikas. Therefore it is indicated in Tibetan 
sources that Säntaraksita and Kamalagila are the Mäyopamädvayavädin and it does not 
contradict our hypothesis that the Mäyopamädvayavzdin is the Silk<ra-Yogdcüra- 
Mädhyamika. 
As for the Indian sources, Sahajavajra, a disciple of Advayavajra, considers that 
Säntaraksita and others accepts the Sdkilra-Madhyamaka, when he classifies the 
Madhyamaka into the St kara-Madhyamaka and the Nirlkiira-Madhyamaka although he 
does not explain what the Sakara-Madhyamaka is. 5° It is possible that Sahajavajra, being 
a disciple of Advayavajra, classifies the Madhyamaka in the same way as Advayavajra 
but designates it in a different way. 
If we thus consider that the Mäyopamddvayav din maintains the Sükära- 
Madhyamaka, it can be the case that Sintaraksita and his followers are 
Mdyopamädvayavädins. There is, furthermore, a passage which indicates that Säntaraksita 
was considered to have held the citrädvaita view. As was mentioned above in chapter 
2, sß Bodhibhadra classifies the Miidhyamikas into the internalist and the externalist in the 
50 However, he seems to consider the Niräkara-Mädhyamikas as those who conventionally accept 
the cognition of the completed nature (parinispannasvabhäva) which is held by the Nir ra- 
Yogäciiras. It is, therefore, very likely that the S ikära-Mddhyamikas accept the view of the S: iU a- 
Yogiicära conventionally. 
51 See 2.3 (p. 65 ff. ). 
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Jndnasarasamucca)yanibandhana: 
[4-20] 
Those who do not consider appearance are Bhavya (Bhäviveka) and others, 
and those who assert that things which appear are not as they are [thought 
to be external], but only internal cognition manifesting in various ways 
are Säntaraksita and others 52 
In this passage, Bodhibhadra explains that Säntaraksita and others hold that internal 
cognition appears in various ways. It is the citradvaita view that a single mind manifests 
as manifold images. Therefore, it is very likely that Säntaraksita was regarded already in 
India as an internalist Mädhyamika who accepts the citrädvaita view conventionally 
although Bodhibhadra's explanation is so short that we cannot be absolutely certain. In 
the Pancatathagatamudrüvivarana Advayavajra mentions the four proponents, the 
Niräkäravädin, the Citrldvaitavädin, the Mäyopamddvayavädin and the Sarvadharmä- 
pratisth5navädin. It may be the case, therefore, that he understands that the 
Mayopamädvayavädin conventionally postulates the view of the Citrädvaitavädin. 
Bodhibhadra and Advayavajra are said to have been direct teachers of Atiga (982-1055)53 
probably at Vikramagfla. It is possible, therefore, that Säntaraksita was considered to 
hold the citrüdvaita view conventionally by teachers around the 11th C, including 
Advayavajra, although it is again not absolutely certain at the moment whether Advayavajra 
regarded Säntaraksita as the Mäyopamädvayavädin. 
It is also worth noting that this passage is in the commentary of verse 28 of the 
Jnanasdrasamuccaya, which denies the four alternatives based on existence: 
52Jidnasarasamuccayanibandhana (Mimal: i [1976] p. 206,27-30, Dcrge cd. No. 3852 tsha 44a7-bl, 
Peking cd. No. 5252 tsha 51b7-8): 
snang ba la mi 'jal ba ni slob dpon bha bya la sogs pa dang/ snang ba'i dngos po ji lta ba ma 
yin gyi nang gi shes pa khon sna tshogs su snang bar smra ba slob dpon zhi ba 'tsho la sogs 
pa'o // 
s' Ati§a himself states that Bodhibhadra was his teacher in the Bodhimärgapradipapanjikä (Derge 
cd. No. 39481: hi 280a4-7, Peking ed. No. 5343 khi 323a4-8). See [3-72] (p. 188). According to the 
Deb they sngon po, Advayavajra was a teacher of Atisa (Rocrich [1976], p. 244). 
1ý 
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[4-211 
Neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both existent and non-existent, nor 
even the nature of neither [existent nor non-existent]. The Mddhyaniikas 
know that the reality is free from the four alternatives (catuskoti). 54 
When Bodhibhadra comments on this verse, he mentions the difference of views 
between Bhavya and kntaraksita. However, he does not mention the difference in the 
two sets of the four alternatives. In other words, he does not mention that based on 
permanence and annihilation. Therefore, he possibly considers that S-ntar ksita as well 
as Bhavya uses the four alternatives based on existence and non-existence. 
Now the question is whether or not Säntaraksita himself holds the citrýidvaita 
view conventionally. He mentions the theory of the citradvaita in the 
Madhyamakälainkaravrtti on verse 33: 
[4-22] 
Moreover, it is not possible that it is not conventional designation (gdags 
pa, *prajnapti) that "even the cognition of various images like the piebald 
of imitation, genuine butterflies and the like, which do not have one 
nature, has one intrinsic nature "55 
If one takes the saküra view ultimately, a contradiction that single cognition has 
manifold images follows. If mind is a single entity its image must be a single entity, too, 
because they are not different. However, the images we perceive are not single but 
various. Säntaraksita maintains that this citradvaita view that single mind sees plural 
r, 
54 JT nasärasamuccaya, v. 28 (Mimaki [2000] p. 241,1-2): 
na san näsan na sadasan na cäpy anubhayätmakam 
catuskotivinimmktam tattvam mädhyamikä viduh 1128 II 
Also see 3.3.6 of this present thesis for the detailed examination of this verse and its commentary 
concerning the Tibetan translation of this verse. 
ss Madhyamakiilamkäravri i, ad. v. 33 (Ichigo [ 1985b] p. 98,2-4): 
gzhan yang bcos ma dang bcos ma ma yin pa'i phye ma leb khra ho la Sogs ji liar gcig pu'i 
bdag nyid ma yin pa de bzhin du mam pa sna tshogs pa'i mam par shes pa de yang gcig pu'i 
rang bzhin du gdags pa ma yin par 'thad pa med do// 
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images is not acceptable at the ultimate level and it should be only conventional. Being a 
M-dhyamika, Szntaraksita does not accept the existence of the subject or the object 
ultimately, based on these contradictions. We, however, conventionally perceive objects 
in some way. It seems that he here does not positively express his acceptance of the 
citradvaita view because it is only useful to explain conventional cognition and cannot 
bear an examination from the viewpoint of the ultimate truth. In addition to this, as we 
have seen in chapter 2,56 explaining the two different views on conventional existence, 
he describes the view of the internalist after showing the view of Bhäviveka, an externalist 
M,, idhyamika: 
[4-231 
Even though it is postulated that visual appearance and others (*riipädi) 
which are considered to be external are existent separately from cognition, 
experience [of them] is not established because there is no cause in close 
contact simultaneously or non-simultaneously, like an eye. Therefore 
perception of those [visual appearance and others] is perception of images 
such as blue which are not different [from perception]. It is like perception 
of appearance in a dream, an illusion and so on because of the nature of 
perception. 
If it is inferred that there is even another object that produces images 
of cognition separately from the result, [i. e. images, ) even so it is not 
established through direct perception but only inferred. Even so that [external 
object] is not established because certainly there is an immediate cause 
(*samanantarapratya), a) and atoms and others are denied. 57 
'6 Sec 2.7. The passage [4-23] comes immediately after [2-21 ] (pp. 85-86). 
57 Madhyamalalaml dravrtti, ad. v. 91 (Ichigd [1985b] p. 292,9-19): 
gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol du 'dod pa maws shes pa las gud na yod par bzhug na yang mig la 
sogs pa bzhin du dus mnyam pa dang mi mnyam pa'i tshe na rab tu nye ba'i rgyu med pas rig 
par mi 'grub bo// de Ita bas na de dag myong ba ni tha dad pa ma yin pa'i sngon po la (l-sngon 
po la') sogs pa'i ream pa myong ba ste/ myong ba'i ngo bo yin pas rmi lam dang sgyu ma la 
sogs pa'i gzugs myong ba bruin no// 
gal to shes pa'i main pa bskyed pa'i don gzhan zhig 'bras bu las gud na yod par rjes su 
dpog na/ dc Ita na yang mngon sum du grub par ma gyur gyi rjes su dpag par zad do// dc lta na 
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Säntaraksita here explains how the view of the internalist is established. First he 
denies perceptibility of external objects in the way the Sauträntika does. Causal relationship 
between external objects and sense faculties is rejected and external objects are only 
inferred. It is explained that our cognition is, in fact, cognition of images which are not 
different from cognition itself. If we define, as we examined in the previous section, that 
the Säkäravädin is one who maintains that images are not different from cognition, and 
that the Niräkäravädin is one who considers images are produced by latent impressions 
(vasan, a), this can be regarded as the view of the Säkärav idin. 
Meanwhile, Jitäri is also one of the Madhyamikas who maintain the identity of 
cognition and images. In the Sugatamatavibharigabhäsya, he states as follows: 
[4-24] 
In this way, we maintain that because cognition of blue and so on is not 
different from those [blue and so on], [cognition] is false in the same way 
as that [blue]. " 
This shows that Jithri holds the saküra view because he maintains that cognition 
and images are not different. As Shirasaki points out, this passage corresponds to a 
passage in the Prajnäpüramitopadesa of Ratnäkarasänti (A) that criticises the 
S iklraviidin 59 If we take into account that he accepts the four alternatives (catuskoti) 
based on existence and non-existence in the Sugatatnatavibhatigakdrika, he is most 
probably aM iyopamädvayavädin. As we have seen in chapter 3, in addition, Jitäri has a 
yang 'di med par grub ste// de ma thag pa'i rkycn nges par yod pa dang/ rdul p}ra mo la sogs 
pa bkag pa'i phyir ro// 
(1) Omit as Peking ed. 
Sugatamatavibharigabhasya (Derge cd. No. 3900 a 47b7-48a1, Peking cd. No. 5868 nyo 332a8-bl): 
de ]tar sngon po la sogs pa'i sties pa ni de dag dang tha mi dad pas na de dang 'dra bar brdzun 
pa yin no zhes kho bo cag gis brjod pa yin no// 
59 Shirasaki [1992] (p. 109). Also see passage [4-171 (p. 237). Shirasaki considers that Jitdri is a 
Niräkäravädin because here he says that blue and so on [=images] are `false'. however Jitäri is not 
talking about the conventional existence of self-awareness. The Mädhyamika, regardless of whether 
he is a Säkäravädin or a Niräkäravädin, does not accept anything as real ultimately. As Ratnak-arasänti 
(A) defines, it is the Säl: äravädin who maintains that cognition is not different from images. 
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close relation to Säntaraksita who is considered by Sahajavajra to maintain the Sik, ra- 
Madhyamaka. It is therefore quite certain that Jitäri is a Skravldin according to 
Ratnfkarasänti's criteria and it is accordingly doubtful that Jitiri was considered in India 
as a Nirzk, ra-Mzdhyamika although some Tibetan doxographers maintain that he is a 
Nirakara-Madhyamika. 
According to Advayavajra, the Mayopamadvayavadin postulates awareness 
presumably at the ultimate level. Now we go on to examine whether S intaraksita and 
Kamalasila maintain awareness and images ultimately. The view on cognition held by 
Säntaraksita and Kamalasila has been studied in detail by Ichigö 6° He reports that when 
S, Intaraksita criticises the Niräkäravidin in verse 60 of the Madhyamakälamkara, he 
expresses his view on cognition at the ultimate level in its auto-commentary Vrtti: 
[4-25] 
Therefore, because it is not established that images such as blue are 
connected to delusion and also to its latent impressions (vasand), even 
when being completely pure after that [delusion] disappears, it is not 
possible that all images disappear. If there is no connection, it cannot be 
ascertained that as a result of one's disappearance the other disappears, as 
a cow and a horse and so forth [do not have a connection and even if a 
cow disappears, a horse and so forth do not necessarily disappear] 61 
On this point, Kamalasila comments as follows in theMadhyainakälamkdrapaiijikü: 
[4-26] 
[If one argues that] if it was possible for all images to disappear in the 
60 Ichigo [1985a] pp. 61-67. 
61 Madhyamal alamkdravrtti, ad. v. 60 (Ichigb [1985b] p. 166,4-7): 
de bas na sngon po la cogs pa'i mam pa ni 'khrui ba dang de'i bag chags dang yang 'brel bar 
ma grub pas/ de log ste shin tu ream par dag pa'i dus na yang mam pa thaws cad ldog pa mi 
rigs te/ 'brel pa mcd na gcig log pas gzhan yang Idog par nges pa med de/ ba lang dang rta la 
sogs pa bzhin no// 
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pure state, then this [cognition of one intrinsic nature62] must be possible, 
[I answer] in this way: Even though delusion disappears, disappearance 
of images is not possible because there is no connection between delusion 
61 and images. 
These passages show that S, ntaraksita does not hold that all images disappear in 
the completely pure state and Kamalasila also considers that he does not. Strictly speaking 
it is not certain that Kamalasila has the same opinion as Santaraksita because this is 
Kamalagila's commentary on the work of Säntaraksita. It does not necessarily mean that 
the former had the same view as the latter. However, I here assume that Kamalasila 
himself also maintains that there is no connection between delusion and images. 
Anyway it should be noted that S ntaraksita does not accept the connection between 
delusion, its latent impressions (vdsanü) and images conventionally as well as at the 
completely pure state. Thus S-ntaraksita and probably Kamalasla postulate some sort of 
images at the completely pure state. If this `completely pure state' means the ultimate 
truth, it may justify the classification of these two teachers as Mäyopamädvayavädins, 
which is shown by Tsong kha pa as some former teachers' view, because the 
M5yopam5dvayav5din is said to maintain that images and emptiness are the ultimate 
truth. According to Ichigö, who has studied these passages in detail, ýäntaraksita does 
not accept the connection between delusion and images because he postulates self- 
awareness and is a S5k5ravijfianav5din 64 If we accept that those who maintain that 
62 In the Madhyamakdlamkara, Säntaraksita attempts to prove emptiness of all dharmas with `lacking 
one and many' theory (See [3-44]): 
The entities postulated by us and others lack intrinsic nature in reality because they lack one 
intrinsic nature and many, like a reflection. (Madhyamaka1amkara, v. 1) 
However the Nirälcam-Cittamätra insists, according to Ichigö [1985a] (pp. 61-62), that the inferential 
reason "because they lack one intrinsic nature and many" is unproven due to a doubt 
(samdigdhasiddha) because cognition is various in the impure state, but it becomes single and 
non-dual in the perfectly pure state when delusion disappears. 
63Madhyamakiilamknrapanjikd, ad. v. 60 (Ichigö [1985b], p. 167,14-17): 
gal to dag pa'i gnas skabs na mam pa thams cad Idog par srid par 'gyur na ni de'i tshe 'di yang 
srid pa zhig na 'di Ita ste/ 'khrul ba log kyang mam pa mams Idog par ni mi srid de/ 'kh ul ba 
dang mam pa rnams 'brel pa med pa'i phyir ro// 
6i Ichigö 11985a] p. 58,5-6. (Translated by the present author) 
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images arise from latent impressions (vasand) is the Nir5kzravgdin, Szntaraksita should 
not be classified as a Nir ikäravgdin. 
It is also very interesting that Haribhadra quotes a passage almost identical with 
Kamalasila's, as Ichigö points out! ' This suggests that Haribhadra does not maintain the 
connection between delusion, its latent impressions (vüsand) and images just as S, ýntaraksita 
and seemingly Kamalasila do not. Then he can be classified as a Mzyopamidvayav, din 
together with Säntarakýita and Kamalasila in that he does not consider that even when 
delusion disappears at the pure state, images do not necessarily disappear. Furthermore, 
he should not be a Niräkära-Yogäc ira-Mgdhyarnika since a proponent who holds a 
causal relation between latent impressions (visanü) and images (ükdra) is regarded as a 
Nirikaravidin 66 
Säntaraksita and Haribhadra do not, therefore, consider images disappear at the 
completely pure state. Kamalasila does not seem to oppose them. If this state is meant to 
be the ultimate truth, they maintain some kind of cognition at the ultimate level. Although 
I have not yet found any passage of Säntaraksita mentioning a Yogin's cognition, Kamalasila 
explains it in detail in the Madhyamakdlantkärapaiijikä, as follows: 
[4-27] 
If [one asks whether] at that state [of the ultimate truth] any Yogin exists 
and anything is seen, [I answer that] ultimately nothing is seen and no 
Yogin exists at all, either. But conventionally in the way it is explained 
that "Devadatta sees and hears", for example, there is no fault [in saying 
a Yogin sees and so forth] as a Yogin also is the same as that [Devadatta]. 
If [one asks] what is cognition of a Yogin which is without appearance 
of non-dual cognition and whether it is understood as being non-appearance 
by anything: first it is not by itself because of contradiction of activity on 
65Abhisama)rilamkdrälokd (Wogiliara [1932] p. 634,5-8): 
yadi hi visuddhävasthäyäm sarvesun äk: ir: mäm nivrttih sambbavet tadä sambliävyata evaitat I 
yävatd blurntinivrtl: iv api n ikärsnäm nivrttih sambhavati I tatra tcsäm yathoktanyäyena 
pratibandhäbhävät II 
66 This is indeed against the opinion of dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po and 'Jam dbyangs bzhad 
pa, who hold that IIaribhadra is a NirdUra-Yog5cdra-M5dhyamika. See chapter 1. (p. 10 ff. ) 
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itself, and not by others, either, because of the undesirable consequence of 
infinite regress, [I answer as follows]: 
This is not a fault. As it is established by cognition which is acquired 
after [cognition] is perceived by self-awareness as being non-dual and 
being non-appearance but activity on itself is not contradictory, lack of 
intrinsic nature is [established] in the same way. Also because self-awareness 
is established [among people] up to a cowherd, it cannot be refuted. It is 
not infinite regress, either. Because two cognitions take everything as 
object, everything is equal in the same way as [cognition] of the Vaibh, -isika, 
for example 67 
Here, Kamala! 41a maintains, on the one hand, that a Yogin does not see anything 
ultimately. On the other hand, he explains that in conventional terms, he is said to see 
something. In other words, he has `cognition which is without appearance of non-dual 
cognition. ' It is also noted that Kamalasila considers that this cognition is based on 
self-awareness. It is not clear how Kamalasla understands the ultimate cognition by 
explaining it as cognition which is `without appearance'. Concerning this term, `cognition 
which is without appearance of non-dual cognition', Kamalasila gives an explanation 
also in the Bhävanakrama, as follows: 
67 Madhyamakdlamkdrapanjikä, ad. v. 92 (Ichigo [1985b] p. 299,11-27): 
gal to de'i gnas skabs na mal 'byor pa gang zhig yod/ gang zliig ni Ita zhe na/ don dam par ni 
'ga' yang lta ba med la mal 'byor pa yang med mod kyi/ kun rdzob tu dper na lhas byin Ita'o 
nyan to zlhcs bya ba la sogs pa ston pa Itar rnal 'byor pa yang dc dang 'dra bas nyes pa med 
do// 
ji ste mal 'byor pa'i sties pa gnyis med pa'i sties pa snang ba med par bycd pa gang yin pa 
de yang gang zhig gis snang ba med pa nyid du khong du cliud/ re zhig de nyid kyis ni ma yin 
te/ bdag nyid la byed pa 'gal ba'i phyir ro/ gzhan dag gyis kyang ma yin to thug pa med par 
that bar gyur ba'i phyir ro zhe na// 
de ni nyes par mi gyur to ji ]tar gnyis mcd pa nyid dang snang ba med pa nyid du rang rig 
pas nyams su myong nas phyis rjes su thob pa'i sties pas ream par 'jog par byed la rang la 
bdag nyid byed par 'gal ba yang ma yin pa ltar/ rang bzhin med pa yang dc dang 'dra'o// rang 
rig pa yang gnag rdzi yan chad la grub pa'i phyir khan kar yang mi rung ngo// thug pa med pa 
yang ma yin te/ sties pa gnyis kyis thanes cad yul kho nar byed pa'i phyir dper na bye brag tu 
smra ba rnams kyi dang 'dra bas tbams cad mtshungs so// 
This part of thePanjikü is quoted and discussed in Ichigö [1985a] p. 65. 
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[4-281 
In this way, having gone beyond cittmnatra, [a Yogin] should also go 
beyond the cognition in which there is no appearance of duality 
(dvayanirübhdsa), because it is impossible for entities to arise from 
themselves [or] from others. And he should examine that because the 
perceived object and the perceiving subject are false, for they are not 
different from those [entities], it (advayajndna) also cannot be true. The 
meaning is that he should eliminate attachment to reality with regard to 
even this cognition of non-duality and should abide only in cognition 
without the appearance of cognition of non-duality. This being the case, 
he comes to abide in understanding that all phenomena lack intrinsic 
nature. Because he who is abiding there enters the ultimate reality, [this 
is] entering into meditation without conceptualisation. Likewise, when a 
Yogin abides in cognition without the appearance of cognition of non- 
duality, then he sees the Great Way because he abides in the ultimate 
reality. " 
This cognition without the appearance of cognition of non-duality 
(advayajiiiananirübhäsa jflana) is considered the ultimate cognition which a Yogin acquires 
at the culmination of meditation. It is placed at the end of practice through denial of 
external objects, denial of cognition of duality of the perceiving subject and the perceived 
object and denial of the cognition of non-duality. Here, the highest state held by the 
Yogäcära, i. e. the cognition of non-duality, is not the highest according to Kamalasila, a 
Mädhyamika. He clearly states "when a Yogin abides in cognition without the appearance 
of cognition of non-duality, then he sees the Great Way because he abides in the ultimate 
68 Bhävannkrama (fucci [1958] p. 211,10-20): 
evam cittamätram atikramya tad api dvayaniräbhäsam yaj jndnam tad atikramet I svatah parato 
bhävdnäm janmänupapatteh I grähyagrahal ayos c i1il atve tadavyatirekdt tasyäpi satyatvam 
ayuktam iti viciirayet I tatripy advayajiiäne vastutväbliinivesam tyajet, advayajnänanirsbhäsa 
eva jnäne tisthed ity artliali I evam sati sarvadharmanihsvabhävatepratipattau sthito bhavati I 
tatra sthitasya paramatattvapravesät, nirvikalpasamädhipravesah I tathä cidvayajnänaniräbhäse 
jnäne yadn sthito yogi tadä paramatattve stliitatvät, mahäyänam sa pasyati I 
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reality. " Thus he indeed maintains some sort of cognition at the ultimate level. 
Kamalasila thus holds cognition without the appearance of cognition of non-duality, 
although it is, of course, empty and without intrinsic nature. However, it is not clear what 
kind of cognition this is. Moreover, he explains, in the Madhyamakalanzkdrapanjikd, "If 
[one asks whether] at that state [of the ultimate truth] any Yogin exists and anything is 
seen, [I answer that] ultimately nothing is seen and no Yogin exists at all, either. " On the 
other hand, he says "But conventionally in the way it is explained that "Devadatta sees 
and hears", for example, there is no fault [in saying a Yogin sees and so forth] as a 
Yogin also is the same as that [Devadatta]. " It seems that KamalaTla holds no cognition 
as existent at the ultimate level and considers that a Yogin is said to see something only 
in conventional terms. This may explain the contradiction between Advayavajra and 
Ratn, karasänti (B). Advayavajra holds that the Mäyopamidvayavädin employs the four 
alternatives based on existence and non-existence and maintains awareness presumably 
at the ultimate level. On the other hand, Ratnäkarasänti (B) maintains that the Mädhyamikas 
who maintain that the convention is images of cognition employs the four alternatives 
based on existence and non-existence, but do not accept existence of mind and cognition 
ultimately. 
As we have discussed above, concerning epistemology, Haribhadra is very likely 
to have followed the view of Szntaraksita and Kamalasila, which can be regarded as the 
Säk, ýra-Yogiclra-Madhyamaka althö igh some Tibetan doxographers classify him as a 
Niräkära-Yogacara-Midhyamika 69 Therefore it is worth mentioning his view on cognition. 
As Shirasaki reports, 7° in the Abhisamayalamkaralokd, we find the term müyopmnddvaya 
which is probably the origin of the term Mäyopamädvayavidin used by Advayavajra. 
According to Haribhadra, this term, rnayopamüdvaya, describes cognition as the nature 
of the dhannaküya: 
[4-291 
Venerable Buddhas characterised by the perfection of wisdom (prajnd- 
'See chapter 1.1 (p. 11 ff. ). 
70 Shirasaki [1993]. 
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pnrarnita) whose nature is non-dual cognition like an illusion 
(müyopainüdvayajiiina) are the dhannakäyas. 71 
Thus the term mayopamUdvaya is used by Haribhadra to denote the characteristic 
of cognition of the dharinakäya, but it is not clear what it is from this brief passage. 
In the passage of the Abhisamayalamkäräloki! which we examined in the first 
chapter, however, Haribhadra mentions this cognition when he explains a Yogin's 
procedure of cultivation in a very similar way to Kamalasila: 
[4-30] 
[Then a Yogin should] ascertain that nothing but the non-dual (advaya) 
cognition is existent in reality. 72 
[4-311 
[Then he should] meditate that in reality that [non-dual cognition 
(advayajnana)] also lacks its intrinsic nature like an illusion because it 
arises in dependence, and free from the nature of one sided reflection of 
existence, non-existence and so on. When the power of the meditation is 
completed, and like some people's knowledge of jewel, silver, and so on, 
there arises apprehension illuminating by itself like an illusion 
(müyopamütmapratibhüsadhi), with all causes of faults eliminated, free 
from conceptualisation and which is somehow individually known, the 
Yogin should completely abandon the obscuration of what can be known 
(jiteydvarana). 73 
71 Abhisama alaml aralokä (Wogihara [1932] p. 268,12-13): 
dharmakäyä mäyopamädvayajnänasvabliäv i praji ipdramititmakä buddliä bhagavanta iti 1 
72 Abhisamaydlamkaraloka (Wogihara [ 1932] p. 884,24-25): 
advayajn: mam eva kevalam bhävato bhävanipam ity ni§citya... 
72Abhisama)rilamkäralokii (Wogihara [1932] p. 884,25-p. 885,1): 
tad api prattyasamutpannatvän mäyävan nilmsvabhavam tattvato 'pagataikäntabhävabhävädi- 
parämarsarüpam iti bhävayan I bhävanäbalanispattau kcsämcin manirüpylidijnänavad utsärita- 
sakalabhräntinimittäyä mäyopamiitmapratibliäsadhiyo nirvikalpäyah kathamcit pratyätma- 
vedyäyäh samutpäde jiieyävaranam samyag yogi prajahylt II 
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Thus the term mäyopamädvaya is found in Haribhadra's work and it is very likely 
that the name Miyopamidvayav, din is derived from this state of meditation held by 
Haribhadra. He postulates self-awareness which is like an illusion after rejecting existence 
of non-dual cognition. This is in line with Advayavajra's exposition in the 
Pancatathägatamudravivarana "if there is realisation of awareness in this state, there is 
an opportunity that it is the Mäyopamädvayaväda, it is not `non-abiding in any position' 
(sarvaträpratisthana ). " 
The term mayoparnadvayajnäna seems to be derived from cognition of the 
dharmakaya that is the cognition of non-duality (advaya) without dichotomy of the 
perceiving subject and the perceived object that is fictitious like an illusion. This passage7' 
is strikingly similar to the passage in the Bhävanakrama of Kamalasila that was presented 
above. Kamalasila shows the stages of cultivation from denial of external objects, through 
denial of the cognition of duality of the perceiving subject and the perceived object and 
denial of the reality of the cognition of non-duality, and finally to cognition without 
cognition of non-duality. According to Haribhadra, on the other hand, it is non-dual 
cognition like an illusion (mäyopamadvayajnäna), that comes after denial of the reality 
of the non-dual cognition, and itis explained as the nature of the dharmakaya. 
Nevertheless, extra caution is necessary regarding Haribhadra's theory of 
buddhakdyas because Haribhadra postulates four buddhakayas: svdbhdvikakäya, 
dhannakaya, sambhogikakdya and nairmdnikakäya in the Abisamayälamkära Sphutartha 
as well as in the Abhisamaydlamkdralokä: 
[4-32] 
And the dharmakäyäbhisambodha is fourfold according to the distinction 
of the svabhdvikakäya and others. As it is said: 
The svübadvikakäya of the Sage is characterised by primordial 
essence (prakrii) of undefiled dharmas which have obtained all 
74 See passages [1-9] to [1-13] (pp. 21-22) 
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forms of purity. (v. 8: 1) 
The first is, the svdbhdvikaküya of the Sage, i. e. of the Buddha Bhagavat, 
which is obtained through the understanding that all phenomena and 
consciousness are like an illusion -because it is an uncreated object, that 
is to say, it is obtained, not created, through the supramundane path-. It 
is characterised by non-arising, that is the primordial essence, i. e. intrinsic 
nature, of application of awareness (sinrtyupasthdna) and other [dharmas], 
which is characterised by cognition, supramundane and undefiled because 
of the nature of the dharmadhütu, which have obtained all kinds of urit 
characterised by innate isolation, because impurities are adventitious. 
The remaining three bodies appearing at the level of the true convention, 
have the nature of reality (dharmatü) ultimately, are made visible in 
accordance with the inclination [of those who see], and are established 
according to their being accessible to Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, Srzvakas 
and others. " 
Thus Haribhadra classifies the appearance of three kayas other than the 
svdbhüvikakdya as the true convention. This is evident in his exposition of the dhannaküya 
in the Abhisamayädamkärdlokä 
[4-33] 
75 Abisamayälaipkärasphuuutha (Amano [19751p. 262,3-14, identical with AbhisamaAlamkdrdloka, 
Wogihara [1932] p. 914,10-15,21-23): 
sa ca dIiarmakäy5bhisambodha1i sväbhävikakäyädibhedena caturvidha iti I tathä coktarn I 
sarväkäräm visuddhim ye dharmäli prrptä niräsraväh I 
svdbhäviko munch käyas tesäm prakrtilaksanah 118: 111 
pratliamo yesmrtyupastlidnädayo jnänätmakä lokottarä dharmadhäturiipatväd anäsraviimalännm 
igantukatvena sarvaprakärsm visuddhim prak tiviviktalaksanam priptäs tesim yä prakrtii 
svabhävo 'nutp idarüpo 'yam muner buddhasya bhagavanto lokottarena m irgena präpyate na 
kriyata ity akrtrimäuthena mäyopamavijn, inasarvadharmapratipattyd 'dhigatah sväbhävikalº 
käyalI 
parisistakäyatrayam tathyasamvrtyä pratibhäsaminam paramärthato dhannatürüpam yathä- 
dhimoksaprabhävitam buddliabodhisattvasräval: ädigocaratvena vyavasthäpitam... 
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The dharmakaya with function, which has arisen from the equipment of 
merit (punyasambhüra) and is the domain only of Tathzgatas, should 
surely be accepted as all kinds of mind and mental concomittance which 
are non-dual and which are transformed [into the pure state] by fundamental 
transformation and have causal efficiency such as teaching of the truth by 
producing appearances as excellent objects at the level of Yogins' 
convention. 76 
Thus the dharmaküya `with function' is considered conventional because it has 
causal efficiency. As what has causal efficiency (arthakriyd) is conventional for the 
Mädhyamika, it is necessary for Haribhadra to separate the dhannakäya which has 
function from the svübhavikaküya, which is the ultimate truth, although they are considered 
identical by proponents of three käyas. 77 Moreover, the dharmakdya is considered to 
have non-dual cognition (advayajüdna) by proponents of the three-küya theory. As we 
have examined, according to Haribhadra, the meditation of a Yogin proceeds frone denial 
of external objects (mind-only) through denial of the perceiving subjects and perceived 
objects, i. e. non-dual cognition (advayajii na) to realisation that even that non-dual 
cognition is like an illusion (indyopa, n dvayajnüna). Therefore, the dhannaknya consisting 
of non-dual cognition cannot be ultimate. Thus Haribhadra is forced to place this 
dhannakaya at the conventional level. 
This is apparently caused by verse 1: 17 of theAbhisamaydlamkära, which mentions 
`the dhannakaya with its function': 
[4-34] 
[Dharmakdya section (8th chapter)] is explained in four parts: the 
svJbhüvika[kaya], the sämbhogika[kdya], and the nairmanika[kaya] as 
76Abhisamaynla, nkärdlokä (Wogihara-[1932] p. 20,28-p. 21,2): 
avasyam eväbhyupagantavyo yogisamvrtya vigis1511hapratibhäsajananadvdrenäsayapar5vltty 
parävrttd dliarmadesanädyarthakriyäl ärino 'dvayäs cittacaitiäh sarväkäräs tathägat5näm eva 
gocaro jnanasatnbliärajah savyäpäro dharmakäya ity... 
`' For details, see Williams [1989b] pp. 179-181, and Makransky [1997], especially chapter 10, pp. 
211-257. 
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well as the dhannakdya with its function. 78 
In this way, Haribhadra, when commenting on the Abhisamayülamkora, chapter 
8, takes the four käya theory. Nevertheless, in other places he seems to hold the three-kaya 
theory by regarding the dharmakaya as ultimate, as Isoda and Sakuma argue. 79 For 
example, just before passage [4-29] quoted above, he mentions the dhannakäya: 
[4-35] 
For this is the real body of Tathägatas. 
Because this is the real, i. e. ultimate (para, närthika) body, i. e. the 
dhannakäya.. 80 
After this passage, he describes that the dhannaküya has the nature of non-dual 
cognition like an illusion (mayopamadvayajflana). Therefore, I regard the dhannakaya 
described in passage [4-29] as the ultimate dhannakaya with the nature of non-dual 
cognition like an illusion (müyopamädvayajndna) but not as the conventional dhannakaya 
with its function. If Advayavajra regards Haribhadra as the Mlyopamadvayavüdin and 
understands that the ultimate dhannakaya possesses non-dual cognition like an illusion 
(mayopamadvayajnäna), we can conclude that the distinction between the 
Mäyopamddvayavädin and the Sarvadharmäpratisthänaviidin is related to the ultimate 
truth. In verse 3 of the Madhyamasatka, Advayavajra, explaining the tenet of the 
Mäyopam idvayavadin, says that the illumination (prakdsa) is free from the four alternatives 
and non-dual like an illusion (mayopamadvaya). 81 Because the ultimate truth is regarded 
as `free from the four alternatives', non-dual cognition like an illusion must be ultimate. 
78 Abhisamaya! amkara (Wogihara [ 1932] p. 21,13-14): 
svdbhävikah sasämbhogo nairm nil o 'paras tatha I 
dharmakäyah sak: ritras caturdhä samud-u-itah II 
'9Isoda [1985] (p. 371), Sakuma [1994] (p. 265). 
80 Abhisamayalamkardlokd (Wogihara [1932] p. 268,1-3): 
clad dhi tathägatänäm bhütärthikarn gat imp 
yävad clad bhtitärthikam pardmärthikam §ariram dharmakäyah ... 
81 Sec [4-8] (p. 228). 
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This is, nevertheless, not entirely certain, because a later Madhyamaka teacher, 
Abhayakaragupta, understands that Haribhadra maintained that the conventional 
dharmaküya with function possessed non-dual cognition like an illusion 
(in yopamddvayajnana): 
[4-36] 
Therefore, there never is any teaching that [the body of the Buddha which 
has] supramandane bodhyafigas and others [and] the nature of wisdom 
that is non-dual like an illusion is the dhannakäya, and is the fourth one. 
This teaching is [known] from Haribhadra and should be rejected. 2 
This is regarded as Abhayäkaragupta's objection of Haribhadra's interpretation of 
verse 1: 17 of the Abhisamayülamkdra. 83 Abhayäkaragupta holds the three-kaya theory 
and here attempts to reject Haribhadra's four-kaya theory, which separates the conventional 
dhannakdya from the svübhüvikakäya. Therefore `the fourth' dharmaküya mentioned 
here is the conventional one with function, but he considers that according to Haribhadra 
it has the nature of wisdom that is non-dual like an illusion. 
[4-37] 
This may be related to the following statement by Haribhadra: 
And then, the lords of Yogins, who, by means of reasoning and scriptural 
authority, have fully understood their mind as like an illusion and whose 
intellects are engaged in the perception of reality and non-reality, establish 
with knowledge consisting of hearing and consideration that non-dual 
mind like an illusion has the nature of the true convention (tathyasamvrti). 
[Then] according to the nature of reality (dharmata-) that is dependent 
82 Munimatdlamkara (Derge ed. No. 3903 a 217b3-4, Peking ed. No. 5299 ha 285a6-7): 
dc'i phyir'jig rten las 'das pa'i byang chub kyi phyogs la sogs pa maws sgyu ma Ita bu'i gnyis 
su med pa'i ye shes kyi ngo bo ni chos kyi sku ste bzhi pa'o zhes gang du'ang roam par bzhag 
pa med de/ rnam par gzhag pa de ni seng ge bzang po'i rang dbang las to spang bar bya'o// 
" See [4-34] (p. 255). 
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origination, they, cultivating by means of the special concentrated and 
long uninterrupted cultivation in the order of eight clear realisations 
(astabhisamaya), such as the state of knowing all forms, cause [mind] 
that has accumulated all conceptual constructs, and which is connected to 
existence, to reach continuity only of non-dual consciousness like an 
illusion. " 
I am not confident if I understand this passage correctly. However, it seems that 
Haribhadra here implies that non-dual cognition like an illusion (mayopainddvayajnäna) 
has the nature of the true convention although here the term advayam mdyopamacittam 
is used. It is likely, therefore, that it does not necessarily belong to the ultimate truth. He 
may have thought that the dhannaküya, irrespective of the state, possesses non-dual 
cognition like an illusion (mayopami7dvayajnana). Assuming that Haribhadra postulates 
the same cognition as cognition without the appearance of cognition of non-duality 
maintained by Kamalasila, we should interpret that the term `like an illusion' (mäyopamä) 
means that it appears conventionally and does not appear ultimately. In this case, it is 
understood that the conventional dhannakaya has non-dual cognition appearing like 
illusion, and the ultimate dharmakdya has cognition without the appearance of cognition 
of non-duality. It is thus very likely that this classification of the Mäyopamädvayavädin 
and the Sarvadharmäpratisthznavidin is based on what cognition the dhannakc ya has. 
To summarise, Sintaraksita, Kamalasila, Haribhadra and Jitäri can be classified as 
Säkära-Mädhyamikas based on their understanding of the relationship between images 
(dkdra) and cognition or between images (dkdra) and latent impressions (vasanä). Of 
these, according to Tsong kha pa, Sitntaraksita and KamalasTla are said by some Tibetan 
teachers to be Mzyopamävädins. Jitäri uses the four alternatives based on existence, 
$`Abhisamaynlamkdratoka (Wogihara [1932] p. 641,17-24): 
tatas ca yuktyägamäbhyäm parividitamäyopamacittäh tattviitattvävabodhäbhyudyatamatayo 
'dvayam mäyopamacittam tathyasamvrtirüpam cva srutacintämayena jnanena vyavasthäpya 
pratityasamutpädadharmatayä sarväkärajflatädyastäbhisamayal ramena sädaranirantaradirgha- 
kälaviscsabhävanayä bhävayantah samhttasakalavilalpam ä bhavam anubaddham 
mäyopamädvayavijnänamätraprabandham dsädayanti yogi§äh II 
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which is a characteristic of the MayopamävMin. Meanwhile the term, Mzyopamädvaya- 
v idin, is probably derived from mayopamüdvayajnüna mentioned in the 
Abhisamaydlamkarülokd of Haribhadra. According to Haribhadra, the dhannaküya 
possesses non-dual cognition like an illusion (mayopamddvayajnäna). In fact, 
Advayavajra's explanation in his works is so brief that it is difficult for us to ascertain if 
he means that Haribhadra is a Mzyopamzdvayavidin. However, we can speculate that 
the classification of the Mäyopamädvayavädin and the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin is 
related to the cognition of the dhannaki7ya described in the Abhisamaydlamkdrdlokd of 
Haribhadr 
. on the assumption that the Mäyopamädvayavädin is the Säkära-Mädhyamika 
and Haribhadra is indeed a Säkära-Mädhyamika. 
Nevertheless neither does this mean that there was the classification of the 
Madhyamaka into the Säkära-Madhyamaka and the Niräkära-Madhyamaka at the time of 
Sintaraksita, Kamalasfla or Haribhadra, nor that they regarded themselves as Säkära- 
Madhyamikas. While Säntaraksita and Kamalagila mention the two Midhyamikas who 
do not agree on conventional existence, they do not mention the distinction of the two 
Mädhyamikas concerning images. We have to wait for this classification more or less 
until the time of Ratnäkarasznti (A). This means only that they can be classified into the 
Säkära-Mädhyamika depending on the criteria created at a later time. 
The same is applied to the classification of the Mäyopamidvayavidin and the 
Sarvadharmlpratisthanavldin. We find this classification in the works of Advayavajra 
but can hardly go back any further. 
4.3 Examination of Sarvadharm5prat4thänavädin 
At the beginning of this chapter, we affirmed that Advayavajra classified the 
Mzdhyamikas into the Mäyopamädvayavädin and the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin. It 
is, however, not clear what their positions are from the ambiguous description in verse 
27-31 of the 7attvaratnävali. 85 We, however, hypothesised that the Mäyopamädvayavzdin 
and the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin respectively maintain the Säk ira-Madhyamaka and 
95 Passage [4-2] (p. 214). 
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the Nirikzra-Madhyamaka. 
Some Tibetan doxographers classify Haribhadra, Jitari and Kambala as Niräkara- 
Madhyamikas, and Santaraksita and Kamala ila as Sakara-Madhyamikas, as we examined 
in the first chapter of the present thesis. On the contrary, in terms of epistemology, 
Haribhadra has a close relation to Szntaraksita and Kamala§7a who are often classified 
as SAftra-Mldhyamikas. The examination in the previous section revealed, in addition, 
that he uses the term mayopamüdvayajnnna to explain cognition of the dhannaküya. 
This seems to relate to the designation of the Mäyopamädvayavädin. Jitdri also seems to 
be a Mäyopamzdvayavädin because he uses the four alternatives based on existence and 
non-existence. He again has a close relation to Sintaraksita. It is therefore doubtful that 
Haribhadra and Jitdri are regarded as Nirdkära-Mädhyamikas in India. 
It is certain, on the other hand, that Säntaraksita and Kambala were respectively 
classified as a Sak1ra-Mädhyamika and a Niräkdra-Mädhyamika in India around the 11th 
C as Sahajavajra maintains in the Yattvadasakaakd. 86 If the Sarvadharmdpratisthänavzdin 
is the Niräkära-Mädhyamika, as we hypothesised, and Kambala is considered a Niräkara- 
Mädhyamika, there should be some relation between Kambala and the 
Sarvadharmäpratisthänavidin, such as Advayavajra. In this section, therefore, we examine 
the relationship between the two in order to establish whether our hypothesis is tenable. 
First, in the Tattvadasakatikä, after naming Szntaraksita and Kambala respectively 
as the representatives of the Szkära-Mädhyamika and the Niräkära-Madhyamika, 
Sahajavajra quotes 12 verses, 11 of which are identified as verses in the Alokamalä of 
Kambala. 8' Then he explains the tenet of the Niräkära-Mädhyamika as follows: 
[4-381 
The Yogzcäras who are proponents of nirnkdra, too, postulate the same 
cognition of perfected [nature], i. e. the nature of self-awareness without 
the perceiving subject and the perceived object is not non-existent. The 
96 Sec [4-15] (p. 233). 
87 The 12 verses in the Tattvadasakatikd (berge ed. No. 2254 wi 165a7-b6, Peking ed. No 3099 mi 
180b8-181a7) corresponds to vv. 23,25,219,167,166,243,246,6,232, unidentified, 248 and 274 
of theAlokamdld. See Matsumoto [1980b] (p. 165). 
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Mzdhyamikas who are proponents of nirärkdra postulate that the perfected 
[cognition] has the nature of the convention of Yogins and does not arise 
ultimately. This is the difference. 88 
Here Sahajavajra explains that the Nir5kara-Yogic5ras consider that the non-dual 
cognition without the perceiving subject and the perceived object is the perfected nature. 
In other words, they understand that self-awareness is not non-existent at the ultimate 
level. On the other hand, the Nirikzra-M, dhyamikas consider that it is conventional and 
does not arise at the ultimate level. Thus the Nirak5ra-M5dhyamika is explained as the 
MAdhyunika who accepts cognition (self-awareness) without images (nirdkdra) 
conventionally and denies it ultimately as empty. Nevertheless, the S5kira-Yogic'ras 
also postulate the non-dual cognition without the perceiving subject and the perceived 
object. Therefore this explanation only implies that the Niräk5ra-Mzdhyamikas maintain 
the view of the Nir5kara-Yogicira conventionally, but it is not necessarily a basis for the 
distinction between the Slk iravidin and the Nir ikzravidin. However, if we examine 
verses quoted in the Tauvadasakatika from the Alokainalä, we will be certain that this is 
the Nirdkira-Madhyamaka. Of these verses quoted in the 7attvadasakatikC1, in verse 243, 
Kambala explains the perfected nature, as follows: 
[4-39] 
However, when the perfect nature is perceived, everything has the nature 
of the single essence, without parts, without beginning and end, without 
images and without attachment 89 
Tattvadasakatikü, ad v. 2 (Derge ed. No. 2254 wi 165b6-7, Peking ed. No 3099 mi 181a8-bl): 
rnam pa med par snua ba'i mal 'byor spyod pa manis kang yongs su grub pa'i sbcs pa dc 
nyid kbas len par bycd de/ gzung ba dang 'dzin pa dag gi'l stong pa'i rang rig pa'i ngo bo ni 
med pa ma yin no// rnam pa med par smra ba'i dbu ma pas ni yongs su grub pa yang mal 'byor 
gyi kun rdzob kyi ngo bo yin te/ don dani par ma skycs pa nyid 'di ni bycd brag go// 
(1) I): gi, P: gis. 
Matsumoto [1980b] mentions this passage. 
89Alokamälä, v. 243 (Lindtner [1985] p. 202,13-14): 
jnätc tu parinispannc sarvam ckaras itmakam I 
nirvibblgam anädyantam nirdk5ram nirigrabam II 
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For the Yogic5ras, the whole world is mind-only. Therefore `everything' here 
means the mind of the perfected nature, which is devoid of the perceiving subject and the 
perceived object. It is said to be `without images' (nirikdra). Whether Kambala himself 
is a Niräkirav, din is also ascertained from his own words because he holds that this 
entire world arises due to latent impressions (väsann) in verse 46 of the Alokamdld, 
which is translated as follows: 
[4-40] 
Whence is the very origin of this entire [world] and where is the very end 
of it? It is from one's own seed in the form of latent impressions (väsandbija) 
placed in the store consciousness (älayajnana). 9o 
Thus Kambala understands that this world arises from latent impressions (vasanü). 
For proponents of mind-only, the world we perceive is nothing but images in consciousness. 
Therefore this means that images arise from latent impressions (vüsana). This is in line 
with the view of the M idhyamika who postulates that the convention is latent impressions 
(vnsann) described in the Triyänavyavasthana of Ratnäkarag inti (B). 91 Therefore the 
Mädhyamika who postulates that the convention is latent impressions (väsana) is certainly 
understood as the M5dhyamika who holds 1, the view of the Niri kira-Yog icära 
conventionally. This M5dhyamika who postulates that the convention is latent impressions 
is again identified with the Sarvadharmipratisthänavädin in that they both maintain the 
four alternatives (catuskoti) in a similar way. Then the Sarvadharm ipratisthänavädin 
must be the Niräkära-Mädhyatnika. In addition, considering that Sahajavajra is the 
commentator on Advayavajra's work and known as his disciple, we can assume that he 
may classify the Mädhyamikas in the same way as Advayavajra in the Tattvaratndvali, 
9DAlokania! a, v. 46 (Lindtner [19851 p. 136,1-2): 
prabhavah pralayag caiva visvasyäsya lartah kva vii 
väsanäbijatah svasmäd älayajnänasamsthität II 
9' See 4.1.4, passages [4-121 (p. 231) and [4-15] (pp. 233-234). I here followed Matsumoto [1980b], 
who identifies the Mädhyamil: a who postulates that the convention (samvrti) is latent impressions 
(väsanrl) in the Triyänavyavasthäna and the Niräkära-Mädhyamika in the Tattvadasakatikn. 
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but uses different terms. 
It is next necessary for us to find evidence which indicates that Advayavajra 
follows Kambala. One piece of evidence is the fact that he, in the Pancatathagalamudrä- 
vivarana, quotes verses 248 and 274 of Kainbala's Alokaindlä: 
[4-411 
Let there not be abiding in consciousness. Therefore the Sage, for fear of 
this, having taught again and again according to emptiness, divides the 
teaching. (v. 17)92 
[4-42] 
All tenets of those with subtle sense faculties and sufficient intelligence, 
when analysed, [would be] the same, if there were not the teaching of 
`emptiness' alone here, which makes a distinction of a Buddhist and an 
outsider. (v. 19)93 
It seems to me that these verses are quoted in order to show that Advayavajra 
follows Kambala who was indeed a M, dhyamika. Verse 17 shows that the Buddha 
taught emptiness so that nobody should have attachment to consciousness, i. e. to the 
teaching of mind-only. Verse 19, on the other hand, shows that a distinction between 
Buddhist and non-Buddhist teachings is made depending on whether emptiness is taught. 
This means that emptiness is most important element that separates Buddhist teaching 
from non-Buddhist. They constitute the concluding part of the Pancatathdgatamudrä- 
vivarana, together with quotations from the Lariknvatärasirtra, the Hevajratantra, and 
the Sekanirdesa of Advayavajra himself. It should be pointed out that these two verses 
are also quoted in the Tattvadasakatika of Sahajavajra as the view of the Niräkära- 
92 Paiicatatfujgatamudrdvivarana, v. 17 (=Alokanold, v. 248. See appendix 2, p. 281): 
mä bhüt samvitpratisthänam ata eva munir bhayät I 
bhinatti dcsanä dharmam uktvok-tvii §ünyatätmanä 11 17 II 
93 Pancatatluagatamudrdvivarana, v. 19 (=Alokamdld, v. 274. See appendix 2, p. 282): 
sarva1i samdnali pravibhajyamänah S ill sm ksil äkstimadhiyim krtäntah I 
bauddhasya bihyasya vibhägaka id na syäd ihaika yadi sünyatoktih 1119 II 
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Madhyamaka" when he distinguishes the Säkära-Madhyamaka and the Nirdkära- 
Madhyamaka. This means that Sahajavajra understands that these two verses express the 
tenet of the Nirlkzra-Madhyamaka. In addition to this, they are quoted in the 
Sekanirdesapanjikä of Rzmapäla on verse 19 of the Sekanirdesa. 95 
In the Pancatathdgatamudravivarana, which is quoted above, Advayavajra 
maintains that it is necessary to establish mind-only first, by showing that four Tathzgatas, 
Vairocana, Ratnasambhava, Amitäbha and Amogasiddhi, who are respectively the four 
constituents (skandha), rilpa, vedand, samjnä and samskdra, are sealed with Aksobhya, 
who is mind. Then he states that Aksobhya is again sealed with Vajrasattva, to show that 
mind is in fact empty. This same view is expressed in verse 19 of the Sekanirdesa and 
Rimapäla's commentary after showing the similarity of tenets of outsiders to those of 
Buddhists: 
[4-43] 
Having mentioned similarity of outsider's scriptures, he explains 
examination of his own scripture: "Moreover" and so on, [i. e. 
Moreover, if mind without the perceived object and the perceiving 
subject (adi), which is Aksobhya, is taught [to be the reality], 
there will be a censure from our own authority because of absence 
of the rnudrü of Vajrasattva. (v. 19)] 
Because, here, the goal examined according to the Madhyamaka and so 
forth is praised because of the result that has unity with the deity in the 
Way of Mantra. Having understood that that which is sealed with it has 
the nature of it, the four perceiving subjects beginning with the eye are 
taught to have the dependent nature in order to abandon the perceptibility 
Tattvadasakat d (Derge ed. No. 2254 wi 165b5-6, Peking ed. No 3099 mi 181a7-8): 
rang rig la gnas ma gyur zhcsll dc phyir 'jigs la thub pa yis// 
chos maws mtha' dag bstan nas ni// stag pa'i bdag nyid bstan pa yin// 
thams cad mthungs pa rab tu dpyod byed nas// phra rab Ita has blo yis thar byas nas// 
sangs rgyas pa dang phyi rot mam phye ba// gcig kyang mi dmigs stong par smra ba byed/I 
95 See [4-71 (pp. 223-225), footnote 24. 
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of the perceived object whose nature is the four constituents beginning 
with rispa. If Aksobhya free from the perceiving subject and the perceived 
object is taught to be the perfected nature in order to seal them, then it 
contradicts the seal of Vajrasattva described in scriptural authority. 96 
This passage thus shows that the four Tathigatas, which are rüpa and so on are 
sealed with Aksobhya that is mind without the perceiving subject and the perceived 
object. This is the same as what Advayavajra regards as Niräkiravida in the 
Pahcatathdgatamudrüvivarana. In the Sekanirdesapanjikü, verses 248 and 274 of 
Kambala's Alokainnla are quoted after this passage? to show that this mind without the 
perceiving subject and the perceived object, which is considered the perfected nature by 
the Niräkara-Yogäcära, is not ultimate for the Midhyamika. This implies that the 
Sarvadharmapratisthänav5din's position is the Madhyamaka cultivated conventionally 
on the basis of the nirakära view. It is also worthwhile noting that the view rejected by 
Rimapäla here is quite similar to that of the Niräkiira-Yogäcfira given by Sahajavajra, 
which says, "The Yogacdras who are proponents of nirükara, too, postulate the same 
cognition of perfected [nature], i. e. the nature of self-awareness without the perceiving 
subject and the perceived object is not non-existent. '"3 
Both Sahajavajra and Rämaplla wrote commentaries on works of Advayavajra 
and are known as his disciples. Therefore verses 248 and 274 of Kambala's Alokamälel 
are considered important among Advayavajra; and his followers. Now it is clear, from 
96 Sekanirdesa, v. 19 (Miklyo [19911 p. 54,4-5. This verse is inserted by the present author. ) and 
SekanirdesapanjiA: ä (folio. 11b2-5): 
parägamasarnyam uktvä svägamavicäram äha kirr cctyddi I 
leim ca grähyädisünyam cec cittam aksobhyam ucyate I 
bädha svägamato vajrasattvamudräviyogatah 11 19 11 
iha hi madhyamakädivicärito 'rtho mantranayc phalena devatäyogena khyäpyate I tatas ca yad 
yena mudryate tat tatsvabhävam bhavatiti l rtvä grähyasya rüpädiskandhacatustayasvabhiivasya 
grähyatvahdndya vii rocan[ä]dya§ catvdro grähakäh paratantrarüpih kathyantel to im ca 
mudrärtham parinispannarüpo grähyagrähakasünyo 'ksobhya§ ced ucyate I tadel ägamolä 
vajrasattvamudrä virudhyate 1 
97 Sekanirdesapanjikä (folio 12a1-2) 
See [4-38j (pp. 260-261). 
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these two verses, that the Nir ikära-Mädhyamika mentioned in the Tattvadasakatikd of 
Sahajavajra and the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin mentioned in the Pancatathagatainudra- 
vivarana of Advayavajra and in the Sekanirdesapanjikd of Rämapäla maintain the same 
view, in terms of their accepting the position of the Niräkära-Yog icära conventionally. 
As seen in the previous section, the Mayopamädvayavädin is the S5kgra-M5dhyamika. It 
is, however, not evident what is the difference between these two proponents except for 
their understanding of conventionality and use of the different sets of the four alternatives. 
Therefore, we now proceed to examination of the view of the Sarvadharmzpratisthänavädin. 
As I mentioned above, the Sekanirdesa contains three verses (vv. 30,32 and 34) 
identical with those in the Tattvaratnävali (vv. 30,29 and 31)" which show the view of 
the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin. In addition, verse 31 of the Sekanirdesa is identical 
with verse 20 of the Pan"catathagatamudrävivarana. Therefore, we can regard them as 
the most important verses that contain the essence of the tenets of the 
Sarvadharmapratisthänavädin. As I admitted at the beginning of this chapter, their meaning 
is hardly clear. Rimapäla's commentary is helpful for us to understand these verses. Of 
these, verse 30 of the Sekanirdesa (=verse 30 of the '1'attvaratnävali) is especially 
informative with regard to the view of the SarvadharmäpratisthänavIdin. 
Advayavajra, in verse 30 of Sekanirdesa states as follows: 
[4-44] 
And the effortless cognition is said to be unthinkable. That which is 
unthinkable after being considered cannot be unthinkable. (v. 30)100 
This verse describes the cognition which the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin 
postulates. In the previous section, on the other hand, we found that the term 
mdyoparnädvaya describes cognition of the dhannaknya. This may be, therefore, the 
point on which the Miyopamädvayavidin and the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin disagree. 
99 See [4-2] (p. 214). 
10°Sekanirde. a, v. 30 (Mikkyo [1991] p. 58,1-2. Identical with v. 30 of the TatvaratnävalO: 
anäbhogam hi yaj jnänam tac cäcintyam pracal: syate I 
samcintya yad acintyam vai tad acintyam bhaven na hi II 
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Rzmapila explains this verse as follows: 
[4-45] 
Or, the cognition which is unthinkable is non-abiding, [but] the [cognition] 
produced from examination (vicara) is not. How is it then? It is effortless, 
i. e. produced spontaneously'°' 
The translation `unthinkable' may not be appropriate for acintya. In English 
`unthinkable' means something beyond one's thought. Here acintya is used to describe 
cognition which takes effect effortlessly. It is compared by Rämapäla with `examination' 
(vicara), which requires an effort. We should therefore understand that it almost means 
`without thinking. ' Rämapäla glosses it as non-abiding (apratisthana). Thus we find that 
both müyopamüdvaya and apratisthana are used in relation to cognition. 
This contrast of unthinkable and examination is quite suggestive. Haribhadra 
explains, in the Abhisamaydlamkärd1okä, 102 that "the lords of Yogins who have fully 
understood non-dual mind like an illusion according to reasoning and scriptural authority... 
... establish that non-dual mind like an illusion has the nature of the true convention. " 
Thus he considers that non-dual mind like an illusion is understood according to reasoning, 
not effortlessly. Therefore, it is plausible that this passage concerning vicara in the 
Sekanirdesapanjikd is intended to refer to the Mäyopamädvayavidin. 
The other point which may be controversial between the Mayopam5dvayavidin 
and the Sarvadharmäpratisthanavädin is their understanding of the dharmaküya. As we 
saw in the previous section, Haribhadra holds the four-käya theory which separates the 
dhannakaya from the svrbadvikakdya. This is probably another difference between the 
two because Advayavajra holds the three-käya theory. He expresses this in the 
Tattvaratnnvali by quoting three verses from the Abhisamaydla, nküra: 
Sekanirdesapan"jika, ad v. 30 (18b3-4): 
tad väpratisthänam acintyam jnänam na tad vicäragatam I 
kim tarhi, anäbhogam svarasätyägatam (I ) 
1Q2 See [4-33] (pp. 254-255). 
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[4-46] 
And for him (the Midhyamika) the establishment of the three-käya [system] 
is taught by Maitreyan, tha [in the Abhisamaynlamkdral. To explain: 
The nainnänikakäya of the Sage with which [he] equally causes 
various benefits for the world is not interrupted as long as [the 
world] exists. 
This [body] characterised by thirty two marks and eighty signs is 
considered the sambhogikakäya of the Sage. 
The svnbhavikakäya of the Sage is characterised by the primordial 
essence (prakrti) of undefiled dhannas which have obtained all 
forms of purity. 'o3 
In addition to the fact that the Mäyopamzdvayav5din and the 
Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin have different ideas with regard to images in cognition at 
the conventional level, we can thus tentatively assume that the difference between the 
two also lies in their understanding of the bodies of the Buddha because Haribhadra 
postulates the four-kdya theory but Advayavajra the three-käya theory. 
4.4 The Origin of the Classification 
So far we have discussed doctrinal aspects of the Myopamidvayavzdin and the 
Sarvadharm, pratisthänavldin. It is probably worth noting a historical aspect of the 
classification briefly. It is not clear when the dichotomy of the M5yopamidvayavzdin 
and the SarvadharmZpratisthinavädin came into existence or how their tenets are 
103 Tattvaratnavali (Ui [1952] p. 5,32-p. 6,7): 
k yatrayavyavasth i cäsya maitreyanätliair uktä I taths ca 
karoti yena citriini hitäni jagatali samara 
ä blhavit so 'nupacchinnali kayo nairmäniko munch II (Abhisamajiqlamkdra, v. 8: 33) 
dvdtrimsallaksanasitivyanjanätm muncr ayam I 
sämbhogiko matah kayo mahäyiinopabliogatah II (Abhisamawilamkdra, v. 8: 12) 
sarviikäram visuddhim ye dlianmäh präptä niräsraväh I 
svabhäviko munch käyas tcs m prakrtilaksanalh 11 (Abhisama)nlamkära, v. 8: 1) 
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transmitted. However, it is known from past studies that Haribhadra's Yogzcära- 
Madhyamaka is transmitted to Jnänapäda and his followers. Jnänapäda wrote a commentary 
on the Abhisamaydlamkdra, entitled the Prajnapizramitopadesadastrdbhisamayalamkrra- 
vivrtti Praji-Opradipavali. This work consists of many quotations from Haribhadra's 
Abhisamaydlamkdrnlokn, and Jn5inapäda clearly accepts Haribhadra's four-kaya theory 
in the text. 10' According to Yoshimizu's study, followers of Jnänapida, such as Vitaplda, 
postulated the Yogicära-Madhyamaka view. 105 When they establish that mind, which the 
Yogäcäras consider ultimate, is actually conventional, they rely on `lack of one and 
many' reasoning of Sintaraksita. 106 Yoshimizu also points out that some of the followers 
of Jii napida quotes verse 64 of the Madhyamakülamküra of Säntaraksita to show that 
mind-only is conventional107 Therefore, we can tentatively assume that what is later 
called the Säkära-Madhyamaka was transmitted in so-called Jnänapäda school of the 
Guhyasamnja tradition., It is, however, not clear if they accepted non-dual cognition like 
an illusion (mäyopamddvayajnäna) because I have not found the term in their works. 
On the other hand, Laksmi postulate the Niräkira-Madhyamaka in the 
Pancakramatika Kramärthaprakäsika. 1°8 The Pancakrarnatrka is a commentary on the 
Pancakrama, a set of authoritative works of the Arya school which is other lineage 
belonging to the Guhyasamdja tradition. It is interesting to see the fact that Bhavya in 
the Madhyamakaratnapradipa, quotes verses from the Pancakrama and the 
Sviidhisthänakramaprabheda, '°9 which is also an authoritative work belonging to the 
Arya school, to explain the view of the internalist Madhyamika. As we examined in 
2.10, while these verses quoted in the Madhyamakaratnapradipa contain an element of 
'a' Kendai [1993]. Sakuma [1994] reaches the same conclusion on the basis of the examination of the 
Samcayagnthd panjiki. 
105Yoshimizu [1985]. However, Yoshimizu says that she does not find the view of the Yogäcära- 
Mädliyamika, which holds that mind-only is conventional and lack of intrinsic nature is ultimate, in 
the works of Jhänapäda himself. 
106 Sec [3-44] (p. 160). 
1°Y' Sec [3-66] (p. 184) for v. 64 of the Madhyamakdlamkdra. Yoshimizu [1985] points out that 
Vitp ida and Thagana quote this verse. 
'08 Sec 2.2 for Laksmi s view. 
109 See [2-34] as well as [2-35] (pp. 105-106). 
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the säkdra view, the Sanskrit verses in the Paücakrmna and the 
Svadhisthünakramaprabheda which are currently extant are different from those quoted 
in the Madhyamakaratnapradipa and do not have the sdkära element. Therefore, assuming 
that the Madhyamakaratnapradipa retains the older version of these verses, we can 
speculate that the doctrine of the A rya school gradually developed towards the nirnkara 
view. It is also suggestive that Laksnn does not rely on the reasoning or the definitions of 
the convention maintained by Säntaraksita but on the `neither from itself nor from 
another' reasoning, which is expressed in verse 1: 1 of the Mülamadhyamakakarika. 
When Bhavya explains the internalist Madhyamaka, he does not quote from the 
Madhyamakälamkdra, but from the Pancakrama and the Svädhisthänakramaprabheda. 
Here we can find two different ways of explanation of the internalist Madhyamaka: one 
follows the Madhyamakälamkära of 9äntaraksita and the other follows the Pancakrama 
of Nägärjuna and other texts that belong to the Arya school. 
Even though both Laksmi and Advayavajra are regarded as Niräkära-Mädhyamikas, 
it is not clear if there is a close relationship between the Arya school and the 
Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädins. As far as I know, only Isoda reports an example which 
may indicate their relationship. "o According to him, in the Sekanirdesapanjikd, Rämapäla 
quotes from Candrakirti and Äryadeva" when he interprets the four mudrds in relation 
to the five stages (pancakrama) of the Arya school. Isoda however considers that this 
interpretation is introduced by Rämapäla. I have not found any quotation from texts of 
the Arya school in Advayavajra's works, either. After all, it is not entirely certain to 
what extent they are related. I will therefore confine myself to pointing out a possibility 
that the origin of distinction between the Mäyopamädvayavädin and the 
Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin may have had something to do with the Jnänapäda school 
and the Arya school. 
"o Isoda [1979] 
"' In theSekanirdesapanjikä (Derge ed. No. 2253 wi 158a4-bl, Peking ed. No. 3098 mi 174a4-175a1) 
Rämapäla quotes from Candra1irti's Pradipodyotana (Chakravarti [1984] p. 1,9-18) and Aryadeva's 
Car dnwldpakapradipa (Panday [2000] p. 2,4-5). 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Regarding doctrinal aspects, first, the Mäyopamidvayavädin and the Sarva- 
dharmäpratisthänavädin are respectively regarded as the Säkira-Mädhyamika and the 
Niräkära-Mädhyamika. The former considers that the convention is appearance of mind 
and that the dharmakäya possesses the non-dual cognition that is like an illusion 
(mayopamädvayajnäna). According to Sahajavajra, gäntaraksita and others are the Säkära- 
Mädhyamikas. Kamalagila, Haribhadra and Jitäri can be included in `others' depending 
on their understanding of the relationship between latent impressions (vasand) and images 
(akdra) or between cognition and images (äkdra). The term Mäyopamädvayavädin is 
probably derived from mayopamädvayajnäna mentioned in Haribhadra's 
Abhisamaydlamkdralokiz It does not necessarily mean, however, that äntaraksita, 
Kamala§Tla and Haribhadra were conscious of such a classification since we have not 
found it in their works or in any other Indian sources prior to Advayavajra and Ratnäkaras inti 
(A), who were roughly contemporary to Jitäri . In Haribhadra's work, mayopamädvayajnäna 
is explained as ultimate as well as conventional. This is connected to his four-kdya 
theory in which the dharmakaya can be ultimate as well as conventional. 
On the other hand, the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin considers that the convention 
arises from latent impressions (väsand), and the Niräkära-Mädhyamika is represented by 
Kambala. Although it is doubtful that Kambala regarded himself as a Mädhyamika, the 
Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädins regard him as a Mädhyamika by quoting verses 248 and 
274 of the Älokamald. Due to the fact that Sahajavajra classifies Kambala as a Niräkära- 
Mzdhyamika and quotes the same two verses from the Älokamdln, the Sarva- 
dharmäpratisthänavädin is regarded as the Niräkära-Mädhyamika. The 
Sarvadharmapratisthanavädin holds that the cognition of Buddhas works effortlessly 
without thinking but does not explain how it works because it is impossible for an 
unenlightened person to infer the content of Buddhas' cognition that is beyond the 
capacity of human thought. It is not an object of examination although Haribhadra 
considers that it is. It is however explained as being free from conceptual construct. It is 
therefore not fixed to any particular view such as permanence or annihilation. This 
cognition is called non-abiding in any position (sarvaträpratisthäna). 
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The examination undertaken in this thesis is far from explication of the view of 
the Sarvadharmlpratisthänav,; Idin and further study is necessary to understand it in detail. 
It is, however, sufficient to show that Tibetan accounts are not always reliable. As we 
saw in the first chapter, doxographical accounts in the dGe lugs tradition classify 
Haribhadra, Jit5ri and Kambala as Nir5kära-M5dhyamikas. Of these, it is ascertained that 
Kambala is regarded as a Niräkara-Madhyamika by Indian teachers, but Haribhadra and 
Jitzri are not likely to be. We are, as a result, obliged to doubt the existence of further 
division in India, the Samala-Nir5kara-Madhyamaka and the Nirmala-Niridcära- 
Madhyamaka. Moreover, some dGe lugs teachers understand that the 
Mäyopamzdvayavädin and the Sarvadharmäpratisth5nav5din are other designations of 
the Svätantrika and the Prdsangika. Because the Mäyopamädvayavädin establishes non- 
dual mind like an illusion according to reasoning and the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin 
refuses to do so, this can be regarded as the matter about the use of reasoning. It is, 
therefore, not so far-fetched to consider that the Mayopamädvayaviidin and the 
Sarvadharm-pr, tisthänavädin are other designations of the Svitantrika and the Präsaiigika. 
However, as long as we define that the Przsangika follows Candrakirti's view, this is not 
appropriate because the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavädin is regarded as the Nirikira- 
Mädhyamika, who postulate mind-only conventionally, while Candrakirti maintains 
external objects conventionally. 
Regarding a historical aspect, we hardly know anything about the origin of this 
classification because we have not found the designations, Myopam5advayavzdin and 
Sarvadharmapratisthanavadin, in works before Advayavajra. However, assuming that the 
Mdyopamadvayavadin and the Sarvadharmäpratisthänavadin are respectively the Sakara- 
Mädhyamika and the Niräkira-Midhyamika, the origin of the classification may possibly 
be related to the Jnänapzda school and the Arya school. Haribhadra employs the term 
indyopamadvaya in the Abhisamayälamkdrälokä, and his epistemological view as well 
as the four käya theory is transmitted to Jnznapida. Advayavajra, a Sarvadharm5- 
pratisth, nav5din, is regarded as a Nirikära-Mädhyamika. Meanwhile Laksmi, who wrote 
a commentary on the Pancakrama, is also regarded as a Nirdkära-Mädhyamika. This 
hypothesis is, however, highly speculative and further studies are necessary to clarify 
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The purpose of this thesis is to show the classification the Indian Madhyamaka on 
the basis of late Indian sources that refer to the Madhyamaka doxography and compare it 
with Tibetan accounts such as Grub mtha'. There are many points of disagreement in 
Tibetan accounts as we examined in the first chapter. According to the later dGe lugs 
doxographers, however, it is shown as follows: 
Svitantrika 





Nirakara-Madhyarnaka ............... Haribhadra, Jitari, Kambala 
Präsaiigika .......................................................... Candrakirti 
This classification is generally accepted by modern scholars, except for the 
classification of the Szk, 5ra-Madhyamaka and the Nirak ra-Madhyamaka, which is not 
studied fully and scholars do not agree on. This bifurcation is also accepted as historically 
correct. 
It is, however, now clear that development of the Madhyamaka thought, especially 
in the late period, was more complicated than dGe lugs doxographers show. First of all, 
the existence of the classification of the Svitantrika and the Präsangika among the 
externalist Miidhyamikas before the 9th C is very much in doubt. We have not found any 
opposition between them in any works of the major Madhyamaka teachers after Candrakirti 
for almost 300 years. Moreover, the continuity of Candrakirti's thought is not confirmed 
from Indian sources. One evidence is the fact that there is no commentary of Indian 
origin in a strict sense on Candrakirti's works except for his auto-commentary on the 
Madhyamaknvatära. It is also doubtful that Atisa imported Candrakirti's thought into 
Tibet because he clearly followed Bhavya concerning the view on the two truths and the 
use of inference. On the other hand, we cannot find any work of the externalist Sv5tantrika 
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that was evidently written after the 10th C. It is, therefore, very likely that the externalist 
Svätantrika and the Prisaiigika were integrated in the way of Bhavya's Pr, sangika 
maintained in the Madhyamakaratnapradipa. It is, nevertheless, necessary to notice that 
it is through Kashmir that Candrakirti's thought was imported to Tibet. Jayinanda who 
wrote the Madhyamaka vatäratikä and Nyi ma grags who translated many works of 
Candrakirti into Tibetan are both related to Kashmir. Texts dealt with in this thesis are 
limited to those related to the lineage that descends to Atisa, who is connected to 
Vikramasila. Therefore it is possible that there existed a separate tradition of Candrakirti's 
thought in Kashmir. 
Because it is doubtful that there was a classification of the Svätantrika and the 
Präsangika among the externalist Midhyamikas, the existence of the Sautrintika- 
Svatantrika-Madhyamaka, which is regarded as a branch of the Svatantrika, should also 
be questioned. It is also problematic to accept dGe lugs doxographers' explanation of the 
Sauträntika-Mädhyamika since it is considered that the Sauträntika-Midhyamika holds 
the nirakara view and denies self-awareness while the Sauträntika, being a Sikäraviidin, 
maintains existence of self-awareness. The accounts of dGe lugs doxographers on the 
Sautrintika-Madhyamaka rather resemble the view of the externalist M idhyamikas after 
the 10th C, who were most probably Prisangikas, since they hold the niräkära view. On 
the other hand, we find some Indian works that mention the externalist Mädhyamika 
who accepts self-awareness. The externalist Mädhyamikas who do and do not accept 
self-awareness do not seem to have existed side by side in opposition except for the time 
of its transition. Rather, the externalist Mädhyamikas changed their view on self-awareness 
as time passed. It is hard to believe, therefore, that the Sauträntika-Midhy mika does not 
accept self-awareness. 
In this way, our evidence shows that the externalist Madhyamika changed their 
view from si7kara to niräkära and from the Svätantrika to the Präsangika around the end 
of the 9th C or the beginning of the 10th C although it is not clear whether the changes 
with regard to epistemology and to the use of inference happened simultaneously. A 
possible reason for this change is the dominance of the intemalist Mzdhyamikas who are 
the Svätantrika and accept self-awareness. Another incident of this period that may have 
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had something to do with this change is the arising of the Arya school. In the 
Madhyamakaratnapradipa, which I regard as the turning point of the externalist 
Madhyamaka from the Svätantrika to the Prisangika, Bhavya quotes verses from the 
Dohakosa of Saraha and the Pancakrama of N ig irjuna among others. 
With regard to the classification of the Sakara-Madhyamaka and the Nirakara- 
Madhyamaka, we know an Indian account that mentions this classification. Sahajavajra 
classifies Säntaraksita into the former and Kambala into the latter, but does not mention 
Haribhadra and Jitlri. However, the Mdyopamzdvayavädin and the Sarvadharmii- 
pratisthänavädin are regarded respectively as the Säkära-Mädhyamika and the Niräkzra- 
Mädhyamika, and Haribhadra and Jitiri are classified as Mäyopamädvayavidins in most 
probability. As a result, the classification of Haribhadra and Jitiri made by dGe lugs 
doxographers is again doubtful. This is supported by the fact that their views have many 
similarities with 5äntaraksita's and Kamalastia's and there are many parallel passages or 
common quotations among their works. It is, therefore, more appropriate to classify 
Haribhadra and Jitäri as Sakära-Madhyamakas if SZntaraksita and Kamalaila are regarded 
as Sakära-Madhyamikas. 
On the other hand it is possible to classify Kambala as a Nirakara-Madhyamika 
although he was probably a Nirikzra-Yogacira. We are not certain about his date or 
development of the Nirdkara-Madhyamaka. We find clear Nirhkara-Madhyamaka views 
only in works written around 11th C or later. 
Hitherto, studies of the Madhyamaka doxography have been conducted, to a large 
extent, on the basis of Tibetan accounts. They have also been limited to the examination 
of works of a small number of Indian Madhyamaka teachers. To give an example, the 
opposition of the Sv itantrika and the Prisangika has been studied only in relation to 
Buddhapilita, Bhiviveka and Candrakirti. We hardly find any study with regard to how 
this opposition was taken over by later teachers. I consider that it is as important to trace 
lineage of a doctrinal view as to study the view of individual teachers independently. As 
far as this is concerned, I believe, problems with regard to the development of Madhyamaka 




11'a ba'i khyad part 
[1-21] dbu ma main gnyis kyi tshul ci Ita bu zhc na/ 
[1-22] sngon ni dbu ma'i mkhan po a tsa rya na ga rdzu na dang/ a rya dc bas dbu ma'i bstan 
bcos2 mdzad par zad del ream pa gnyis su phyc ba yang mycd/ 
[1-23] dc'i 'og tu a rya a sang ga dang/ ba su ban dus ream par shes pa shes pa tsam du smra ba'i 
bstan bcos mdzad de / phyi rol gyi yul myed kyi mam par shes pa nyid yul du snang bar 
bsgrubs shing// rnain par shes pa dag pa gnyis su myed pa ni don dam par yang yod par 
bshad la// phyi dbu ma'i mkhan po 'ba' phbya shes bya ba'/ a tsa rya na ga rdzu na'i lugs 
kyi man ngag yod pa/ dongs grub brnyes pa zhig bzhugs pas/ mam par shes pa tsam du smra 
ba sun phyung ste/ a tsa rya na ga rdzu nas mdzad pa'i / dbu ma'i ka ri ka'i 'grel pal shes 
rab sgron ma zhes bya ba dang/ dbu ma'i snying po zhcs bya ba mdzad pa dang/ 
[1-24] bar gyi mkhan po shan to rag shi to zhes bya bas// a tsa rya a sang gas / main par shes pa 
tsam du bstan bcos mal 'byor spyod pa mdzad pa la brten te/ kun rdzob du de'i lugs dang / 
mthun bar rnam par shes pa tsam du bsgrubs la/ don dam par nam par shes pa yang rang 
bzhin mycd par bshad pa'i dbu ma'i bstan bcos/ dbu ma'i rgycn ces bya ba zhig mdzad dc! 
dbu ma'i bstan cos lugs cung zad myi mthun ba gnyis byung bas/ a tsa rya 'ba' phyas mdzad 
pa la ni/ mdo sdc spyod pa'i dbu ma zhes btags// a tsa rya shan to rag shi tas bzad pa la ni/ 
mal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma zhes btags so// 
[1-25] a tsa rya na ga rdzu na dang/ a rya de bas mdzad pa la ni/ phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol du 
phyin pa las bstsogs pa las 'byung ba bzhin dull 
spyir dngos po roams rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba yin bas/ kun rdzob du ni sgyu ma 
dang 'dra' ba tsam du skye ba yod la/ don dam par ni bdag dang gzhan gnyi ga dang/ 
rgyu myed pa las kyang skyer myi rung ste/ rang bzhin rayed do// 
zhes bshad pas/ dbu ma gnyi ga yang de la Brien te/ 
[1-26] dc la mal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma'i lugs ni/ kun rdzob du mam par shes pa tsam du smra 
ba dang mthun te/ rnam par shcs pas yul shcs pa yang/ yul nyid mam par shcs pa'i rang 
bzhin yin bas/ 'brei pa yod pa'i phyir// rang gi rig pas shes par rung gi/ yul gzhan yin bar 
'dod na ni/ shes pa dang 'brel pa myed pas/ rig par myi rung ngo// phyi rol gyi rten cing 
'brel bar 'byung ba snang pa yang/ dper na/ rmyi lam na mthong ba'i reams yul myed kyi/ 
Sems nyid mthong ba dang 'dra ste// lang kar gshegs pa las kyang// 
phyi rol gzugs ni yod ma yin// nang gi sems ni phyi rol snang/? 
' Tibetan text of the ITa ba'i khyad par is based on Pelliot no. 814 (Cf. Lalou [1939,1950 and 1961]) as 
edited in Ueyama [1977] (p. 32,8-p. 35,5: 4b1-9b1 of Pelliot no. 814). Ucyama transcribed it preserving 
the characteristics of the manuscript. Therefore he does not attempt to emend mistakes but suggests 
emendation in notes. I emended the text according to Ucyama's suggestion in his notes. Concerning 
annotations I mainly referred to Matsumoto [1981 a]. 
Z It seems that both bstan cos and bstan bcos appear in this text. 
3laiikävatärasütra, v. 10: 489ab (Nanjö [1923] p. 326,8): 
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zhes gsungs pa Ita bu'o // 
don dam par ni sems de yang gcig dang du ma'i ngo bo nyid dang brel ba'i gtan tshigs 
kyis yod par myi 'grub stell cilia zhe na/ yul nyid ream par shes pa'i rang bzhin yin na/ 
yang na ni/ yul nams tha dad pa mang po bzhin du seins kyang du mar 'gyur ro/ yang na ni 
sems bzhin du yul yang sna tshogs su myi 'gyur roll de lta has na sems tsam la brten nas/ 
phyi rol gyi yul myed par rig par bya'o 1I dbu ma'i Ishul 'di la brten nas/ Sems de yang bdag 
mycd par rtog par bya ste/'phags pa 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ic'u las kyang// 
kye rgyal ba'i Bras/ khams gsum ni sems tsam ste// dus gsum yang sems tsam du 
rtogs shing// sems dc yang miha' dang dbus mycd par rtogs po4 
zhe 'byung ba Ita bu'o // lang kar gshegs pa las kyang// 
sems tsam las ni brten nas su// phyi rol don la myi bstag go// 
dc bzhin nyid la gnas nas su// sems tsam las kyang bzla bar bya// 
sems tsam las ni bzlas nas su// snang ba myed la bzla [5] bar bya'// 
snang myed gnas pa'i mal 'byor pas// de'is theg pa chen po mthongs 
zhes gsungs ste// de lta bas na dbu ma'i tshul 'di// mdo sde dang yang myi 'gal lo zhes 
'chad do// 
[1-271 mdo sde dbu ma'i lugs ni// a tsa rya na ga rdzu na mdzad pa'i lugs dang/ mthun bar phyi 
nang gyi dngos po thams cad rten cing 'brel par 'byung bar 'chad de// kun rdzob du ni rgyu 
rkyen las byung bas// sgyu ma tsam du yod ]a// don dam par ni bdag dang/ gzhan gnyi ga 
dang rgyu myed pa las skyer myi rung zhes gtan tshigs ream pa bzhis dngos po marns skye 
ba myed de// 6... 
... 
'phags pa sa bcu ba las// 
khams gsum pa Sems tsam 
zhes 'byung ba ni// byed pa po dang za ba po dgag pa ste7 mdo de nyid las 
de ltar brten cing 'brel par 'byung ba la/ rnam pa bcur rab du rtog cing bdag myed ra 
dang/ srog mycd ra dang/ gang zag mycd pa dang/ ngo bo nyid kyi stong pa dang/ 
rang bzhin gyis byed pa po dang/ tshor ba po myed par rab du rtogs pa'i tshe/ stong 
vahirdlhä nästi vai rüpam svacittam drsyatc bahih I 
° IAkottaraparivarta (Peking ed. No. 761 shi 179b8-180a1. Sanskrit is as quoted in the Bhavanäkrama, 
Tucci [1958] p. 217,9-11): 
punar aparam, bho jinaputra, cittamätram traidhätukam avatarati tac ca cittam 
anantamadhyatayävatarati 
5l ankavatärasütra, vv. 10: 256-257 (Nanjb [1923] p. 298,15-p. 299,1): 
cittamätram samäruhya bähyam artham na kalpyct I 
tathatälambane sthitvä cittamätram atiltramet 11 10: 256 II 
cittamätram atikramya niräbhasam atikramet I 
niräbhäsastitho yogi mahäyänam na pasyate 11 10: 257 II 
61 omit the following part (Ueyama [1977] p. 33,32-p. 34,27). 
7Cf. Madhyamakahrdayal ärikü, v. 5: 28cd (Lindtncr [20011 p. 61,8): 
sütresu cittamätroktih ksrtrbholctmiscdhatah II 5: 28cd II 
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pa nyid kyi rnam par thar pa'i sgo skyes pa yin8 
zhe gsungs pa'i phyir ro// 
'phags pa lang kar gshcgs pa las/ 
phyi rol gyi dong myed kyi// Sems dc Itar snang ngo 
zhes 'byung ba yang// dngos po don dam par yod par 'dogs pa dang/ sems tsam du bshad 
pas/ 'dul ba la phan gdags pa'i phyir/ rten cing 'brei par 'byung ba'i don/ rang bzhin gyis 
dngos por grub pa myed pa/ log pa'i rnam par rtog pas/ dngos por sgro btags pa la dngos 
nas/ dc skad gsungs pa yin no zhcs bshad do/ 
[1-28] a tsa rya ka ma shi las dbu ma'i bstan bcos/ dbu ma snang ba zlics bya ba mdzad pa las ni// 
dbu ma ream gnyis kun rdzob du cung zad myi mthun na yang/ don dam par phyi 
nang gi dngos po thams cad/ rang bzhin mycd bar 'dod du 'dra bas na 'gal myed do 




namo vajrasattväya I 
prat-ityajätäh parika1pa iinyäh sünyäh svabhävcna na vastusantah I 
nocchcdinas citracidckariipä rüpädayah pancajinä jayanti 11111 
pancaskandhäh pancatathägatds, tatra catväro vijnänamätratäpratipädanäya aksobhycna 
mudryantc I ctena bähyäkäranäm cittamätratvät grähyäbhäve grähakastinyataya 
grähyagrähakarahitam param irthasat samvinm itram vijnänam eva tisthate II 
idam eva garadamalamadhyähnagaganäyämam nitäkäravädinäm maulam jnanam sädhyam II 
tathä cokiam 
sünyam kalpitarüpcna nir bhäsam anäkrti I 
satsamvitsätamätram vai prsth ikäracayäkulam 112 II 
tad uktam I 
rtipakäyau tu pa§cimäv2 
8 Dasabhümika (Kondo [1936] p. 102,3-5. Cf. Rahdcr [1926] p. 52,2-6): 
tasyaivam dasäl äram pratityasamutpädam pratyavck amdnasya I nirätmato nihsattvato 
nirj vato nihpudgalatah svablidvasünyatali kärakavedakarahitatas ca I pratyaveksamänasya 
sünyatävimoksam äjätam bhavati I 
1 The text as well as anotations is mostly based on Mikkyo [1986] (pp. 46-56). 
2 Ratnagotravibhäga, v. 2: 61b (Johnston [1950] p. 88): 




api ca I 
nisprapanco niräbhäso dharmakäyo mahämunch I 
rupakäyau tadudbhütau prsthc mäycva tis II3 thalah 113 
iti I 
[4-41 
nanv aksobhyamudrayaiva siddhatvät kimartham tarhi aksobhyo vajrasattvcna mudryate ity 
ägamah, ydvat kalpitäkära§ünyatiipratipädanayeti cet I tan na I pnrvamudrayaiva siddhatvät I 
tasmäd yathä 'ksobhyainudrayaiva jhdnam maularn prstham anyat tathä vajrasattvamudrayd 
vijnänam api prstham maulam vajram iti sy it II 
uktam ca vajra§ckharc 
drdham sdram asausiryam acchcdyäbhcdyalaksanam I 
adähi avinä ca §ünyatä vajram ucyatc 114 II4 
iti I 
prstham rüpädi cet maulajnänäd aksobhyamudrayä I 
tad vajramudrayd sattvam prstham hanta gatam na kimll 
sattvam api prstham iti cet tarhi 
karunähhäväd I 
ucchedav idaprasangah II 
isyate ca 
vajrena sünyatä proktä sattvena jnänamätratä I 
täddtmyam anayoh siddham vajrasattvasvabhävatah 11 5 II 
snnyatäkrpayor bhcdah pradipolokayor iva I 
§ünyatäkrpayor aikyam pradipälokayor iva 11 6 II 
badvebhyah gnnyatä niinyä na ca bhiivo 'sti täm vinä I 
avinäbhävaniyamam krtakänityayor iva 11 7 II 
kathyamiine yathd tattvc ucchcdo naiva samvrtch I 
samvrtivyatirekena na tattvam upalabhyatc 118 II 
3 This verse is shown as the doctrine of the Nir ikära-Yogäcära in the Tattvaratnavalf (v. 18, Ui [1952] p. 
4,12-13, ShastriIl. [1927] p. 18,16-17). 
4 Vajrasekharamahdguhyayogatantra (Derge ed. no. 480 nya 149a7-bl, Peking ed. no. 113 nya 170a3). 
Also quoted in the Caturmudraniscaya of Nägärjunagarbha (Mikk-yo [1989] p. 114,1-2). 
I followed Ms. T (Tokyo University, Matsunami Catalogue, no. 151. Cf. Mikkyo [1986]). Ed. has: 
prsthc njpädim cet maulajii näd aksobhyamudrayii tad vajramudrayä sattvam prsthc 'ham tanna 





evam aksobhyavajrasattvayor aikyatn iti cet, tarhi vijnänarüpidyaparityäge citrädvaitavädo 
jyäyän I 
yad uktam 
sacitracitmätram a§esakalpasnnyam hi säkäramatam mataip me I 
gacchatt nasparsasamänamb anye tanmadhyamärtham pravadanti santah 119 II 
citrädvaitavädinäm tu paramärthasad iti vijninam apcsalam I grähyagrähakasünya- 
citridvaitäksobhyartipajnänasya vajrasattvainudrayä vastusattänirastatvät 
tad uktam 
rüpädikalpa§ünyam ced jnänam aksobhyamudrayä I 
tad vajrasattvamudräto vastusattd nirasyate 1110 II 
na ca vijnaptimätrasya kalpitäkärasnnyatä 1 
kriyatc vajrasattvcna pürvaqi tasyänavasthitch 111111 
tad evam paramärthasad iti salyäpagamc sarvaträpratisthänarüpänäbhogayuganaddh idvaya- 
vähisamvedanasiddhamadhyamakasiddhäntaht sreyän I ayam ca sadgurupädaprasdddd 
avagamyate I 
[4-61 
nanv atra samvedanasiddhau mäyopamädvayavädaprasangah na sarvaträpratisthänam iti cet 
tan na 
yat pratityasamutpannam notpannam tat svabhävatah I 
svabhivena yan notpannam utpannam ntuna tat katham 1112 IIg 
iti I 
samvcdanam ca pratityasamutpannam tasmät samvcdanam eväpratisthitam ajdtapadam I 
tathä ca 
sanivedanam ajätam vai vastusattäpi t idrsi 
vajrasattvasvarüpam tu jagad eva jagau muni )11 1311 
kim ca manjusris tathägatcna prstah I 
katamo 'säv acintyadhätuh I 
6 Cf. NAyakandali (Jetly and Parikh [1991] p. 329,1). 
7 Ed: -yuganaddhädvaymidi-. Read: -yuganaddhadvayavahi-. 





manjusr r äha I 
yo dhätur niscintyo na cittagarnan yo na cittaprameyo na cittacetanayä prativeditavyah I 
asäv ucyate 'cintyadhätuh I aiha ca punar bhagavan9 cittam eväcintyadhätuh I tat kasya 
hetoh I na by acitte cittam samvidyate I niscintyat i hi cittaip cittasya yathärthävabodhät 
atha ca sarväkäro bhagavato 'cintyadhätuh 
anyaträpy uktam 
avikalpitasamkalpa apratisthitamänasa I 
asmrty amanasikära nirälamba namo 'stu to 1114 1110 
candrapradipc 
yah pratyayair jäyati sa by ajäto na tasya utpäda svabhävato 'sti I 
yah pratyayädhina sa sünya uktah yah snnyatäm jänati so 'pramattah 1115 Ill' 
[4-7] 
äryalankävatäre 
bhräntim vidhnya sarvd hi nimittam jäyati yadi I 
saiva tasya bhaved bhräntir asuddham timiram yathd 1116 1112 
tathä ca 
mä bhnt samvitpratisthänam ata eva munir bhayät I 
bhinatti dcsanä dharmaun uktvoktvii sünyatätmanä 1117 1113 
uktam ca hcvajrc 
9 Ed. bhagavat 
I0 Sarvabuddhav4ayävatarajn0nalokalamkdramahnyrinasi7tra (Ms. 25b6-7. Cf. Derge ed. no. 100 ga 299b6, 
Peking cd. no. 768 khu 328a2-3): 
avikalpatasamkalpa apratisthitamänasah 
asmrtyamanasik irate nirälamba nomo stu to II 
Also quoted in the A nanasikaradhdra of Advayavajra and the Caturmudrdniscaya of Nägärjunagarbha 
(Milk-yo [1989] p. 136,13-14 and p. 102,14-15). 
" The Candrapradipa is usually an alias of the Samädhirdjasiitra. However this verse cannot be found in 
it but in the Anavataptanagaräjapariprccha. (Derge ed. no. 156 pha 230b2-3, Peking ed. no. 823, pu 
238a6). See May [1959] p. 224, note 770 and Kajiyama [1964] p. 128. Also quoted in the Prasannapadä 
(La Vallee Poussin [1903-16] pp. 239,491,500 and 5(4) as the Anavataptahrddapasamkramanasütra and 
in the Bodhicaryavatärapaiijikd (La Vallee Pouss in [ 1901-14] p. 355,10-14) as well as the 
Subhnsitasamgraha 
(Bendall [1905]p. 21,22-p. 22,1) without mentioning the source. 
12 Lankavatarasütra, v. 2: 169 (Nanjo [1923] p. 109,13-14). 
13 rd. has : 
ma bhüt samvitpratisthänam ata eva munir bhayät I 
bhinatti dcsanädharrnam uktvoktä §ünyatätmanä II 
Alokamälä, v. 248 (Lindtner [1985] p. 204,9-10): 
mä bhüt samvrtpratisthänam ata eva muner bhayam 
bhinatti desana dharmam uktoktä §ünyatätmanä 11 
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svabhäva§ caivädyanutpannam na satyam na mrscti ca 11 18 1114 
kim ca I 
sarvah samänah pravibhajyamänah süksmäksikäksämadhiyäm krtäntah 
bauddhasya bähyasya vibhägakartri na syäd 
ihaikä 
yadi sünyatoktih 1119 1115 
äha ca ucchcdasnnyatäm apanayan I 
tathataun ye tu pa§yanti madhyamärthänusäratah I 
to vai tattvavido dhanyäh pratyaksam yadi samvidäh 1120 1116 
tad uktam d kin vajrapanjare 
snnyatäkarunäbhinnam yatra cittam prabadvyate I 
sä hi buddhasya dhannasya sanghasy ipi hi de§and 1121 III 
tasmät pancäkäränäin pratityasamutpannänäm pancatathägatasvabhävatviit svabhävasya ca 
snnyatäkarunäbhinnatvät sünyatäkarnäbhinnam jagad iti sthitam II 
ctad eva sadguror upadcsato dhyänam avicchinnam 
nadisrotapravähena dipajyotiprabandhavat 
mantratattvänusäratah 1122 11 
tathä cähur nägärjunapädd iI 
kii ägäram idam na yat tribhuvanam na pränino ami janäh 
cakreso 'smin na mänuso na visayä näksdni na by i dayah 
rnpädyä na ca dharmatätmakatayä to mändalcya ime 
visvam mandalacakram äkalayatas cctah kim udbluämyasi 1123 11 
pratityasambhaviid eva gandharvapuravat sphutam I 
na svabhävasthitam visvam näkäsämbhojasamnibham 1124 II 
uktam ca hcvajre 
ami dharm is tu nirvänam mohät samsärwvpinah 1125 1118 
iti II 
II pancatathägatamudrävivaranam samäptam iti II 
"Iletiajratantra, v. I-iii-36ab (Snellgrove [1959] p. 56,32): 
svabhävam ädyanutpannam na satyam na mrsä tathä II 
15 Ed. has: 
sarvah samdnapratibhajyamdnah süksmäm vikämksäm adhip krtäntali I 
baudhasya bähyasya vibhägakartri na syäd ihaikä yadi sünyatoktih II 
Alokamdlü v. 274 (Lindtner [1985] p. 214,9-12): 
sarvali [---] pravibhajyamänah siüksmeksikäksämadhiy! krtäntah I 
bauddhasya bähyasya vibhägakartä na syäd ihaikii yadi sünyatol ih II 
16 Identical with theSekanirdeda, v. 31 (Shastri II [1927] p. 30,19-20, Mikkyö [1991] p. 58,3-4). 
''näkinivajrapanjara (Derge ed. no. 419 nga 54h7-55a1, Peking ed. no. 11 ka 289b7). 
18Iletiajratantra, v. II-iv-34ab (Snellgrove [1959] p. 66,15). 
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Tib. : Derge ed. no. 3895 ha 51a6-62a4, Peking ed. no. 5866 nyo 270b3-283a2. 
*Karatalaratna (Da cheng zhang zhen lun, `), of Bhäviveka. 
284 
Bibliography 
Chi : Taisho 30, no. 1578. 
Kramärthaprak, Vika, of Laksmi -- >Pancakramatfkä Kramdrthapraküsikä 
Calurmudropadesa, of Advayavajra 
Tib. : Derge ed. no. 2295 zhi 211b4-214b5, Peking ed. no. 3143 tsi 231a'-234a6. 
Catuhsataka, of Aryadeva 
Skt. ed.: Shastri H. [1914] (fragment). 
Tib. : Derge ed. no. 3846 tsha 1-18a7, Peking ed. no. 5246 tsha 1-20b'. 
Carydmeläpakapradipa 
Skt. and Tib. ed. : Pandey [2000]. 
Tib. : Derge ed. no. 1803 ngi 57a2-106b2, Peking ed. no. 2668 gi 64a'-121b3. 
Jnanasdrasainuccaya, of Aryadeva 
Skt. ed.: Mimaki [2000] (vv. 20-28). 
Tib. ed.: Mimaki [1976]. 
Tib. : Derge ed. no. 3851 tsha 260-2W, Peking ed. no. 5251 tsha 29a5-31a3. 
Jn nasärasamuccayanibandhana, of Bodhibhadra 
Tib. ed.: Mimaki [1976]. 
Tib. : Derge ed. no. 3852 tsha 28a3-45b4, Peking ed. no. 5252 tsha 31a3-53b3. 
Däkinivajrapanjara 
Tib.: Derge ed. no. 419 nga 30a4-65b7, Peking ed. no. 11 ka 262a6-301 b3. 
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